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THE LABOR PROBLEM AND THE
SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT
IN FRANCE



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
THE LABOR PROBLEM AND THE SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

A Study in the History of Social Politics

BY

PARKER THOMAS MOON

Instructor in History in Columbia University



New York

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PREFACE

NOR until quite recently, in the United States, has anything like general public attention been directed to one of the most powerful and interesting of contemporary movements toward the solution of the insistent problem of labor unrest. There is a real need for an impartial historical study of this movement and a critical analysis of the forces which lie behind it. Such a need the present narrative does not pretend to satisfy completely; but it is hoped that even a preliminary survey, such as this, will be of interest to those who concern themselves with the grave social and economic problems now confronting political democracy.

The movement in question,—generally known as the Social Catholic movement,—has expanded so rapidly in the last few decades that it may now be regarded as a force comparable in magnitude and in power to international Socialism, or to Syndicalism, or to the coöperative movement. On the eve of the Great War, Social Catholicism was represented by organizations in every civilized country where there was any considerable Catholic population. Its adherents were numbered by tens of millions; a host of journals, reviews, year-books, economic treatises, manuals, and millions of tracts were preaching its doctrines; it had apologists in the universities and representatives in the legislatures of many European and several American states; its propaganda was growing by leaps and bounds. It had already taken its place as second or third among the great international movements for social reform. Moreover, thanks to authoritative endorsements by papal encyclicals, and thanks to the energetic efforts of its patrons in the hierarchy, it has resumed its progress since the conclusion of peace and bids fair to command the substantial support of the great body of Catholic Christians throughout the world.

The program of reforms advocated by the leaders of this movement presents an elaborate and far-reaching scheme of economic reconstruction. One might call it a rival of the other "Proposed Roads to Freedom" described by Mr. Bertrand Russell. The program is all the more significant because several of its basic principles, which once appeared somewhat visionary, are gaining widespread popularity at the present time. For instance, the idea that a modernized guild system, with industrial democracy, was the true alternative to State Socialism, had little vogue a generation ago, except among Social Catholics, whereas today it is making remarkable headway among British labor leaders, in the form of "Guildism" or "Guild Socialism." The conservative wing of the British Guild Socialist movement, one might add, is Social Catholic. The scheme of Joint Standing Industrial Councils put forward by the Whitley Committee¹ and incorporated in the British Government's reconstruction policy provides another indication of the same trend of thought, and the Whitley plan bears an astonishing resemblance to the scheme of industrial organization formulated many years previously by French Social Catholics. Again, the Social Catholics have insisted, from the beginning, that labor must not be regarded as a commodity, the price of which could be determined by the law of supply and demand. This principle is now officially recognized by a clause in the Treaty of Versailles. International labor legislation is a third principle of which the Social Catholics were among the earliest and most determined advocates. Yet another of the reforms of which Social Catholics, particularly in France, have long been supporters, is the establishment of an industrial, or, rather, a vocational senate as a complement to the existing parliament based on purely numerical or geographical representation. Under the name of "functional representation," this idea is coming to be more and more widely debated.

A genuine practical interest attaches to the question whether the Social Catholic movement is inherently antagonistic to other schools of social reform, or disposed to coöperate with them. In general, the Social Catholics have been opposed to

State Socialism, Bolshevism, and the anarchistic wing of Syndicalism. On the other hand, in promoting trade-unionism, in legislating against child labor, in protecting women from injurious industrial exploitation, in establishing social insurance, and in similar matters, there has been much coöperation between Social Catholics and other friends of labor legislation.

In the United States, there has been less of such coöperation than in Europe, principally because the Social Catholic movement was more backward in the New World. Very striking, however, is the manifesto on social reconstruction recently issued by four American bishops, in the name of the National Catholic War Council, championing in principle a minimum wage law; social insurance against sickness, invalidity, unemployment, and old age; shop committees and labor participation in industrial management; coöperative selling and marketing; coöperation in production; regulation of public service monopolies; heavy taxation of incomes, excess profits, and inheritances. While this "Bishops' Program" contains several distinctive features, it nevertheless explicitly approves many of the practical reform measures urged by American liberals, by labor leaders, and by Socialists.

In France, Social Catholics helped to enact the law of 1884, the charter of French trade-unionism, and have rivalled the Socialists in urging factory and labor legislation, workingmen's insurance, and other reforms. In Germany, the early establishment of workingmen's compensation and of social insurance was in no small part due to the influence of the Center or Catholic Party. In Switzerland, the Social Catholic leader, Decurtins, coöperated with Radicals and moderate Socialists to secure workingmen's compensation, to fix a maximum working day, to pass factory legislation, and to establish a Secretariat of Labor; he also obtained the support of the Radicals, and ultimately the approval of the Swiss Federal Council, for his proposal that Switzerland convoke the first international conference on labor legislation. In England, Cardinal Manning became so conspicuous a champion of workingmen's demands that his portrait was borne on a banner in the great eight-hour-

day demonstration of May 4, 1890. Instances need not be multiplied. No one familiar with the recent history of France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, or Spain can be ignorant of the active participation of Social Catholics in Continental social politics.

In the light of the facts just stated, it is clear that this movement is important enough to repay a more thorough analysis than it has yet received at the hands of Anglo-American historians, economists, and students of public policy. Among European publicists and scholars, Social Catholicism has been much debated. Unfortunately, most of the voluminous literature on the subject has been controversial or apologetic, and no adequate general history of the Social Catholic movement has yet been published, in any language. Professor Nitti's history of *Catholic Socialism*, written in the Italian language, thirty years ago (1890), and subsequently translated into English, is admirable, so far as it goes, but it covers only the infancy of the movement. Turmann, de Clercq, Calippe, Goyau, Eblé, and Monicat,—to mention only a few,—have written scholarly and readable books on various special aspects of Social Catholicism; their works, however, have not been translated, nor do they provide the general and impartial account that the ordinary reader would desire. There remains, therefore, an attractive field, still open, for historical investigation.

To compress the whole history of the international Social Catholic movement within the two covers of the present monograph would be obviously impossible. It has appeared wise to focus attention principally upon the development of the movement in a single country. France is selected, because the Social Catholic program has there been elaborated in great detail and formally incorporated in the platform of a political party, the *Action Libérale Populaire*. Consequently, Social Catholicism has played a most interesting rôle in French politics.

Unfamiliar though its name may appear to the eyes of American readers, the *Action Libérale Populaire* or, as we may call it, the Popular Liberal Party, is quite as interesting, in point of political theory and social doctrine, as the Socialist and

Syndicalist movements in France. Nor is it insignificant in numerical strength. Before the war, Revolutionary Syndicalism in France could boast, at the maximum, only two or three hundred thousands of adherents, since the national Syndicalist organization, the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, embraced at most 600,000 members, many of whom were not Syndicalists at all, but merely trade-unionists or Socialists.² The Popular Liberal Party at that time had a dues-paying membership of over 250,000 and a voting strength of three-quarters of a million. The Unified Socialist Party had only one fourth as many dues-paying members, although its dues were eighty per cent smaller than those of the Popular Liberal Party.³ From the war the Popular Liberal Party has emerged unquestionably more powerful than the Unified Socialist Party, both in parliamentary representation and in membership. In the elections of November, 1919, the Unified Socialists obtained only 68 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, whilst the Liberals won a hundred.⁴

As an important political organization pledged to the social program of the French Social Catholic movement, the Popular Liberal Party will necessarily figure largely in the present narrative. The party, however, is not the movement; it is only a part, and not even the most important part, of the movement. In all probability, the Social Catholic vote, like the general Catholic vote, will remain scattered, and the influence of French Social Catholicism will be discernible not so much in the growth of a single party as in the penetration of several political parties by Social Catholic ideas. For this reason, the author has endeavored to sketch not only the activities of the Popular Liberal Party, but also the development of the Social Catholic movement prior to the formation of the party, and the work of various non-political organizations.

In this attempt to reconstruct from scattered and all too fugitive sources the story of a comparatively recent political and social movement,—to analyze the factors that gave birth to the movement and then to portray the movement as a living force in practical politics,—the difficulties were so formidable

that the author more than once lost courage and was held to the task only by a lively consciousness of the inherently interesting and significant character of the subject. Finality is not claimed for the narrative as it is given here. It will betray some of the errors of judgment that are well-nigh inevitable in any endeavor to bring a puzzling array of facts into a comprehensive synthesis for the first time; it is certainly and unavoidably incomplete. If it provides an objective and substantially accurate picture of the movement, intelligible to the general reader as well as to the specialist, the author will consider his purpose achieved.

For courteous replies to inquiries which often must have been troublesome and for assistance in collecting the materials used in the preparation of this study, the author is grateful to several officers of the Action Libérale Populaire of Paris, and particularly to M. Abel Tocquet. Thanks are also due to M. Arthur Saint-Pierre, of Montreal, for advice which facilitated the preliminary stages of research. The author is deeply indebted to Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Charles Downer Hazen of Columbia University for reading and criticizing the manuscript. From Professor Hayes, who has done so much to stimulate the scientific study of social history and social politics, the author received not only inspiration and many a helpful suggestion for the improvement of this book in style or in content, but also patient assistance in the wearisome task of revising the proofs.

PARKER THOMAS MOON.

Columbia University,
February 14, 1921.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. A DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL PROGRAM IN THE MAKING . . .	1
General Background	1
The Labor Problem in France: Facts and Theories. 1815-1848	6
French Pioneers of Social Catholicism	13
Conservative Traditions and Democratic Tendencies	28
II. MODIFICATION OF THE PROGRAM: 1848-1870	38
Political Reaction	38
An Advocate of Social Legislation	42
Social Reaction: Causes	52
Le Play and Périn	58
Royalism and Social Catholicism	68
By Way of Summary	74
III. POPULARIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM .	77
The Commune and the Reaction	77
Count Albert de Mun and the Catholic Working- men's Clubs	80
The Social Aspect of Monarchist Politics	87
De Mun's Advocacy of Social Legislation	101
A Manufacturer's Experiment	113
IV. ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ABROAD	121
V. VANGUARD AND STRAGGLERS	140
VI. EFFECT OF PAPAL INTERVENTION	157
"On the Condition of the Working Classes" . . .	157
The Political Intervention of Leo XIII: The Rallie- ment	166
Immediate Effect of the Encyclicals	172
VII. "THE NEW SPIRIT": 1893-1899	194
VIII. REPUBLICAN DEFENSE AND PIOUS DILEMMA	216

CHAPTER	PAGE
IX. THE POPULAR LIBERAL PARTY	223
The Product of a Century of Evolution	223
Organization of the Party	227
Development of a Program	237
Social Catholic Influence on the Program	246
Summary of the Party's Program of Social Recon- struction	256
Constitutional Reforms and Political Theories	261
"Liberalism" and Religion	279
Social Legislation and the Religious Question	285
Patriotism	295
Some Criticisms of the Party	299
X. SURVEY OF THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN FRANCE	315
General Survey	315
The Action Populaire and Its Publications	321
The Doctrines of the Action Populaire	330
The Semaines Sociales	339
The Young Men's Catholic Association	347
XI. DISSIDENT GROUPS	353
The "Social Reform" School	354
A Monarchist Group: L'Action Française	361
The "Christian Democrats"	365
The Sillon and the Young Republic	375
XII. CONCLUSION	383
Summary	383
Opinions of the Social Catholic Movement	386
Guildism, Guild Socialism, and the Social Catholic Program	390
APPENDIX: EXPLANATORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES	400
INDEX	469

THE LABOR PROBLEM AND THE SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

CHAPTER I

A DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL PROGRAM IN THE MAKING

GENERAL BACKGROUND

SOCIAL CATHOLICISM, like most important social movements of the present time, is nothing more or less than an attempt to find a solution of the problems created by the two greatest historical events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely, the Industrial Revolution and the Political Revolution.

The essential feature of the Industrial Revolution was the modernization of industry by the invention and introduction of power-driven machinery owned by capitalists, in place of hand tools owned by workingmen. Its effect was to multiply enormously the power of man to produce all the things which go to make up material wealth — from hosiery to houses, from pocket-knives to pianolas — and at the same time to place the working classes temporarily at the mercy of the factory and mine owners. Consequently while industrial capitalists were accumulating great fortunes, the condition of the working classes seemed to be going from bad to worse. Starvation wages were paid; employment was uncertain; women and children were toiling twelve and fourteen hours a day in the new factories, under unhealthful and often immoral conditions; family life among the workers of mill and mine seemed to be doomed to destruction; drunkenness and disease were undermining the stamina of the race. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that the working classes should be discontented,

even rebellious, and should show their unrest by participating in riots, strikes, labor agitations, socialistic propaganda. In short, the Industrial Revolution gave birth to the labor problem of the present age.

The Political Revolution,—by which is meant the series of revolutions and reforms which, since the eighteenth century, have almost universally replaced divine-right monarchies and feudal aristocracies by democratic governments,—gave the labor problem political significance. A democratic government cannot be indifferent to the economic welfare of the working-man.

For a time, the wealthier and better educated classes, controlling the governments of Europe, denied the necessity or even the wisdom of state-intervention in labor matters; according to the principles of the “ Liberal ” or “ *laissez-faire* ” system of political economy, prevalent in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century, economic liberty or free business competition was not to be tampered with by meddlesome statesmen. This principle of non-intervention, however, soon broke down in practice. For its failure, four reasons may be found.

First, the evils arising from the Industrial Revolution were so intolerable that philanthropic and humanitarian considerations demanded corrective legislation to abolish child labor in factories and mines, to regulate the conditions of employment of women, to ensure sanitary working conditions, to relieve extreme poverty.

In the second place, the workingmen, when they obtained the right to vote, were inclined to regard the ballot as a weapon to be used in defense of their own economic interests, and consequently bourgeois politicians found it necessary, in bidding for workingmen’s suffrages, to promise satisfaction of workingmen’s grievances. This factor operated with fluctuating force, according as questions of national defense, foreign policy, relations between church and state, and other political issues diverted attention from labor problems, but it was generally of considerable significance.

A third, and a most important reason for the growing dis-

regard of the principle of non-intervention, was the rise of trade-unionism. Even before they were able to exert any appreciable direct influence in politics, the workingmen in various trades discovered that they could materially improve their lot by the practise of collective bargaining, through the instrumentality of trade unions. Notwithstanding early failures, due to the inexperience and incapability of their leaders, and despite repressive laws, the trade unions gained in numbers and strength so rapidly that towards the end of the nineteenth century they constituted, in industry and in politics, a force of the first importance. The influence of the trade-union movement in demonstrating the capacity of the working classes for democratic self-organization, in promoting a spirit of labor solidarity, and in breaking down the theory of "economic liberty," has often been ignored, but is coming to be appreciated. Trade-unionism provided the solid foundation of existing reality on which schemes of social reform could be based. This is true not only of far-reaching plans of social reconstruction, such as Syndicalism, Social Catholicism, or the British Labor Party program, but also of specific measures of labor legislation, such as legal limitation of the hours of labor, regulation of factory conditions, standardization of wages. When, by persuasion, by strike, or by threat of strike, trade unions had secured an increase of wages, a reduction of the hours of labor, or an improvement of labor conditions, in a number of the better organized industries, the enactment of a law ratifying such an achievement presented no such difficulty as the enactment of a law embodying some novel and untried principle. *A fait accompli*, in social politics no less than in diplomacy, is a most convincing argument. Moreover, where employers in some trades had been forced by the labor unions to grant certain concessions, these employers sometimes became advocates of legislation extending such concessions to other branches of industry.⁵ In short the trade-union movement made government intervention in labor matters almost inevitable, and profoundly modified the attitude of legislators, economists, and reformers toward social legislation.

In the third place, during the second half of the century, Socialism became a powerful political movement and revolutionary Syndicalism appeared as a menace to capitalism. The aim of Socialism was to use the voting strength of the poorer classes to gain control of democratic governments and then to substitute for capitalism collective ownership of the means of production and distribution. The Syndicalists proposed a different method of action, *viz.*, the overthrow of the capitalistic organization of industry by means of "direct action" on the part of the workingmen, that is by means of general strikes. Both Socialism and Syndicalism were revolutionary in purpose; the success of either would mean the destruction of private capitalism.

As the Socialist and Syndicalist movements gained headway, the defenders of the capitalistic organization of industry were compelled to make concession after concession to the demands of labor, in the hope of convincing the workman that his situation could be improved immediately and progressively without waiting for or incurring the risks of a social revolution. As they were now bidding against Socialists and Syndicalists, as well as against each other, the bourgeois parties became more and more generous in their offers; the more radical among them were willing to grant old age pensions, national insurance, government employment agencies, housing reforms, recognition of trade unions, even the minimum wage and the establishment of a maximum limit for the number of hours in the working day. Conservatives, liberals, and radicals, all felt the compelling influence of the new situation. The foregoing statement is not meant to imply that vote-getting was the only motive behind the social reforms of liberal, radical, and conservative politicians, but merely that the sincere humanitarian motives of such politicians were strongly reinforced by the political necessity, ever present in democratic countries, of offering the masses at least a part of what the masses demanded.

The four reasons which have just been stated explain the breakdown of the theory that the state should not intervene

in labor questions. Converting this statement from the negative to the positive, the above reasons show why the political democracies established by the Political Revolution were bound to concern themselves with the labor unrest arising from the Industrial Revolution. This application of political democracy to the task of creating a more harmonious and perhaps a more democratic organization of labor, industry, and society has been happily designated "social politics";⁶ it is the most vital political problem of the present age.

In relation to this general background, the significance of the Social Catholic movement may be more easily perceived. Like Socialism and Syndicalism, Social Catholicism offers a program for the solution of the labor problem created by the Industrial Revolution. Like the more conservative programs of social reform, Social Catholicism offers an alternative to social revolution, and makes a counter-bid for popular support against Socialism. Social Catholicism, however, cannot be regarded as merely a counter-bid, or as a program of concessions. It is a separate social philosophy, based on the application of long-recognized ethical principles to modern problems; moreover, it proposes to solve the labor problem by a bold organic reorganization of the existing industrial system and of existing democratic institutions, rather than by cautious compromises and palliatives.

The foregoing generalizations afford a standpoint from which to view the development of the French Social Catholic movement in its proper perspective. In the earliest stage of that development, the important features are, first, the growth of a conviction that social reform was necessary to remedy the evils arising from the Industrial Revolution, and, second, the acceptance of democracy as the political instrument and condition of such social reform. In the present chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze these two features; then, in subsequent chapters, we may study the elaboration of the social program, and its influence on democratic politics.

THE LABOR PROBLEM IN FRANCE: FACTS AND THEORIES
1815-1848

Social Catholicism as an organized movement did not appear in France until after 1870, but to discover the impulses and ideas which produced the movement, we must turn back to the first half of the nineteenth century, the formative period of the Social Catholic program. The peculiarities of the movement, the obstacles and the tendencies against which it had to struggle, and the nature of the motive forces sustaining it, can be explained only by reference to the circumstances under which its basic ideas had their inception.

During the period from 1815 to 1870 the Industrial Revolution, already started, made rapid progress in France.⁷ The number of steam-engines affords as good an index as any of the progress of the new industry. In 1820 there were approximately 200 steam-engines in France; in 1830, approximately 600; in 1840, approximately 2,900; in 1850, approximately 6,800; in 1860, approximately 18,700.⁸ It was pre-eminently in the textile, mineral, and sugar industries, and in transportation, that the revolution made itself felt; according to an incomplete estimate made in the years 1840-1845, there were 243 steam-engines in cotton spinning mills, 143 in silk spinning and weaving mills, 135 in wool spinning mills, 218 in coal mines, 209 in sugar factories.⁹ The first French railway was opened to traffic in 1828 (with horse-traction); the first French steam locomotive was set in motion in 1832, but by 1850 there were 3,002 kilometers of railway under exploitation, and by 1870 there were 17,405.¹⁰ The enormous expansion of the textile industry may be gauged by the increase in the number of spindles for flax and hemp spinning from 57,000 in 1840 to 752,000 in 1865; for cotton, from 2,610,000 in 1834 to 6,800,000 in 1867.¹¹ The production of coal increased from 8,816,000 metric quintals in 1815 to 44,335,670 in 1850, and 83,036,818 in 1860.¹² Only 1,125,000 metric quintals of cast iron were produced in 1819, as compared with 8,983,533 in 1860.¹³

The rise of the new industry was paralleled by the development of the labor problem in a new form. The working-people employed in factories and mines represented, numerically, only a minority of the industrial population, but it was a minority that rapidly grew in numbers, in discontent, in class-conscious unrest. According to the census of 1872 there were 153,932 men and 10,887 women working in mines and quarries, and 593,964 men and 418,042 women in factories, shops and mills. If we add families of these workers, we arrive at 2,412,079 as the total industrial proletariat dependent upon mine and factory, as compared with 3,062,903 dependent upon the smaller industries.

Conditions among the workers of mine and factory were appalling. In the textile mills of Alsace in 1828, the normal working day was fourteen or fifteen hours, according to the statement made by one of the mill owners.¹⁴ At Mulhouse, work began generally at five o'clock in the morning and lasted until eight or nine in the evening, often even later. In some factories the working day lasted seventeen hours, with a half hour for lunch and an hour for dinner.¹⁵ At Lille, the working-day in the cotton mills was sometimes sixteen or seventeen hours; four-year-old children were found working in the shops; and the average wage was forty cents (two francs) a day for an adult male worker, twenty cents (one franc) for a woman, nine cents (forty-five centimes) for a child between eight and twelve years, fifteen cents (seventy-five centimes) for a young person between thirteen and sixteen years of age.¹⁶ Villermé, who made a careful survey of factory conditions towards 1840 for the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, reported that in general the working day for all factory-workers in the cotton and wool industries was from fifteen to fifteen and a half hours, *i. e.* at least thirteen hours of effective work, but in some places conditions were still worse.¹⁷ Another investigator, in 1847, asserts that workingmen occasionally were employed twenty-four hours at a stretch in some of the factories in northern France.¹⁸

Some suggestion has already been given regarding wages.

A few additional statements may make the situation clearer. In 1832 the Baron de Morogues estimated that an industrial workingman might be able to earn, at thirty cents (1 fr. 50 c.) a day, about ninety dollars (450 fr.) a year. The cost of supporting his family (counting three children to the normal family) would be, at a conservative estimate, over 170 dollars (860 francs), making no provision for sickness or accident, or for saving. In other words, his wages would pay little more than half the cost of the bare necessities of a hand-to-mouth life. He could live only if his wife and his children also worked in the factory; counting their earnings, the family income would probably fall only a little short of the cost of living.¹⁹ The Vicomte Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont, writing in 1834, said that according to his own investigations, the estimate of 860 francs for the cost of living was too low.²⁰ Certain it is that a man's wages were often less than thirty cents a day. An industrial crisis — and crises were frequent — or an accident, or a spell of sickness, would suffice to plunge the family into destitution, which meant starvation, or pauperism, or crime, or, sometimes, all three.²¹

The employment of women and children in the factories was one of the worst abuses. Children were needed in the textile factories, because they were cheap, and because "the task which is confided to them requires a delicacy of the fingers in mending threads, and a suppleness of the body in gliding under the looms, which are not found in adults."²² The children entered the factories at six to nine years of age, sometimes earlier; they were compelled to work, like adults, thirteen hours or more a day not including meal hours.²³

This might be harmful for the children, but, said the manufacturers, it was necessary.

It is proved by the facts that it is not to the spinning factories that the evil must be attributed. If you indicate [as a maximum] eight hours, ten hours, eleven hours of labor, according to the age of the children, you will condemn several industries to witness the slowing-up, even the cessation, of their operations, because they could not stand competition if they were deprived of child-labor.²⁴

What argument could be more conclusive?

The effect upon the children was terrible. In soul and body they were starved, dwarfed, deformed. Contemporary observers seem to have been horrified at the viciousness and the physical degeneracy of these child-workers. It is an unpleasant picture to dwell upon. The children, says Villermé,

remain on their feet sixteen to seventeen hours a day, thirteen hours of which are spent in a closed room, with hardly a change of station or attitude. That is not work, a task, it is torture; and it is inflicted upon children of from six to eight years, underfed, poorly clad, obliged to walk, at five in the morning, the long distance to the factories and then to walk back at night, exhausted.²⁵

In most of the factories, Villermé tells us, the employer did not permit the children to be beaten. Many foremen and adult workers, however, avowed that they often found it necessary to beat the children. It is even asserted that, in certain factories in Normandy, "in rush-seasons, when the workingmen spend the night at labor, the children also have to stay awake and work, and when these poor creatures, succumbing to sleep, cease to move, they are awakened by all possible means, including the use of the lash."²⁶

That the working classes were so inhumanly exploited under the new industrial régime was due to a remarkable historical coincidence. The invention of machinery, which diminished the importance of skilled labor and increased the importance of capital in industry, occurred just at the time when the new science of "political economy" was arising to exalt still higher the importance of capital, and to destroy any hope of government intervention on behalf of labor.

The science of political economy was originated by a group of French writers, the so-called *Economistes* or *Physiocrates*,²⁷ in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. Dr. Quesnay,²⁸ physician to Louis XV and Mme. de Pompadour, was their acknowledged chief; prominent among his disciples were Du Pont de Nemours,²⁹ president of the Constituent Assembly in 1790 and president of the Council of Elders under the Directory, Marquis de Mirabeau³⁰ (father of the famous Revo-

lutionary orator and statesman), Mercier de la Rivière,³¹ Le Trosne,³² Father Baudeau³³ and Turgot,³⁴ the great minister of Louis XVI. Quesnay and his followers spoke with the authority of natural scientists. Their doctrine, said Du Pont de Nemours, was "the science of the natural Order."³⁵ And by the "natural order" was understood the free play of private interests, untrammelled by legislative restrictions or regulations. "We have seen that it is of the essence of order that the private interest of an individual can never be separated from the common interest of all. . . . [Under a regime of liberty] private interest perpetually and urgently presses every individual to perfect and multiply the things he sells, to increase thus the sum of the enjoyments he can procure for other men, in order to increase, by this means, the sum of enjoyments other men can procure for him in exchange. Society then runs itself; the desire of wealth and the liberty of possession incessantly promote the multiplication of production and the expansion of industry, and impart to society entire a movement which becomes a perpetual tendency toward the best possible condition."³⁶ The functions of government, therefore, should consist principally in not obstructing the automatic and beneficent operation of economic laws, and in "punishing the small number of people who attack the property of others."³⁷ "*Laissez faire et laissez passer*":³⁸ let industry and commerce alone. Again we read,

The sovereign authority is not instituted to *make laws*; for the *laws are all made* by the hand of Him who created *rights* and *duties*.

The *social laws*, established by the Supreme Being, prescribe solely the conservation of the *right of property* and of the *liberty* which is inseparable from it.

The ordinances of sovereigns, which are called *positive laws*, should be merely acts declaratory of these essential laws of the social order.³⁹

The natural inference from such principles is that the capitalist should be left free to drive as hard a bargain as he will

with the workingman, while the government protects the capitalist's property and restrains the workingman from forming labor coalitions which might prevent free bargaining between the employer and the individual employee.

The Physiocratic school of economy flourished before the Industrial Revolution had profoundly affected France; indeed, the Physiocrats were chiefly preoccupied with agriculture rather than with industry, and their doctrines were radically amended by later British economists, such as Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill, and Nassau Senior. However, their "scientific" justification of economic liberty and of the free play of private interest remained a fundamental principle of economic theory and a maxim of statecraft throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century.

In France, especially, even after many of the doctrines of the Physiocrats had been refuted, and after the effects of the Industrial Revolution had become manifest, economic science continued to insist as had the Physiocrats upon the unwisdom of legislative interference with economic laws, upon the necessity of economic liberty, and hence upon the inexpediency of governmental intervention in labor questions. These three correlated principles formed the core of what we may describe as Economic Liberalism.

A Protestant economist, J. B. Say,⁴⁰ who was himself an industrial capitalist⁴¹ and may be considered Adam Smith's foremost disciple (but not merely a disciple) among French economists,⁴² held that the laws of political economy are not at all the work of man. "They result from the nature of things, quite as surely as do the laws of the physical universe; they are not invented, they are discovered; they govern the rulers who govern others, and are never violated with impunity."⁴³ Wages depend upon the law of supply and demand, and naturally tend to the barest minimum of subsistence; profits depend upon supply and demand and upon the capacity of the individual.⁴⁴ Who, then, will be so bold as to interfere? "We conclude, as a general thesis, that the most favorable

legislation for industry is that which procures for everybody in the highest degree liberty and security of person and property." ⁴⁵

As the Industrial Revolution in France progressed, during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the leading French economists became even more emphatic, if possible, in their defense of economic liberty and in their condemnation of intervention. The great economist of the period, Frédéric Bastiat, ⁴⁶ has been styled, with much justice, "the incarnation of bourgeois political economy." ⁴⁷ The rate of wages depended upon supply and demand, not upon the generosity or avarice of the employer, said Bastiat. ⁴⁸ Liberty, pure and undefiled, was his solution for social problems. "Oh! So many things have been tried! When will the time come, then, when we shall try the simplest of all: Liberty?" ⁴⁹ He believed in liberty because he was convinced that economic laws were in themselves beneficent and harmonious, and tended to the improvement of society, if allowed to operate freely. ⁵⁰ "When you are thoroughly convinced that each of the molecules which compose a liquid has in itself the force whence results the general level, you conclude that there is no surer or simpler method of obtaining this level than not meddling with it. All those, therefore, who adopt this point of departure, that *interests are harmonious*, will agree on the practical solution of the social problem: to refrain from opposing and displacing interests." ⁵¹ Interests are harmonious, therefore the entire solution is in one word: "LIBERTY." ⁵² Placing his faith in economic laws, rather than in artificial legislation, he quite naturally opposed any such measures of social reform as workingmen's insurance, workingmen's pensions, profit-sharing, free public education. ⁵³ Believing that he had discovered the veritable solution of the economic problem, Bastiat died with the words "The Truth" on his lips. ⁵⁴

Similarly Charles Dunoyer, in his treatise "On the Liberty of Labor, or simple exposition of the conditions under which human forces exert themselves with the greatest power" (1845), ⁵⁵ explained how the true means of remedying the evils

under which the working classes suffered were to be found in an extension of the régime of competition.⁵⁶ He therefore condemned not only government intervention in behalf of labor, but even the formation of labor organizations, as disadvantageous to the free operation of economic laws.⁵⁷ Thanks to his optimistic economic creed, Dunoyer was able to regard the existence of poverty in a comfortably philosophical mood. "It is well," he wrote, "that there exist in society certain lower regions into which families which do not conduct themselves well are in danger of falling and from which they cannot escape except by virtue of good conduct. Poverty is this terrible hell. . . . It is made to cause salutary fright; it exhorts them [workingmen] to practise the difficult virtues which they need to achieve a better situation."⁵⁸

In short, Bastiat and Dunoyer preached the social benefits of an unrestrained economic struggle for life. A generation later, Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), setting forth the biological thesis that the difficulties of existence with "unerring power" select those variations of natural species which are best qualified to survive, and destroy the unqualified, seemed to provide powerful support for economic individualism. If the struggle for existence had been demonstrated to be the agent of natural selection in biology, why not also in human society? Darwinism in biology and Liberalism in economics seemed to lend each other mutual confirmation. If Liberalism declined during the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was not for lack of philosophical appeal, but because of the rise of powerful opposing forces. One of the opposing forces was Social Catholicism.

FRENCH PIONEERS OF SOCIAL CATHOLICISM

The ideas of Social Catholicism were conceived during a period when the Industrial Revolution was causing terrible suffering among the working classes, and the classical school of political economists was teaching that any effort to protect the working classes would be an unwise interference with economic liberty. Social Catholicism, therefore, had to find

not only a practical remedy for the appalling poverty of the masses, but also a theoretical refutation of classical or Liberal economic science. This necessity, growing out of the very situation which called Social Catholicism into existence, will perhaps help to explain the distinctly anti-Liberal tendency which at first characterized and long afterwards embarrassed the movement.

This hostility to Liberalism is a dominant note in the first protests raised by Catholics against the social consequences of the Industrial Revolution. As early as 1818, when the effects of the Industrial Revolution were manifest in England, but not yet in France, the Vicomte de Bonald⁵⁹ pointed out that "notwithstanding the wealth of the nation, there is in England more individual poverty than anywhere else, and Mr. Morton Eden in his *State of the Poor* and Mr. Malthus in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* enter into almost incredible details on this subject." For his part, he would prefer "fewer millionaires and fewer paupers" than existed in England. And he added, "I know that a Liberal philosophy will treat this consideration as superficial, and will refer, by way of reply, to the perfection of industrial arts, commerce, credit, *etc.*, *etc.* But I confess that I do not conceive public wealth as an abstract matter without application to a very large part of the individual citizens."⁶⁰

Bonald's attack on Economic Liberalism was the natural reply of a royalist, an aristocrat, a returned *émigré*, to the social and political philosophy of the new age.⁶¹

Chateaubriand,⁶² another royalist and returned *émigré*, eminent in politics and diplomacy under the Restoration, was uncertain what the future held in store, and seemed to believe that the old order was changing; but he could not accept the philosophy of Liberalism, nor could he regard the French Revolution without repugnance.⁶³ He resolutely maintained that in the teachings of Christianity were found the only enduring supports of a sound political and social order.⁶⁴ It is because of his emphasis on the social value of Christian doctrines that

Chateaubriand merits mention in this narrative, rather than for any constructive ideas as to the application of those doctrines. To be sure, he prophesied, in 1831, that "a time will come when it will seem inconceivable that a social order ever existed in which one man enjoyed an income of a million, while another had not the wherewithal to pay for his dinner."⁶⁵ But his reflections took the turn of forebodings rather than of proposals.

Under the old régime, he believed, the inequality of property had been "tempered by the diffusion of moral laws," by charity, by religion. In the new order, he asked, "can a political state in which some individuals are millionaires while others die of hunger exist when religion is no longer present with its hopes beyond this world to explain the sacrifice?" He went on to say,—

In the measure as instruction descends into the lower classes, they will discover the secret plague which infects the irreligious social order. The too great disproportion of conditions and fortunes could maintain itself as long as it was concealed; but as soon as this disproportion was generally perceived, the mortal blow was struck. Reconstruct, if you can, the aristocratic fictions; try to persuade the poor man,—when he knows how to read and has no beliefs, when he possesses the same education as you,—try to persuade him that he must submit to all privations, while his neighbor possesses a thousand-fold superfluity; as a last resort, you will have to kill him.⁶⁶

And on another page, Chateaubriand disposed in short order of the Saint-Simonians, Fourierites, Owenites, socialists and communists as visionaries.⁶⁷

The "other-worldly" consolation so strongly emphasized by Chateaubriand is not the feature that modern French Social Catholics would stress. They seek in Christianity not a preservative of unjust economic inequality, but the principles for social reform to the end of doing away with social injustices. Herein, it may be remarked, is to be discovered the true measure of progress in social thought among French Catholics

in the nineteenth century,— the progress from a conception of religion as a social anaesthetic to a conception of Christianity as the enemy of social injustice.

Not all the early Catholic protestants against Liberalism were royalists by tradition. Buchez,⁶⁸ for example, had been a *Carbonaro* and a Saint-Simonian socialist and returned to the Catholic faith later in life. In his judgment, the individualistic political economy dominant in the early nineteenth century was positively immoral.⁶⁹ The poverty and degradation of the masses was in truth neither inevitable nor a matter of indifference to the state; rather, society should assure to every laborer a sufficient wage, and should also endeavor by means of sanitary and hygienic measures to improve the workingman's health.⁷⁰ He advocated coöperative societies of production for small-scale industry. Workers in the same trade should establish a joint capital, eliminating the professional capitalist, and should set aside a fifth of their profits each year to maintain and increase their capital.⁷¹ Buchez inspired philosophical economists like Dr. Ott⁷² as well as artisans like Gillaud, Pascal, Genoux, and Perdiguier.⁷³ He founded a journal with the interesting name of "The Workshop" (*L'Atelier*), which flourished during the period 1840–1850, and which had as its motto St. Paul's famous dictum, "He who will not work, shall not eat," and as its purpose, "unceasingly to urge the workingmen to make the conquest of their instruments of labor by means of free and voluntary association."⁷⁴ Buchez, however, was too radical in his political theories to be typical of the precursors of Social Catholicism. Whereas most Social Catholics abhorred the French Revolution, Buchez wrote, "the human purpose of Christianity is identically the same as that of the Revolution: it is the former that inspired the latter."⁷⁵

The religious element was frequently brought out with marked emphasis. Gerbet,⁷⁶ bishop and philosopher, rebuked the political economists for their failure to recognize theology as the true basis of social economy, and in glowing sentences exhorted the Christian clergy to "take their stand in the Future, and establish themselves as at once the defenders, the modera-

tors, and the guides of the interests of the masses," for, "if the lower classes revolt before Christianity has been reconstructed in their spirits, Europe will witness terrible struggles, the like of which, perhaps, has not been recorded in the annals of the world."⁷⁷ One of his most remarkable utterances is found in a Lenten pastoral letter of 1838: "The proletarian without religion is either an idiot or a Communist."⁷⁸

Louis Veuillot,⁷⁹ whose distinguished career as a clerical journalist and controversialist began under the July Monarchy and continued through the Second Empire and into the early years of the Third Republic, very clearly held up Christian social economy as the contradictory of Political Economy. Brought up in the humble cottage of a cooper, Veuillot had almost from his boyhood nourished a furious hatred of the Free-Thinking bourgeoisie, which he regarded as hostile both to the church and to the common people. Political Economy, he held, "is as profoundly calamitous as it is profoundly impious," since it destroys the Christian notion of charity and divides men into the "hostile classes" of rich and poor. "Before making the poor able to live, Political Economy first absolves the rich and fortunate from the duty of assisting them. By virtue of its counsels, the destitute [workingmen] become fodder for factories, just as in the eyes of certain diplomats they are fodder for cannon; and competition, like war, sacrifices armies."⁸⁰ The true science of social economy, Veuillot declared, would destroy destitution (*misère*), but not poverty (*pauvreté*), "which is a divine institution." This true social science was Charity.⁸¹

A journalist, like Veuillot, but much bolder in his conception of the social mission of Christianity, was Jean Baptiste Henri Dominique Lacordaire.⁸² After a youthful apostasy, Lacordaire was led back to the Catholic faith, he said, by his social ideas.⁸³ He was subsequently ordained to the priesthood, and was the prime mover in reestablishing the Dominican order in France. Whether in the pulpit or in the press (for he collaborated with Lamennais on *L'Avenir* and later edited *L'Ère Nouvelle*), Lacordaire was indefatigable in championing

Christianity and democracy, in the name of "God and Freedom." As regards social philosophy, he provided the later Social Catholics with an arsenal of arguments against Economic Liberalism and in favor of social legislation. His remarkable talent for incisive epigrammatic utterance gave his arguments added force. "Between the strong and the weak," he declared in 1848, "between the rich and the poor, between the master and the servant, it is liberty which oppresses and law which makes free."⁸⁴ Developing the thought, he argued, "that absolute *laissez-faire* is the abandonment of the weak in the hands of the strong"; "that whenever laws have been made it has been for the protection of the weakest"; "that the workingman is weaker than the master"; that, therefore, the workingman should be protected by law.⁸⁵

Enough has been quoted from Catholic writers of the first half of the nineteenth century to exhibit the nature of their attack on Economic Liberalism, and to show their tendency to substitute a Christian philosophy of social reform for the accepted teachings of economic science. We may now turn from the theoretical to the practical side of the question, and examine the definite proposals advanced and the institutions founded by the pioneers of Social Catholicism, for the relief of the working-classes.

The practical aspect of early Social Catholicism is well exemplified in the labors of the Vicomte Armand de Melun.⁸⁶ Melun, an aristocrat by birth and a Legitimist by family tradition, had been destined for a diplomatic career, but shortly after the July Revolution of 1830 he decided to devote his life to social rather than to the diplomatic service, and began to do charitable work among the poor in the Quartier Saint-Médard. At first, the idea that charity was a religious duty seemed to be the sum and substance of his social philosophy. As his thought developed, however, he evolved ambitious schemes of organized charity, then of an international charitable organization; he became an earnest advocate of social legislation; and, in the hope that by some such means the workingman might be protected from the rigors of the existing

competitive regime in industry, he proposed the revival of the old industrial *corporations* or guilds. In the field of charitable organization, he was the outstanding figure of his generation. He instituted what might be called a Charity Organization Committee (*Comité des Œuvres*), in 1842. In 1844 he established a review, the *Annales de la charité*,⁸⁷ concerning itself with questions relative to hospitals, child-labor, unemployment, the coöperative movement, prisoners, trade-unionism, popular education, and with social service generally. A few years later he organized an Association for Charitable Economy (*Société d'économie charitable*) and even an International Association for Charity (*Société internationale de charité*);⁸⁸ in March, 1848, after the overthrow of the Orleanist monarchy, he induced Mme. Lamartine and the wives of the other members of the provisional government to form a "Fraternal Association in Favor of the Poor" (*Association fraternelle en faveur des pauvres*). Before 1848, Melun was chiefly concerned with private charity; but after the Revolution of 1848, as we shall see, he became one of the foremost champions of social legislation in the national parliament.

The precursors of Social Catholicism rarely elaborated extensive programs of social legislation; Economic Liberalism was still too strongly entrenched to permit any hope of radical labor legislation in the near future. But in agitating for modest measures of intervention, such as the legislative prohibition of child labor, the forerunners of the Social Catholic movement helped to drive home the entering wedge for reforms of wider scope. Among the early opponents of child labor was Cardinal Croï, Archbishop of Rouen.⁸⁹ In his Lenten Pastoral of 1838, the cardinal made a strong plea in behalf of the children, "these young plants," from whom "parents and employers demanded fruit in the season of flowers." "Poor little children," he exclaimed, "God speed the day when the laws will extend their protection over your existence."⁹⁰ The Vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont,⁹¹ a Catholic deputy and economist, was one of the most conspicuous authors and defenders, in the Chamber of Deputies, of the law of 1841 estab-

lishing a maximum working day of eight hours for children under eight years of age in manufacturing employments.⁹² In the Chamber of Peers, this measure found one of its most vigorous champions in Count Charles de Montalembert,⁹³ a former collaborator of Lacordaire and Lamennais. The fact that the child-labor law of 1841 represents the French government's first departure from the principle of non-intervention in labor questions, lends some importance to the efforts of Melun, Cardinal Croï, Villeneuve-Bargemont, Montalembert, and other Social Catholic pioneers in behalf of the reform.

Villeneuve-Bargemont⁹⁴ merits more than passing mention. He attained prominence by his success as an administrative official, under the Empire and under the government of the Restoration period; in 1812 he became prefect; in 1828, councillor of state; in 1830 he was elected to the national legislature. As a Legitimist, however, he could not hope for an important public career under Louis Philippe. A few years after the enthronement of Louis Philippe, consequently, we find Villeneuve-Bargemont turning his attention from politics to political economy. A visit to Lille, where there were almost 32,000 paupers, in a population of 70,000, seems to have made a tremendous impression upon his economic philosophy.⁹⁵ The problem of preventing pauperism became his favorite theme. The very titles of his writings show the trend of his thought: *Christian Political Economy, or an Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Pauperism in France and in Europe, and into the means of Alleviating and Preventing It* (1834),⁹⁶ *History of Political Economy, or Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies on the Political Economy of Ancient and Modern Peoples* (1841),⁹⁷ and *The Book of the Afflicted* (1841).⁹⁸ In the last-mentioned work, he portrayed the misery of the "indigent workingmen," and ascribed the lamentable condition of the laboring classes to the social indifference of profit-seeking employers and to the narrow-mindedness of legislators who thought their duty accomplished when they had prohibited labor organizations.

Vigorously attacking the economic theories of Adam Smith

and J. B. Say, he declared that the great and pressing problem for economists to solve was not the augmentation of production, but the "equitable distribution" of wealth and the diffusion of prosperity.⁹⁹ The accepted economic science of the day he regarded as fundamentally false; its errors he attributed to the heretical influence of the Reformation. A true Christian political economy would justify state intervention to protect labor against the "new feudalism of the employers."¹⁰⁰

With all the authority of his administrative experience and economic erudition, Villeneuve-Bargemont advocated social legislation,—not merely occasional legislative intervention to alleviate some particularly outrageous abuse, but systematic regulation. The evil was deep-seated, and required thorough-going remedies. "The wretchedness," he said, "which crushes the laborers, has profound causes which must be cured. If one looks for the numerous causes of this general and perpetual poverty, one is compelled to recognize that the first and most active of all is found in the principle of an almost unlimited production and of an equally unlimited competition, which imposes upon industrial *entrepreneurs* the ever-growing obligation of lowering the price of labor, and upon the workingmen the necessity of surrendering themselves, their wives and their children to a labor the excessive quantity and duration of which exceed the measure of their strength, and for a wage which does not always suffice for even the most wretched existence."¹⁰¹ It would be unjust to accuse the employers of sole responsibility for these evils. The fault was with the situation. Machinery had revolutionized industry while the abolition of the old restrictive laws had allowed production to increase enormously; but in destroying the obstacles to industrial development, legislators had also destroyed the guarantees which protected labor. The present task, therefore, was to renounce the economic theory of non-intervention, and to establish a system in which the workingmen would be treated as human beings rather than as merchandise. This task, the restoration of the working classes, he said, was "the great problem of our age."¹⁰²

To prepare the needed code of social legislation, a commission composed of peers, deputies, state councillors, magistrates, and "enlightened citizens," should be established under the authority of the ministry of justice. This commission would examine ancient and modern legislation, institute investigations of the condition of the working-classes, and draft the necessary laws, in the light of their investigations.¹⁰³

Among the specific measures recommended as practicable, we find the following. In the first place, to correct the ignorance, immorality, and improvidence which were so fruitful a cause of wretchedness among the lower classes, the communes should establish compulsory and free schools for vocational training and for moral and religious instruction. Provident banks should be created at the expense of industrial towns and communes, or of charitable associations, and the workingmen should be *obliged* to lay aside a part of their wages, when the rate of their wages was sufficiently high so that this obligation would not be burdensome. Workingmen's guilds should be created by law, for the purpose of fostering the spirit of association and mutual aid; but the mistakes of the old guild system should be avoided.¹⁰⁴

On another page, Villeneuve-Bargemont proposed that the following obligations be imposed by law upon manufacturers employing more than fifty workingmen: (1) to maintain perfectly salubrious conditions in their shops, and to submit them to inspection; (2) to establish schools for adult workers; (3) to refuse employment to any person who is under fourteen years of age and who has not received a medical certificate of fitness for industrial labor; (4) to refuse employment to any person who has not learned reading, writing, and arithmetic; (5) to separate workers of the two sexes, and to give adequate guarantees of respect for religion and good morals; (6) to form, for the laborers, provident or insurance funds, in which would be deposited the portion of wages in excess of the needs of the workingman and his family.¹⁰⁵

As regards wages, Villeneuve-Bargemont held that "a just rate of wages should be the first condition of all industrial

enterprise." The capitalist's profit should be taken only after sufficient wages had been paid the workingmen. By a sufficient wage was meant a wage adequate to provide the workingman, according to the customs and requirements of the country in which he lived, (1) the wherewithal to exist properly, that is to say, to have nourishing food, clean and durable clothes, and a ventilated dwelling affording proper protection against the rigors of the seasons; (2) the wherewithal to support his family, which may be presumed to include a wife and two children under fourteen years of age; (3) the wherewithal to make some provision for times of sickness and for old age. "If the wage cannot provide all these things for the workingman," he said, "it is no longer in conformity with the laws not only of nature, of justice, and of charity, but even of political prudence."¹⁰⁶

For agriculture, Villeneuve-Bargemont demanded (1) a rural code, favoring small holdings, (2) government credits for agriculturists, (3) alleviation of taxes, (4) agricultural coöperative societies.¹⁰⁷

Finally, he advocated international labor legislation. "If it is true," he said, "if it is recognized that unrestrained competition is the principal cause of the evils which weigh upon the manufacturing classes, could one not interpose, in the midst of this universal competition, a moderating element, which the other industrial nations might be induced to adopt likewise in the general interest of humanity? Could it not be established in principle, for example, that the daily duration of effective labor, for all workers, should not exceed thirteen hours, twelve hours, or any other limit deemed proper? . . ." At that time, be it remembered, France had placed absolutely no restriction on the length of the working day, and even children, if we may believe Villeneuve-Bargemont, were often compelled to spend sixteen or seventeen hours a day at the factory.¹⁰⁸

The importance of Villeneuve-Bargemont's contribution to the Social Catholic movement was very considerable. His were not occasional, ill-considered, incidental remarks on the social question; they were erudite volumes, carefully composed

by an economist of recognized standing, and supported by the authority of long practical experience in administrative affairs, first-hand observation of social conditions in many countries, and wide acquaintance with the standard writers on economic science. His was a serious and heavily documented contribution. None of the "pioneers" mentioned in these pages has a better claim to the title of "ancestor of Social Catholicism," with which a recent biographer¹⁰⁹ invests him.

The influence of Villeneuve-Bargemont upon his contemporaries is attested by M. Henry Michel:

The Christian political economy of Villeneuve-Bargemont had in the eyes of contemporaries an importance which we have some difficulty in accounting for. The socialists cite this writer and use him as an authority. The economists make an honorable place for him. For the rest, his polemic against industrial competition is distinguished by the vivacity with which it is imbued and the Christian socialism which there makes its first appearance.¹¹⁰

Gaston Isambert, a reformist socialist or solidarist writer, tells us that the works of Villeneuve-Bargemont prove that one can be "a Legitimist, a militant Catholic, a member of the Institute, and still have a mind accessible to the idea of economic justice." Villeneuve-Bargemont "may be ranged along with Sismondi¹¹¹ among precursors of labor legislation and considered as an ancestor of the Catholic solidarist party, of which MM. de Mun, Turmann, Fonsegrive, *etc.*, are the present representatives."¹¹²

Among Villeneuve-Bargemont's friends¹¹³ was Charles de Coux,¹¹⁴ "a Catholic professor who is forgotten nowadays,"¹¹⁵ but who enjoyed a certain amount of influence in his day especially among the group of Catholic publicists who prefigured the modern Social Catholic movement. The son of an *émigré*, de Coux had spent his youth abroad, part of the time in America, and long contact with Protestantism had weakened his Catholic beliefs. His studies in political economy, however, led him to form a high opinion of the social value of Catholicism, and, like Lacordaire, he was converted by his social

philosophy.¹¹⁶ "Catholicism," he said, "in its practical consequences, presents the most admirable system of social economy that has ever been given to the world."¹¹⁷ "The democratic tendency of Catholicism in countries where the poorer classes are menaced by imminent starvation is assuredly the most remarkable phenomenon of our epoch,"¹¹⁸ he declared, and "to-day the combat is essentially the same as in the Middle Ages: Catholicism is now at grips with the aristocracy of capital as formerly with the aristocracy of the land."¹¹⁹

De Coux was welcomed as an associate by Lamennais, Lacordaire, and the little group of militant clerical but politically "liberal" journalists who had founded *L'Avenir* shortly after the revolution of 1830. He wrote the leading economic articles for the journal. He may, therefore, be regarded as "the living bond of union between Villeneuve-Bargemont and the ephemeral but brilliant movement of Lamennais."¹²⁰ Subsequently, when a chair of political economy was established at the Belgian University of Louvain, de Coux was called upon to be its first incumbent.

His economic theories were in large part those of Villeneuve-Bargemont and need not long detain us. The classical Liberal economists, he held, by concerning themselves mainly with the production of material wealth, had exerted a deleterious influence upon society. To be sure, "gigantic fortunes arose here and there, towering above the mass of terrible wretchedness," but round about them the discontent of "a famished population" was like the ominous murmur of angry floods. Already "the maintenance of public tranquillity requires a deployment of forces which in other ages would have sufficed to conquer the universe."¹²¹ Such was the situation which the ideas of orthodox political economy could not remedy, but could only aggravate. What was needed was a Christianized political economy, which would give proper emphasis to the social value of virtue, and would have as its aim not the mere increase of production, but the welfare of society.¹²²

Another remarkable attempt to translate Catholic principles into a practical program was that made by Frédéric Ozanam.¹²³

At a very early age Ozanam became interested in the problem of social reform, in its relation to Christianity. He was only eighteen when he wrote his *Reflections on the Doctrine of Saint-Simon*.¹²⁴ Saint-Simon's challenge to the Pope to undertake a mission of social reform profoundly stirred the heart of the young Ozanam. It is well worth quoting,—

Your predecessors have sufficiently perfected the theory of Christianity; they have sufficiently propagated that theory. . . . It is now the general application of this doctrine which must be your concern. True Christianity should render men happy not only in heaven, but also on earth. . . . You must not content yourself with preaching to the faithful of all classes that the poor are the beloved children of God, but you must frankly and energetically employ all the power and all the resources acquired by the Church militant to bring about a speedy improvement in the moral and physical condition of the most numerous class . . . the clergy will always exercise a preponderant influence on the temporal institutions of all nations, when it sets to work in a positive manner to ameliorate the condition of the poorer class, which is everywhere the most numerous class.¹²⁵

Ozanam's entire life might be regarded as a reply to Saint-Simon's challenge, and a not wholly unconscious reply. For, Ozanam himself tells us that his later works of charity were motivated not merely by a sense of pity, but also by a zeal to prove by means of deeds the faith which he professed.¹²⁶

Ozanam's program rested on the general principle that neither Liberty nor Authority must be exaggerated, but each reconciled with the other. Rejecting the extremes of absolute *laissez-faire* and dictatorial government intervention, Ozanam proposed as methods of ameliorating the condition of the masses: first, legislative intervention by the government under abnormal conditions; second, the formation of voluntary associations among the workingmen. Every workingman, he believed, was by nature entitled, as a minimum, to a wage sufficient to provide for the necessities of life, for the education of his children, and for the support of his old age.¹²⁷ These ideas, obviously, were not in harmony with the doctrines of the Liberal economists. "God does not make paupers," said Ozanam,

" . . . It is human liberty that makes paupers." ¹²⁸ Again, denying the accepted economic thesis that labor is a commodity, he declared, " the exploitation of man by man is slavery." ¹²⁹

Pronouncements of this tenor may at first thought seem incongruous on the lips of a *littérateur* and historian whose most vivid intellectual interest was in medieval culture, in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Dante,—since Ozanam was a professor of literature and a scholarly student of the Middle Ages,—but in this very incongruity, if incongruity it be, a closer scrutiny will reveal a characteristic feature of Social Catholicism. For the modern Social Catholics of France considered their propaganda essentially as an attempt to revive and apply the kindly medieval Christian doctrines enforcing the duty of charity, the sinfulness of avarice, the dignity of human labor, and the social responsibility of property, as substitutes for the individualistic counsels of the classical Liberal economists.¹³⁰ If the Social Catholics were quick to discern the potential merits of the trade-union movement, it was because they admired the medieval guilds. Ozanam's most important practical achievement, the creation of the charitable society of Saint Vincent de Paul,¹³¹—which rapidly expanded into one of the world's largest organizations for the relief of poverty,—had its thirteenth-century parallel in the work of the mendicant friars among the poor.¹³²

At this point it is convenient to recapitulate what has been said regarding the origin of the social program of Social Catholicism. During the half-century beginning in 1815, while the Industrial Revolution was gathering headway in France, and while the Liberal economists were advising against any legislative protection of the working classes, numerous Catholic economists and publicists arose to combat Economic Liberalism and to urge that something be done to solve the labor problem resulting from the Industrial Revolution. These Catholic reformers, who may be regarded as the pioneers of Social Catholicism, differed one with another as regards political views and as regards certain points in their social philosophy, but, taken as a group, they may be said to have laid down at least

five planks in what was to become the platform of the Social Catholic movement: (1) instinctive rebellion against the teachings of the Liberal school of political economists; (2) an appeal to Christian charity and to Christian morals as the basis of a sounder economic and social philosophy; (3) faith in labor organization, and specifically in the possibility of reconstructing or adapting the medieval guild system to meet modern needs; (4) insistence upon the justice of a minimum wage sufficient to support the workingman and his family in a style befitting human dignity and Christian decency; (5) advocacy of social legislation to protect the working classes, above all, the women and children, against the ruthless pressure of modern industrial methods.

These ideas, as has been shown, were originated and gained considerable influence during the period between the years 1815 and 1848. How and why they lost ground, and were fundamentally modified, during the period of the Second Empire, that is, roughly speaking, between 1850 and 1870, will be explained in the following chapter.

CONSERVATIVE TRADITIONS AND DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES

Before passing on to the period of the Second Empire, however, it is of interest to note that in the earlier period there had already begun to manifest itself a strong tendency on the part of certain Social Catholics to couple social reform with political democracy, while others evinced a contradictory desire to associate Catholic social philosophy with a reactionary political theory. Was Social Catholicism to become a democratic movement, or an adjunct of monarchist reaction, or was it to be neutral? As the subsequent bearing of the Social Catholic movement depended upon the answer to this question, it is important that we trace the development of the controversy.

The reactionary tendency was perhaps the more natural. By contrast with the French Revolution, which had expropriated, disestablished, and persecuted the Church, the Bourbon Monarchy, which had for centuries maintained Catholicism as the state religion, seemed the very champion and defender of

the Church. Even those Catholics who saw clearly the shortcomings of the Bourbons abhorred the Revolution no whit less. Joseph de Maistre,¹³³ one of the most eminent Catholic apologists of the early nineteenth century, understood clearly enough that the Bourbon Monarchy had at times interfered with the free exercise of the pope's ecclesiastical authority in France, and that the French court in the eighteenth century had been deeply invaded by corruption and infidelity. In a sense, de Maistre was willing to regard the French Revolution as a providential event, designed to purge the French monarchy of its vices.¹³⁴ But intrinsically, the Revolution was an abomination. Its spirit was "satanic."¹³⁵ Said de Maistre,

Frenchmen, it is amidst the din of infernal chants, the blasphemies of atheism, the cries of the dying and the agonized convulsions of outraged innocence; it is by the light of incendiary conflagrations, on the débris of the throne and of the altars, stained by the blood of the best of kings and an innumerable host of other victims; it is in disregard of evils and in defiance of the public faith; it is in the midst of all conceivable crimes, that your seducers and your tyrants have founded what they call *your liberty*.¹³⁶

De Maistre's counter-Revolutionary political philosophy was all the more influential, and is all the more significant in the present study, because he coupled with it a firm belief in the social value of the Gospel.¹³⁷

During the period of the Restoration (1814-1830), the favors granted to the Church by Louis XVIII and Charles X encouraged the monarchist sympathies of many French Catholics.¹³⁸ Louis XVIII's government maintained Catholic Christianity as the state religion;¹³⁹ it repealed the divorce law (1816);¹⁴⁰ it forbade the press to attack the state religion (1822);¹⁴¹ under Charles X (1824-1830) a law was enacted making sacrilege punishable by death;¹⁴² both monarchs favored the religious orders and religious education.¹⁴³ That influential Catholic writers, such as Mgr. Frayssinous¹⁴⁴ and the Vicomte de Bonald,¹⁴⁵ should have extolled the monarchy was inevitable, under the circumstances.

Nevertheless, an anti-monarchical tendency began to manifest

itself during the second quarter of the century. Chateaubriand, whose name has already been mentioned, on a preceding page, in connection with Social Catholicism, was during his early life conspicuous as a royalist; but in 1824 even he quarrelled with the king, was dismissed, and became a critic of the government; he refused to take the oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe, when the latter ascended the throne in 1830; and the conviction grew upon him that "Royalty and aristocracy are things of the past; they are not vital; the democratic idea grows, equality increases; the sapper is at work under the thrones."¹⁴⁶

Louis Veuillot, another of the writers we have mentioned as a precursor of Social Catholicism, was like Chateaubriand a monarchist by predilection. And like Chateaubriand, he too felt conscious of the uneasy stirrings of the democratic spirit of the age. In his more optimistic moments, he dreamed of the day when a "baptized democracy," friendly to the Church, would organize a European confederation of republics under the presidency of the pope. "There will be a Holy Roman Democracy," he prophesied, "as there has been a Holy Roman Empire."¹⁴⁷ Veuillot, however, was an opportunist rather than a convinced democrat in politics; with him, the interests of religion transcended in importance all merely political questions. Hence we shall find him, at the time of the revolution of 1848, giving his adherence to the provisional republican government, because that government seemed favorably disposed toward the Church, and on the other hand we shall find him supporting the Emperor Napoleon III, and declaring, "France will reject parliamentarism as she has rejected Protestantism, or will perish in the attempt to vomit it. . . . The nation has said to a man: My orators tire me, rid me of them and govern me."¹⁴⁸

Veuillot, therefore, can hardly be taken as a protagonist of the democratic school of Catholic social reformers. His flirtations with democracy in the period 1838-1848 are interesting merely as a sign of the times.

Probably the most powerful impulse toward political liberalism came from two men who cannot be classed as Catholic

social reformers, namely, de Tocqueville and Lamennais. Alexis de Tocqueville was not a devout Catholic himself,¹⁴⁹ but in his famous study of *Democracy in America*, first published in 1835-1840, he maintained a thesis which gave French clericals much food for thought. Political liberty and the separation of the Church and state in America had not prevented the Catholic Church from flourishing, nor was Catholicism the enemy of democracy. On the contrary, he said, the Catholics "constitute the most republican and the most democratic class in the United States." Religion and liberty were found in alliance rather than in opposition. Generalizing from his observations, de Tocqueville concluded that "the Catholic religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy," whereas in reality, it was the most favorable of all the Christian religions to the equality of men. Moreover, democracy had need of religion. "Despotism may govern without faith but liberty cannot."¹⁵⁰

Félicité Robert de Lamennais has not been classed with the Social Catholics, because, finding it impossible to reconcile his political philosophy with Catholicism, he repudiated the latter. Prior to his breach with the Church, however, de Lamennais had won many converts to his faith that Christianity and democracy were reconcilable, and had formed a band of ardent followers and collaborators — generally known as "Liberal Catholics" — many of whom remained within the Church and continued to exert a powerful influence in the direction of political democracy.

Lamennais had become prominent, before the Revolution of 1830, as a brilliant apologist of Christianity, a defender of papal infallibility, an advocate of liberty. "You tremble before liberalism," wrote Lamennais in 1829. "Catholicize it and society will be reborn."¹⁵¹ A group of able disciples — Lacordaire,¹⁵² de Montalembert, Gerbet, de Coux, de Salinis, Cazalès, Combalot, Maurice de Guérin, and others acknowledged him as their leader, and as the future "O'Connell of France."¹⁵³

The July Revolution of 1830 gave Lamennais and his followers their opportunity. For the Catholics of France it was

no longer a question of choosing between an existing conservative Bourbon monarch whom they considered friendly to the Church, and, on the other hand, a possible experiment with democracy. The conservative Bourbon monarchy had failed. It was now a forlorn hope. The choice was henceforth between a Liberal constitutional monarchy, resting upon compromise with the principles of the hated Revolution, and distinctly unfavorable to the claims of the Church, and, on the other hand, an attempt to establish a Christian democracy. Louis Philippe's government was most unacceptable. Catholicism, by the Charter of 1830, was designated as the religion "professed by the majority of Frenchmen," not as the religion of the state. Freedom of worship was proclaimed. The number of ecclesiastical holidays was reduced. The pope was no longer to be represented by a nuncio in France. A Protestant, Guizot, was brought into the ministry;¹⁵⁴ the state assistance formerly given to ecclesiastical students was discontinued.¹⁵⁵

Lamennais and his associates seized the occasion to launch a vigorous democratic and Catholic campaign. In October, 1830, they¹⁵⁶ founded a journal, for which they chose the suggestive title, *The Future (L'Avenir)*, and the motto, "God and Liberty"; in its columns they boldly proclaimed their faith in democracy and Christianity, in the pope and the people.¹⁵⁷ The franchise, declared *L'Avenir*, should be "extended to the masses."¹⁵⁸ Belgium, Ireland, and Poland were pointed out as countries where the cause of the Church was the cause of liberty and of democracy. The galling fire of *L'Avenir's* criticism, directed now against the monarchy, now against the ministry, now against Conservatives, now against Gallican opponents of the papacy,¹⁵⁹ brought down upon the heads of the editors the heavy displeasure of the government. More than once haled into court, the editors defended themselves with such eloquence that they obtained a triumphant acquittal.¹⁶⁰

More serious than the hostility of the government, as events proved, was the opposition of conservative bishops to the cam-

paigned conducted by *L'Avenir*. Certain of the bishops, still clinging to the Gallican idea of a French national church, sheltered by the French national monarchy, found *L'Avenir* both too Roman (in its exaltation of papal authority) and too liberal (in its advocacy of freedom of the press, *etc.*) for comfort. Moreover, the journal was sowing a whirlwind of controversy. Many bishops, therefore, forbade their clergy to read *L'Avenir*.¹⁶¹ The orthodoxy of the Liberal Catholic movement fell under suspicion.

Consequently, at Lacordaire's suggestion, the three principal editors — Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Montalembert — in November, 1831, decided upon a pilgrimage to Rome to obtain the sanction of the pope for their teachings. Gregory XVI received the three pilgrim journalists with courtesy, but gave no sign of approving their doctrines.¹⁶² After some delay the pope issued an Encyclical Letter, *Mirari Vos*, August 15, 1832, condemning the doctrine that the Church had need of regeneration or modernization, denying that freedom of conscience and liberty of the press were unqualified rights, and reproving those who incited peoples to revolt against their princes.¹⁶³ Although the pope had tactfully avoided mentioning their names, the three editors could hardly have mistaken his intention.¹⁶⁴ They promptly published a declaration that, in deference to the pope, they would abandon the publication of *L'Avenir*.¹⁶⁵ Lamennais, profoundly disappointed and humiliated, gradually abandoned his ecclesiastical functions, discontinued all outward profession of Catholic Christianity, and ended by denouncing the clergy along with the kings as conspirators against the people.¹⁶⁶ His repudiation of Catholicism brought the Liberal Catholic movement into further disrepute.

Far from following the example set by Lamennais, Lacordaire and Montalembert remained zealous Catholics and at the same time preserved their belief that political liberty could and should be christianized. Both became, however, more and more moderate in their political liberalism. Perhaps for this very reason, they were able to exert greater influence upon the conservatives. Montalembert, the younger of the two, organized a

powerful Catholic political movement and led a vigorous campaign for liberty of religious education and liberty of association.¹⁶⁷ Even Veuillot's *Univers*, the most influential conservative Catholic organ, seemed to be persuaded, at one time, that liberty of the press, of education, of worship, was desirable.¹⁶⁸

The Revolution of 1848, which overthrew Louis Philippe, again found Lacordaire and Montalembert prominent in the liberal movement. Montalembert declared that the Catholics were "ready to descend into the arena, with all their fellow-citizens, to claim all the political and social liberties."¹⁶⁹ But his conception of political and social liberties was relatively narrow, and he soon fell to quarrelling with the more democratic Catholic leaders.

In the latter part of 1848 he attacked the tendency to "confuse socialism with democracy and democracy with Christianity,"—a tendency to which the democratic Catholic organ *L'Ère Nouvelle* had been, in his judgment, all too prone. Montalembert's hostile attitude was characterized by his former intimate associate, Lacordaire, in these caustic sentences:

M. de Montalembert . . . is destroying with his own hands the edifice which represents his life-work, and he is preparing the way for calamities which will make him tremble, later on. He and his friends have employed against the *Ère Nouvelle* an even more odious tactic than was employed against the *Avenir*. They have wittingly diverted attention from the true point of the question, in order to persuade their readers that the *Ère Nouvelle* was a revolutionary, demagogic, socialist journal; they have suppressed or denatured the replies made to their attacks, concealing their silence now by hypocritical manœuvres, now by calculated assaults. I have never seen anything which seemed to me further from fairness. So the separation is complete and irremediable.¹⁷⁰

As for Lacordaire, who during the interval between 1832 and 1848 had become a celebrated preacher and had reëstablished the Dominican Order in France, an opportunity for liberal service soon offered itself. Not long after the February Revolution of 1848, Maret, a priest who believed in "a

decided, frankly-avowed alliance with democracy," and in "a true and pacific socialism," came with Frédéric Ozanam, the founder of the Society of Saint Vincent-de-Paul, to ask Lacordaire to enter the lists once more, as in 1831, for the defense of religion and liberty.¹⁷¹ Yielding to their persuasion, Lacordaire launched a new journal.¹⁷² The prospectus, published on March 1, 1848, and signed by Lacordaire, Maret, Ozanam, Charles de Caux,¹⁷³ and others, announced that the purpose was to reconcile religion and the democratic Republic, to demand from the Republic liberty of education, liberty of association, amelioration of the condition of the workingmen, and protection of "the peoples who have lost their nationality by unjust conquests which time cannot rectify, and those other peoples which, following our example from afar, aspire to achieve their own political and moral emancipation."¹⁷⁴ The very title of Laconlaire's new organ — "The New Era" (*L'Ère Nouvelle*) — was eloquent of hope and confidence.¹⁷⁵

It is significant that among Lacordaire's associates on *The New Era* was Frédéric Ozanam, whose pronounced social views have been adverted to in the preceding section of this chapter. Perhaps more clearly than any other man of his generation, Ozanam perceived the opportunity for the Catholic Church to become the protectress of the common people in both economic and political life. Again and again he exhorted his fellow-Catholics to interest themselves in the masses, as the medieval Church had interested itself in the conversion and civilization of the barbarians. "Let us go over to the barbarians," he cried.¹⁷⁶ Being an historian, Ozanam formulated a historical theory of political evolution: "all that I know of history," he declared, "gives me reason to believe that democracy is the natural goal of political progress and that God is guiding the world towards democracy."¹⁷⁷

The optimism of the editors of *The New Era* seemed justified by events when, in the elections of April 23, 1848, Lacordaire, three bishops, ten other ecclesiastics, and a strong body of Catholic laymen were elected to the National Assembly. The white-robed figure of Lacordaire, sitting on the Extreme Left,

was loudly acclaimed. It was a token of the anticipated alliance of Catholicism and democracy.¹⁷⁸

Even more conspicuous than Lacordaire, in the Revolution of 1848, was Alphonse de Lamartine, a Catholic *littérateur* and politician, who had slowly gravitated from moderate royalism, in the 'thirties, to democratic republicanism, in the 'forties, and whose declamatory *History of the Girondins* (1847), glorifying moderate revolutionary principles, had done much to stimulate the liberal movement. Lamartine was the most conspicuous of the parliamentary leaders in the revolution of 1848; it was he that proclaimed the provisional government; in the new republican cabinet he held the post of foreign minister; it was the magic of Lamartine's eloquence that on more than one occasion saved the new republic from falling a prey to mob violence.¹⁷⁹ The spirit of Lamartine's political and social philosophy may be caught from the following passage, brief as it is, which he penned in 1849.

The two great and the richest conquests are, in politics, the sovereignty of all, exercised through universal suffrage, and in morality, the right of every one to the providence of all, the right to assistance by means of work or by state-aid. . . . Death from poverty or hunger is then banished from our economic laws, as death by the political scaffold is banished from our revolutionary laws. . . . Transport the infinite charity of Christianity from the conscience of the individual into the conscience of governments, and you will have created the Republic imperishable, for you will have incorporated into your government all that the age contains of truth and all that the Gospel contains of charity.¹⁸⁰

So general and so spontaneous was the acceptance of the new regime by the Catholics, that the alliance between the French Church and democracy seemed on the point of being realized. Even conservatives like Louis Veuillot urged acceptance of the provisional government and declared that the Catholics would make the most sincere republicans.¹⁸¹ The papal nuncio at Paris entered into diplomatic relations with the government and assured its leaders that the pope would approve

The year 1848 marked the climax of the first stage in the development of the Catholic democratic or liberal movement in France. It also marked a climax in the development of Social Catholicism. For, as the reader has undoubtedly inferred from the fact that many of the men mentioned in the second section of this chapter as Social Catholics appear in the present section as democrats, the Catholic democratic and social movements had tended to merge. *The New Era*, championing democracy, was also the advocate of social reform. In their prospectus, March 1, 1848, the editors declared,

We regard with sorrow the moral and physical afflictions of so many of our brothers who bear, in this world here below, the heaviest portion of the common labor, a portion rendered more burdensome than ever by the very development of industry and of civilization. We do not consider these evils impossible of remedy. . . . We look to the Republic, and rightfully so, to employ its power in alleviating the sufferings of the majority of its children.¹⁸³

This is a thoroughgoing acceptance of the two principles upon which the idea of modern social politics rests, namely, the need of reforms in the interest of the laboring classes, and the acceptance of political democracy as the instrument of such reforms. The two essential foundation-stones of democratic Social Catholicism had been laid.

CHAPTER II

MODIFICATION OF THE PROGRAM 1848-1870

POLITICAL REACTION

THE New Era was not as close at hand as Lacordaire, O'Connell and their associates of 1848 had dreamed. The democratic and social movement which had made such rapid progress among French Catholics from 1830 to 1848 was violently interrupted at this point. During the period from 1848 to 1870, while a few indomitable optimists held fast to the program of the earlier period, the more influential Catholic intellectuals showed a preference for a less advanced program. In politics and in economics alike the reactionary tendency was so strong that it left a deep impress upon the body of ideas which was to form the heritage of the later Social Catholic movement under the Third Republic.

In its political aspects, the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848 brought, instead of triumph, a grievous disillusionment for the group of Catholic democrats. To begin with, the republican National Assembly elected in May, 1848, thoroughly out of sympathy with socialistic experiments, decided to suppress the "national workshops" ¹⁸⁴ which had been instituted by the provisional government. Thereupon the workingmen in the eastern part of the city grew rebellious, erected barricades, and demanded the dissolution of the Assembly. Rather than yield, the Assembly sent General Cavaignac with armed forces to quell the disturbance. The Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. Affre, who rushed to the barricades in the vain hope of restoring peace, was mortally wounded; his death seemed to symbolize the tragic failure of Christian intervention in the struggle for democracy. ¹⁸⁵ The bloody conflict that ensued in the streets

of Paris during the terrible "June Days" (June 23-26),¹⁸⁶ resulted in the triumph of General Cavaignac, but it rendered illusory any hope of founding a democratic government upon the basis of fraternal accord and good-will.¹⁸⁷

Disappointments for the Catholic democrats followed thick and fast. In the presidential elections of December, 1848, Lamartine, who had run as a republican candidate, obtained only a few thousand votes, while the Bonapartist pretender, Prince Louis Napoleon, posing as a republican, by clever electioneering secured the great majority of the Catholic votes, and won an overwhelming victory. The Catholic democrats of the *New Era* group steadfastly opposed Louis Napoleon's candidacy, but their voice was not heard.¹⁸⁸

While Louis Napoleon was transforming the Second Republic into the Second Empire he continued to enjoy strong Catholic support.¹⁸⁹ The reason for this support is not far to seek.

In the first place, the revolutionary movement of 1848 had demonstrated that democracy was a dangerous experiment, fraught with perils of civil strife; the revolutionary disturbances had given socialistic extremists an opportunity to assert themselves in Paris; moreover, in France and elsewhere the democratic uprising had been followed by demonstrations of an alarming anti-clerical spirit.¹⁹⁰ In Italy, Pius IX had been compelled to flee from the papal states, and a republic had been established in Rome.¹⁹¹

On the other hand, Louis Napoleon skilfully taught the Catholics to look to him as a powerful friend and protector. When the pope appealed to the Catholic powers for aid against the Roman revolutionists, Louis Napoleon's government dispatched a French military expedition to restore the papal government at Rome.¹⁹² Hardly less gratifying to French Catholics was the educational reform put through under Louis Napoleon's presidency. In January, 1849, Louis Napoleon's minister of education, M. Falloux, created two extra-parliamentary commissions on primary and secondary education, and appointed some of the most prominent clericals,—notably Mon-

Montalembert, de Melun and Abbé Dupanloup,— as members. The investigation led to the enactment of the important Educational Law (the Falloux Law) of 1850, which permitted the Catholics to establish “ free ” or private primary and secondary schools, in competition with the public schools. Priests were not required to show certificates of capacity ordinarily required of teachers in primary schools. In each canton, the ministers of the different religions were to supervise the religious instruction, which was included as part of the official curriculum of primary education. General advisory powers were given to a Superior Council, whose membership included representatives, among others, of the clergy and of the free schools. As a result of this law, 257 new Catholic schools were founded within two years; 52 state *lycées* were closed; and the religious orders greatly increased their educational activities. Thus an issue which had long been the subject of bitter controversy under Louis Philippe was settled under Louis Napoleon in a manner very favorable to Catholic interests.¹⁹³

A majority of Catholic leaders were therefore quite willing to acquiesce in the *coup d'état* of 1851 which, while restoring universal suffrage, instituted a plebiscite on the proposition of granting to Louis Napoleon the power to draw up a new constitution. Montalembert exhorted Catholics to vote for the revision.

To vote for Louis Napoleon, is it not equivalent to voting for all that he has done, choosing between him and the total ruin of France? . . . I recall the great religious reforms which have signalized his government: liberty of the press guaranteed; the pope reestablished by French arms; the Church restored to possession of her councils, her synods, the plenitude of her dignity, and witnessing the gradual increase in the number of her colleges, her communities, her works of salvation and charity. I seek in vain for any other system which can guarantee for us the conservation and development of like benefits. . . .¹⁹⁴

Veuillot, the great clerical journalist, repeated in other words the same eulogy of Napoleon.¹⁹⁵

Under the new constitution promulgated by Napoleon in January, 1852, the president's term of office was lengthened

to ten years, the ministry was responsible to him alone, and, in effect, a monarchical government was established under republican forms. On December 2, 1852, the final step was taken, when, having secured authorization by a plebiscite (November), Napoleon assumed the title and powers of emperor.

During the first few years of the Empire, the Church continued to enjoy favor with the government. The bishops were free to hold provincial councils and to communicate with the pope; pensions were provided for aged and infirm priests, and the salaries of the bishops were increased; French cardinals were *ex officio* members of the senate; public affronts to religion were punished; religious orders were allowed to expand; negotiations were opened for modification of the Organic Articles, which had been so distasteful to ultramontanes. Consequently, the Empire continued to enjoy Catholic support, although a few Catholic leaders still cherished democratic ideas. The Catholic group in the national legislature dwindled away, as its members identified themselves with other parties. Patriotism, economic interests, and gratitude for favors granted to the Church obscured the issue between democracy and monarchy.¹⁹⁶

Under these circumstances, the Catholic democratic movement failed to find new leaders, while its former champions dropped away one by one. Ozanam died in 1853. Lacordaire, after making a strenuous attack on the Bonaparte government, turned from political to ecclesiastical affairs.¹⁹⁷ The *New Era* ceased publication. Montalembert, to be sure, lost his enthusiasm for Louis Napoleon, as the illiberal character of the Empire became manifest; he persistently attacked the government and advocated liberty, but not in a very democratic sense.¹⁹⁸

Moreover, a certain amount of support was given by Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, who, although he himself was disposed in favor of a liberal monarchy, contended that the Church was not interested in maintaining a particular form of government, but merely desired that the government should be Christian.¹⁹⁹ But the liberalism of Montalembert and Du-

panloup failed to find general favor. And the reactionary tendency received a very powerful stimulus from the Syllabus of Errors (1864), in which Pius IX condemned many popular conceptions of liberalism.²⁰⁰ So weak had the democratic idea become that, when in the later years of his reign Louis Napoleon became less friendly to clerical interests, no strong republican movement arose among French Catholics. Some who were dissatisfied with Napoleon III looked to the Legitimist pretender, the Count de Chambord, for the salvation of France. Democracy was far from their thoughts.²⁰¹

In short, the democratic tendency of French Catholics was checked, was even reversed. This change made it highly probable that Social Catholicism would be linked up with an undemocratic political philosophy, and would be seriously embarrassed thereby when democracy finally triumphed in France.

AN ADVOCATE OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Although the political reaction was closely followed by a movement of social reaction, there arose, before the latter carried all before it, an influential Catholic advocate of social legislation, whose ideas and achievements demand some consideration. The work of Vicomte Armand de Melun in the years 1849-1851 represents a transitional stage from the democratic and liberal reforming spirit of 1848 to the conservatism of the Second Empire.

The Revolution of 1848 had found Melun busily engaged in charity organization and social service work. Through his review, the *Annales de la charité*, through his national organization, the Society of Charitable Economy, through his International Association for Charity, and through the charity organization committee (*Comité des œuvres*), he inspired and directed the social service movement of the period in both its theoretical and its practical developments.²⁰²

Though a Legitimist by family tradition, he welcomed the February Revolution of 1848, because it appeared to have brought about a reconciliation of the priest and the working-man, and because it seemed to open up glorious vistas of Chris-

tian democracy.²⁰³ "Events have outstripped the most audacious thought," he declared, "and the dream of a few has become the awakening of all." The social questions formerly relegated to a distant future for settlement now demanded an immediate and positive solution. "Social economy" had inaugurated her reign, and was imposing the duty of solving "the most terrible problems." "Charitable economy, her sister," he added,

more modest, and too often charged with the duty of picking up the dead and healing the wounded who have fallen on the battlefield of society, cannot abandon her in this high and perilous position, but must mount the throne with her, share her labors, and participate in her rule; for, in the government of human affairs, in the study and solution of the questions which are now the order of the day, charitable economy has a special mission to fulfill.²⁰⁴

Responding to Melun's appeal, the Society of Charitable Economy promptly organized five sections for the study of conditions among the poorer classes, and a special committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for the general organization of public assistance.²⁰⁵ Melun himself, meanwhile, persuaded the wives of the members of the provisional government to form a Fraternal Association in favor of the poor.²⁰⁶ He also urged Lamartine and other friends to bring to the attention of the Constituent Assembly a project to "base all public charity on the principle of fraternity, and realize the thought we have so often discussed, the union of the state with private charity." Lamartine took great interest in the scheme, but procrastinated, and the only result was discouragement for Melun.²⁰⁷

Perhaps because he was more interested in practical charitable work than in social or political theories, Melun was not crushed in spirit by the failure of the "national workshops" (which he had never approved) or by the June insurrection. In fact, his political career did not begin until after these events. In 1849 he redoubled his efforts to persuade the government to aid the poor, and decided to present himself as a candidate for the Legislative Assembly in order that he might personally work for the realization of his ideal. Considering

only his personal convenience, he wrote in February, 1849, he would not seek to enter parliament, but considering the need, he could not hold aloof. He said,

I tell myself every day that there is a great work to be done, the consummation of all my achievements, the inauguration of charity in politics, the reconciliation of rich and poor, of him who possesses and him who suffers; and it is only from the height of the [legislative] tribune, and through legislation, that the treaty of peace can be accepted; it is only with the authority of universal suffrage that one will have the right to recall the causes of the February revolution, which you see . . . so nearly forgotten. . . .²⁰⁸

Such ideas inevitably brought down upon Melun's head accusations of socialism, so strong was the *laissez-faire* spirit at the time. His own reflection on the accusations is worth quoting:

Of late I have had my days of combat and almost discouragement. I had published separately the two articles which appeared in the *Annales* on the intervention of society in the sphere of charity; and my friends the Catholics, those for whom I was working, could find nothing better to do than to accuse me of socialism and to put my work on the index. I admit that I was revolted by such intolerance and by so small an understanding of the needs and duties of the moment; and I was tempted to despair of the aim which I pursued, on seeing those who should have seconded me casting stones at me; but the storm quickly passed, public reason came to my aid, and today even the extremists recognize that society as well as the individual must be charitable.²⁰⁹

The charges of socialism were certainly absurd, in the modern sense of collectivism, but in a certain sense, the accusation was not entirely without justification. Melun's conception of social intervention in economic affairs was so diametrically opposed to the accepted doctrine of *laissez-faire* that it might well be called revolutionary. Melun himself confessed,—“If I followed my inclination, in two years I would be anathematized as a socialist and repelled as a revolutionist.”²¹⁰

In the election of May, 1849, he represented himself as a champion of religion and of order, as a servant of the cause

of "the weakest and most unfortunate of our brothers."²¹¹ He was elected by a large majority.

On June 23, 1849, he asked the Assembly to appoint a committee of thirty members to study the question of public assistance for the poor, in fulfilment of article XIII of the constitution.²¹² The task of the committee was not to run through the whole gamut of economic questions, from tariffs to trade unions, but merely to consider remedies for the more obvious sufferings of the working-classes. The code of laws to be elaborated by the commission, should "enter into his home with the workingman to render his lodging more sanitary, and into his shop, to make the air purer and the work less dangerous and more healthful; [it should] facilitate his savings, encourage his thrift, take care of [him in] his involuntary idleness, concern itself with his sickness and infirmities, and not leave him without support in the sterile and often friendless days of his childhood and old age."²¹³

When the bill came up for debate, July 9, 1849, Victor Hugo, though intending to support it, stirred up opposition by his tactless remarks; but when the debate seemed to be going against him, Melun opportunely intervened with a graceful appeal for unanimity, and unanimity he secured.²¹⁴ The most eminent leaders in the house were appointed to the committee of thirty; Thiers, Montalembert, Berryer, Buffet, Arago were among them. A Catholic bishop, Mgr. Parisis, was chairman. Its deliberations lasted years; scores of pamphlets, bills, schemes, reports were considered; it was the clearing-house for the social legislation of the day.²¹⁵

In committee, as well as in the Legislative Assembly (1849-51) as a whole, there were sharp differences of opinion on social questions. The republican extremists of socialistic tendency were a negligible minority. The conservative majority was divided. One wing, of which Thiers was the most illustrious representative, usually opposed social legislation, whether through confidence in the orthodox economic doctrines of non-intervention and *laissez-faire*, or through an intense fear of socialism, or through solicitude for property-

rights. The other wing, represented by Melun and by other Catholic deputies, and supported by the Society of Charitable Economy, desired moderate social legislation.²¹⁶ Melun has left us a vivid picture of the situation in the committee. In one of his letters he tells us how he almost dreaded to bring any project before the committee, for when schemes were proposed,

the inexorable logic of our friend the ultra-economist, M. Buffet, opens the attack; MM. Randot, de Sèze, Béchard, can think of nothing but exaggerated decentralization; the excellent bishop of Langres [Mgr. Parisis, chairman of the committee] says a word or two about the rights of private charity . . . and after our poor projects have been riddled from every side, it is hard to save even a few shreds of their mutilated articles. Occasionally M. Thiers . . . comes to our aid; more often, he energetically combats socialist and humanitarian theories, and from the pinnacle of his eloquence hurls his thunderbolts at Utopians and philanthropists. On those days, to add the finishing touch to our defeat, Emanuel Arago [a Republican, regarded as an extremist] never fails to defend us, and the committee, frightened by our defenders as well as by our assailants, adjourns in dismay at the evil it was on the point of committing in doing something . . . Treated as a socialist by the majority with which I vote, as a philanthropic idiot by the great politicians, as an enemy of private and religious charity by the bishops and the Catholics, I am nevertheless held responsible by many for the inaction of the committee, which I convoke every day and which I urge forward with all my strength.²¹⁷

Melun's own scheme of social legislation, which he would fain have induced the Committee to support, was set forth in a pamphlet on "The Intervention of Society to Prevent and Alleviate Poverty" (1849).²¹⁸ He wished to steer a middle course between socialism and *laissez-faire*. Society, he said, should be neither a communistic organization blotting out private property and human personality, nor a "heartless mechanism" leaving each individual to survive or perish as best he might. But society should be a great protective association, defending the workingman against ignorance, sickness, vice, poverty, excessive labor and unemployment,—for these

were no less inimical to his safety and happiness than theft and murder, to suppress which everybody admitted to be the duty of the state.

To wait until the workingman had become a pauper, or was on the verge of starvation, before coming to his relief, was, in Melun's view, the most short-sighted of policies. An ounce of prevention was worth a pound of cure. Social legislation should be preventive rather than merely palliative.

Melun's scheme for the prevention of poverty was comprehensive, if nothing more. Maternity hospitals, day-nurseries, orphan asylums, popular education, vocational training, welfare associations for young workingmen,— these formed but part of the series of institutions which should follow the workingman from infancy to old age, offering relief to the unfortunate and aid to all, encouraging thrift, promoting education, alleviating distress. These manifold agencies should be coördinated and fostered by a supreme council appointed by the National Assembly;— perhaps it would be too ambitious, he said, to demand a special minister of state for social welfare. Under the central council would be formed a pyramidal structure of local committees, managing public institutions for poor relief and coöperating with private charitable enterprises.²¹⁹ His fundamental ideas were first, that the state should supplement and utilize private efforts for social service, rather than replacing them, and, second, that the vast complex of public and private institutions needed to be coördinated.

Furthermore, Melun desired the development of association among employers and workingmen, to the end that the wage-system might be transformed into profit-sharing. The idea was characteristic of the period. Coöperative production and profit-sharing were regarded by many social reformers as panaceas. Melun did not go quite so far; he merely recommended association as one of the many remedies.

As respects labor legislation Melun held that the government had the right and the duty to intervene to correct the evils of industrial competition. "When competition shows itself inhumane and unfair, if it crushes the child and the

adult," he declared, social legislation must be adopted to protect the health and morals of the young worker; to prevent his being employed at too early an age, or before he has had an education; to restrict hours of labor; to protect the adult laborer against unhealthful shop conditions, dangerous mechanical installations, and excessive labor. In the matter of unemployment, also, society must intervene to protect labor. Furthermore, the government should foster insurance against old age, but without instituting compulsory contributions for old age pensions.

Such social legislation, Melun believed, would involve the establishment of a protective tariff system in order to defend French industries against competition of less progressive nations. It also would involve the setting up of international standards for labor. Taking a glimpse into the future, he predicted that the movement then afoot in many countries of Europe "will not permit any country to continue abusing human strength; the reduction of hours will become general law." Perhaps, he added, it would even be necessary to require that employers found schools, dispensaries, institutions for the shelter of the sick and the aged, and old-age pension funds.²²⁰

Melun's scheme was not accepted in its entirety by the Committee of Thirty. But his ideas bore fruit in a number of the measures which the committee induced the Legislative Assembly to adopt. In the words of one of his biographers,

Fortunately M. de Melun was charged with the duty of reporting numerous special bills to the Assembly, and his friends drafted, under his inspiration, those that he had not been able to present himself. Consequently, the Legislative Assembly in its session of 1850 was able to vote, successively, a law on insalubrious dwellings,²²¹ a law on pension funds,²²² and a law on mutual aid societies,²²³ as well as a law on the education and guardianship of juvenile offenders.²²⁴

The committee on Assistance [*i.e.*, the Committee of Thirty] also presented a bill on foundlings, which reestablished the foundling depots;²²⁵ it had also adopted other bills, on hospitals and hospices,²²⁶ on outdoor relief, on medical service in the country,

on apprenticeship,²²⁷ on the employment of women and children in manufacturing industries.²²⁸ Most of the bills had been prepared and discussed in advance by the Society of Charitable Economy (founded by Melun). . . .²²⁹

Melun had the great gratification of seeing that his efforts in their behalf were appreciated by the workingmen themselves. In May, 1851, he wrote:

Already the workingmen are singularly well disposed towards me, and boundlessly grateful for the good I have not yet done them. Saturday, one of the most advanced members of the Mountain, strongly opposed to the majority, announced to me that in the day of the people's triumph only one member of the Right would not be excluded from the popular unity. It was I. It seems that the associations [of workingmen] were so touched by my visit that my name is never pronounced except with enthusiasm and veneration.²³⁰

Had Melun been made responsible for the general report of the Committee of Thirty he might possibly have persuaded the Legislative Assembly to venture further in the path of social legislation and create the comprehensive organization of which he dreamed. But Thiers, more accomplished as a parliamentarian and as a writer, was chosen to make the general report. The document prepared by Thiers was a model of literary composition; even those who disagreed with his conclusions could not help applauding the great statesman's felicitous phrases. But Thiers represented the non-interventionist tendency and his voluminous report was more destructive than constructive in tendency. Caution was the dominant theme. "The state, like the individual," said Thiers, "should be beneficent. But, like the individual, it should do so as a virtue, that is to say, freely, and, moreover, it should do so prudently." Among the really novel proposals advanced in recent times for the relief of poverty, "few are compatible with respect for property, for individual liberty, for the public fortune." Many were "chimerical and impracticable." In fact "there is little that is novel to be done, if one desires to keep within the limits of common sense." The pretended duty of

the state to assure employment to workingmen was an absurdity hardly worthy of refutation. Coöperative production associations would mean "nothing more nor less than anarchy in industry," because their fatal tendency would be towards equal division of profits, which would result in "the stifling of human genius," and the workingmen would "perish by suffocation and be sacrificed to mediocrity." Compulsory insurance against old age was out of the question; even government contributions to voluntarily established old-age pension funds would be wrong in principle, for,—

in all these systems [of social insurance] you take from the poor to give to other poor people, with a thousand chances of being mistaken, of taking from the thrifty poor to give to the improvident, taking from the industrious poor to give to the shiftless,—and one has no right to do that; for, after all, it is on each man's own toil that his fate should depend, and not on the state. . . .²³¹

Melun's comment on this report shows the gulf that lay between the two men:

It was a veritable volume, such as one might expect from so ingenious a mind and so accomplished a writer. When he [Thiers] read it to the committee, there was nothing to do but applaud the felicitous ideas, the charming pages. He spoke of private charity in very good terms, refuted the socialist doctrines very clearly, held up schemes of universal reform to ridicule;—and if a timid voice raised the objection that although he had combated the panaceas of charlatans very ably, it would perhaps be well to indicate some better remedies for evils which could not be denied, he fell back on the statement that it was almost impossible to find such remedies, and that it was necessary for poor humanity to live with its maladies, fearing lest it kill itself in attempting a cure.²³²

Melun ironically remarked that he feared the poor would not be much aided by "this voluminous masterpiece." "The most eloquent pages give very little warmth or nourishment to people who suffer from cold and hunger."²³³

With Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, Melun's political career came to an abrupt end. He was among those who were imprisoned for raising a protest. Upon

his release, he retired to private life. Sceptical and distrustful toward the Second Empire, he nevertheless had keen enough an insight into the social background of political events to write:

In representing the empire as the perfection of the republic and the consecration of democracy and of universal suffrage, one responds well enough to the instincts of the working class, which, seeing the impossibility and the vexatious consequences of Louis Blanc's doctrines, prefers the emperor, acclaimed by masses, to the monarch by divine right or by legal claim. The liberties which the [new] presidential constitution impairs mean little to the laborer, and democratic tendencies always aim toward the despotism of a man or of a convention. The people, when they think and talk politics, desire above all that authority have the air of coming from them. . . . They do not care much for offices; three years ago it was very difficult to persuade them to elect a workingman among their representatives. Louis Napoleon is certainly the most popular, the least bourgeois, the least aristocratic power on earth.²³⁴

As in ensuing years he witnessed the progress of political and social reaction, the growing hostility between the masses and the bourgeoisie, he became more and more pessimistic, and looked back with the regret of disillusionment to the time when, in his own words,

I had faith in the future of my country and dreamed of her great and holy mission in the world; and in the struggle against the voltairian and egoistic tendencies of the government and the ruling classes, I saw the triumph of religious and charitable ideas.²³⁵

One consolation he had. "There will remain," he said, "among the parliamentary achievements of assemblies now silent and vanquished, some few laws of genuine service to the poor."²³⁶ And he had just reason for self-congratulation; the social laws of 1850-1851 represented a solid achievement, and several of them have continued in force, with only slight amendment, to the present day.

SOCIAL REACTION: CAUSES

After Melun's retirement, the spirit of social reaction became widely prevalent among Catholics. Social and political conservatism triumphed over the spirit of reform. It will be remembered that the Liberal Catholics of 1830-1848,—Ozanam, Lacordaire, and their friends,—had proclaimed a two-fold mission for Christianity in the "new era": on one hand, democratic political liberty must be Christianized; on the other hand, the economic organization of society must be reformed in harmony with Christian ideals. After 1851, both aspects of that mission were pretty generally denied, or else interpreted in a very conservative sense, with the result that the democratic and social program which had been evolved before 1848 was profoundly modified, if not altogether discarded, during the years 1851-1870, and the Catholic social-reform movement in France, while it allied itself politically with the cause of monarchy, grew decidedly cautious about proposals for changes in the economic order. The causes of the political reaction have already been suggested. It remains to indicate the reasons for the social reaction.

It is not difficult to assign causes for the retrogression of Social Catholicism after 1848. One obvious cause was the fact that the movement, if it may be called a movement, lost its leaders. Villeneuve-Bargemont, the economist, died in the year 1850; Ozanam, in 1853; Lacordaire, in 1861; Gerbet, in 1864; de Coux, in 1865. Lacordaire had been almost silenced some time before his death. Montalembert (d. 1870) survived most of his associates, but was primarily interested in the political controversy regarding religion and liberty, and was terrified by socialism. The career of Melun also lasted throughout the period of the Second Empire, but Melun, after 1851, devoted himself to private charity rather than to social legislation. As the old leaders disappeared, new leaders were not found to take the vacant places. Or rather, the Catholic leaders of the new generation refused to follow the trail blazed by Ozanam, Lacordaire, de Coux, and Villeneuve-Bargemont.

The tendency of the times changed; for what reasons, remains to be seen.

The Revolution of 1848 did much to discredit the idea of radical social reform, and particularly of social legislation. In the first flush of revolutionary enthusiasm, in the spring of 1848, everything had seemed possible. The revolution, from its inception, had shown a marked social penchant. By one of its first decrees the provisional government promised "to guarantee the existence of the workingman by his work," and "guarantee work to all citizens" (Feb. 25, 1848).²³⁷ The decree was drafted by a socialist, Louis Blanc, and its approval was expedited by the insistence of a group of workingmen who had flocked to the Hôtel de Ville to urge the measure. The next day, the government announced that it would establish "national workshops" to provide labor for the unemployed. Accordingly, public workshops were opened, and thousands of workingmen entered government employ.²³⁸ Meanwhile a commission, presided over by Louis Blanc, had been established at the Luxembourg Palace to inquire into the conditions of labor, and had promulgated various social reforms,—among others, the limitation of the working day at Paris to ten hours, and in the provinces, to eleven hours (decree of March 2, 1848).²³⁹ The provisional government seemed to be making rapid progress along the path of social legislation.

As a matter of fact, however, the majority in the provisional government was opposed to Louis Blanc. The experiment with "national workshops" was not what many people were misled to believe it, a sincere attempt to realize Louis Blanc's program of social reform. Louis Blanc had advocated the establishment of "social workshops" (*ateliers sociaux*), by which he meant genuine coöperative societies for industrial production. The government was to provide the capital, in the first instance, and to organize the workshops during the first year; once thoroughly established, the workshops were to become autonomous, under the management of officials elected by the workingmen; all workingmen were to receive equal wages; net profits were to be divided into three equal

parts,—one for distribution to the workers as a wage bonus, one for the support of the aged, the sick, and the infirm and for the alleviation of crises, and one for equipment. These social workshops, it was hoped, would prove so efficient that private capitalists would be unable to compete with them, and private capitalism would be gradually eliminated or absorbed by the new organization of industry.²⁴⁰

Now the “national workshops” established by the provisional government of 1848 were not true “social workshops” but merely makeshift devices for the public employment of unemployed men. Many of the men were set to work, not at their proper trades, or in productive industrial enterprises, but at such tasks as excavating in the Champs de Mars or planting liberty trees. Even then, there was not work enough, and thousands of men found themselves with little or nothing to do. The wage paid by the state was a mere pittance. The manager was an opponent of Louis Blanc’s socialism. Nevertheless, the conservative classes seem to have regarded the national workshops as the realization of Louis Blanc’s socialist ideas, and when, inevitably, the national workshops proved to be so costly and so useless that they fell under general condemnation, Louis Blanc’s socialism and his theory of the “right to work” suffered blame. Socialism was deemed discredited.²⁴¹

The failure of Louis Blanc’s committee on labor to accomplish any solid reforms was another blow to socialism. Blanc resigned the chairmanship in May, 1848, and the committee was considered dissolved. Louis Blanc found it advisable to depart from France in haste, and lived in exile during the ensuing twenty years.²⁴²

If Catholics after 1848 regarded socialism as dangerous, impractical, nay more, as a deadly menace to society, it was not merely because socialistic theories had been discredited in 1848. It was partly because the socialistic movement had changed in character. With the Revolution of 1848, socialism, passing definitely from its Utopian stage, became a political and revolutionary movement.²⁴³ The Utopian socialists, notably Saint-

Simon and Fourier, who flourished in France during the first part of the nineteenth century, had hoped for the reorganization of society by voluntary action of the upper classes.²⁴⁴ They were not dangerous agitators of the proletariat. Moreover, some of the Utopians showed a distinct tendency to regard Christianity as an ally, not as an enemy. Saint-Simon's famous appeal to the pope has already been cited.²⁴⁵ Cabet held that Christianity and communism were synonymous terms.²⁴⁶ Pierre Leroux took the Christian ideas of charity and human equality as his starting point.²⁴⁷ When we come to Louis Blanc, whose influence was greatest during the 'forties, we find a certain hostility to Christianity: ²⁴⁸ still, the socialistic workingmen of 1848 were not anti-Christian to any marked degree. But after Louis Blanc's flight, the spirit changed. In part this was due to the bitter resentment which the workingman felt at the readiness of the Catholics to applaud and even promote the transformation of the semi-socialistic provisional government into an undemocratic empire. The labor movement under the Second Empire became increasingly anticlerical.²⁴⁹ In part the change was due to the influence of Proudhon, whose ideas exercised considerable influence among French socialists, although, strictly speaking, he is to be classed as an anarchist rather than as a socialist. Proudhon wished to substitute the idea of justice for religion; he was outspoken in his attacks on the Church. "The tyranny of the priests," he wrote in 1855, "is worse today than in 1815-1825; their avowed plan is to kill science, to stifle every liberty. If ever democracy gets another inning, and I count for something, it will be all up with Catholicism in France."²⁵⁰

Moreover, after 1848 the socialist movement came increasingly under Marxian influence. *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels marked the beginning of modern socialism. Marx and Engels were both Hebraic in race, and decidedly anti-Christian in philosophy. The Marxian socialist movement of the second half of the nineteenth century found many of its leaders among Jews and free-thinkers. The socialists came more and more to be re-

garded — and in some measure justly — as enemies of Christianity as well as of capitalism.²⁵¹

The growing anticlerical tendency of socialism made the Catholics only more hostile to socialism. Montalembert, who is certainly not to be classed among the extreme reactionaries, wrote in 1851, "to vote against Louis-Napoleon is to decide in favor of the socialist revolution."²⁵² And the more firmly the Catholics supported Louis Napoleon, the more anticlerical the socialists became.

Their hostility to socialism made it all the easier for some Catholic economists and sociologists to join with the Liberal economists in decrying excessive governmental intervention in labor problems, and even in justifying the existing economic organization of society. The pious Blanc Saint-Bonnet,²⁵³ for example, stoutly maintained that the economic order placed each man in the station he deserved. Prosperity, he declared, was the measure of virtue. Men's souls, rather than social institutions, needed to be reformed. "Open your eyes," he said, "this life is nothing but a system organized so as to keep man in poverty, in order that man may exercise all the virtues for the purpose of escaping from poverty." On the other hand, Blanc Saint-Bonnet urged the bourgeoisie to strive for the restoration of Christianity among the masses, and the clergy to acquaint themselves with political economy. "Everything for the people, nothing by the people." Blanc Saint-Bonnet's economic system was little more than the classical or Liberal political economy in a new garb of Christian phraseology.

Not all Catholic thinkers of the period would go so far as Blanc Saint-Bonnet in adopting Liberal political economy. A few there were who saw danger in the prevalent drift toward liberalism in economics and away from liberalism in politics. Augustin Cochin, who had been associated with the Liberal Catholic group of 1848, and who had achieved some prominence in municipal politics at Paris, vehemently rebuked the Catholic leaders who claimed to be promoting the interests of religion

by favoring the reactionary tendencies of the Second Empire. "People imagine," he said, "that to preach religion is to preach patience. Religion in the rôle of police is pleasing to small-spirited men. This path is narrow, this enterprise is sterile, it will lead to the detestation of God and of them who preach God." ²⁵⁴

A second Catholic writer, J. Bourgeois, very candidly pointed out that his co-religionists had made a monumental blunder in abandoning the earlier Catholic social teachings and rushing to the defense of economic Liberalism, since 1848. Economic Liberalism, he maintained, caused industrial anarchy, starvation-wages, unbridled competition, speculation, corruption of morals, and a whole train of corollary evils. Socialism was a natural, though not a true, reply to economic Liberalism. The duty of Catholics was to make themselves the sincere and serious champions of a social program which would correct the errors of both economic Liberalism and socialism. ²⁵⁵

Still another, Jean Baptiste Bordas-Demoulin, writing in a somewhat more democratic spirit, made an earnest plea for Catholic support of the democratic movement in both politics and economics. If Christianity becomes democratic, he declared, democracy will become Christian. Economic democracy could be achieved, he believed, by the concurrent influence of governmental intervention, *i. e.*, social legislation, and labor organization, or association. By promoting these influences, Catholics would help to bring about "the social reign of Christianity." ²⁵⁶

Bordas-Demoulin drew most of his ideas from François Huet, whose book entitled *The Social Reign of Christianity* ²⁵⁷ is an interesting attempt to reconcile Catholicism and the French Revolution, and to use the two as a basis for a sort of "Christian socialism." As one student of his theories remarks, Huet was not a socialist in the modern sense, for he opposed excessive governmental regulation and defended freedom of labor as well as interest on capital. His scheme was to establish equality of economic competition by endowing each man with

a patrimony, an education, and a right to public assistance. As regards politics, Huet was a republican and dreamed of a future universal Christian republic.²⁵⁸

Bourgeois, Bordas-Demoulin, and Huet, however, cannot be taken as genuine representatives of Catholic ideas on social reform, during the period of the Second Empire. The really typical Catholic economists of the era, the men who formulated the social philosophy which was to be handed down from the Second Empire to the Catholics of the Third Republic, were Le Play and Périn. And Le Play and Périn, as the following paragraphs will attempt to show, felt very strongly the influence of the social and political conservatism of their day.

LE PLAY AND PÉRIN

The economists who dictated the social philosophy of the French Catholics during the latter part of the Second Empire period were far from approving the social program which had been developed in the period 1832-1851 by men like Villeneuve-Bargemont, Ozanam, and Melun. Frédéric Le Play,²⁵⁹ a French engineer, economist, and sociologist, and Charles Périn, a Belgian professor of economics, were the two outstanding figures. These two men wielded an enormous influence in economic thought, particularly among Catholics. They claimed to represent Christian social economy as contrasted with the old materialistic political economy. But the Christian social economy of Le Play and Périn was not the Christian economy of a Villeneuve-Bargemont or a Melun; it was a system fundamentally hostile to the social legislation which Villeneuve-Bargemont and Melun had demanded.

Strongly as he criticized the existing social order, Le Play was even more opposed to any serious attempt to modify that order by means of social legislation. Admitting that the moderate British factory acts of 1833, 1842, 1844, and 1847, restricting the employment of women and children, had brought beneficial results, Le Play nevertheless emphatically condemned government regulation of industry in principle.²⁶⁰ As exceptions, legislation to prevent the disruption of family life and

to enforce respect of Sunday might perhaps be admitted. Labor legislation was a last resort, to be relied upon only under abnormal conditions, and, in most cases, the remedy was worse than the evil.

Le Play believed that social reform was to be accomplished not by social legislation alone, but by the threefold work of (1) enlightening public opinion, (2) reforming morals and customs, (3) establishing proper institutions and laws. The part of the state in this regenerative process would be relatively small and would be more negative than positive; to be specific, the state should reestablish liberty of testament, and should repress violations of industrial liberty; on the positive side, the state should be content to favor and support the action of individuals, especially of individual enlightened capitalists. The state should intervene, however, where private initiative was incapable of acting, as in the case of preventing the industrial employment of women. In the main his doctrine was of a strongly anti-interventionist tendency. It led almost irresistibly to the conclusion that, "for the time being, we must renounce the hope of seeing the present state of suffering remedied by the initiative of the rulers." Perhaps this is one reason why Le Play's school of political economy received such strong support from men of wealth.²⁶¹

Le Play was equally mistrustful of labor organization. The laboring classes were incapable of forming unions which would contribute to the solution of the social problem. "Among the panaceas which have been lauded in our time, labor organization is one of the most overworked. . . . These societies can not afford, from the point of view of results, the same advantages as individual labor or even capitalism, properly understood." If labor organizations or guilds were formed at all, they should be entirely free and voluntary.²⁶²

The following message from Le Play's book on *Social Reform in France* exhibits his fundamental opposition to any vigorous form of labor organization:

One would reestablish, it is true, the stability of men's positions in life,—that excellent characteristic of the middle ages,—by re-

turning to the closed guilds and to compulsory engagements. This return to the past, however, is not at all desirable; for, one would destroy thereby the liberty of labor, which, despite certain grave but remediable evils, is one of the rare features of superiority in our epoch of instability and antagonism. It is as necessary as ever to assure the existence of improvident families; but we must obtain from the intelligent employment of free will the result which our forefathers obtained more easily from the régime of regulation. To attain this end freely, we must found agriculture and the manufacturing industry on the family [*la famille souche*, *i. e.*, the family in which the chosen son takes the father's place as head of the family and proprietor of the family patrimony] and voluntary patronage. The return to constraint would be opportune only if our employers and our workingmen, persisting in their deplorable antagonism, refused to follow the example of the model factories of France and foreign countries.²⁶³

Martin Saint-Léon, the eminent historian of the French craft-guilds, believes that he finds in Le Play merely a condemnation of compulsory guild organization, not a repudiation of the guild idea *in toto*. Says Martin Saint-Léon,

A mind such as that of Le Play could not fail to appreciate the value of the great social force of association, especially of professional association. But,—and it is from this point of view alone that we are not able to adhere to the conclusions formulated by that great mind,—Le Play desires the *free* guild, *i. e.*, not merely open, respecting the right of each individual to labor and to economic liberty, but also voluntary and resulting from private initiative.²⁶⁴

Compare this with Le Play's own statement, quoted above, that the idea of industrial association was an over-rated "panacea." Even more negative is the following passage from the pen of Le Play:

Comparing the distress which nowadays weighs upon manufacturing populations with the prosperity which they formerly enjoyed, people have often been led to praise the principle of the former guilds of crafts and trades. It has even been proposed to reëstablish and perfect them. The experience acquired in a host of factories, and even in whole regions of Europe, counsels us to reject this proposition.²⁶⁵

The practical influence of this doctrine may be seen in the debates of the Legislative Body; in 1864, for example, we find an important employer, Kolb-Bernard, echoing Le Play's theories and opposing a bill to legalize labor unions.²⁶⁶

The true bases of social reform, according to Le Play, were religion, property, the family, and *patronage*. Religious piety, he held, brought temporal blessings as its reward. Property was an essential bulwark of social order, and should be widely diffused. The family was the natural unit of social organization. Finally, much social good might be accomplished by the voluntary action of employers and large landowners, who should encourage their employees to marry, to acquire homes of their own, and to lead pious, moral lives. The beneficent rôle of the capitalist is what Le Play understood by the word *patronage*.²⁶⁷

Le Play's thoroughly aristocratic version of Catholic social doctrine appealed chiefly to capitalists, to wealthy landed proprietors, to engineers (Le Play himself was an engineer),—in a word, to the upper and middle classes.²⁶⁸ In Le Play's hands, Social Catholicism lost its democratic features, was reshaped on a conservative model, and was coupled up with monarchist and aristocratic ideas in the domain of political theory.²⁶⁹ Le Play, in this sense, is the successor of de Maistre and Bonald, rather than of Ozanam and Lacordaire.

Six characteristics of Le Play's system were destined to affect the future development of Social Catholic thought.

(1) In the first place, it was counter-revolutionary; it claimed to set itself squarely in opposition to "the false dogmas of 1789."²⁷⁰ Hence, (2) in politics, it associated Catholicism with monarchism. (3) In the field of social reform, while repudiating democracy and equality, it sought to conserve liberty, and to ameliorate the condition of the masses by the benevolent voluntary action of the upper classes. (4) In method, Le Play was much more thorough, more scientific, than his predecessors; casting aside *a priori* reasoning, he laid the basis for his sociological theory in a painstaking study of typical families, in the most minute detail. Le Play's in-

fluence and example were very beneficial in promoting objective, scientific research among Catholic sociologists. (5) While the object of his research was to discover the true facts about existing conditions, Le Play was far from falling into the complacent belief that "whatever is, is right," that existing conditions were the inevitable result of natural laws. In his book on the *Organization of Labor* he explains his difference with the Liberal economists on this point:

The trouble came about because several writers, ignorant of the practise of prosperous shops, have established a systematic demarcation between the economic and the moral order. These writers have exalted into theories the most regrettable facts of the new manufacturing régime. They have taken no account of the reciprocal duties imposed upon employers and upon workers by time-honored customs, which all the social authorities of the Continent and of England herself continue to respect. Thus, for example, they have assimilated the social laws which determine the wages of the workingmen to the economic laws which govern the exchange of produce. By this [error] they have introduced into the régime of labor a germ of disorganization; for they have led the employers to exempt themselves, with easy consciences, from the most salutary obligation of custom.²⁷¹

(6) Emphasizing very strongly the moral aspect of the social problem, Le Play assigned to religion a very large rôle in reforming social customs, in fostering industry, sobriety and thrift on the part of the workers and charity on the part of the employers.²⁷²

Much the same drift towards conservatism that we have found in Le Play's doctrine is evident in the teaching of Charles Périn,²⁷³ a Catholic professor at the University of Louvain. Périn's best-known works were published after 1870, but his influence had already begun to be felt before that date, and he properly belongs with Le Play as one of the conservative Catholic economists of the Second Empire period whose ideas left a strong impression on the Social Catholic movement of the Third Republic period. He has been called the "creator of Christian political economy,"²⁷⁴ the "father of the liberal Catholic economists."²⁷⁵ Nitti, writing in 1890, asserted that

Périn "is still the Catholic Socialist writer who enjoys the largest credit among French Catholics." ²⁷⁶

To Périn, as to Le Play, the social problem was more a problem of morals than of institutions. Genuine social reform was to be secured only by a reform of morals, in accord with the Christian religion; let everybody practise charity and industry, and the social problem would disappear. The great obstacle to be overcome was the prevalence of the rationalistic ideas which had characterized the French Revolution. The social problem, said Périn, arises from

impious conceptions which affirm the absolute sovereignty of man over himself, which attempt to substitute, in the social order, the authority of reason for the authority of God. . . . To escape from the precarious situation in which the workingmen live, there is only one way; and that is to effect a counter-revolution in the ideas by which the present régime is inspired.²⁷⁷

Reactionary and monarchist as he was in politics ²⁷⁸ and in social philosophy, Périn was at bottom a Liberal in his economic theory. Liberty, he maintained, was an essential principle in an ideal economic system.²⁷⁹ Owing to the corrupt condition of existing society, the government might be called upon to correct certain evils by means of legislation, in order that genuine economic liberty might be reestablished;²⁸⁰ but the principle of government regulation was inherently dangerous:

As soon as you admit that the State has the right of regulation in questions of production, as soon as you accept, as the basis of economic organization, the intervention of the State in the relations between private interests, you are heading straight toward socialism.²⁸¹

Regarding the question of intervention from another angle, he observed:

If it should happen, because of the apostasy of the nations, that charity is dethroned and society delivered to the contrary of charity, which is utilitarian individualism, enslavement to legal regulation will reappear fatally as a necessary condition of the material existence of society.²⁸²

It would be unfair to represent Périn as an exponent of absolute economic liberty, an uncompromising opponent of all government regulation. He justified social legislation for the repression of flagrant economic abuses, it must be repeated, and he claimed to differ from the "Liberal" economists in that he recognized the value of Christian charity and of association in industry. Let him speak for himself:—

We demand that the labor question—in which nowadays the economic question is concentrated—be solved by all the forces which the social organism offers us, by liberty and by public authority, the rôle of each being measured by its rights and its influence. If one is a socialist because he represses the liberty to do evil, and because he protects the weak by means of legal regulation against the injustice of the strong, the Catholics are socialists. They are so today as they have been in every age, because they obey today as in every age the impulse of the Church, which incessantly claims from the government laws to protect the weak, and which, in all places and at all times, has fostered, organized, and patronized association, under the rule of justice and charity given to men by the Gospel.²⁸³

But, using the terms in their true sense, he said, "We are neither Liberals nor Socialists."²⁸⁴ Herein lay Périn's greatest contribution to the Social Catholic movement. He claimed that Christian political economy differed from Liberal political economy and from Socialism in that it assigned to liberty its just rôle, without exaggeration, in harmony with the dictates of justice, and without prejudice to the operation of Christian charity. The idea that Christian political economy was the only true economy gave enormous encouragement to Social Catholics of a later generation, who regarded Périn with imperishable gratitude while they carried his ideas much further in the direction of social legislation.

The agencies to which Périn looked for a solution of the labor problem were: first, Christianity and, second, the free organization of industry on something resembling the plan of the medieval guild system. Christianity would bring capitalists and workingmen alike to a sense of duty, of renunciation, of justice, of charity.²⁸⁵ The modernized guild,—as we may

call it for lack of a better term,— would combine two potent principles of social reform, namely, patronage and association. In the guild, the relations of employer and employee, of superior and inferior, would be preserved in their most salutary form; direct contact would make the employers more conscious of their responsibility as regards the material and moral well-being of their employees, and the workingmen would be benefited by the influence of their betters. On the other hand, the guild would embody the principle of association without false ideas of equality, and without infringement of individual liberty, for the association would be hierarchical, voluntary, and free from external constraint.²⁸⁶

Advocacy of the guild idea is the most significant trait of resemblance between Périn and Ozanam; it is a feature that appears very conspicuously in the Social Catholic movement of our own generation.

Among the less eminent Catholic economists of the period, Metz-Noblat and the Abbé Corbière may be mentioned as further illustrations of the tendency, which has already been seen in Blanc Saint-Bonnet, Le Play, and Périn, to repudiate schemes of extensive social reform and to fall back upon the accepted doctrines of liberal political economy. Alexandre de Metz-Noblat (1820-1871) firmly believed in Ricardo's theory of rent and in Malthus' law of population (with some modifications); in fact, he was convinced of the reality of most of the "economic laws" discovered by the classical economists,— Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, J. B. Say, Bastiat, *etc.*²⁸⁷ The economic life of society, he tells us, is governed by providential laws. Wages are determined by the law of supply and demand.²⁸⁸ The following passage from his treatise on *Economic Laws* shows how absurd it would be to attempt by social legislation to interfere with the laws which govern wages and profits:

Political economy proves that the laws according to which wealth distributes itself naturally, when the play of interests is free, are the most equitable that it would be possible to adopt; and that, furthermore, these laws are not conventional and contingent, but are

established by God and therefore necessary; that any attempt to modify them would be vain and disastrous, and that instead of thereby increasing the welfare of the masses, one would plunge the workingmen into frightful poverty because one would inflict sterility upon productive power.²⁸⁹

These economic laws are not in conflict with moral law. "We cannot admit," he said, "the alleged antagonism of scientific truth and religious truth, because the contradiction of two truths would be a logical monstrosity, the very supposition of which is revolting to good sense."²⁹⁰ But natural economic laws are often misapplied. Hence, humanity "cannot return to happiness and realize the harmony of all interests by merely returning to liberty." Corrective action on the part of the State, to reestablish harmony and, so far as possible, liberty, in the operation of economic laws, is therefore necessary. In Metz-Noblat's system, however, such intervention could play no very large rôle.²⁹¹ Morality, he believed, was the most important curative agent.²⁹² Let us add in conclusion, that he favored coöperative societies, but thought it impossible for co-operative production to replace private capitalism entirely.²⁹³

Abbé Corbière, like Metz-Noblat, attempted to show that there is no contradiction between economic science and religion. Even more than Metz-Noblat, he relied upon the classical or liberal economists, upon Bastiat, Say, Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus.²⁹⁴ Economic liberty was the keynote of his philosophy. Liberty, he declared, was the divinely imposed natural condition of human progress.²⁹⁵ In Abbé Corbière's work on *Social Economy from the Christian Point of View*, we find the same lyric enthusiasm for liberty, for the harmonies of economic law, as in Bastiat or in any other of the recognized liberal economists. It is not surprising that Abbé Corbière should deny the "right to work" (the slogan of the proletarian revolutionists of 1848), and the "right to assistance."²⁹⁶ In only two respects does he leave the way open for social reform, other than moral regeneration. First, he admits that it is the duty of a Christian State to supplement the inadequate work of private charity in relieving destitution

and misfortune.²⁹⁷ In the second place, he justifies the principle of labor organization or association, as an exercise of liberty, a sacred right, and a source of social good; such association, however, must be absolutely free and voluntary, and must not interfere with normal competition.²⁹⁸

If these Catholic economists were, from a modern point of view, excessively timid in proposing remedies for social injustices, if they were inclined to uphold "economic liberty," and to preach morality rather than to point out the opportunities for social legislation, it was not because they were less progressive than their contemporaries, but, as a matter of fact, because they shared both the fears and the prejudices of their contemporaries. The Catholic economists before 1848 had been more advanced than the recognized bourgeois economists; after 1848 Catholic social philosophy, for the reasons which have been explained, merely fell back towards the intrenched position of orthodox political economy. The dominant spirit of the Second Empire period was, in political economy, a revulsion against socialism.²⁹⁹ The bourgeois economists, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, feared socialism, exalted economic liberty, preached morality as the cure of social disorder, and showed the danger of extensive social legislation.³⁰⁰ Hippolyte Passy, for example, declared that "from the moment that you admit that something should be done in favor of any particular fraction of society, even though it be the most numerous fraction, you are abandoning political economy, you are practising socialism."³⁰¹ Louis Napoleon himself, while claiming to be the friend of the workingman, echoed the same warning against excessive government regulation of industry: "perhaps the greatest danger of modern times," he said in 1849, "comes from the false opinion, . . . that a government can do everything and that it is essential in any system to respond to all requirements, to remedy all evils."³⁰² Jules Simon, a liberal and non-Catholic, who was regarded as an authority on labor problems, emphatically defended liberty of industry and asserted that the government

should not intervene to regulate individual activity except when that

activity is notoriously incapable of directing itself without profoundly disturbing society, and should not assume any function unless that function is indispensable and cannot be exercised either by individuals or by free and voluntary association. For him who is convinced of the identity of politics and morals, or, to speak more generally, of the universality and legitimacy of the moral law, these principles have the same force as geometric axioms.³⁰³

Jules Simon was fully aware of the deplorable conditions existing among the laboring classes; in fact, he published a sensational book, *The Woman Worker*, exposing some of the worst evils; yet he proposed as a remedy, not social legislation, but the acquisition of new markets, the establishment of provident institutions, education, the revival of family life, and the reform of morals.³⁰⁴ In one of his books he said, "There is only one reform to accomplish; it is not to renounce liberty, but to complete it."³⁰⁵ Again he declared, "It is clear that if the State fixes the hours of labor and the wages of the workman, it takes away all liberty from the manufacturers."³⁰⁶ The evils of free competition in industry were very grievous, but they must be accepted as the price of progress. "While competition dashes forward, more than one falls bleeding on the road; but the power of the human spirit is doubled, discoveries follow one another," and, in short, civilization rolls on in the path of progress, ruthlessly and inexorably.³⁰⁷

ROYALISM AND SOCIAL CATHOLICISM

It has already been shown how the politically liberal and democratic school of Catholic social reform was submerged by the wave of political and social reaction which swept over France during the Second Empire period. Especially during the earlier years of Louis Napoleon's reign, the prevalent tendency of Catholic leaders was to accept Bonapartism in politics and a kind of moralized Liberalism in economics; in both politics and economics they retreated from the advanced position taken by Ozanam and Lacordaire in 1848. It was not a complete reaction. The political philosophy of the Second Empire represented a compromise between the democratic

theories of the French Revolution and the monarchical practises of the first Napoleon. The social policy of the Second Empire was a *mélange* of traditional Bourbon paternalism and modern economic Liberalism, tinged, perhaps with the socialist ideas which had interested Louis Napoleon before his accession to power.³⁰⁸

In the latter half of Louis Napoleon's reign, this system of social and political compromises was rejected by an increasing number of Catholics, for one reason or another. By his support of the Italian national movement in 1859, imperilling the independence of the Papal States, he made it quite impossible for French Catholics to regard him as a protector of the Church; consequently, even though he subsequently revised his Italian policy, and maintained French troops in Rome as a guarantee of papal sovereignty, he could not overcome the distrust of the clericals.³⁰⁹ His refusal to assist the Catholic Poles in 1863 in their rebellion against Russian oppression,³¹⁰ and his humiliating failure in the Mexican intervention episode,³¹¹ merely strengthened clerical opposition. The advantages enjoyed by Catholic schools since the Falloux Law of 1850 were curtailed by administrative decrees in the 'sixties, and Victor Duruy, an adversary of religious education, was appointed minister of education (1863).³¹² The government attempted to bring the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul under its control, and, by claiming the right to appoint the chairman of that society, precipitated a conflict which led to the dissolution of the central committee.³¹³ These and similar incidents led many Catholics to regret that Catholic votes had helped to place Louis Napoleon on the throne. So thoroughly, however, had the monarchist sentiment captivated their imagination, that they turned not to democracy but to royalism.³¹⁴

For the development of Social Catholicism, this royalist trend of thought was specially significant. It meant that as the influence of Lacordaire and Ozanam waned, the ideas of de Maistre and Bonald gained popularity; it meant that the organized Social Catholic movement was to be launched, after 1870, under royalist colors, and under the handicap of association

with political opposition to the republican form of government.

The royalist pretenders did much to encourage the idea that the cause of Christian social reform was bound up with the cause of royalty. The Count of Paris, who represented the Orleanist claims, published a study of *Labor Organizations in England*, in 1869, in which he took what must be considered, for the age, a fairly advanced stand on labor problems. There was no panacea, he said, but there were a number of partial solutions. Experience had proved that "nothing is more expensive than cheap labor"; hence, mere business shrewdness should compel employers to pay decent wages. Legislation should be enacted to protect women and children against employers who demanded excessive labor. Arbitration and the free discussion of disputes between employers and employees had brought very happy results in England; it was not a radical solution, but it would prepare the way for further solutions. Coöperative production, he thought, should not be regarded with disfavor. Education of the working-classes was to be regarded as a reform of the highest importance, for upon it depended the success of all other reforms in the interest of the masses.³¹⁵

The Legitimist pretender, the Count of Chambord, did not content himself with rambling reflections on the labor problem. He boldly and unequivocally identified himself with the characteristic reform to which the pioneers of Social Catholicism had been most powerfully attracted, *i. e.*, the guild organization of industry. In his public "Letter on Labor,"³¹⁶ April 20, 1865, Chambord declared:

Royalty has always been the patron of the working classes; the establishments [établissements] of Saint Louis, the regulations of the crafts, the system of guilds, are manifest proofs of this. It is under this protection that French industry grew and arrived at a degree of prosperity and of just renown which, in 1789, left it inferior to none.

The Revolution, on the contrary, had been a disaster for labor.

The Constituent Assembly did not content itself with giving greater freedom to industry, to commerce, and to labor, as the *cahiers* had demanded; it threw down all barriers, and instead of freeing the guilds from the fetters which troubled them, it prohibited even the right of assembly and the privilege of agreement and combination. . . . The liberty of labor was proclaimed, but the liberty of association was destroyed by the same blow. Hence the individualism of which the laborer is still the victim today. Condemned to isolation, he is penalized by the law if he wishes to make an agreement with his fellows, if he wishes to organize, for his defense, for his protection, for his representation, one of those unions which are his natural right, . . . and which society should encourage and regulate. . . .

The individual, remaining without protection for his interests, has been all the more rendered a prey to unlimited competition, against which he had no resource other than coalitions and strikes. Up until last year, these coalitions were liable to severe penalties, which most of the time fell upon the most capable and honest workingmen, whom the confidence of their comrades had made leaders or representatives. It was a wrong. . . .³¹⁷

After contrasting the benefits conferred upon labor by the monarchy with the evils wrought by the Revolution, the Count of Chambord went on to observe that a sort of "industrial privileged order" had arisen, "holding in its hands the existence of the laborers." Though many of the industrial capitalists had shown great Christian charity and zealous benevolence, "protection is not yet sufficiently exercised," and "the moral and material interests of the working classes are still badly neglected."³¹⁸

By way of remedy, the count proposed "the voluntary and regulated constitution of guilds" as the most effective safeguard against individualism, unbridled competition, and industrial license. To the workingmen must be restored their right of concerted action within the limits prescribed by the necessities of public peace and respect for the rights of all. "The only means to this end" was "liberty of association, wisely regulated and restricted within just limits." "In a word," he continued, "what is demonstrated is the necessity of voluntary and free association of workingmen for the defense of their common interests." It would be natural that

within these associations, there should be formed some sort of trade-unions, delegations, or representative institutions through which the workingmen would be able to negotiate with employers or employers' associations for the amicable settlement of disputes regarding wages and conditions of labor. In other words, the organization of labor would make possible the creation of joint shop-committees, representing employers' and workingmen's unions.³¹⁹

Certain safeguards would be necessary to prevent the labor unions from being used for purposes inimical to public order. Meetings must not be held without preliminary notice. The government should have the right of representation at any meeting, and should make sure that "the aim and object of the meetings were not forgotten or exceeded"; but the government would allow "entire liberty" in the debates and proceedings and would intervene in labor disputes only in a friendly manner, at the request of both parties, to facilitate agreement. In this way, he believed, the labor organizations would enjoy substantial freedom, while the government would be able to repress disorders. This form of organization, he predicted, would lead to a community of interest between capital and labor.

Peace and order will result from these deliberations [of the joint committees], in which, according to reason and experience, the most capable and conciliatory representatives of both parties will participate. An equitable satisfaction will thus be assured to the laborers; the abuses of competition will be avoided as much as possible, and the domination of industrial privilege will be confined to narrow limits.³²⁰

Furthermore, the Count of Chambord suggested, the guilds might "enter into the organization of the commune and into the bases of the electorate and of the suffrage."³²¹ This is, in embryo, the idea of functional or professional representation, which Social Catholics of a later generation were to elaborate, and which was destined to gain considerable popularity.

The Count of Chambord did not enter into further details.

His description of the new form of labor organization leaves much to be desired in respect of clarity and elaboration. Apparently the guild (*corporation*) is to be a sort of outer shell embracing within itself separate unions of capital and labor, with a mixed committee. But he gives us no hint as to the precise nature of the constitution which he proposes for the guild.

For all its vagueness, the pretender's "Letter on Labor" is a significant document. At that date (1865), labor unions had no legal status in France; in fact, up until 1864, every "coalition, whether on the part of employers with a view to forcing a diminution of wages, or on the part of the working-men with a view to stopping work in a shop," had been illegal, and its principal authors were liable to the penalty of from two to five years' imprisonment. This clause of the penal code had been repealed in 1864, but labor organization was still not recognized as legitimate; trade-unions and employers' associations were organizations outside the law, existing on sufferance.³²² Therefore one of the principal demands of labor leaders was for legalization of trade-unionism. It required twenty years of agitation (1864-1884) to induce the government to grant such a reform. Now the significance of the count's letter is that as early as 1865 the reactionary Legitimist cause was placed on record as favorable to the legalization of labor organization. We shall see some of the most extreme political reactionaries standing shoulder to shoulder with socialists as champions of labor's right to organize.

Chambord's stand on the question of labor organization was calculated to revive the idea that Catholic social reform was bound up with the cause of the Bourbon Pretender. In this connection, the concluding paragraph of his letter is worth quoting:

Above all in the face of the present difficulties, does it not seem [right] that the truly Christian and truly French monarchy, faithful to all the traditions of its glorious past, should today do for the emancipation and the moral and material prosperity of the working classes what it has done in other periods for the enfranchise-

ment of the communes? Does it not appertain to it [royalty] to summon the working-people to enjoy liberty and peace, under the necessary guarantee of authority, under the spontaneous tutelage of devotion and under the auspices of Christian charity? ³²³

BY WAY OF SUMMARY

If the reader will turn back to Chapter One of this volume, he will find a statement of the five principles ³²⁴ which had been laid down, in the period 1815-1848, by the group of Catholic reformers whom we may regard as the pioneers of Social Catholicism. It is now opportune to ask, in what respects had these five principles suffered modification during the Second Empire period? To what extent had the embryonic democratic and social program of French Catholicism been modified?

In the first place, the instinctive rebellion against the harsh teachings of the Liberal or Classical school of political economy was no longer so characteristic. A number of Catholic writers had become enthusiastic converts of Adam Smith, J. B. Say, Ricardo, and Malthus. Others, like Le Play, and, above all, Charles Périn, attacked orthodox economic Liberalism in certain of its extreme aspects, but were at heart partisans of economic liberty, averse to any large conception of social legislation. A few remained uncompromisingly hostile to economic Liberalism and individualism.

In the second place, the foremost Catholic economists and sociologists of the Second Empire period were, in the author's opinion, disposed not so much to make Christian charity and Christian morality the basis of a different social and economic philosophy, as to include them in the prevalent philosophy. Charity and morality, to Le Play, were factors which should correct the abuses of the existing régime and mitigate its evils; they were not principles dictating a fundamentally different organization of industry. To Périn, Christianity did offer the basis of a different organization; he desired the formation of guilds; but the reform was to take place within rather than against the existing order; the classical principle of economic

liberty was not to be controverted, but used, by Christian social reform.

In the third place, it had been asserted that the condemnation of labor organization by the classical economists was absolutely pernicious; that the most promising means of eradicating the evil effects of individualism and competition in industry was the creation of labor organizations; that the guild system, destroyed by Turgot and the Revolution, should therefore be adapted to modern needs and restored. Under the Second Empire, this principle survived, but not universally. Le Play, as we have seen, had little confidence in labor organization. Périn, to be sure, strongly favored the guild idea, but wished the new guilds to be entirely voluntary. Chambord made the guild, vaguely defined, the central feature of social reform. It was an idea that subsequently appealed strongly to Catholic royalists.

Insistence upon a just family wage was no longer so emphatic under the Second Empire. As was quite natural with economists whose thoughts were preoccupied with the menace of socialism, Le Play, Périn, and their contemporaries tended to be less belligerent than their precursors in attacking the injustices under which the workingmen suffered.

In the fifth place, social legislation for the protection of the working classes was no longer so strongly supported in principle, although the necessity of minor measures (such as restriction of the employment of women, interdiction of labor on Sunday, etc.) was admitted. The theoretical dangers of social legislation,—the peril of socialism and the destruction of liberty,—were so insistently held up to view, and voluntary individual moral or benevolent action was so frequently urged as the proper instrument of social reform, that the idea of social legislation may be said to have suffered a distinct setback.

While the social program was thus moderated, the democratic program was absolutely discarded by the more influential Catholic leaders and writers of the period. A majority acquiesced in Louis Napoleon's rule, hoping that the Church

would benefit by his protection. Others, especially in the 'sixties, cherished the hope that the Legitimist pretender or the Orleanist pretender could be restored to the throne. Consequently, Catholic ideas of social reform tended to lose their democratic spirit and associations. Le Play and Périn place their faith in the beneficence of the upper classes. Social reform becomes an aristocratic "uplift" movement rather than a democratic effort to establish a better social order. With the Legitimists the undemocratic tendency reaches its extreme; Christian social reform becomes the function of divine-right monarchy, aided by the private charitable endeavors of the upper classes.

CHAPTER III

POPULARIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM

THE COMMUNE AND THE REACTION

UNDER the Second Empire, bourgeois economists and sociologists, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, had shown so strong a tendency to react against positive programs of legislative action for the relief of the working classes, and to content themselves with exhortations to moral reform, that some violent shock, some terrible explosion of the pent-up forces of social discontent, seemed necessary to awaken them to a sense of reality. Such a shock was provided by the Commune, that tragic insurrection of the Parisian populace in the spring of 1871, following the downfall of the Second Empire and the defeat of France by the Germans.

As in the February Revolution of 1848, the popular uprising of March, 1871, was tinged with socialism. It was not thoroughly socialist in character, but sufficiently so to be alarming to the propertied classes. The socialists were conspicuous, though a minority, among the leaders of the Commune.³²⁵ While foreign socialists hailed the uprising as the inaugural victory of the proletarian revolution, French conservatives, realizing in their fright that the existing social order was menaced, sent troops to besiege Paris, in April. The resolute resistance of the Commune was not easily overcome. Not until May 21 did the national troops succeed in forcing an entry into the city. Still the city's defenders held out; though barricade after barricade was captured; though various quarters of the city were in flames; though artillery added to the havoc; though the troops of "law and order" took savage vengeance on the defenders. In their desperation, the insurgents shrank from

no deed of horror. While the conflict was raging, they massacred batches of hostages — clergymen, policemen, and bourgeois — whom they had been holding. But at length the last barricade was taken, after eight days of street-fighting; Paris was once more in the hands of the national government; and the work of punishing the rebels was taken in hand. Thousands were summarily executed; other thousands were condemned to imprisonment or deportation. Altogether, it has been estimated, Paris lost 80,000 citizens.³²⁶

The Commune, it should be repeated, was not a socialist proletarian revolution, but socialism played a large enough rôle in it to terrify the governing classes. Even after the Commune had been crushed and its surviving authors condignly punished, the government seemed to regard socialism with mixed feelings of panicky fear and vengeful hatred.³²⁷ Jules Favre, then foreign minister, issued a circular note to the French representatives abroad, proposing an international European entente against the socialist *Internationale*. "The *Internationale*," he declared, "is an organization of war and of hate. It has for its basis atheism and communism; for its aim, the destruction of capital and the annihilation of those who possess capital; for its method, the brutal force of great numbers, which will crush whatever attempts to resist it."³²⁸

To suppress the *Internationale*, the French National Assembly in 1872 passed a law defining as an attack on public peace "any international association which, under whatever name it may assume, and notably under the name of the International Working Men's Association, aims to provoke the suspension of labor, the abolition of the right of property, of the family, of religion or of freedom of worship." Affiliation with such associations was heavily penalized.³²⁹ Certain members of the Assembly even proposed to reëstablish the clause of the penal code against coalitions or unions of workingmen.³³⁰ Freedom of association, said a member of the majority party, would be a "dangerous weapon" in the hands of labor.³³¹

A parliamentary inquiry into the conditions of the working-classes, instituted in 1872, resulted in a report, written by

an industrial capitalist, Ducarre, justifying the existing organization of industry, opposing trade-unionism, and concluding:

The liberty of labor formulated by Turgot and decreed by the great Constituent Assembly is the essential reason for our industrial prosperity.

It leaves to all French citizens, workingmen or employers, the task of regulating their economic relations as they understand them.

It forbids any collectivity, whatever be its name, form, or origin, to substitute itself for their private initiative.

The existing laws do not intervene except to protect and secure the execution of conventions freely consented to by them and between them.

Perfectible, like all the works of man, these laws must be kept in touch with and on a level with progress and civilization. But they must respect, above all, and in the most absolute manner: *the individual liberty of labor*.³³²

In the general reaction against socialism, the Catholic leaders were as emphatic as any.³³³ To them, even more than to others, the Commune had appeared as a terrible object lesson. The Communards, it will be recalled, had confiscated the property of the religious orders, had separated church and state and suppressed the public worship fund. Among the hostages massacred by the Communards had been the Archbishop of Paris, and a number of priests.³³⁴ Catholics naturally felt that socialism and revolution, as manifested in the Commune, were inherently anti-religious in purpose and criminal in method. Socialism, it seemed, was the foe of religion as well as of society and of property.³³⁵

While opposition to socialism was perhaps the first element in the emotional reaction of Catholics after the Commune, the reaction was so genuine and so powerful that it had a positive as well as a negative side. So painful was their consciousness of the reality of the social problem, that Catholics threw themselves into various branches of charitable and settlement work with unaccustomed ardor. In September, 1871, the directors of Catholic charitable societies concerned with the welfare of the poorer classes came together in a congress

at Nevers, and created a nation-wide Union of Catholic Welfare Societies (*Union des associations ouvrières catholiques de France*), which, through its annual congresses, helped to arouse interest in social problems and to organize Catholic philanthropy.³³⁶

In 1872, the great Catholic economist, Le Play, founded what he called "Unions of Social Peace" (*Unions de la Paix sociale*) to give practical expression to his theories of social reform. Their aim was to refute popular errors, such as socialism, to strengthen paternal authority and the stability of the family, to establish good relations between capital and labor, to encourage thrift and home-ownership, to protest against the employment of women in factories and encourage work at home, to protect women against immorality, to support the principle of cessation of labor on Sundays, *etc.*³³⁷

This activity, while important enough in its way, had no very direct bearing on radical social reform or labor legislation. It is significant, in this study, as a background for the more aggressive movement launched about the same time by two young army officers, Count Albert de Mun and Count René de La Tour du Pin. Starting where Le Play and Périn left off, de Mun and La Tour du Pin, and their followers, gradually developed a remarkable constructive program of labor reform and social legislation, which was so sweeping and so radical that many conservatives branded it as socialist. It was chiefly due to the efforts of de Mun and La Tour du Pin that the Catholic reaction produced a Catholic social movement capable of playing a conspicuous rôle in the social politics of the Third Republic. They may be regarded as the initiators of the contemporary Social Catholic movement in France.

COUNT ALBERT DE MUN AND THE CATHOLIC WORKINGMEN'S CLUBS

Count Albert de Mun's own story of his "social vocation"³³⁸ and of his first experiments with Catholic workingmen's clubs reads almost like a romance; it is the story of a novel adventure and of generous enthusiasm. Like many an-

other ambitious youth of noble family,³³⁹ Albert de Mun had studied military science at the École de Saint-Cyr; he had passed five years (1862-1867) in active service with the French cavalry in Algeria; upon his return to France he had married and had been assigned to garrison duty at Clermont-Ferrand. Thus far his was the typical career of an aristocratic army officer. At Clermont-Ferrand, however, he discovered for the first time the existence of the working classes and speedily became interested in charitable work as a member of the local Conference of Saint Vincent de Paul.³⁴⁰

The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 found him a lieutenant, attached to a cavalry division of the ill-fated army of Metz. Taken prisoner by the Germans at Metz, he was interned at Aix-la-Chapelle. There, in the company of a fellow-officer — (Captain) Count René de La Tour du Pin,—he had ample opportunity to reflect upon the causes of his country's disaster. A social turn was given to the philosophizing of the young French officers by conversation with a German Jesuit, the Reverend Father Eck, who placed in their hands Emile Keller's suggestive treatise on Catholicism and Democracy,³⁴¹ as well as by discussions with Dr. Lingens, who subsequently became a prominent member of the German Center Party, and who was abundantly able to enlighten de Mun and La Tour du Pin regarding the progress of Social Catholicism in Germany.³⁴²

Returning home at the close of the war, de Mun arrived just in time to assist in the suppression of the Paris Commune. The virulent hatred engendered by the struggle, the impiety of the insurgents, and the massacre of the hostages, not even sparing the priests, left an ineffaceable impression upon his memory; the Commune, he declared, was a "monstrous insurrection," a "crime." But along with his detestation of the Commune, de Mun in his memoirs confesses also to a revulsion of feeling against the bloody reprisals in which the victors indulged. "M. Thiers," he writes, "cherished the spirit of the bourgeoisie of 1830; he had no love for the people and his policy toward them was ungenerous." Moreover, being charged with

the official duty of inquiring among Parisian shopkeepers regarding the causes of the Commune, de Mun was shocked at the ignorant indifference of the bourgeoisie toward the problems of the poor.³⁴³

Little might have come of de Mun's observations had not a certain Maurice Maignen,³⁴⁴ lay brother of the congregation of Saint Vincent de Paul,³⁴⁵ called upon the young officer — de Mun was then thirty years of age, — and begged him to address a small Catholic Club of young workingmen on the Boulevard Montparnasse.³⁴⁶ Maignen did not mince words. Dramatically pointing to the charred ruins of the Palace of the Tuileries, which had been burned during the Commune, Maignen declared, "The persons truly responsible for the Commune are you, the rich, the great, the fortunate (*les heureux de la vie*), who have amused yourselves within these ruined walls; who pass by without seeing the people, without knowing the people; you, who know nothing of the soul, the needs, the sufferings of the people."³⁴⁷

Deeply touched by the appeal, Lieutenant de Mun promised to speak at the Club's next meeting. Accordingly, one wintry night, bravely accoutred in uniform, with sky-blue cape, silver epaulets, and sabre, and with speech carefully written and memorized, the young nobleman presented himself before the group of workingmen. It was his first public speech. In the excitement of the moment, he was overcome by a strange emotion, as though he were pronouncing some solemn covenant, as though he were dedicating himself irrevocably. And walking out into the night, after the meeting, he felt certain that this was the decisive moment of his life. At any rate, such was his recollection thirty-seven years later.³⁴⁸

A fortnight after his maiden speech, Albert de Mun, with his brother Robert, and Maignen, induced La Tour du Pin, Paul Vri gnault (an official at the foreign office), Léon Gautier (professor at the École des Chartes and an enthusiastic admirer of the middle ages), Armand Ravelet (editor of the *Monde*), and two members of the National Assembly, Baron Léonce de Guiraud (deputy from the Aude), and Émile Keller (deputy

from the Haut-Rhin), to join with them in forming a "Committee for the foundation of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs in Paris." The Committee's first act was to launch an "Appeal to Men of Good Will."³⁴⁹ "The labor problem," began the Appeal, "at the present hour is no longer a problem to be discussed . . . it must be solved." The remedy proposed was the multiplication of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs on a huge scale in "a last effort to save the people [from revolutionary doctrines] and to hasten the reign of God in the regenerated shop." "To subversive doctrines and dangerous teachings, we must oppose the holy teachings of the Gospel; to materialism, the notion of sacrifice; to the cosmopolitan spirit, the idea of country; to atheistical negation, Catholic affirmation." "The men of the privileged classes," continued the manifesto, "have duties to be fulfilled with regard to their brothers, the workingmen; and society, though it has a right to defend itself with arms in hand, knows that shot and shell do not cure, and that something else is needed." The Appeal, reinforced by an article in *Le Figaro* (Jan. 17, 1872), made a great sensation. Felicitations, contributions, threats, poured into the office of the committee.

Flushed with enthusiasm, the committee resolved that their first campaign should be launched in the stronghold of proletarian revolution, in Belleville, the worst of the working-class districts of Paris, where the bourgeois hostages had been massacred, and the fighting had been fiercest during the Commune. Albert and Robert de Mun were detailed for the task. Certainly it was a curious enterprise for two young noblemen, to found a workingmen's club in a district where they did not know a single person. Nevertheless they succeeded. A house in the Rue Levert was secured as the home of the new Club; a score of young artisans were recruited as members; six or seven bourgeois consented to act as the Council of Directors; and a Brother of Saint Vincent de Paul, as director.³⁵⁰ At mounted upon the back of a chair and delivered a stirring speech.³⁵¹ The meeting sang the Club song, "neither the the formal inauguration of the Club, April 7, 1872, de Mun

verses nor the music " of which, de Mun admits, " are master-pieces." ³⁵²

"Quand Jésus vint sur la terre,
Ce fut pour y travailler;
Il voulut, touchant mystère,
Comme nous être ouvrier.

CHORUS

Espérance
De la France
Ouvriers, soyez chrétiens!
Que votre âme
Soit de flamme
Pour l'auteur de tous les biens!"

The words of the chorus,— " In you the hope of France we see. Workers, you must Christians be! "—indeed must have awakened strange echoes in the streets of Belleville, only a few minutes' walk from the spot where the blood of an archbishop ³⁵³ had been shed by proletarian revolutionists. And the inhabitants of the Rue Levert must have stared in some surprise at the unusual group of young officers and aristocrats descending the hill after the meeting, " drunk with victory." ³⁵⁴

Victory, indeed, did seem to smile auspiciously on the Count de Mun and his work during the ensuing months. In May he was called upon to found a branch of the " Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs " (*Œuvre des cercles catholiques d'ouvriers*), as it was now called, at Lyons, where the seeds of enthusiasm had been sown by one of the ladies who had heard the speech of April 7. ³⁵⁵ In June, the Association invaded Montmartre and established a Club near the site of the sanguinary Parisian battle of May 23, 1871. ³⁵⁶ In August, de Mun instituted a Club in the industrial quarter of the Croix-Rousse at Lyons, where, forty years earlier, insurgent workingmen had raised the desperate battle-cry, " Live working, or die fighting." ³⁵⁷ A year later, in August, 1873, the Clubs made a pilgrimage to Notre-Dame-de-Liesse (near Laon); at that time, seven Clubs had been established in Paris alone, and many others in Lille, Roubaix, Béthune, Maubeuge, Arras, Laon,

Saint-Quentin, and Aire-sur-la-Lys; two thousand men marching as pilgrims of the Association now thundered out the chorus so feebly chanted sixteen months previously at Belleville,—“In you the hope of France we see. Workers you must Christians be!”³⁵⁸ When the General Assembly of 1875 was convened, the Association boasted 130 committees, 150 Clubs, and 18,000 members,—“the magnificent fruit,” writes de Mun, “of three years of labor and apostolate.”³⁵⁹

The Association continued to expand rather rapidly in the next few years, although it never attained great size. By 1884 it boasted 400 committees and 50,000 members. Subsequently, it seemed to lose its expansive power, particularly among the urban workingmen. By 1900, it had only 60,000 members, more of whom were rural than industrial workers. The failure of the Clubs to attract the industrial workingmen in any large numbers was probably due, as an unsympathetic historian suggests, to the workingmen’s “repugnance for an authoritarian patronage,” and also to their distaste for religion. They were unwilling to be patronized by benevolent aristocrats.³⁶⁰

Small as its membership was, the Association nevertheless possessed a real national significance. Its development was accompanied by a nation-wide campaign to rouse the Catholic upper classes to their social duty; it ultimately made de Mun a conspicuous figure in national politics; it excited alarm in anticlerical circles; and it provided the initial impetus of the present-day Social Catholic movement in France. The Association, in short, was relatively unimportant as an organization, but decidedly important as a starting-point for de Mun’s career and for the Social Catholic movement.

Count Albert de Mun, as secretary-general of the Catholic Workingmen’s Clubs, toured the length and breadth of France, everywhere awakening enthusiasm by his fiery eloquence. On one occasion he thrilled his audience by pointing to a mural painting of Peter the Hermit and exclaiming, “Look at him, he is still speaking to you!”³⁶¹ Indeed, the bishop of Poitiers admiringly called de Mun, “the orator of a new crusade.”³⁶²

The anticlerical press was stirred. *Le Temps* (September 5,

1897) gave space on its front page to an account of this "strange missionary, this even more extraordinary officer," who "is called Captain de Mun." *L'Année politique* likewise commented on "the strange apostolate of a captain of cavalry, Count de Mun, who with the consent of the minister of war, devoted his eloquence [*talent de paroles*] to [founding] committees of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs all over France."³⁶³ So insistent were the complaints of anticlericals, that in 1875 de Mun was compelled to choose between the Association and his future military career. He chose the former.³⁶⁴

At its inception, the Association was less akin to the spirit of Ozanam than to that of the conservative Joseph de Maistre, of Le Play, or of Veuillot. Reactionary abhorrence of revolution, rather than confidence in the democratic social mission of Christianity, characterized the period from 1871 to 1876. At a time when the National Assembly of France was with one hand sternly suppressing the revolutionary socialist International³⁶⁵ and with the other hand generously increasing the budget of worship;³⁶⁶ at a time when the basilica of the Sacred Heart was being erected on blood-stained Montmartre to "expiate the sins of Revolution," was it strange that the founders of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs should declare themselves soldiers of the "Counter-Revolution"?³⁶⁷

The Counter-Revolution was primarily religious. It meant the reconquest of the masses for Christianity; it meant the militant defense of Catholic orthodoxy against the modern "errors" defined in Pius IX's Syllabus of 1864.³⁶⁸ The Counter-Revolution was likewise a social movement, in the sense that it aimed by means of religion to bridge — though not to close — the gulf between rich and poor; in this respect de Mun and his associates at first worshipped a purely aristocratic ideal, — "the devotion of the governing class to the poorer classes."³⁶⁹ Furthermore, the Counter-Revolution was patriotic; de Mun and de La Tour du Pin were army officers, veterans of the Franco-Prussian war, and very emphatic antagonists of anti-patriotism and anti-militarism.³⁷⁰ And, finally, the Counter-Revolution was political. Over against revolutionary,

anticlerical republicanism, must be set Legitimist, clerical royalism. The Count de Mun himself has confessed that at the time of MacMahon's election (1873) "the Count de Chambord appeared to me not merely as the representative of hereditary royalty, but as the living and crowned embodiment of the Counter-Revolution." "As a Catholic and a patriot all my heart belonged to him." Well may the Count de Mun, in his memoirs, affirm that the Association was kept free from monarchist influence.³⁷¹ Strive as its leaders might to maintain "an exclusively Catholic," politically neutral attitude, the Association could hardly have been other than royalist in spirit. In fact, if we may believe M. Georges Goyau, the organization "was in effect an electoral bureau for the cause of monarchy."³⁷²

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF MONARCHIST POLITICS

De Mun's formal entry into politics accentuated the monarchist and counter-revolutionary features of his program, but at the same time, as it will presently appear, reacted upon his social program in such a way as to make him a conspicuous advocate of social legislation.

The ominous republican drift of by-elections to the National Assembly, the enactment of the Republican constitutional laws (January, February and July, 1875), and the rapid rise of anti-clericalism in Paris, afforded convincing proof that the monarchist-clerical-conservative cause stood in desperate need of able protagonists.³⁷³ His extraordinary eloquence and his demonstrated administrative ability rendered the secretary-general of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs particularly available. In the spring of 1875 he began to receive invitations — from Lille, from Toulouse, from Morbihan — to become a candidate for election to the National Chamber of Deputies.³⁷⁴ He himself was beginning to feel the stirrings of political ambition. "The tribune [of the Chamber of Deputies] appeared to me as the theater where our ideas, being affirmed with *éclat*, could best arrest attention and convince opinion. Then, I saw the Catholic Church menaced, already attacked with violence by

those whose reign was beginning, and I burned to defend it on the very battlefield where it might be attacked, with the weapon that God had given me. Finally,—why should I not admit it?—a certain amount of ambition urged me to engage in parliamentary conflicts the oratorical ardor hitherto expended in private meetings.”³⁷⁵

De Mun entered the political arena in 1876, when he became a candidate for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of February-March. Pontivy, in Brittany, was the district which he selected as the scene of his first electoral contest. His platform was primarily clerical and counter-revolutionary:

The Revolution today is seeking to consummate its work of destruction by giving the death-blow to the religion of our fathers, and everywhere those who speak in the name of the Revolution openly declare war on Catholicism.³⁷⁶ The religious question dominates political issues. . . . It is therefore the part of Catholics to take in hand the defense of the social order, and, by protecting their religion in its rights and its liberty . . . to give France once more the peace and stability of which she stands so sorely in need.³⁷⁷

Elected, de Mun took his seat with the Extreme Right in the Chamber of Deputies. The strenuous antagonist of “the Revolution,” however, was not long permitted to retain his place. Henri Brisson, a Masonic dignitary,³⁷⁸ upon whom devolved the duty of reporting on the validation of de Mun’s election, demanded an investigation.³⁷⁹ The “candidate of the court of Rome,”³⁸⁰ said Brisson, had received the frank and public support of the Catholic clergy.³⁸¹ Between charge and counter-charge, the debate waxed warm. Gambetta, ever the foe of clericalism, thought the matter important enough to throw his eloquence into the scales against de Mun.³⁸² A committee of inquiry, composed exclusively of Republicans,³⁸³ reported unfavorably,³⁸⁴ and although de Mun produced affidavits controverting the committee’s allegations, the invalidation of his election was decided by a vote of 297 to 171, on July 13, 1876.³⁸⁵ His parliamentary début could not have been more unfortunate. The circumstances of his invalidation led

him, more than ever, to believe that Republicanism was inherently opposed to Catholicism, and that the anticlericals had unjustly thrown him out of the Chamber of Deputies because he had too boldly announced his intention of defending the Church.³⁸⁶

Returning to his district, de Mun was immediately reëlected, in August, 1876, and the Chamber could hardly refuse to recognize his mandate.³⁸⁷ In the general election, held in October, 1877, he obtained almost twice as many votes as his Republican rival.³⁸⁸ His temerity in declaring war on the Revolution amazed the Chamber. On February 21, 1878, for example, he said,

The other day we heard it affirmed from this tribune,—by M. Boysset,—that we were the enemies of liberty, because we are the enemies of the Revolution.

Very well, for my part, I assure you that,—on the contrary,—we save liberty, because we combat the Revolution.

Where is the liberty that you have given us? I turn to the people . . . and I ask what the Revolution has given them.

Ah! I will tell you: it has destroyed the ancient organization of labor and has replaced it with nothing but the fever of competition.³⁸⁹

This last remark, touching on the controversial question of labor organization, was true enough to be resented; Floquet, one of the Republicans, could not refrain from an angry interjection—"If that is what you teach in your seminaries, you justify us a thousand times over" [in suppressing the budgetary appropriation for the Catholic seminaries].³⁹⁰

Continuing, de Mun reminded the Chamber that on May 4, 1877, Gambetta had cried, "Clericalism, that is the enemy,"³⁹¹ and that in February, 1878, another Republican, Boysset, had asserted, "between the Catholic Church and the Republic, no conciliation is possible."³⁹² A voice from the Republican benches interrupted de Mun with the remark, "It is true." Accepting the challenge, de Mun went on to say,—

Very well, so be it, it is true! since you wish it to be so! And

henceforth you must forget "clericalism" and say frankly that the enemy is Catholicism. . . .

It is not I that have said it, but I accept it thus, and in the future you will not be astonished at our want of confidence in your Republic.³⁹³

A few months later, November 16, 1878, the Catholic orator said to the Republican Left, "You are the Revolution, and that is enough to explain why we are the Counter-Revolution." "It is in the great work of social reform that the Counter-Revolution consists, and that is the idea, that is the cause, which we serve in the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs."³⁹⁴

De Mun, after these attacks, was again exiled from the Chamber of Deputies, on the ground that his election was not valid.³⁹⁵ This second invalidation made him all the more bitterly opposed to anticlerical Republicanism. When he returned to the Chamber, in 1881, it was as one of the most aggressive of Legitimists.³⁹⁶ His sensational campaign speech at Vannes, March 8, 1881, proclaimed the necessity of restoring the monarchy; politically, as the indispensable means of reconciling strong and paternal authority with true liberty; socially, as the instrument of Christian social reform; patriotically, as the restorer of French prestige. A brief quotation will help to explain the irresistible temptation which de Mun felt to identify the causes of Social Catholicism and Monarchism:

But, in these troubled spirits . . . the dominant feeling . . . is of deception, of profound realization of the bankruptcy of Revolution. The people have been promised everything: power, wealth, and independence! They have been given only the mask of a chimerical sovereignty, and behind that mask there is only a slave, a slave who carries on his shoulders the politicians whose fortunes he has made, a slave who belongs, body and soul, to the industrial furnace into which he is thrown like so much coal.

All sorts of promises have been made to the workingman. But his leisure, his health, his old age, his home, his future, his professional interests,—who cares about them? After ninety years they [the politicians] have gotten to the point where they discuss whether it is proper to restore to the workingman a part of the right of

association of which the Revolution despoiled him! And that is all that they can do to attempt to solve this social question, this economic question which is the vital question of modern times, which confronts all the governments of Europe, and the importance of which ought to be made clear by the public interest, in the absence of a sense of justice.

Gentlemen, I have spoken of justice. Where is it at this moment? It is like liberty, it is like authority, it is dead; the Revolution has killed it. . . . And when a government . . . affords neither authority, nor liberty, nor justice,—I ask,—of what can it avail itself?

. . . I do not mean to say that the monarchy will suffice by itself to solve the social question; but I say that the monarchy alone can fruitfully work at the task, because it is the necessary base of the whole political order. I do not say that the monarchy will solve the social question in a day, but I say that it will strive to solve it, without relaxation, honestly, faithfully, not with phrases, promises, and theoretical formulas, but with principles and institutions, with encouragements to men of good will, with the practical assistance of specialists. . . .³⁹⁷

The political contest between Republicans and Monarchists for the electoral support of the masses tended to accelerate the development of de Mun's social program, especially as regards legislation, while temporarily linking that program with royalism. To explain the process, we must turn back, for a moment, and trace the development of the social attitude of the monarchists.

As long as a monarchist majority controlled the National Assembly (1871-1876), the monarchists gave themselves no very great concern regarding labor questions. To be sure, they authorized an investigation of labor conditions; but of the two reports which were made on the subject, one was never discussed,³⁹⁸ and the other was so complacently optimistic that it failed to nerve the Assembly to action.³⁹⁹

Nevertheless, one important reform was carried through. A bill passed by the Assembly in 1874 excluded from "industrial labor in manufactories, factories, mills, mines, and workshops" all children under twelve years of age (with the exception that in certain industries children were allowed to work six hours a day), restricted the period of labor to twelve hours

a day for young persons between the ages of twelve and sixteen; excluded children under twelve, girls, and women from mines; prohibited the employment of children at night, or of girls in mills and factories at night, or of children and girls on Sundays and legal holidays.⁴⁰⁰ It is perhaps worth noting that the Count de Melun, a brother of the great Catholic charity organizer, acted as chairman of the committee reporting the bill,⁴⁰¹ and that Émile Keller, the Catholic deputy from Belfort who in 1873 had joined with de Mun in the enterprise of founding Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, not only voted for the bill, but insistently demanded provision for its more effective enforcement.⁴⁰²

The first elections (1876) under the Republican constitutional laws gave the Republican groups a majority in the Chamber of Deputies,⁴⁰³ and resulted in the appointment of a Republican ministry, headed by Jules Simon. Thrown into the opposition, the Monarchists devoted more attention to the interests of the masses. In June, 1876, a Bonapartist and clerical deputy, Laroche-Joubert,⁴⁰⁴ whose son, Edgar Jean, later became a member of the Popular Liberal Party, interpellated the Government regarding its plans, or lack of plans, for social reform.⁴⁰⁵ "If I have presented this interpellation," said Laroche-Joubert,

it is because, up to the present, I have seen that this Assembly, and the one preceding, were much occupied with political questions, with dynastic competitions, but that the most burning question, the question that places us on a volcano, that every moment threatens to cause an upheaval, has never, or almost never, been considered.

I have believed it to be my duty,—I, who know the masses because I have lived with them, because I shared their lot at the beginning of my career, who know their legitimate aspirations,—I have believed it to be my duty to call the attention of the government to the necessity of concerning itself with giving satisfaction to the interests of the most numerous class. . . .⁴⁰⁶

The aged president of the council of ministers, Jules Dufaure, a typical bourgeois and moderate republican, rebuked Laroche-Joubert in these words:

. . . When you demand the amelioration of the material condition of our fellow-citizens, you encourage in the country — permit me to say — ideas which are not true. [Applause from the Left and Center.] Do not tell the people that they should look to the government for the amelioration of their condition. . . . Tell them that what they should demand from the government is the freedom and protection of labor [lively applause from the Left and Center.]

Whereupon Laroche-Joubert sarcastically remarked,

I take notice of the words of the Government and of its declaration that it has done all that it should do, when it has promised the country liberty, order, and a definitive constitution.⁴⁰⁷

It is worth noting that Dufaure's reply was applauded by the Republican Left and Center. The Republicans had much to learn.

It is an interesting fact that after the Child Labor Law of 1874 a whole decade elapsed without further social legislation. The decade 1874-1884 witnessed the definite triumph of republicanism over monarchism, and the beginning of the great conflict between clericalism and anticlericalism; but it was barren of social reform. The explanation is obvious. In the first place, the labor movement as yet had neither formulated its program precisely nor organized its tremendous numerical resources; in the second place, defense of the Republic against real and rumored dangers from monarchism and clericalism still furnished bourgeois Republican deputies with the best of all electoral platforms in the elections of 1877 and 1881. An undertone of social discontent, however, began to make itself audible after the constitutional crisis of the *Seize Mai*, 1877, had been safely passed and Republicans placed in control of the Republic. Perhaps it was with some idea of drowning this ominous undertone in the din of a new conflict that in 1880 a Republican cabinet — the same cabinet which proved its veneration of liberty by declaring July 14th the national holiday of France — declared war on the teaching orders, and expelled the Jesuits from their educational establishments.⁴⁰⁸ At any rate, such was the suspicion expressed by the organ of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs:

The campaign undertaken by the government against the religious orders and against the liberty of education is nothing but an expedient to divert the attention of the electoral masses from the social question.⁴⁰⁹

One of the most striking instances of a monarchist attack on the indifference of the Republican Government to the labor question is to be found in the debates of March, 1881, on a bill to limit the working-day in industry to ten hours.⁴¹⁰ Cyprien Girerd, a Republican of the Left, speaking for the Government, had declared that no reason could justify so grave an attack on the liberty of labor, "which is the most sacred of all our liberties," and had urged the Chamber to reject the bill.⁴¹¹

Other Republicans⁴¹² had spoken against the measure. Marcel Barthe, for example, declared that a recent inquiry by the Government had proved the Bill to be "absolutely useless"; twelve hours' labor a day was not destructive of the working-man's health; moreover, the hours of labor tended to decrease "by the natural and normal development of our industries." The employment of children in factories had the advantage that "the fathers and mothers have the joy of seeing them work before their eyes. They can direct them, instruct them, and teach them to work faster and better." (This was not irony on Barthe's part; it was earnest argument.) The bill would have the effect of increasing class-division and antagonism; hence it should be rejected.⁴¹³

Another Republican, Louis A. Hugot, opposed the bill, saying that state intervention in such matters was nothing else than socialism, and, once started in that direction, "you cannot tell where you will stop." Hugot used the classical economic argument against labor legislation:

The nature of things is stronger than all the laws, all the decrees and all the regulations in the world, and . . . the legislators may strive in vain, for economic laws cannot be eluded at will.⁴¹⁴

Such statements afforded Émile Keller, a clerical-monarchist deputy, an unequalled opportunity to contrast Republican neglect with Monarchist championship of the working classes.

The Republican Chamber, he asserted, had not examined the social problem under any of its aspects; the end of the session was drawing near, and it was high time to treat the question with the gravity it deserved, "for, at this moment, the Chamber is giving the measure of its sympathy for the laborers." He took the Government to task severely for the "singular attitude" which it had taken in opposing the bill. "A Republican government," he said, "a Republican assembly, are in contradiction with the principles which they pretend to profess in treating the labor question in such a manner." The masses, as he attempted to demonstrate, were beginning to see through the mask of selfish bourgeois republicanism. He quoted the complaint raised by a labor assembly in 1876:

Our bourgeoisie, like Lot's wife, stands petrified, motionless. It occupies the political offices, the functions of administration, and, thanks to the capital which it possesses, it has in its hand the economic world. The workingman, for his part, is condemned to a subjection a hundred times more oppressive than the political conditions against which our fathers rebelled in '89 and '93.

The bourgeoisie has absolutely discarded the bonds which formerly attached it to the people, since it no longer has need of the people to overthrow the nobility. . . .

For the majority of the bourgeoisie, politics is only a means to dupe their fellow-citizens and to obtain their votes. They practise politics without sincerity and traffic in democratic, socialist, or other ideas just as the capitalist traffics in leather, iron, or copper goods. Once in power, they are our worst enemies.

In 1880, Keller continued, workingmen at Lyons had declared that "the first act of the bourgeoisie, once it had gained control of the government, was to betray its former ally [the proletariat] and to monopolize the benefit of the Revolution by substituting itself for the fallen class [the nobility]. . . . The poverty of the workers has increased in direct proportion as the wealth of the new possessors, and ten years of the Republic have made no change. . . ."

"Well, gentlemen," said Keller, "it is not by repression, it is not by dry and hard refusals, such as we have heard from the lips of the under-secretary of state, that we shall succeed in

directing the aspirations of the working class; we must examine their demands closely; we must see what they contain that is right, and give them satisfaction in just and legitimate measure." ⁴¹⁵

As regards the specific question before the house, the regulation of hours of labor, Keller submitted a counter-proposition, which was more radical, in several important respects, than the bill originally reported by the committee: (1) it provided a maximum working week of 61 hours, whereas the committee's bill would have permitted 70 (ten hours a day); (2) it applied to mines as well as to factories and mills; (3) it prohibited the employment of women at night and the employment, day or night, of women in the first month after child-birth; (4) it provided more severe penalties.⁴¹⁶ Keller had the satisfaction of seeing provisions for limitation of the working-week to six days, and for prohibition of the employment of women at night, incorporated in the text finally adopted by the Chamber but the bill as voted applied only to young persons and women, and established 66 hours as the maximum week.⁴¹⁷

In the same debate, Keller took occasion to discuss the question of the guild organization of industry. As he was an associate of de Mun's in the enterprise of founding Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, it is not surprising that he should express similar views. The debate, said Keller, had clearly revealed one dominant fact, and that was the lamentable turn of events, as concerned labor, since 1791. "The famous law of 1791," abolishing the guilds, had established the liberty of the employer, the liberty of capital, but had destroyed the liberty of the workingman, who had hitherto enjoyed the right of association. In defence of his thesis that abolition of the guilds was a mistake, Keller cited the following passage from Louis Blanc:

. . . The guilds had been formed under the dominant influence of the Christian spirit. A passion, which no longer exists in our manners and customs, or in public affairs, at that period brought conditions and men closer together: this passion was charity. The life of the workingman was not troubled by bitter jealousies, by the

necessity of hating his fellow-being, by the pitiless desire to ruin him by surpassing him.

While frankly admitting that in many respects abuses had crept into the guild system, before its abolition in 1791, and denying that he was a partisan of the restoration of the old régime, Keller voiced his strong conviction that the law of 1791, in forbidding all association, all organization of labor, was in large measure responsible for the alarming turn which the labor problem had taken.⁴¹⁸

This is the characteristic feature of the monarchist social philosophy of the period; it is the view emphatically stated by no less a personage than the Legitimist pretender. The Legitimist pretender, the Count of Chambord, was distinctly aware of the value of a social reform program as a political asset. His *Letter on Labor* (1865) had portrayed the monarchy as the historic protector of the right of labor to organize,—a right which the Revolution had destroyed.⁴¹⁹ Shortly after the Commune (1871), in a solemn manifesto, Chambord had declared,

It is the laboring classes, these workingmen in field and town, who have suffered most from this social disorder; their condition is the subject of my most earnest attention and of my favorite studies.⁴²⁰

Six months later, in another declaration, he had dramatically asked, who, besides a hereditary monarch, "will assure to the working classes the benefits of peace, to the working man the dignity of his life, the fruits of his labor, and security for his old age?"⁴²¹ By such promises Chambord endeavored "to prove to France and principally to the working classes, on which side are to be found their true friends and the constant champions of all their interests."⁴²²

Count Albert de Mun, who had appeared in the political arena at precisely the moment (1876) when the monarchists had lost their majority in parliament, was just the spokesman that the Count de Chambord needed. As secretary-general of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, de Mun had acquired a preëminent position as an exponent of Catholic ideas

of social reform, and as a critic of the existing capitalistic régime. It is not surprising, then, to find Chambord writing to de Mun,

Among these working classes, who are the constant object of my attention; among these dear workingmen surrounded by so many flatterers and so few true friends, you better than any one else can serve as my interpreter. . . . Let them know well that I love them too well to flatter them, and, to express my whole idea in a word, repeat to them incessantly that God must return to France as master, in order that I may reign there as king, in order that France may be saved.⁴²³

The task of acting as the Pretender's "interpreter" to the working-classes, and as the spokesman of Catholic social ideas in parliament, had a marked effect in clarifying de Mun's thought and in giving his program a practical trend. From the beginning, de Mun and his associates in directing the work of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs had made the principle of association (among workingmen, capitalists and philanthropic aristocrats) the first article of their social program. In their first manifesto, they had characterized the workingmen's club as "the threshold of the future edifice, and the living type of the Catholic labor associations that we shall see flourishing some day."⁴²⁴ The conception had been vaguely presented in de Mun's speech at the inauguration of the first club founded by the Association in 1872.⁴²⁵ Gradually the idea had taken the form of a definite conviction that the medieval craft guilds, abolished at the time of the Revolution, should be restored in modern industry.⁴²⁶ Still, in 1876, de Mun had been none too specific: the guilds, he had asserted, "will spontaneously arise as they should be, and they will always be good and legitimate because they will be Christian." "As to their form and their statutes," he lamely added, "it is not for us, but rather for practice and experience, to determine them."⁴²⁷

After his entry into politics, de Mun became both more outspoken in his denunciation of the existing régime and more precise in his program for the future. His attacks on the existing régime of anarchical capitalist competition were no

less candid than those of the socialists. In competitive industry, he declared, "the workingman is used like the coal which is shovelled into the engine. . . ." ⁴²⁸ "I hear people proclaiming absolute liberty of labor as the principle of the emancipation of the people," he said, "and I see that in practise it leads to the enslavement of the people." ⁴²⁹ The Revolution, in the name of liberty, had destroyed the ancient organization of labor instead of reforming it. *Laissez faire! Laissez passer!* the "magic formula of liberal economy," had served to cover the abuse of force. As a result,

the fever of speculation invaded everything; merciless conflict took the place of fecund emulation; hand-industry was crushed; professional labor falls into decadence; wages shrink; pauperism spreads like a hideous leprosy; the exploited laborer feels the ferment of an implacable hatred growing in his heart; he has no refuge except in resistance and no recourse except to war; the coalition and the strike take the place of the organization of labor.⁴³⁰

To say such things before a great assembly of workingmen was dangerous. De Mun was rebuked by conservatives; he was accused of socialism. "We are called socialists," he said, "because we recognize what there is of justice in the demands of the workers." Admitting that he had seen, and commiserated, the sufferings of the working class, de Mun vehemently denied the charge of socialism; socialism was the "logical Revolution," and he stood for the Counter-Revolution.⁴³¹

Merely denouncing abuses was not sufficient: a positive program was needed. "It is not enough to talk," he said, "we must act and put in practice the labor reform we have undertaken. The abolition of the right of industrial organization was the consequence of the principles of liberty of labor; we purpose to reconquer that right." Industrial organization should take the form of "the Catholic guild, which is neither a trade-union, nor a tribunal of arbitration, but a center of Christian activity where the interest of the profession is superior to private interest, where antagonism between capitalist and workingman gives way to patronage exercised in a Christian spirit and freely accepted." ⁴³²

What we demand, is the right for masters and men to form freely together professional associations united by the bond of Christian confraternity and common interests, in order to remedy the antagonism which divides them, the isolation which leaves the laborers without protection against the abuses of competition which lead to the decadence of the trade.⁴³³

The guild idea was primarily applicable to small industries, to the arts and crafts, but the same principle must govern the great industries in which machine-production had been introduced.

If from the arts and crafts, that is to say, the professions in which . . . the human being has not become an accessory of the machine, we pass to industry, to the establishments in which mechanical motor forces are predominantly employed, the situation is doubtless delicate, and the applications will consequently be different; but the cause of the evil is the same, and the principles from which the remedy must be drawn subsist in their integrity. It is always the same thought: limit competition, associate common interests, impose upon the employer the duties of patronage, uplift labor and the condition of the laborer. . . .⁴³⁴

De Mun demanded not only labor organization, but labor legislation. The Christian moral law forbade the sacrifice of the body and soul of the workingman to the production of wealth.

In the name of this morality, we demand that his [the laborer's] work should not be excessive, and that his hours of labor should be regulated otherwise than by the law of interest and of the necessities of competition; we demand that his wife shall be permitted to remain the mistress of his home and shall not be engulfed with him in the whirl of labor without limits; we demand that his child shall grow up apart from this fever which devours his body prematurely and withers his soul; we demand, finally, that the workingman shall regain possession of what has so justly been called the great charter of his independence, the right to rest on Sunday.⁴³⁵

This program, formulated in 1878-1879, became more specific in 1882. In a speech at the tenth general assembly of the Workingmen's Clubs, May 7, 1882, de Mun described the guild as follows:

The guild as we conceive it is a community formed among employers and workingmen of the same profession, held together, first of all, by acceptance of the principle of social justice, which imposes on the former as well as on the latter reciprocal duties: that is the moral bond; and united by a common possession, by a corporate property arising from the voluntary sacrifices of both (classes): that is the material bond. . . .

To administer its affairs, to govern it, there is a trade board (*conseil syndical*) elected by the association and composed of employers, workingmen and that element of the upper class whose special rôle I have described.⁴³⁶ The trade board governs the guild, morally and materially; it discusses common interests; it administers the collective property and economic institutions [presumably, social insurance against accidents, old age, *etc.*]; it supervises the preservation of the homestead and the education of the children; it is, in short, the guardian of the community. . . .

For these professional communities, freely formed, raised up by private initiative, sustained by the family spirit, and invested with property rights in the guild property [*patrimoine corporatif*], we demand legal existence, not toleration, but the sanction of law for their regulations.⁴³⁷

Moreover, de Mun has caught an anticipatory glimpse of the scheme of professional representation which was subsequently to be so widely discussed:

We have greater ambitions and still larger visions; and when one thinks what the world of labor might be, thus organized, it is not difficult to perceive how the guild, when legally existing, might in the future become the basis of a sincere, fair, and true representation of interests in the domain of politics.⁴³⁸

In the same year de Mun asserted the necessity of social legislation,—“a legislation which will respect divine law, protect the weak, limit the fever of competition, prevent excessive labor, and, by giving the laborers their Sunday holiday, preserve their souls and their bodies.”⁴³⁹

DE MUN'S ADVOCACY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1883-1891

In the great debate of 1883 on the legalization of trade-unionism,⁴⁴⁰ de Mun's oration⁴⁴¹ against economic individual-

ism and in favor of the guild organization of industry created nothing less than a sensation. He was the first speaker to take the floor, and his ideas were so aggressively and emphatically stated that the debate proved to be more a discussion of his views than a deliberation on the technical provisions of the bill.

The fundamental cause of the modern labor problem, he maintained, was the false doctrine of the Liberal or individualistic economists. Leaving aside the generous intentions and magnificent phrases which had filled men with enthusiasm for liberty, he said, there was a doctrine which could not be overlooked. "I mention it," he said,

because in my opinion it is still, and in a very large measure, the cause of the malady from which the world of labor is suffering. It is the doctrine which consisted in considering labor as a commodity instead of regarding it as an act of human life, the noblest of all,—an act for which rules could not be traced without considering the man who is its author.

The principle established, all the rest follows as a logical sequence. If labor is in fact a commodity, once it is delivered he who sells it and he who buys are quit; hence there are no longer any reciprocal duties between employer and workingman; the interest of the former is to buy at the lowest price, and the interest of the latter is to sell at the highest price; therefore the struggle between capital and labor arises.

They [the economists] forgot that! They were enthusiastic for theories without weighing the practical consequences sufficiently. And when a system was built upon the law which a celebrated economist, Cobden, formulated in the sentence,—“When two workers are trying to get a wage, wages decline; when two employers are trying to get one workingman, wages rise.”—they did not think what miseries are accumulated in the first of these alternatives, “wages decline,” and what industrial crises, that is to say, after all, new miseries, are implied by the second: “wages rise.”

Thus it has come about that not only is the individual workingman isolated from his fellows, his interests being opposed to theirs, but also a grievous division has been created between those who purchase labor, that is to say, the employers, on one side, and on the other side those who sell it, that is to say, the workingmen. This is a new situation. . . .

This social situation has received a name, it is individualism, and

it is the plague which infects our diseased society, from top to bottom. An illustrious English statesman, Mr. Gladstone, has said that this century would be called the century of the workingmen. That is true if you mean that the history of this century is filled with the echoes of their sufferings and of their vain attempts to escape the yoke of individualism.

The mistaken idea of economic liberty or individualism had led the Constituent Assembly to abolish the guilds in 1791 and to prohibit any industrial organization to take their place. In showing how this policy had resulted in the oppression and degradation of the laboring classes, de Mun quoted socialist writings with telling effect. But, socialistic as his indictment of the capitalist régime might sound, he could not sympathize with the socialists in their proposals for reform. "In my opinion, and I say this without wishing to offend any one," he said, the socialist program "is the most dangerous of chimeras and would lead to the worst of despotisms."

Turning to the bourgeois parties, de Mun demanded,

What have you done to avert this peril? . . . What have you done, in the last half-century, to appease the regrets of the workingmen, and to remedy the plague of isolation which preys upon them? . . . Since you have been in power, what have you done to lessen the evil, to prevent the explosion? When, at what moment, have you concerned yourselves with the situation of labor? When you were absolutely compelled to do so; when the crisis burst out before your eyes, under your very feet, so to speak; but until then you spent your time in political quarrels, in the scramble for cabinet offices.

And even now the Government had no sound program. Co-operative production, which seemed to be regarded as a panacea, had been tried in practice and had proved to be successful only in special situations; it was not a remedy which could be applied to industry in general, and even where successful it did not touch the root of the problem, since coöperative production enterprises soon became in effect capitalist organizations, in which the shareholders hired employees.

Coming to the question of trade unions, de Mun expressed his belief that the legal recognition of trade unions might in

some measure relieve the existing situation, but he could not see how it would remove the division and antagonism between capitalists and laborers.

What is lacking in the unions as you conceive them — unions of employers or unions of workingmen, but isolated and separated from one another — is precisely what is the great want, the great social necessity of our times, and what existed at the basis of the old guild institutions, namely, personal contact, conciliation of interests, appeasement, which cannot be had except by the reconstruction of the industrial family.

Under the proposed law, the labor unions would be unable to realize a genuine, permanent amelioration of labor conditions. Employers' unions would be formed to resist labor unions. In the clash of organized interests, the employers would tend more and more to forget their social duty. Capital and labor would be organized for war, and "in this impious war, everybody will suffer: the workers first, because they are weaker; the masters, also, who little by little will be ruined; and finally, the country. . . ."

Therefore, in addition to permitting the legal organization of separate labor unions and employers' unions, the Chamber should grant special encouragement to unions which brought employers and workingmen together in a common organization. Such mixed unions (*syndicats mixtes*) should be empowered to receive bequests and legacies, to establish collective funds, to create institutions for insurance against sickness, unemployment, accidents, old age. Unions of this type were best suited to improve the conditions of the workingmen, to cultivate a spirit of social responsibility among employers, and to remove the causes of antagonism between capital and labor. Such unions, in fact, were the most promising modern substitute for the medieval guilds. Moreover, they responded to a real desire on the part of the employers and laborers alike; in support of this assertion, de Mun presented petitions signed by more than six thousand five hundred employers and workingmen.

The amendment which de Mun and his friends presented, to give effect to the ideas which have been summarized, was not

accepted by the Chamber. The Republicans regarded the proposal with undisguised suspicion; de Mun, they knew, was a clerical, and his mixed unions, they asserted, were designed to strengthen the hold of clericalism and monarchism on the masses. Perhaps the following sentences from a speech by Lockroy will give the flavor of the Republican replies to de Mun. Asserting that de Mun's scheme was nothing less than a clerical conspiracy against the work of the French Revolution, Lockroy said,

Never, perhaps, has an enterprise of this kind been more eloquently defended, more cleverly conducted, and more dangerous for society. They [de Mun and his followers] rely on a true fact; they rely on the difficult situation in which workers and capitalists have momentarily been placed by unemployment and foreign competition; they rely on a true sentiment, that is, the desire of capitalists and laborers to organize and to end a struggle ruinous to both; they rely on this fact and this true sentiment to attack the present régime and to demand that we say our *mea culpa* for the French Revolution, return to the institutions of the past, and destroy the great work of Turgot and the revolutionary assemblies. . . .

I wonder whether it beseems a representative of the monarchy, a representative of clericalism, to stand before this assembly and take the part of the workingmen against us.⁴⁴²

In the trade-union debate of 1883, de Mun sprang at a single bound into the front rank of orators on social questions in the Chamber of Deputies. Thenceforward, he took an important part in most deliberations on labor problems, and continually reaffirmed his principles, with more and more specific applications.

On January 14, 1884, in the course of a debate on trade-boards in mining industries, he again put forward the guild organization, combining workers and employers and containing within itself the natural means of arbitration, as the true remedy for labor unrest.⁴⁴³

In a debate on January 25, 1884, regarding the Government's program for the alleviation of the labor crisis, he renewed his charge that the Republican Government was neglecting the workingmen. He cited statistics and quoted economists to

prove the gravity of the situation. In the face of existing discontent, unemployment, poverty and industrial anarchy, the Government was doing little or nothing. "It is not for me to explain," he said, "who is responsible for the fact that as yet no definite law in favor of the laborers has been sanctioned by the republican assemblies." Addressing the Government, he asked,

Will you at once begin the laborious, difficult task of legislation for the protection of the workers? It has been said with truth, that there were a large number of bills in your portfolios, but they have been slumbering there for the last three years.

Will you study the creation of a corporative [guild] organization of labor, based on the union of masters and men? We have asked you to provide the means; you refused; but we still demand them.

He proposed, besides the guild, national and international labor legislation; he hoped that France would welcome and act upon the Swiss proposal for an international congress on labor legislation. He also advocated the encouragement of consumers' coöperative societies.⁴⁴⁴

Accident insurance, said de Mun on October 20, 1884, should be based upon labor organizations rather than upon the administrative bureaucracy of the government. Invoking the example of the law recently passed by the German Reichstag, he urged the Chamber of Deputies to adopt a system of accident insurance administered by unions. Such a system would be the safest and most effective method of insurance, and it would be a step in the direction of guild organization. Furthermore, he added, it would in no way outrage justice to make accident insurance compulsory; compulsory insurance was "perhaps the only practical and truly efficacious method of solving this grave social difficulty."⁴⁴⁵

In a debate on November 20, 1884, regarding the labor crisis in Paris, de Mun intervened to make another plea for the guild, and to deliver another warning against the Government's policy.

What means this universal complaint regarding the disorganization

of labor? That the social institutions which we lack are needed.

Well, gentlemen, every time we take up these questions, you know what happens. We run up against the stone wall of impotence. In this Chamber all questions of providence, against accident, against sickness, against old age, have been discussed; what has been the result? Nothing.

If the Government persisted in refusing to foster a constructive labor organization, it would be compelled to adopt palliative measures to relieve labor troubles, and such measures would take on more and more a state-socialistic character: the choice must be made between healthy industrial organization and state socialism. "Every time, gentlemen, that one mentions state socialism to you, you cry out in protest; nevertheless, you are being pushed towards it inevitably, by the force of events, by the economic situation which presses upon you from every quarter; you can escape from anarchy only by throwing yourselves into state socialism." ⁴⁴⁶

The progress de Mun had made toward formulating a practical program of labor legislation may be estimated by the platform which he sketched, in 1885, as the basis for a clerical party, a "Catholic Union," which at the time he dreamed of founding.⁴⁴⁷ The party would maintain (1) for the Church, liberty and security; (2) for the Family, liberty of religious education, the sanctity of marriage,⁴⁴⁸ and protection of the homestead;⁴⁴⁹ (3) "for the People,—the limitation of labor by the legal establishment of the Sunday holiday; the prohibition of night work for women and the progressive suppression of factory work for mothers and for children of both sexes; protective legislation against accidents, sickness, involuntary unemployment, and the inability to work resulting from old age; and, to render this legislation practical and efficacious, a corporative [guild] organization of labor destined, in the words of the Encyclical *Humanum Genus*, 'to protect under the aegis of religion the interests of labor and the morals of the working-men'." ⁴⁵⁰

The projected Catholic party never materialized. It was not reactionary enough, in its political program, to suit some

clericals; it was too much so to suit others. The papal nuncio, considering the scheme inopportune, advised de Mun to abandon it; and de Mun renounced his project.⁴⁵¹ The bourgeois Republican anticlericals were to continue in power, while the Catholics remained divided; and, as regards social legislation, dreary decades were to elapse, during which the Republicans, while talking much of labor problems, made painfully slow progress in actual social legislation. Some of the reforms outlined by de Mun in 1885 were accomplished in fragmentary and hesitant fashion: — the restriction of female and child labor, by the laws of 1892, 1900, 1909; accident compensation, by the law of 1898; old age assistance, in 1905; old age pensions, in 1910; the Sunday holiday, in 1906.

After the failure of his project for a Catholic party, de Mun devoted more of his attention to the elaboration of his social program. In the years 1886 to 1889 he presented, in concert with a small group of his friends in the Chamber of Deputies, a series of remarkable bills embodying his ideas. In some respects these bills were not as radical as those which socialists were presenting at the same time, but they were unquestionably much more radical than the measures that the republican majority was willing to enact.

De Mun's Bill for the Regulation of Labor, presented on February 20, 1886, proposed as "a minimum of very insufficient reforms": reduction of the working-day to eleven hours for adult laborers (the legal limit was then twelve hours and was not enforced)⁴⁵²; observation of Sundays and legal holidays as days of rest; reduction of the working-day to eight hours on Saturdays and on days preceding holidays; absolute prohibition of the industrial employment of children under twelve years of age (the existing law prohibited employment of children under ten years of age); requirement of a medical certificate of fitness for employment of children between twelve and sixteen years of age; prohibition of the employment of girls under fourteen years of age in factories; exclusion of girls and women from heavy labor and from shops in which

toxic substances were handled; non-employment of mothers during the four weeks after childbirth.⁴⁵³

Another bill, likewise presented by de Mun and his associates in 1886, provided compulsory sickness insurance and old age pensions for workingmen. The insurance and pension funds were to be raised by joint contributions of workingmen and employers, the workingmen paying not more than half the premium, and in no case more than three per cent. of their wages. These funds were to be administered, in each region and for each trade, by elected boards of workingmen and employers. In addition to sickness indemnities and old age pensions (for himself, his widow, or his orphaned children), the workingman was to receive gratuitous medical treatment.⁴⁵⁴

A somewhat similar scheme for the insurance of workingmen against accidents was proposed by de Mun's bill of February 2, 1886. Workingmen were to receive compensation, or in case of fatal accidents their survivors were to receive pensions, according to a schedule stated in the bill; negligence or slight imprudence on the part of the victim was not considered sufficient to invalidate his claim. To guarantee the payment of accident indemnities, employers were required to form regional insurance unions, which would be managed by elected boards of workingmen and employers. The cost of the insurance was to be borne for the most part by the employer (75 per cent. at a minimum), but in part by the workingmen (at most 25 per cent.).⁴⁵⁵

Two bills on industrial arbitration and conciliation boards, presented by Le Cour, were signed also by de Mun. Arbitration of questions regarding wages, length of working hours, conditions of health and safety, might be invoked by either workingmen or employers; arbitral boards were to be composed of an equal number of members chosen by the workingmen and members chosen by the employers. Employers and workingmen in any trade were legally authorized, but not compelled, to institute a permanent board of arbitration and conciliation.⁴⁵⁶

The proposals outlined in the bill of February 20, 1886, regarding child-labor, the employment of women, and the eleven-hour day, were carried further in a bill presented by de Mun in December, 1889. The bill, he explained, did not pretend to exhaust the question, but included simply certain "indispensable" reforms. The maximum working-week for adult workers of either sex, in factories, shops, and mines, was to be reduced to 58 hours, with no work on Sundays or legal holidays, and only eight hours on Saturdays or days preceding legal holidays. Children were not to be employed, in any case, under the age of thirteen years (the 1886 bill had proposed twelve years), and not under the age of sixteen without a medical certificate of health. Women were not to work at night, or underground, or in shops employing toxic materials, or under conditions prejudicial to their health, or during a period of four weeks following childbirth. To make the code of labor laws truly effective, a special corps of labor inspectors was to be created, and a supervisory committee was to be instituted.⁴⁵⁷

A specially interesting feature of this bill was the provision that shop-regulations and wage-schedules should be posted in all shops and regularly notified to the labor inspectors. In this way, the inspectorate would obtain ample data to enable the Chamber of Deputies to study the question of a minimum wage.

Two additional bills presented in 1889 embodied other details of de Mun's program. The first, presented on December 5, by Thellier de Poncheville, Le Gavrian, de Mun, and others, protected small wages against seizure.⁴⁵⁸ The other, presented on December 7, aimed to prevent the excessive division of land, by permitting the division of inheritances in value, without involving the break-up of the family farm as a workable unit.⁴⁵⁹

De Mun's activity was not limited to the presentation of bills outlining his solution of the labor problem. In the debates on social legislation he constantly employed his eloquence in urging reforms. In the debate of January 29, 1889, for instance, he delivered a remarkable reply to the spokesman of

orthodox political economy, Frédéric Passy, who had declared that labor reform must be accomplished by private initiative rather than by legislative action; de Mun maintained the necessity of legislative intervention and of international agreement on labor legislation, and urged his friends, whatever their opinions on other matters, to support him in taking a strong attitude on this question.⁴⁶⁰ Again, in the discussions early in 1891, regarding the restriction of child-labor, the employment of women, and the reduction of the working-day, de Mun took a very active part, striving to secure effective legislation.⁴⁶¹

Count Albert de Mun's social program as presented before the Chamber of Deputies in the years from 1883 to 1891, far from representing the final expression of Social Catholic ideas in France, was destined to undergo considerable modification and amendment in subsequent years; nevertheless, it marked a great advance. The counter-revolutionary impulse which led to the formation of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs had been translated into a definite, detailed social program, a program decidedly modern in tone, despite de Mun's admiration of the middle ages and inclination toward monarchism; and de Mun had become a leading advocate of social legislation in the Chamber of Deputies.

The program may be summed up under three heads. (A) *Labor Organization*: The right of labor to organize was to be recognized in law, and every encouragement, legislative and otherwise, was to be given to the formation of mixed arbitration and conciliation boards, mixed unions, and other institutions tending toward the inter-organization of capital and labor. The ideal to be approached was not one-sided labor-unionism, which could merely exact concessions from capitalists, but rather, a modernized form of guild organization, embracing both capital and labor and reconciling their interests. Such an organization would secure respect of the rights of the workingman, would admit him to a share in the management of industry, and would help to restore his interest and craftsmanlike pride in his trade. Ultimately, the trade organizations would become, in large part, the agencies for the regulation of

wages, hours, and industrial conditions, and for social insurance.

(B) *Labor legislation*: The principle that the Government should intervene to protect not only women and children, but also adult male workers, against excessive hours of employment and unhealthful conditions was fully recognized. As regards adult male workers, a weekly maximum of fifty-eight hours of labor was fixed. Sundays and holidays were to be respected. Women were not to be employed at night, or underground, or in unhealthful occupations, or in heavy labor, or during four weeks after childbirth. Children were excluded absolutely from factories up to the age of thirteen; girls, to the age of fourteen; and a certificate of health was required before children between thirteen or fourteen and sixteen years of age could be employed. The details here given were not intended to represent the maximum of the desirable, but merely what was considered practicable and "indispensable" at the period. The establishment of a minimum wage, for example, was not definitely included, but it was proposed to collect wage statistics with a view to action on the wage problem. Furthermore, it was believed that social legislation in France should be supplemented by international agreements; such agreements would enable national legislation to proceed further without danger of ruinous foreign competition.

(C) *Social Insurance*: The workingman was to receive an old age pension, and was to be insured against the consequences of accident and sickness. To place these social insurances in the hand of the state, de Mun believed, would only aggravate the evils of bureaucracy and accelerate the drift toward state socialism; instead, he would entrust the management of insurance funds to boards representing the employers and the workingmen themselves. By this device, he hoped not only to secure a better system of insurance, but to foster the inter-organization of labor and capital on a trade basis.

A MANUFACTURER'S EXPERIMENT

A political or social movement is rarely the result of a single impulse; more frequently it is produced by a combination of dynamic factors. So it was with the Social Catholic movement under the Third French Republic. Count Albert de Mun's political and social campaign was only one element, albeit the most important element, in creating the new current of social philosophy. Having followed the development of de Mun's ideas down to the year 1891, we may now turn back to trace the influence of a second factor in the situation, and to show how this second factor, though of independent origin, entered into close combination with the first.

In this case, the impulse toward social reform comes not from the ranks of the feudal nobility, but from the industrial bourgeoisie, from the owners of the Harmel Cotton Mills. This dynasty of industrial magnates had been founded in the early days of the Industrial Revolution by Jacques Harmel, a hand-spinner, who was one of the first to introduce the new spinning machines into France. One of his sons, Jacques Joseph Harmel, founded the great spinning mill of Val-des-Bois in the year 1840.⁴⁶² That the factory at Val-des-Bois became internationally famous as a social experiment was due to Jacques Joseph Harmel's originality, an originality consisting largely in a really sincere and almost saintly religious devotion. Shocked by the irreligion and immorality prevalent among the working-classes, he strove at first to convert his employees to Christianity by personal contact and personal example. This means proving to be of small effect, he hit upon the idea of founding and fostering welfare associations which while ameliorating the material conditions among his workingmen would also exert a salutary moral and religious influence.⁴⁶³ Thanks to his persistence and enthusiasm, the experiment proved successful. The Val-des-Bois became in some sort a modern guild. Instead of strikes and class-conflict, "Christian Democracy" and "social peace" reigned at Val-des-Bois, and the title, "the good father" (*Bon père*), which the workingmen gave to their

master, expressed the "family-like" harmony which pervaded the establishment.⁴⁶⁴

The organization of Val-des-Bois was developed by Jacques Harmel's son Léon, who fully realized the significance of his father's and his own innovations as a social experiment, an attempt to establish a "Christian guild" as a pattern of industrial organization. Léon Harmel's books,—*Manual of a Christian Guild* (1876),⁴⁶⁵ and *Employer's Catechism* (1889),⁴⁶⁶ provide us with an excellent description of what the Harmels actually accomplished and with a statement of the theory upon which they worked.⁴⁶⁷

The Val-des-Bois guild was an organism, a union of associations, rather than a simple union. This complexity was inherent in the theory itself, for the Harmels were striving to combine several principles in a harmonious practical system. The simple principle of union by itself was considered inadequate; it tended to create labor-unions hostile to capital and bent on class warfare. The principle of democratic control of industry would logically lead to the elimination of the employer. The principle of capitalistic paternalism, if taken alone, was inadequate because it failed to awaken any vital response among the workingmen. The Harmels attempted to make a Christian synthesis of these principles. In the first place, the workers were permitted, nay encouraged, to form various associations—a men's club, a women's association, a girls' society, a mutual benefit society. Democratic control was practised in the management of these associations, and was represented by elected shop-committees, but was not carried to the extreme. The Guild Board, an elective council of workingmen, was consulted on such questions as shop-management and wage-schedules, but had no sovereign authority in these matters; the policy of the employers was to act with democratic advice and consent, but not to abdicate their authority. The third principle, paternalism, received expression in manifold efforts on the part of the employers to promote the material and moral welfare of the workingmen, to foster and guide even the institutions controlled by the workers. The

paternal influence may be seen in the fact that one of the employers acted as chairman of the Guild Board, and the supervision of general guild interests was entrusted to a committee composed of the members of the firm, the chaplain, the school-director, and representatives of the various workingmen's associations. In this fashion the three principles of association, democratic control, and capitalist paternalism were combined and balanced in a complex organism consisting of first, employers, second, the general committee of employers and representatives of the workingmen's institutions, third, the workingmen's Guild Board, fourth, shop committees, fifth, various economic, social and religious associations among the work-people.

The Guild Board was in many respects the most interesting feature of the organization. Its meetings were held every six weeks, as a rule, and were concerned with general questions, such as workingmen's insurance, wages, shop-regulations, supervision of the guild institutions. For matters of detail, the Board was divided into four sections, each of which held weekly meetings. One section had charge of accident-compensation, sickness-benefits, life-insurance, and the savings-bank. Another secured discounts from licensed tradesmen. A third purchased coal and potatoes at wholesale prices. Vocational training was supervised by one of the sections.

In these and similar matters the workingmen gained valuable experience in collective action and obtained very considerable material advantages for themselves. For example, by licensing a butcher, a baker, a grocer, a vegetable-dealer, and a cheese-dealer to supply the guild-members, and by guaranteeing these licensed tradesmen against bad accounts, the guild secured a discount of five per cent. on all purchases by members. Again, by purchasing coal in large quantities, a twenty per cent. saving was effected; on potatoes, vegetables and bread the saving was ten per cent. Seasonal exhibits of clothing were arranged, enabling the members to select their wearing apparel from a large stock and to purchase at wholesale prices.

The members of the guild also enjoyed the benefits of what

we now call social insurance. All members were insured against accident and death. In case of sickness, a very small daily indemnity of from ten to thirty *sous* was paid. Moreover, when a woman was sick and unable to discharge her home duties, a girl was sent to do the household work. A physician was paid by the employer to give free medical assistance. Medicines were provided without charge. In serious cases, a patient might be sent to the hospital at Rheims, without expense to himself. In case of accident, the worker received half-pay while he was disabled; if permanently crippled, he received a life annuity; if he was killed, his family received a compensation proportional to his wages.

Harmel was especially interested in promoting the family life of his employees. Instead of erecting barren and unsightly tenements, in which no family could enjoy privacy, and all were condemned to live in depressing squalor, he built separate cottages each with as large a garden as the family desired. These he rented at 140 francs a year. A dowry of one hundred francs was given to girls at the time of their marriage. Weddings were made the occasion of social festivities. Mothers received material and medical assistance at time of childbirth. Morality was preached and vice discouraged. Every possible means was employed to make the workingman's home a stable center of contentment and happiness.

Many years in advance of national legislation, a rule was established at Val-des-Bois that no children should be employed under the age of twelve years. Free primary education was instituted and school-attendance was made compulsory. Furthermore, as has been remarked, the guild had a system of vocational training. The higher positions in the factory were filled from the ranks of laborers, and the idea that promotion was the normal result of expertness was sedulously cultivated.

Probably the moral effects of the guild organization were quite as important as its material advantages. The workingman who was secure in his employment, protected against accident or sickness, participating in the management of guild affairs, was no longer a "wage-slave," a cog in the machine,

but a self-respecting human being. He felt a pride in his trade and in his home. The increase of savings indicated the growth of self-respect among Harmel's workmen; in the year 1877 almost 19,000 francs were deposited in the guild savings-bank. Moreover, a healthy social life, fostered by the various associations, satisfied the human craving which under different circumstances would have been indulged in vicious amusements. Musical clubs, recreation-rooms, billiards, bowling, skittles and theatrical entertainments afforded harmless forms of amusement, while the deliberations of the various boards and committees and the meetings of the associations offered an interesting and useful means of occupying leisure hours. The net result was contentment, a commodity as satisfactory to the workmen as it is profitable to the employer. Strikes and lockouts were inconceivable.

Just how large a part religious elements played in the guild at Val-des-Bois would be difficult to estimate. Certainly it was a very important part. In founding the guild institutions, the Harmels, by their own testimony, had at heart the religious welfare of their workmen quite as much as the harmonious and efficient conduct of the factory. The members of the guild were encouraged to join purely religious Catholic societies. The chaplain and the friar who directed the schools were members of the governing committee. The whole life of the community was pervaded by the Christian spirit. Harmel, when he came to discuss the theory of the guild, insisted that unity and harmony could not be obtained without frankly accepting Christianity as the moral basis.

Because his experiment in industrial management was so distinctly Catholic in character, Léon Harmel took the keenest possible interest in Count Albert de Mun's campaign for the establishment of Catholic Workmen's Clubs. What Harmel had achieved in fact,—the reorganization of industry on a Christian basis,—de Mun was demanding in theory. Harmel's experiment and de Mun's propaganda inevitably converged.

Contact between the two was established in the year 1873,

when de Mun's Catholic Workingmen's Clubs were making a pilgrimage at Liesse. The club members were marching in a procession, when they were surprised to see Harmel and a detachment of workingmen from Val-des-Bois appear from behind an ambush. This was Harmel's manner of announcing that Val-des-Bois had joined de Mun's Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs.⁴⁶⁸

That Harmel was warmly welcomed goes almost without saying. He supplied precisely what the Association needed, the confirmation of practical experience for its doctrines. Hitherto, the directors of the Association had eloquently but somewhat vaguely recommended the restoration of the guild régime in industry; now, however, they had before their eyes a concrete example, a practical working model. Restoration of the guild in a modernized form was no longer an ideal glowing dimly through the mists of the distant future; it was a program for immediate action. What Harmel had done, other Christian employers could and should imitate. Hence we find the leaders of the Association becoming more positive and much more definite in their propaganda for the guild idea.

At the request of de Mun's friend, La Tour du Pin, Léon Harmel prepared a Manual setting forth the principles and describing the operation of the Christian guild.⁴⁶⁹ He laid the proofs of this book before the national Congress of the Association, at Bordeaux, in 1876, together with a report on the same subject. His definition of the guild may be quoted:

The Guild may be defined as follows: The Christian labor guild is formed by the harmonized collectivity of divers societies, which comprise the employers as well as the workingmen and the various members of the family. The guild is established by a committee; it is based on Catholic principles, respect of social hierarchies and submission to the Church.

The associations which compose it are constituted and governed in accord with two principles adopted by the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs:

1. The devotion of the upper class to the laborers;
2. Participation of the working-class members in the internal control, under the direction of an affectionate but efficacious paternal care (*paternité*).

Each association has its elected council, which really conducts the administration, under the chairmanship of a director or directress.

Each association is represented in the guild committee, the men's associations by their directors, the associations of women and girls by delegates.

The union of these associations is manifested by joint meetings. . . .

This union is cemented by Christian charity and sustained by economic institutions which extend the solicitude of the guild to all the needs of its members, from the moral and the material point of view. These economic institutions are governed by a board chosen by the Council of Clubs and the Committee.⁴⁷⁰

The following year, Harmel brought his Manual before the congress of Catholic Friendly Societies (*Œuvres ouvrières catholiques*), at Puy. Again he insisted that the guild must be primarily religious. In fact, its primary aim seemed to be the religious reformation of the industrial classes. "Instead of attempting a vain and useless resistance," he said, "let us go to the machine and baptize it."⁴⁷¹

Harmel's influence was especially powerful in attracting Catholic capitalists. To them, his scheme offered at once a means of reconciling Christianity and capitalism, and a safeguard against the socialist labor movement. In November, 1879, an important group of Catholic industrialists in northern France endorsed Harmel's principles.⁴⁷² A few years later, in August, 1882, all the employers present at the Congress of Catholic Friendly Societies at Autun subscribed to a declaration approving the Val-des-Bois experiment as an example to be imitated, and affirming the very great importance of "multiplying without delay examples of the Christian guild, in order to prepare the way for the guild system, the true solution of the labor problem."⁴⁷³

True to their word, a number of Catholic employers did in fact attempt to imitate the organization of the Val-des-Bois guild. To all such efforts the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs gave the most lively sympathy and active encouragement. Almost every month the Bulletin of the Association contained some report on the progress of these foundations.

Meanwhile, in parliament, Count Albert de Mun was demanding not only legal recognition, but special rights, such as the right to receive legacies and bequests, for mixed unions (*syndicats mixtes*) of employers and workingmen,—the Christian guild falling within the category of mixed unions.⁴⁷⁴ Other leading members of the Association published articles on the necessity, the theoretical excellence, or the practical value of the guild organization.⁴⁷⁵

In short, the Harmel experiment, antedating and at first independent of Count Albert de Mun's propaganda, was a very powerful factor in reinforcing that propaganda and an important element in the Social Catholic movement. Harmel's great personal prestige and the renown of his model factory were highly-valued assets. Perhaps, in the long run, the influence of Harmel and of the Catholic employers who followed in his train was not altogether helpful to the Social Catholic movement,—as to that, the facts which will be brought out in subsequent pages will enable the reader to form his own opinion. But that the influence, whether helpful or not, was very considerable, can hardly be disputed.

CHAPTER IV

ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ABROAD

UP to this point in the narrative, French Social Catholicism has been considered as though it were an indigenous, self-sufficient movement in France alone, quite independent of foreign influence. There is, indeed, some justification for this method of treatment; it has the advantage of simplicity in exhibiting the evolution of the French movement; moreover, to the reader who has followed the tradition of Lacordaire and Ozanam down through the decades to its revival under the Third Republic, there can hardly be much room for doubt that the purely French elements were vital enough to have produced an entirely independent movement had that been necessary. But on the other hand, it were folly to deny that contemporaneous developments in other countries exerted a very genuine influence upon the French Social Catholics. It is, therefore, of interest to turn aside from France, for the moment, in order to survey the development of the foreign Social Catholic movements and to evaluate their influence upon France.

Probably the most important of these foreign movements, and the one that had the greatest positive influence on French Catholic thought, was that which arose in Germany. It owed its inception⁴⁷⁶ to Baron Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811-1877),⁴⁷⁷ who has been styled "the first and veritable initiator of the Social Catholic Movement."⁴⁷⁸

After completing his university studies in law and economics, von Ketteler entered the Prussian civil service. When, however, the Prussian Government in 1837 arrested the Archbishop of Cologne, he resigned his position and entered the priesthood. This decisive event in his life gave him a strong anti-bureaucratic bias, a bias clearly evinced in his subsequent writings on the social question.

His work as a priest led him to take a keen interest in the labor problem, partly because he came into personal contact with the masses and observed their economic and moral degradation, partly because he discovered that socialist agitation was making progress among them. In November, 1848, a few months after the publication of the historic *Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels, von Ketteler, preaching in the cathedral at Mainz, electrified his auditors by entering upon a bold discussion of the labor problem. "If we would understand the times in which we live," he declared, "we must seek to fathom the social problem." Political leaders were talking of liberty of the press, the franchise, the right of assembly, but none of these would feed the hungry. Social reformers were proposing all manner of remedies, but these were "nothing but drops in the bucket." Equal division of property was a drastic, but not a sound cure. The true solution must be obtained from Christianity. Not mere charitable alms-giving in the name of Christ would suffice. Christians must go further than that. The Christian philosophy must give new direction to men's strivings, and new form to their economic ideas. There must be a return to the love of the common people as that love was exemplified by the mendicant friars in the middle ages. There must be a return to the conception of property-rights as set forth by the great medieval theologian, Saint Thomas Aquinas: namely, that men enjoyed not an absolute and unconditional ownership of property, but only the right to use property in accordance with divine law.⁴⁷⁹

Years of economic study⁴⁸⁰ and reflection confirmed von Ketteler in his opinion that Christianity held the key to the solution of the social problem. In a book on *The Labor Question and Christianity* (1864),⁴⁸¹ he discussed the problem and its proposed solutions in detail. His denunciation of existing conditions was, to say the least, vigorous. The workingman, he said, had been victimized by the Industrial Revolution; "he stands in competition with a machine which works day and night, without hunger or need of sleep, unresting, and with not merely human strength, but the force of many horse-power."

The growing preponderance of capital was driving the independent workman into the class of day-laborers and wage-earners.⁴⁸² Wages, being made to depend upon "supply and demand," were uncertain, inadequate to supply human needs. He quoted a mass of statistics and reports of investigations to show the alarming condition of labor.⁴⁸³ "This is the slave-market of our liberal Europe," he ironically declared, "fashioned according to the pattern of our humane, enlightened, anti-Christian Liberalism and Free-Masonry."⁴⁸⁴

Coming to the analysis of proposed remedies, von Ketteler observed that the Liberals represented by Schultze-Delitzsch and the radicals or socialists represented by Lassalle both proposed to create coöperative production associations as the means of rescuing the workingmen from the wage-system. The Liberals, true to their principles, defended liberty of industry and trade, repudiated state-intervention, and trusted to self-help and education; and the coöperative production associations which Schultze-Delitzsch advocated were to be formed voluntarily, with capital contributed from the savings of the members.⁴⁸⁵ These proposals, said von Ketteler, were wholly inadequate; only the more prosperous artisans could benefit thereby; the wage-earners in the larger industries had no hope of accumulating capital sufficient to launch coöperative enterprises.⁴⁸⁶

The Lassallean socialists, on the other hand, proposed that the state should provide the capital for coöperative production associations.⁴⁸⁷ Von Ketteler, ever distrustful of the government, considered such action dangerous; nay more, the government had no moral right to take the wealth of some of the citizens for the purpose of lending it to others.⁴⁸⁸ He admitted, however, that Lassalle's party had performed a useful service in exposing the evils in the existing industrial system and in calling attention to the grievances of labor.

For his own part, the Catholic bishop proposed that the coöperative associations should be financed by the voluntary contributions of Christians. The Church had raised great sums for the erection of cathedrals,—why not now for the reform

of industry? Here was an urgent duty and a glorious opportunity for Christianity to step into the breach.⁴⁸⁹

Von Ketteler's book had an enormous effect. His ideas were widely and—to a surprising extent—favorably discussed by the Catholic press. Lassalle hailed the volume as a very important confirmation of his own economic doctrine, even though it criticized his program. To French bourgeois observers, it appeared that the German bishop had turned socialist.⁴⁹⁰

Bishop von Ketteler's program soon became more radical and more precise. In 1869 he told the laborers that their demands for higher wages, for shorter hours, for holidays, for prohibition of child-labor and of the industrial employment of women, were sanctioned by justice and by Christianity.⁴⁹¹ That same year, he prepared for the German bishops' congress at Fulda a report in which he advocated: profit-sharing, increase of wages according to years of service, legislative prohibition of child-labor, limitation of the working day, closure of unhealthy work-shops, state-inspection of factory conditions; moreover, the Church must take an active part in combating industrial abuses, and in instilling justice, charity, and morality into men's hearts.⁴⁹²

It is to be observed that von Ketteler, while remaining convinced that Christianity rather than the state must play the leading rôle in promoting the reorganization of industry and in proclaiming social justice, gradually came to a perception of the necessity of labor legislation on the part of the state. Thus his zeal for social reform triumphed, in a measure, over his strong anti-governmental predilection. It was this later phase of his thought, rather than his advocacy of coöperative production, that particularly influenced the French Social Catholics. The mature expression of his ideas regarding social legislation is found in the program which he suggested for German Catholics, at the time of the establishment of the German Empire.⁴⁹³ "The first thing that the laboring and artisan class may demand from the state," he said, "is that the state restore what it has taken away, namely, a constitution for the

laboring class, for the regulation of labor.”⁴⁹⁴ Hence, in the first place, he asked for legislation in favor of the restoration of the labor organization which had been inherited from the middle ages but destroyed in modern times.⁴⁹⁵ In the second place, “at least as long as he cannot help himself by means of his own organization,” the workingman may claim legislative protection. In detail, the following protective measures were necessary: (1) prohibition of child-labor should be enforced in all employments outside the home; (2) children should be excluded from industry up to at least their fourteenth year; (3) employment of married women in factories and in industry outside their homes should be forbidden; (4) if girls are permitted to work in factories at all it should be on condition that their work-rooms are entirely separate from those of the men; (5) on Sundays and holidays all industrial work must be prohibited; (6) the law should limit the working day, even for men, to ten or, at most, eleven hours; (7) sanitary and moral conditions should be safeguarded by the law; (8) the execution of labor laws should be thorough, and should be supervised by an adequate force of inspectors.⁴⁹⁶

Round about von Ketteler there grew up a group of Social Catholic leaders, a group whose influence radiated far and wide. Conspicuous among von Ketteler's disciples was Christopher Moufang,⁴⁹⁷ a priest, whom von Ketteler appointed, successively, rector of the seminary at Mainz, canon of the cathedral, and representative in the upper house of the Hessian Landtag. Canon Moufang went even further than his master in advocacy of social legislation. When, in 1871, he was elected to the Reichstag as a member of the Catholic or Center Party, it was on a strong labor platform. In his electoral address,—a classic formulation of the German Social Catholic program,—Moufang declared that, important as the contribution of the Church to social reform might be, the Church alone, and private efforts alone, were inadequate. The state, therefore, was obliged to intervene in defense of labor, in four ways:

(1) The state must enact protective laws. At present the

law protected landed property and capital. Why should it not protect the workingman against the so-called "iron law" of wages, and assure him an equitable compensation for his labor?⁴⁹⁸ The state was not obliged to create labor associations, but it should certainly give them legal aid and encouragement, and sanction their statutes, so that they might develop strongly and vigorously as in the middle ages. Furthermore, the law should prohibit work on Sundays and should limit the working-day. The labor of women and children should not be merely restricted, but should be absolutely prohibited. There should be factory and housing laws. Such legislation was urgently needed to eradicate industrial abuses which were in open contradiction with Christian principles.

(2) The state should also give financial assistance, in the form of loans on easy terms, to encourage coöperative production. On this point, Moufang adopts the Lassallean principle repudiated in 1864 by von Ketteler.

(3) A third reform helpful to the workingman would be the reduction of military burdens. Militarism, the plague of modern Germany, took the laborers from field and factory for military training, and saddled the people with oppressive taxation.

(4) Finally, it was the duty of the state, by checking excessive speculation and supervising stock-exchange operations, to curb the tyranny of capital. Wealth in itself was not to be condemned, but the acquisition of millions by immoral financial speculation, or by wringing fortunes from the sweat of the working-classes, was not to be tolerated.⁴⁹⁹

After Canon Moufang's retirement from active political life (1886), Canon Hitze⁵⁰⁰ became the most conspicuous exponent of Social Catholic theories in Germany. In Hitze's numerous works on economic questions⁵⁰¹ the starting-point was the same as it was in von Ketteler's *The Labor Question*. The introduction of machinery and the growing power of capital, he pointed out, had placed the workingman in an intolerable situation, and had brought in their train social injustices against which Christians were morally obliged to protest. The work-

ingman had become *mechanized*, a slave to the machine. The unresting machine demanded human labor on Sundays and holidays, and during the night, as well as in normal working hours; it had robbed the workingman of independence, of needful leisure, of wife and children, and of his just wages. Political economy had introduced a false, materialistic, and un-Christian philosophy of industry. The modern economic system, consequently, had become "the organization of 'the struggle for existence,' in which capital and labor alike succumb."⁵⁰² His analysis of the defects of the existing order is worth quoting:

The present social order, governed only by the law of competition, is not adequate as an "order"; it does not satisfy either the material conditions of production or the interests of social distribution, or, finally, from a moral and intellectual viewpoint, the ideas of liberty and equality,—the aspirations, in short, which characterize our epoch. It was born and developed under the exclusive auspices of individualism; its constitution is vicious; it now needs an organization with a more social basis for its further perfection.⁵⁰³

The "social question," then, was the problem of finding a system of economic organization adapted to modern methods of production and at the same time harmonious with modern ideals. The solution was not to be found in state socialism. Hitze rejected Marxian socialism just as von Ketteler in his day had opposed Lassalleian socialism. He distrusted the tendency toward centralization and bureaucracy; he feared lest the heavy hand of the state should be laid upon all social life, preventing the healthy development of individuals and of social organisms.⁵⁰⁴

"It is not state socialism that we want," cried Hitze, "but guild socialism."⁵⁰⁵ In other words, he felt and said that the solution of the social question lay in the return to the medieval idea of organizing society on the basis of guilds. Not a pure and simple return to the medieval guild, but the establishment of a modernized guild-system was what he advocated. The guilds of today must rest upon a larger economic basis and must be more democratic than those of the middle ages."

Whereas the French Social Catholics in the 'eighties were reluctant to accept the principle of compulsory guild organization, Hitze felt that the voluntary and consequently partial organization of industry on the guild basis would be absolutely inadequate. Free guilds would be frail weapons to cleave through the "iron law" of wages. To be effective, guild organization must be made compulsory for all industries, trades, and professions, and for agriculture as well.⁵⁰⁶

Once established, the guilds might serve as the starting-point for far-reaching political and even international reconstruction. For example, Hitze anticipated the later agitation for "functional representation," by suggesting a reform of the representative system on the basis of the guilds.⁵⁰⁷ Again, in international relations, the guilds would promote true peace and fraternity:

Once we have national guild associations, their international federation will be established easily, since they will be forced into it by self-interest. Then the way will be opened to a veritable "fraternization" of the nations.⁵⁰⁸

Bishop von Ketteler, Canon Moufang, and Canon Hitze were but three outstanding figures in the German Social Catholic movement. Count Lösewitz, a Protestant economist who was converted to Catholicism, Professor Rudolph Meyer, a very important non-Catholic economist who became a leading exponent of Social Catholic doctrines, Jörg and Jäger, two historians of socialism and social politics, Abbé Winterer, Hohenberg, Ratzinger, the historian, Lennig, Lehmkuhl, and, among its more moderate political advocates, Windthorst, Hertling, Gröber,—these are a few of the names that suggest themselves were an adequate sketch of German Social Catholicism to be written.

Social Catholic ideas found expression in periodicals such as the *Christlich-Soziale Blätter* and the *Historische-Politische Blätter* and in the Catholic press quite generally; they were discussed at the great congresses of German Catholics; they inspired powerful organizations like the *Arbeiterwohl* (So-

ciety for the Welfare of the Laborer, an association of Catholic employers); they led Catholics to take an active part in the labor movement; they found learned economists as defenders; they obtained representation in the state assemblies and in the national parliament. Both Moufang and Hitze were members of the Reichstag, and Hitze, particularly, was very active in proposing and defending measures of social legislation, such as the progressive diminution of the working-day, the prohibition of child-labor, the restriction of woman-labor, and similar measures.⁵⁰⁹ Hertling, more moderate in his views, was an emphatic advocate of such measures as reduction of the working-day, factory-regulation and inspection, restriction of the employment of women, and prohibition of Sunday-labor.⁵¹⁰ In fact, the great Center party, though interested primarily in political and religious questions, was strongly influenced, as may be seen by reading its electoral platforms,⁵¹¹ by the social ideas of von Ketteler's school; it became a party of social reform, as well as of religious liberty and political particularism.⁵¹²

From a movement so powerful in Germany, Austrian Catholics could not long remain immune. Bishop von Ketteler's writings were widely read, almost from the beginning, and his ideas soon found propagandists. Professor Maxen, coming to Vienna from a German university, acted as the interpreter of German Social Catholicism to a group of young Viennese noblemen, who were in the habit of coming to his home to discuss economic and social problems. His disciples made the Catholic journal *Das Vaterland* an organ of Social Catholic ideas, and constituted a small but extremely influential group.⁵¹³

In the group that gathered around *Das Vaterland*, Prince Aloysius von Lichtenstein, Baron Karl von Vogelsang, and Professor Rudolph Meyer were perhaps the most conspicuous leaders. Lichtenstein, thanks more to his high social position than to his talents, was able to render valuable service to the cause, in parliament, in Catholic congresses, in public gatherings.⁵¹⁴

Vogelsang, Prussian and Protestant by birth but Austrian by residence and Catholic by conversion, became the real leader of the Austrian Social Catholic movement in the 'eighties. In the *Monatsschrift für christliche Social-Reform*, of which he was editor, Vogelsang fulminated against existing injustice, described the misery and oppression of the proletarian workers, denounced the tyrannical abuse of the power of capital, and urged courageous reform. Private charity was not adequate to relieve existing distress, nor should it be substituted for justice. The Church, by itself, could not cope with the situation. Christian principles must serve as the basis for energetic state-intervention and legislation, if a social organization based on justice to the weak was to be established. The state, therefore, should enact drastic social legislation and should, above all, endeavor to reestablish the guild-system, the true means of restoring justice in industry.⁵¹⁵

Dr. Meyer, the most authoritative economist of the Austrian group, was, like Vogelsang, by origin a Prussian and a Protestant. In his younger days, Meyer had been a disciple of Rodbertus, the German state-socialist. Compelled to leave Germany, in consequence of a too candid attack on the Bismarckian régime,⁵¹⁶ Meyer had fled to Austria.⁵¹⁷ There he joined the *Vaterland* group, contributed to the development and popularization of the Social Catholic program, and ably defended it against the attacks of liberal economists. Meyer gave further impetus to the tendency, already observed among von Ketteler's German and Austrian followers, to invoke state-intervention on a large scale. While he looked to the formation of guilds as a fundamental reform, he laid emphasis on the legislative reduction of the working-day to ten hours or less, restriction of the employment of women and children, factory-inspection, establishment of a minimum wage, encouragement of small holdings, social insurance and old age pensions (managed by each trade separately, as de Mun proposed), state coöperative stores, regulation of industrial production, and international agreements against countries which refused to adopt social legislation.⁵¹⁸

In Austria, perhaps more than in any other country, the Social Catholic movement drew its leaders from the feudal nobility. As has been seen, the movement had its origin in court circles, in the aristocratic discussion-group formed by Professor Maxen, tutor of the son of the king of Hanover. Around Baron von Vogelsang and Prince von Lichtenstein, who have already been mentioned as prominent leaders, there clustered a galaxy of titled aristocrats — Count Egbert Belcredi, Count Blöme, Count Franz von Kuefstein, Count Lowenstein, to mention only the more important. And yet the Austrian school of Social Catholics was perhaps more inclined toward state-socialism than any other; Dr. Meyer, whose ideas almost dominated the scientific economic theory of the school, imparted to it no small measure of the socialism of Rodbertus. That a group of feudal aristocrats should become radicals, almost socialists, in economic doctrine is no paradox; to anyone familiar with the early history of social legislation it appears almost as a commonplace. In England one finds a Lord Ashley doing pioneer work for social legislation; in France, a Vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont, a Count de Coux, a Count de Mun, a Marquis de La Tour du Pin; in Germany, a Baron von Ketteler. But especially in Austria, because capital and industry were there so largely in the hands of the Jews, and because Jewish millionaires were rapidly becoming landed magnates, the older, Christian aristocracy of birth was moved to reassert its authority by intervening in the labor question, as the more or less disinterested defender of the industrial proletariat against the industrial capitalist and financier. Feudalism thus found its *revanche* for the attacks of the capitalists and financiers upon the feudal régime.⁵¹⁹

It would be unfair, however, to represent the Austrian movement as exclusively feudal. Among numerous exceptions to the rule,⁵²⁰ Dr. Karl Lueger certainly deserves mention. Lueger was a man of the people; his father's family were peasants, his mother's, artisans. Lueger himself, though he became a lawyer, remained a son of the people, giving his services *gratis* to poor clients too often to become wealthy.

In the 1880's he became prominent in Viennese municipal politics as leader of a campaign against corruption and Jewish capitalism. To him, political corruption, oppressive capitalism, and anticlericalism could almost be summed up in one word, Semitism. Lueger was an antisemite, but he was more than that. He was a leading spirit in the Christian Socialist party, a friend of Vogelsang, and a practical reformer. His work as mayor of Vienna (after 1896), in the field of municipal reform and municipal ownership, attested the fact that his convictions were not merely negative.⁵²¹

Among the foreign Social Catholic movements which influenced the French school of de Mun, the agitation led by Cardinal Mermillod and Gaspard Decurtins in Switzerland is entitled to rank along with the German and Austrian movements. Mgr. Mermillod,⁵²² — he was at that time titular bishop of Hebron, — filled in Switzerland much the same rôle as Bishop von Ketteler in Germany. His celebrated sermon of February 23, 1868, might be compared to von Ketteler's sermons of 1848. Like von Ketteler, Mermillod felt that the social question was the great problem of the age, a problem demanding the earnest attention of all Christians. The development of industry had condemned the workingman to excessive, monotonous, and underpaid toil, making it almost impossible for him either to enjoy his rights or fulfil his duties as a Christian and the father of a family. Revolting against injustice and subjection, the workingman was drawn toward socialism, and a great conflict between the rich and poor seemed imminent. "Do not accuse me of exaggeration," he warned his hearers, "for

it is of no use averting our eyes from the abyss; that can neither fill it up nor help us to avoid it. Dangers cannot be warded off by willingly blinding ourselves; let us, then, examine, without terror or alarm, this state of things, which is the result of the ideas, the habits, and the progress of our times. This movement of the working-classes appears to us as a torrent rushing down from the mountains; it may destroy everything in its passage, and scatter ruin throughout our valleys; but it must be the honor of the Catholic Church to go forth to meet these forces, and by forming

barriers and canals, reduce these imperious billows, and form them, in the nineteenth century, into a mighty and fertilizing river.⁵²³

Bishop Mermillod believed that the situation was so urgent that curative action could not be left entirely to private initiative and the influence of Christian teachings upon men's morals. Vigorous state-intervention was needed. Social legislation should be enacted for the protection of the workingmen. Speaking before an international gathering of Catholics at Liège, in 1886, he made it clear that while the Scylla of "statolatry," or excessive confidence in the state, must be shunned, it would be no less disastrous to fall into the Charybdis of refusing legislative protection to those who needed it.⁵²⁴

The political leader of the Swiss Social Catholics was Gaspard Decurtins, chief of the younger ultramontane party. Hunger, said Decurtins, was neither Catholic nor Protestant. Nor should social reformers, in their efforts to solve the problem of hunger, refuse to coöperate simply because they were divided on religious questions. Practising this precept, Decurtins freely sought the coöperation of the Socialists and Radicals in order to bring about the creation of a labor secretariat, paid by the government but elected by workingmen's organizations, for the purpose of collecting statistical data regarding labor and transmitting to the government the grievances of the workingmen.⁵²⁵ Again, Decurtins solicited the aid of the Radicals in inducing the Swiss Government to convoke an international conference on labor problems, such as the establishment of a maximum limit for the working-day.⁵²⁶ Thanks to the coöperation of Radicals, Socialists, and Catholics, Switzerland made relatively rapid progress in social legislation: in adopting laws for accident compensation, limitation of the working day, protection of women and children, Switzerland was far in advance of France. Decurtins would have gone even further; he would have introduced compulsory insurance against sickness and accidents, and would have established a minimum wage.⁵²⁷ In 1890 he and other Catholics attending a Radical Congress at Olten joined with the Radicals

in formulating demands for compulsory sickness and accident-insurance, special privileges for trade unions, reform of the factory laws, and the ten-hour day.⁵²⁸

Less radical was the Social Catholic movement in Belgium, before 1891. There the moderation of Charles Périn triumphed over the liberalism of François Huet.⁵²⁹ The latter, who is curiously enough regarded by a learned Protestant historian of political economy as one of the "three ancestors" of modern French Social Catholicism,⁵³⁰ had evolved a somewhat visionary philosophy of "Christian Socialism," which he expounded in his book on *The Social Reign of Christianity* (1853).⁵³¹ Fundamentally at odds with the main trend of Social Catholic thought, Huet denounced the middle ages while lauding the French Revolution, and believed that "the true Christian society" did not appear until 1789.⁵³² Basing his system on the trilogy of the Revolution,—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,—Huet argued that property was an equal and natural right of every man, since liberty was impossible without property. Accordingly he proposed that all "patrimonial" property,—that is, property not acquired by a man's own labor,—should revert to the state at the owner's death; thus all the accumulated inheritance of past generations would become a collective heritage, which could be divided among all the citizens of the state, so that no man would be property-less.⁵³³

It was not likely that a doctrine of this description would win general favor. The Belgian Catholics inclined more naturally to the moderate economic philosophy propounded, a quarter of a century later, by Charles Périn. Périn, it will be recalled, was heartily opposed to the political and social ideas of the French Revolution; he repudiated socialism on the one hand and unrestrained economic individualism on the other hand. In the name of Christian charity, which to him was "the first and last word" of social economy,⁵³⁴ he admitted the necessity of moderate social legislation for the repression of abuses, and suggested the voluntary formation of Christian

guilds and the uplifting influence of Christian employers as safe remedies for the existing evils.⁵³⁵

It was upon Périn's principles for the most part, that the Belgian Catholics acted. An "Employers' Union in favor of the Workingmen" (*Union des patrons en faveur des ouvriers*) was founded under the influence of the Bishop of Liège, for the purpose of improving the moral and material situation of the laboring class. Craft guilds and coöperative societies were fostered, moderate social legislation was enacted, and a lively interest was taken in the formation of Catholic trade unions.⁵³⁶ The Belgian movement, in a word, was not of a nature to influence the French Social Catholics in a radical direction; it could only encourage them in moderate tendencies.

The English movement, on the other hand, was almost socialist in character. By reason of his international reputation, Cardinal Manning,⁵³⁷ Archbishop of Westminster, quickly became one of the most prominent leaders in the Social Catholic movement. In a lecture (1874) on the rights and dignity of labor, he showed how capitalism had acquired such overwhelming power that strikes were very rarely settled in favor of the workingmen; he claimed that, whatever Liberal economists might say to the contrary, justice required that the state intervene in the unequal conflict between capital and labor.⁵³⁸ In letters to newspapers and in articles written for periodicals,⁵³⁹ he defended the right of the workingman to a livelihood, that is to say, the right to work and the right to assistance if work is not to be found. By his work on the Housing Commission and on the Education Commission, as well as by his remarkable conciliatory efforts in the great London Dock Strike of 1889,⁵⁴⁰ he proved that his was not a closet-philosopher's view of social problems. His practical program, which he summarized in a letter to the bishop of Liège in 1890 and in a commentary on the papal encyclical in 1891, included the eight-hour day for heavy labor, a ten-hour day for less arduous employments, Sunday rest, limitation of hours for women and minors, the minimum wage, control and periodical revision of

contracts between capital and labor, exclusion of young persons and women from laborious and unwholesome employments.⁵⁴¹

A contemporary comment on Cardinal Manning's attitude, by a French anticlerical politician, is worth quoting. Cardinal Manning, said Eugène Spuller, disliked to be called a socialist but was in fact nothing less than a socialist.

It is just as Count Albert de Mun in France does not wish to be called a Socialist but certainly is one, neither more nor less than M. de Curtins in Switzerland and several other conservatives in different countries of Europe, in Belgium, in Germany, and even in Austria, where Prince Aloysius von Lichtenstein, an aristocrat of the noblest lineage, is a Socialist without consenting to avow it.⁵⁴²

Another English prelate, the Bishop of Nottingham, Mgr. Edward G. Bagshawe, was even more emphatic, if possible, than Cardinal Manning in denouncing present abuses and in advocating state-intervention, regulation of wages, reduction of the working day, restraint of capitalism and of landlordism. His strong interventionist views were very prominently brought before the Catholic congress of Liège, in 1890, but even prior to that date they had excited the interest of Catholics on the Continent.⁵⁴³

In Spain and Italy there were no Social Catholic movements comparable to those just described; nevertheless, an awakening interest was shown in the former country by the Archbishop of Madrid, by the Bishop of Vich, by Juan Orti, who translated Hitzé's *Die Sociale Frage*, by the Conservative leader Canovas del Castillo, who advocated labor legislation, and by Count de Torreanar, who lauded the guild system. In Italy, the discussion of social problems was stimulated by such writings as Rev. Carlo Maria Curci's *Christian Socialism (Di un socialismo cristiano nella quistione operaia, etc., Rome 1885)*; Rev. Matteo Liberatore's *Principles of Political Economy (Principii di economia politica, etc., Rome, 1889, Eng. trans., London, 1891)*; Antonio Burri's *Labor (Il Lavoro, studio sociale, Rome 1888)*; Cardinal Capecepatro's article in *La Compagnia sacra* of No-

vember, 1890, and Mgr. Bonomelli's pastoral letter on "Capital and Labor" (1891).⁵⁴⁴

That a similar tendency was manifesting itself across the Atlantic, in the United States, was proved by the Knights of Labor episode. The "Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor," founded as a secret society in 1869 by Uriah Stephens, had become a very powerful labor organization by the 'eighties, and was advocating principles some of which have since been realized in fact. The program included the eight-hour day, industrial arbitration, equal pay for equal work, the graduated income-tax, prohibition of child-labor, legal recognition of trade unions, government-ownership of railways, telegraphs, and telephones, taxation of uncultivated land held for speculative purposes, establishment of government bureaus of labor-statistics, promotion of coöperative distribution and production.

When, by its activity in connection with strikes and boycotts, the order acquired the reputation of subversive militancy, Pope Leo XIII was induced to condemn it. Cardinal Gibbons (Archbishop of Baltimore) went to Rome in person and presented a memorial stating that the statutes of the order were in no way repugnant to the doctrines of the Church, and that on the contrary, the existing abuses of capitalism and the pitiless exploitation of labor were so notorious that the working classes had a just right to organize in self-defense; therefore, the condemnation of the Knights would cause a very painful impression in the United States. Cardinal Manning likewise made a plea in behalf of the order. The argument of the two cardinals was heeded, the sentence was revoked, and Catholics were permitted to participate in the Knights of Labor movement. As the controversy had been followed with keen interest not only in America but in Europe as well, this victory served as a notable encouragement to Social Catholic views.⁵⁴⁵

The foregoing sketch of Social Catholic movements in other countries, prior to 1891, should make it easier to see the French movement in its proper setting. Without detracting from its spontaneity, and, in some sense, its originality, one may say

CHAPTER V

VANGUARD AND STRAGGLERS

It was the vanguard of the Catholic social movement in France which, most of all, felt the influence of the parallel movements in Germany, in Austria, in Switzerland. And as the vanguard, led by de Mun and La Tour du Pin, encouraged by the news from abroad, advanced further and further in the path of social legislation, it became increasingly evident that not all the French Catholics who interested themselves in economic questions were keeping pace with the bolder spirits. A retrospective glance at the development of the movement in France from 1871 to 1891 will make this clear.

The starting-point in 1871 was from the position taken by the two most eminent Catholic economists of the period, Le Play and Périn, who were regarded as the founders of Christian social economy. It was an essentially conservative position: while attacking the doctrines of bourgeois economic Liberalism, and admitting the need of social reform, Le Play and Périn would allow only the most moderate type of labor legislation, and trusted in the main to the religious and moralizing influences of charitable efforts on the part of the upper classes. Socialism was the enemy, and social peace, ensured chiefly through moral suasion, the *desideratum*. The voluntary formation of guilds and workingmen's friendly societies under the benevolent patriotism of Christian employers was the most radical organic reform to which theorists of Le Play's and Périn's type would grant approval.⁵⁵⁶

Le Play and Périn, as has been said, dominated the situation in the 'seventies. Of the three groups or schools of Catholic economists existing at that period, all were inspired by Le Play or by Périn. The *Société d'économie sociale* and the *Unions*

de la paix sociale were directly under Le Play's influence.⁵⁵⁷ The group of Catholic jurists and economists who collaborated on the *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit* were of a kindred spirit.⁵⁵⁸ The common aim was to combat the "false doctrines of 1789." Count Albert de Mun and the group interested in the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs and the *Association catholique*, though more concerned with practical action and popular propaganda than with economic science, recognized Le Play and Périn as masters. A long article from Périn's pen was given the place of honor in the first number of the *Association catholique*.⁵⁵⁹

The founders of the Workingmen's Clubs in their vision of establishing voluntary Christian guilds were merely aspiring to realize Périn's theories. Their relations were almost equally good with Le Play, of whom La Tour du Pin was an enthusiastic admirer. Though he felt that de Mun and La Tour du Pin were assigning too large a rôle to the workingmen in their clubs, Le Play gave personal encouragement to the two young reformers in the early days of their work.⁵⁶⁰ And when Le Play died, the *Association catholique* published a glowing tribute to him written by La Tour du Pin.⁵⁶¹

The very fact, however, that the organizers of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs had embarked on a career of action made them less conservative in temper. Coming into personal contact with the workingmen and with workingmen's problems they were inclined to adopt a more practical, clear-cut program than were the less active groups. "We are the zouaves of the Union," said La Tour du Pin at the Union of Catholic Welfare Societies in 1874.⁵⁶² And the zouaves soon left the slower units of the army straggling behind.

Little by little, the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs took on the appearance of a separate school of social economy. In 1872, on La Tour du Pin's initiative, the Association decided to institute a Council of Studies. More or less under the guidance of La Tour du Pin's spirit, this Council of Studies laid the theoretical and doctrinal foundations for the later developments of the Association's program. The men

who participated in its deliberations were unquestionably able and earnest; among them were Félix de Roquefeuil, de Bréda, Père de Pascal, de Ségur-Lamoignon, Henri Savatier, Raoul Ancel, and Henri Lorin. When the executive committee of the Association founded a review, *L'Association catholique*, in 1876, these men, already trained in the Council of Studies, became the editorial board, with Ségur-Lamoignon as managing editor, and the principles adopted by the Council of Studies were published in the review. Thus *L'Association catholique* became the organ of the group of social economists who had been brought together by the Association.⁵⁶³

A report on the work of the Council of Studies, published in the *Association catholique* for 1881-1883,⁵⁶⁴ shows to what extent the doctrines of the group had taken definite form by that time. The report unequivocally repudiates economic Liberalism; on the other hand, it defends itself against the charge of Socialism, and affirms that between Socialism and Liberalism or *laissez-faire*, "there is room for a Christian political economy." The essence of Christian political economy, it would appear, is recognition and respect not of natural laws alone, but also of the laws of God, in the social order; this general principle had been enunciated in the first report or *Avis* of the Council of Studies.

The fourth *Avis*, on the subject of the "liberty of labor," exhibited the fundamental antagonism between the new "Christian political economy" and the prevalent Liberal or orthodox school of political economy. Absolute liberty or individualism in industry had been inaugurated at the close of the eighteenth century by the edicts of Turgot and the decrees of the revolutionary National Assembly, sweeping away the old guild organizations and interdicting any form of trade unions. This liberty, said the *Avis*, "favors the absorption of the weak by the strong, of him who has only his arms or his industriousness by him who has a large capital." The doctrine of the absolute "liberty of labor" was condemned in the *Avis*, as "a rationalist and materialistic theory," false in principle and calamitous in effect.

"For our part," said Count de Roquefeuil, who was particularly active in the work of preparing the reports of the Council of Studies,

far from admitting that the Liberal school of political economy has contributed to the welfare of the poorer classes, we positively attribute to its laws the scandalous increase of pauperism, the perils of the labor question, the social conflict; and when the labor world, represented by millions of men, who, it must be admitted, are not all bandits or fools, suffers and says that it is wronged, we do not believe that in order to be just, or even to calm the workingman, it is sufficient to counsel resignation and patience; and we deny that when there is war, antagonism, or debate between individuals or classes or interests, the sole duty of the social authorities is to recommend to everybody the pure love of God and the practice of all the virtues, and nothing more.⁵⁶⁵

The state, in the view of the Council of Studies, had not merely a right to intervene, but a duty. *Justice* — not merely charity — "imposes upon the legislator the duty of recognizing and protecting the rights of the laborer" (*Avis* No. VII). In the name of justice and social peace, the workingman was entitled to the means of satisfying the conditions of an honorable existence in his class, the conditions being specifically: the possibility of founding and possessing a home and of raising a family; advancement in his trade; the possibility of saving against unemployment, sickness, accidents, and old age. These were his just rights, because "labor is not a commodity," to be bought and sold at market prices, but a human act.

Discussing more concretely the duties which justice imposed upon the state, *Avis No. V* dismissed as equally false the socialist theory that the state should substitute itself for private initiative as the great agent of production, and the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, condemning the state to passive indifference in labor questions. According to Christian economy, it was not the duty of the state to become the distributor of labor and of food but it was its duty to enact labor legislation, for the protection of the weak and the poor. Specifically, the law should (1) assure the workingman of his Sunday holiday; (2) restrict

the hours of labor and the employment of women and children, enforce the separation of sexes in industry, and ensure salubrious and moral working conditions; (3) encourage the formation of professional associations, the establishment of collective funds or guild patrimonies, and industrial arbitration; (4) require employers who have not established "guild patrimonies" to deposit funds as a guarantee to the employees against sudden cessation of work; (5) protect national industry against foreign competition.

The third point in the foregoing list, namely, the promotion of professional associations, was developed in greater detail by *Avis* Nos. II, III, VII, and VIII.⁵⁶⁶ It was the only "efficacious means" yet proposed, said *Avis No. III*, for the remedy of the conditions almost unanimously deplored by moralists, economists, and official investigators,—conditions leading to pauperism, industrial anarchy, the decadence of craftsmanship, the antagonism of capital and labor.

The development of the idea, as shown by the successive *Avis*, is an interesting process. No. II merely admitted that strikes and labor conditions were not to be condemned as evil in principle, provided their purpose was legitimate and their methods orderly; but strikes were considered injurious to the interests of labor. *Avis No. III* advocated the formation of Catholic professional associations, uniting employers and workingmen, and combining the principle of hierarchical organization with the principle of participation of labor representatives in the management of the professional and economic interests of the associations. The idea that each such association should have the right to establish a collective property or guild patrimony first appeared in *Avis No. V*. *Avis No. VII* defined the bases of industrial organization with greater care. The fundamental principles should be: (A) Union of employers and workingmen, with a common interest in a "guild patrimony" or collective property; (B) Professional hierarchy, *i. e.*, the workingman's right of regular ascent, in his order; (C) the union of similar industries on a regional basis. Finally, *Avis No. VIII* asserted emphatically that the professional as-

sociations or guilds were not to be purely voluntary and free of government control. As this conclusion marks the beginning of the rupture with Périn's conception of free and voluntary guilds, it is worth quoting *verbatim*:

This restoration of professional associations,— should it be purely spontaneous, voluntary, and without connection with the political régime? Assuredly not. The reestablishment of a guild régime requires all the sanctions of the social authority permitted by a social organization. If it is necessary, it would be puerile to say that it should nevertheless be purely spontaneous and voluntary. Although no institution could be more liberal (in the good sense of the word), for it tends to substitute in the world of labor a régime of arbitral jurisdiction for one of arbitrary will and unbridled force; nevertheless, the guild régime, in order to recover its function in the state, has need of something more than the indifference of the government. In fact, it is not by liberty that the abuses of force are checked, but by constraint where persuasion does not suffice. Doubtless the reconstitution of the guild could not be the work of *a priori* decrees; but as soon as this rebirth [of the guilds], which is indispensable for the peace of the labor world, has been accomplished, *in fact*, having been prepared by the initiative of Christian employers, it will be for the Law to recognize it *in right*, to fortify it with privileges, to direct it towards its political development. But men of good will must not await the initiative of the government to work for the constitution of Christian guild associations; from now on they must restore respect for the principles of this form of organization, demand for it legal recognition by the public authorities, and at the same time, despite momentary difficulties, strive to create models of Christian guilds, which will give substance to their demands and serve as types for the future restoration.

It is easy to see how the influences of Count de Mun's convictions, of Harmel's practical experiment, and of the doctrinal investigations of the Council of Studies combined to bring about this evolution of ideas from *Avis No. II* to *Avis No. VIII* and to provide the *Association catholique* group with a program of labor organization and social legislation more advanced than the programs of the other Catholic groups.

Whereas in the late 'seventies there had been extraordinary harmony between the de Mun group, the *Paix sociale* or Le

Play group, and the *Revue des institutions et du droit* group, consciousness of a differentiation begins to appear in the early 'eighties. A new series of articles ⁵⁶⁷ in the *Association catholique* for 1882, reviewing the progress which the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs had made in the last ten years, showed how at first the Association had found in Le Play and Périn "two guides who, in political economy, were the veritable pioneers blazing the path for the advance of sound ideas in our times." Learning from both, the writer continues, "we did not become completely the disciples of either one or the other . . . because the school of Social Peace, by reason of the character of its method, did not have the same starting-point as we, and because the school represented by Louvain university, in which M. Périn then taught, did not free itself rapidly enough, to our taste, from the Liberal atmosphere which springs from Belgian soil as an historical product. . . . We therefore found ourselves impelled, by the force of our starting-point and by the logic of our tendencies, into the paths opened by the great bishop of Mainz, Mgr. von Ketteler."

At first there had been much hesitation regarding the program to be followed in dealing with the labor question, a second article in the same review frankly admits, but the entry of Count Albert de Mun into the political arena as the spokesman of the Workingmen's Clubs had suddenly put the problem in a new light. "Today, the debate is closed"—the labor question, so long disregarded by politicians, was beginning to claim their attention by reason of the enlargement of popular demands. Now, instead of prescribing "resignation or *gendarmérie*" as the cure for labor troubles, the politicians were endeavoring to satisfy the masses by entering into the path of state-socialism. And now "our adversaries no less than our friends will turn toward the bench in the Chamber of Deputies where sits our champion, and will lead him to the speaker's stand . . . to hear what he thinks, to hear what we think, of the labor question." "Should he then declare," the article asks, "I have no ideas on the subject and my friends hardly trouble themselves with it?" The answer of course,

is negative. The situation demanded that the Council of Studies keep pace with de Mun. In response to the demand, the Council of Studies had made rapid progress in formulating its theories and had accepted the principle of social legislation. The principles of Christian political economy and social justice involved, as corollaries, legislation to ensure Sunday rest; limitation of the hours of work; restriction of the employment of women and children; establishment of apprenticeship; workmen's compensation; unemployment indemnities; old age pensions, etc. To realize these demands, one must have recourse either to state socialism or to the guild system, and naturally, the guild system was preferred as being free of the dangers of bureaucratic tyranny.

Recognition of the fact that the *Association catholique* group was outstripping the other schools was forthcoming from Charles Périn himself. In 1882 Périn took the Council of Studies to task for what he interpreted as a statement that the government should regulate wages; at the same time he criticized Le Play's school for erring in the opposite direction, by too great timidity. To this attack La Tour du Pin replied in the *Association catholique*, explaining that the Council of Studies favored not the direct fixation of wages by the government, but the organization of society in such a way as to safeguard the laborer's right to just compensation.⁵⁶⁸

La Tour du Pin took this occasion to remark that the Catholic reaction against extremes of *laissez-faire* and Socialism had been guided by three great leaders, von Ketteler, Le Play, and Périn. The first had condemned absolutely the Liberal dogma of liberty of labor; the second, following the method of scientific observation, and, living in an epoch of great industrial prosperity, had not been so pronounced in his condemnation of the abuses of industrial freedom; the third, fascinated by the industrial prosperity of his own country (Belgium) was reluctant to condemn the principle of liberty, which was inscribed in the Belgian constitution and dominant in Belgian economic and political life, and had therefore appealed to religious action and charity as palliatives of abusive liberty.

Hence three distinct schools had risen. All agreed that a sound régime in industry could be established only under the influence of religion and with the aid of three social forces — patronage, association, and authority (*i.e.*, of the government). "In the present situation," however, "the school of Le Play appeals *above all* to the traditional exercise of patronage, the Belgian school to free association, and the German school to the intervention of authority." The German school, criticized by Périn, is defended by La Tour du Pin. Though he does not clearly say so, it is evident that La Tour du Pin regards his own group not as a separate school, but as a party of action, eclectic in its theory. He hopes to avert any break between the schools; he strives to find points of resemblance and to ascribe divergences to difference of method rather than of principle. Referring especially to Le Play's school, he affirms, "Though we follow separate paths, we believe them to be essentially converging paths." And he cites the resolution adopted at the congress of Catholic Welfare Societies at Autun in 1882 endorsing the guild program and de Mun's views, as evidence that it was possible for all Catholics interested in labor problems to preserve a united front.⁵⁶⁹

Less than two years later, however, La Tour du Pin was compelled to recognize that the divergences between his group and the others were increasing. While the Council of Studies had been placing the program of the Workingmen's Clubs on a more and more advanced ground, the disciples of Le Play and Périn had failed to keep pace. His own group, he repeated, was eclectic: it had declared with Périn that the economy of Christian societies should be Christian in spirit; with Le Play's "Social Peace" school, it had agreed that the traditions of prosperous epochs must be given due consideration; and in von Ketteler's school it had found these principles affirmed and given legislative application. It was von Ketteler's school, "the influence of which we have felt most of all." Thus the Council of Studies had arrived at its own distinctive formula, — "the guild régime based on the privileged guild."

Périn himself, however, was transferring his interest from

social economy to international law, and his followers were trusting to freedom of association put into practice by mixed associations of employers and workingmen. Such free associations, La Tour du Pin remarked, could not be called guilds; the guild must partake of a public nature; its successful restoration required public recognition and support. Moreover, Périn's disciples seemed to be content to remain closet philosophers, making little or no effort to put their principles into practise.

As regards Le Play's followers, who formed the so-called "Social Peace" school, they placed too much confidence in "patronage" (*i. e.*, the benevolent influence of the employers), were too anxious to preserve the "modern principle of liberty" in industry, and had too much horror of social legislation.

La Tour du Pin, in the name of his own group, insisted upon the necessity of labor legislation. But he still hoped that Le Play's followers would renounce their "coquetry with the Liberal school," and that the Belgian school would see the error of its ways, to the end that all might unite in fruitful collaboration.⁵⁷⁰

The divergence only increased as the years passed. The Council of Studies and the editors of the *Association catholique*, drawing still closer to the German, Austrian, and Swiss Social Catholics, became more strongly interventionist than ever. Their leader, Count Albert de Mun, as we have seen, presented a series of remarkable bills, embodying a comprehensive scheme of social legislation, in the Chamber of Deputies between 1886 and 1891. De Mun even included the eight-hour day and the minimum wage in his program, as he explained in an interview with an English journalist in October, 1889.⁵⁷¹ And even on this point the *Association catholique* supported him. Commenting on the interview, the managing editor of the review declared that de Mun, in taking an advanced position as regards the social question, was acting, as he had always acted, in perfect loyalty to the teachings of the Holy See, and was not weakening his own position "at the head of the Catholic movement."⁵⁷²

On the other hand, the Le Play school suffered schism and retrogression. At the close of 1885 Demolins seceded from *La Réforme sociale*, the organ of the "Social Peace" school, and founded a new review, *La Science sociale*. *La Science sociale* claimed to supplement Le Play's method of monographic scientific observation by de Tourville's method of classifying sociological data. As regards practical conclusions, the new school tended toward the exaltation of individualism, and of private initiative; consequently, it rejected any intervention or industrial organization which might impede the development of private initiative. It was a new scientific version of *laissez-faire*, and as such could not but be repugnant to the Social Catholic school, which made repudiation of *laissez-faire* a capital point.⁵⁷³

The *Réforme sociale*, attempting to adhere more closely to Le Play's spirit, was weakened by dissension, and strove so desperately to conciliate its opponents that it laid itself open more than ever to the charge of coquetting with economic liberalism, and became more than ever estranged from the followers of de Mun and La Tour du Pin. In 1886 we find a writer in *La Réforme sociale* discussing the question of compulsory insurance of workingmen against accidents and coming to the conclusion that, although the bill which Count Albert de Mun had presented for compulsory insurance was the least objectionable of the various schemes under consideration, the whole principle of compulsory insurance was wrong.⁵⁷⁴ Four years later the conflict of views was even more openly declared. In May, 1890, *La Réforme sociale* published with an editorial note of commendation an article which candidly attacked de Mun's social program as unsound and positively dangerous.⁵⁷⁵

The moment had come, said the author of the article in question, to examine seriously the Labor Regulation Bill which de Mun had recently presented in parliament.⁵⁷⁶

"By reason of the rightful prestige which M. le comte de Mun enjoys, the general public is led to consider his doctrines as the doctrines of the Catholics, and to identify his doctrines with those of the Church." Nothing daunted by de Mun's in-

fluence, however, the author — M. de Moly — declares that “if the position of M. de Mun and his great authority make contradiction the more difficult, they also render it the more necessary.” Catholics must be warned against accepting de Mun’s leadership in social questions.

Before delivering his attack, de Moly explains that with two points of de Mun’s bill he is in substantial agreement. The prohibition of Sunday labor is praiseworthy. And the articles protecting women and children are not bad in principle, although there are possible practical objections to the immediate and absolute suppression of child-labor and woman-labor by law.

The main point at issue is the legal restriction of the working day for adult male laborers. De Mun’s bill provides a ten-hour day, or, rather, a 58 hour week. De Moly points out that the restriction of the working day will not stop at ten hours. De Mun, he says, has admitted that the eight-hour day would be preferable, and that only reasons of expediency compel him to propose a ten-hour day instead. Thus de Mun’s program presents “striking analogies” with the Socialist program. State-intervention, says de Moly, “would repose on principles and doctrines which would fatally lead to Socialism.” To show how socialistic de Mun has become, de Moly quotes the following statement by a Socialist deputy, Ferroul, respecting the Labor Regulation Bill: “I have read M. de Mun’s explanations and my friends and I can only applaud them; his demands are in reality nothing else than the demands formulated by the Socialist congresses.” This in itself should be enough to condemn de Mun’s ideas.

De Mun’s proposals are not only socialistic; they are dangerous. If his enthusiastic effort to shorten the hours of labor should succeed, de Mun would ruin employers. “The laudable desire to cure a particular evil may engender a much more terrible evil, the suppression of industry.”

As a matter of fact, there is no real need for such legislation, de Moly contends. In the great industries,—mines, metallurgy, glass-works, textile mills,—to which de Mun’s bill spe-

cially applies, "there may have been some abuses in the past, but today, and in fact, these abuses do not exist." In mines and metal-works the ten-hour day prevails; in glass-works, the eight-hour day; as for the textile mills, the effective working day "often exceeds ten hours and sometimes reaches eleven or even twelve," but, "thanks to the admirable discoveries of contemporary science," this work is not arduous, and the worker who tends a machine "passes part of the day in a state which resembles repose." De Moly concludes that "the general conditions of adult labor in France do not necessitate and do not justify state-intervention."

Catholics, therefore, should content themselves with demanding liberty of religious association and liberty of association. "And with these liberties and the aid of God, Who will not fail them, all evils will be cured in so far as is humanly possible, and social peace and the prosperity of our dear country will at last be assured." Let the Catholics repudiate socialistic propaganda; in so doing they would be following the example of "great and glorious defenders of the truth and of the Catholic cause in France, among whom it will suffice to mention a bishop like Mgr. Freppel, orators and statesmen like MM. Buffet, Chesnelong, and Keller, eminent professors and economists like MM. Claudio Jannet and Béchaux, religious scholars and theologians like the Rev. Fristot, Forbes, Gaudron, Sambin, and Ludovic de Besse, profound jurists like the editors and administrators of the *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, and many others. . . ."

To this attack on the doctrines of de Mun and of the *Association catholique* the editors of *La Réforme sociale* appended a note, asserting that their review had "never varied on the fundamentals of the question here treated." The solution of economic problems, "it should never be forgotten, will depend far less on new economic institutions or on multifarious legal prescriptions than on moral reform and the practice of duty." The editors regret that "generous impulses, forgetful of the lessons of experience, run the risk of leading to theories fraught

with illusions and perils." The rebuke to de Mun is obvious enough.

Périn, too, became alarmed at what he viewed as the socialistic tendency of the school that was growing up around the *Association catholique*. He, too, urgently warned the Catholics to beware of state socialism. Socialism was the great menace of the day.⁵⁷⁷

An arena in which the champions of the various schools might break lances with each other was afforded by the Social Work Congresses at Liège, in 1886, 1887, and 1890, where leading Catholic social workers, economists, and politicians from Belgium, France, Switzerland, Germany, and other countries met to debate social problems. At the first of these congresses, in September, 1886, the anti-interventionists were worsted. "Under the impulsion of the most influential members of the German Center and of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs of France, at the first onset, they [the assembled delegates] broke with the Manchester school [of economic liberalism] and adhered unreservedly to Christian political economy."⁵⁷⁸ The congress voted resolutions favoring legal encouragement of mixed trade unions, legal regulation of child-labor and woman-labor, compulsory accident insurance (despite the strenuous opposition of the non-interventionists), legislation against alcoholism, and legislation to promote housing reform.⁵⁷⁹

The second congress, in 1887, went still further. As one observer remarked, "In spite of the traditional ode chanted by several reactionaries to the old theme of liberty in everything and for everything, the Congress appealed to government intervention."⁵⁸⁰ Two applications of the interventionist thesis were adopted, namely, labor legislation concerning mines, and social insurance. As regards the former the Congress approved the principle that laws should be enacted excluding women from work in the pits, excluding all children under twelve years from the mines, limiting the labor of young persons (twelve to sixteen years) to twelve hours a day, and pro-

hibiting night work for women and children. As regards the latter, the Congress approved: (1) compulsory accident insurance, to be paid for by the employers, and to be conducted by regional associations of employers; (2) compulsory sickness insurance, to be paid for by employers and workingmen equally, and to be administered by associations of employers and workingmen in each industry, labor and capital being equally represented. The Congress was not ready, however, to accept the same principle for old-age pensions.⁵⁸¹

At the third congress of Liège, in September, 1890, opposition to social legislation was triumphantly overridden by the ideas of which de Mun and the Council of Studies, in common with the Austrians, Germans, and Swiss, had long been enthusiastic champions. At the very outset, a letter from Cardinal Manning, strongly advocating social legislation, sounded the key-note. "The mass of delegates without fixed views found themselves, from the start, carried far beyond moderate opinions and swept to the Extreme Left of Christian Socialism."⁵⁸² The Congress recognized the "necessity of extending without delay the guild organization of society," favored an international agreement for the legal limitation of the working day for men, reaffirmed the principle of obligatory accident and sickness insurance, strengthened its plank on old-age pensions, advocated the legal prohibition of child labor (14 years for northern and twelve for southern countries), the establishment of a maximum working day of 8½ hours for women and children, prohibition of night work and Sunday work for women and children, and six weeks' rest for women after child-birth. Even the minimum wage question was debated, but the anti-interventionists, led by Mgr. Freppel, revolted against quite so drastic a decision, and the proposal was tabled. Altogether, the resolutions of the Congress represented a brilliant victory for social legislation.

Sorely discomfited, the moderates complained that the Congress had been dominated by "Christian Socialists" and "State Socialists."⁵⁸³ Under the patronage of Mgr. Freppel, who declared that he did not want "either state socialism or Chris-

tian socialism,"⁵⁸⁴ a rival congress was held at Angers in October, and a rival organization was set up,—the "Catholic Society for Political and Social Economy"—with the express aim of opposing state socialism.⁵⁸⁵ The movement for labor association, according to Mgr. Freppel's views, was to be encouraged, but enthusiasm for the idea should not carry its advocates to the length of demanding obligatory guilds, destructive of industrial liberty. Mgr. Freppel's followers were drawn chiefly from the ranks of Le Play's and Périn's disciples. The Catholic jurists who controlled the *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit* were particularly prominent in the new association,—so much so, in fact, that their review became its organ.⁵⁸⁶ In their opinion, wages must be determined by supply and demand, compulsory social insurance was repugnant to natural law, and state-intervention in labor questions must be restricted to the narrowest limits.⁵⁸⁷

Commenting on Mgr. Freppel's manœuvre, an anticlerical publicist declared that de Mun was in reality a Socialist, vehemently as de Mun himself might deny it. "Count Albert de Mun is a Socialist, and it is not without just motives that there has been formed, among the Catholics, a project to finish once and for all with the dangerous tendencies of M. de Mun and his friends."⁵⁸⁸

The year 1890, in short, found the Social Catholic vanguard, represented by de Mun, La Tour du Pin, and the Council of Studies, definitely separated from the stragglers, represented by Mgr. Freppel, the jurists, the *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, *La Réforme sociale*, and *La Science sociale*.

Fully aware of the situation, de Mun made a great effort to restore unity. In the first number of the *Association catholique* for 1891, he announced that the review would henceforth be independent of the Workingmen's Clubs. Thus he hoped, the Workingmen's Clubs would not be held responsible for the radical theories put forward by certain of the contributors to the review, and might enlist the coöperation of conservatives unable to accept the review's doctrine. The review, on the other hand, would be free to adopt a more eclectic policy, and,

by welcoming contributions from the various Catholic groups, help to restore harmony. Count de Mun was conciliatory almost to the point of surrender. Mgr. Freppel was willing to admit state-intervention for the protection of rights and repression of abuses; all Catholics could agree on this formula, said de Mun. It was only in its practical application that disputes arose. All were agreed on legislative restriction of child-labor and of the employment of young persons and women. On the limitation of hours for adults, there was no agreement as yet. The minimum wage question and social insurance could be left to the guilds or to arbitration boards representing the interested parties. Almost all Catholics agreed that the organization of guilds was desirable. With so much in common, the various schools ought not to find union difficult.⁵⁸⁹ Cardinal Manning and other prelates hastened to praise de Mun's conciliatory effort.⁵⁹⁰ It was at this juncture that Leo XIII intervened. The Encyclical Letter on the Condition of the Working Classes, May 15, 1891, appeared just at the moment when the advance-guard of the French Social Catholic movement had become separated from the stragglers, and was striving desperately to reestablish the lines of communication. With the encyclical, the movement enters a new phase.

CHAPTER VI

EFFECT OF PAPAL INTERVENTION

"ON THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASSES" (1891)

THE Italian nobleman who in 1878 ascended the papal throne as Leo XIII ⁵⁹¹ had already given evidence that he was neither oblivious to the social trend of contemporary Catholic thought nor unmindful of the problem of the proletariat. In the spring of 1877 — the year in which occurred the death of the great German pioneer of Social Catholicism, Baron von Ketteler, ⁵⁹² — he had written a pastoral letter dealing with the social question. He was then Archbishop of Perugia. "The modern schools of political economy," he had said, "see in a man nothing but a machine, more or less precious as it is more or less productive. Hence the contempt with which human morality is regarded; hence this shameful abuse of poverty and of weakness." Even in countries reputed to be the most progressive, excessive hours of labor were imposed upon the toilers in industry. The sight of children shut up in factories, condemned to premature labor, must provoke indignation in every generous heart. Excessive labor was not merely exhausting and wearing out the bodies of the working-people; it was numbing the intellectual life of the wretched victims of the modern industrial system, degrading them, and ruining soul as well as body. ⁵⁹³

After his coronation as pope, he almost immediately issued a vigorous encyclical "Concerning Modern Errors, Socialism, etc." (*Quod Apostolici Muneris*, Dec. 28, 1878) ⁵⁹⁴ and another recommending the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (*Aeterni Patris*, Aug. 4, 1879). ⁵⁹⁵ The former denounced the agitators who, calling themselves "Socialists, Communists, or Nihilists," were seeking to destroy all social order

and had no respect for anything that was written in either divine or human law. Socialism in Italy at that time was assuming a peculiarly violent revolutionary character; the influence of Bakunin, that Russian arch-apostle of assassination, terrorism, and destructive violence, was very strong; in fact, the proletarian movement was perhaps more anarchist than socialist. Revolutionary societies took as names such slogans as *La Dinamite* (Dynamite), or *Morte ai Borghesi* (Death to the Bourgeois). Bakunin's influence helps to explain the grouping of "Socialists, Communists, or Nihilists" in the papal denunciation. These revolutionists, he declared, wished to destroy all authority, the sanctity of marriage, the right of private property. The solution of the labor problem was not to be reached by such methods, but rather by the encouragement of "associations for artisans and laborers and by the influence of religion." "The Church of Christ," he believed, "is possessed of power to stave off the pest of Socialism."⁵⁹⁶

The second encyclical, on St. Thomas Aquinas, is not without social significance. This medieval theologian and philosopher, it must be remembered, had provided von Ketteler with the philosophical basis for a social program.⁵⁹⁷ The Council of Studies of the Workingmen's Clubs in France habitually turned to the same source for principles from which to deduce arguments in favor of the rights of labor and in favor of social legislation.⁵⁹⁸ Leo XIII's interest in St. Thomas, therefore, was a good augury for the Social Catholic movement.

The pope was thoroughly aware of the development of Social Catholicism in France, in Germany, in Austria, in Switzerland,⁵⁹⁹ and seemed to sympathize with it. He received memoranda from Cardinal Mermillod setting forth the views of an international association of Social Catholic leaders — the Union of Freiburg;⁶⁰⁰ he listened with approval to the pleas of Cardinals Gibbons and Manning in defense of the American Knights of Labor;⁶⁰¹ in 1885 a hundred French capitalists brought him an address signed by a thousand employers who believed that "the Church alone can reestablish in the industrial family the practice of justice and charity";⁶⁰² in 1887 a pil-

grimage of French workingmen, organized by Léon Harmel, solicited the pope to raise his voice in behalf of labor; ⁶⁰³ two years later ten thousand humble pilgrims, with Cardinal Langénieux as spokesman, repeated "the suppliant cry of the apostles: *Domine, salve nos, perimus. . .*" and begged the head of the Church to "recall the world to respect of the laws of justice and right." ⁶⁰⁴

In 1890 Professor Francesco Nitti, a prominent Italian economist (who became premier of Italy during the great war), published his stimulating book on *Catholic Socialism*.⁶⁰⁵ National and international Catholic congresses were discussing the labor problem. A flood of books, pamphlets and reviews dealt with the attitude of the Church towards labor. Well might Leo XIII conclude that the time was ripe for official proclamation of the Catholic social doctrine.

Viewed in the light of the antecedent events, just recounted, Leo XIII's Encyclical Letter (*Rerum Novarum*, 15 May, 1891) on the Condition of the Working Classes (*De Conditione operariorum*) ⁶⁰⁶ will appear less original, less revolutionary, perhaps, than it has sometimes been represented,⁶⁰⁷ but not less significant. The pope did not revolutionize the Catholic attitude toward social questions; he did not originate a new social philosophy; he merely confirmed a body of doctrine which had been gradually developed by the application of ancient Christian principles to modern industrial society. The significance of *Rerum Novarum* lay in the earnestness with which it (1) opposed Economic Liberalism or the policy of *laissez-faire* which permitted the masses to be ruthlessly exploited, (2) repudiated socialism as a false remedy, (3) encouraged Social Catholicism as a true remedy, and (4) stated definite principles for a program of social reform.⁶⁰⁸

(1) Emphatically the Encyclical declared, "there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and found quickly, for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and so unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working classes."⁶⁰⁹ The chief causes of the evil were Economic Liberalism, irreligion, and avarice.

The ancient workmen's guilds were destroyed in the last century and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that workingmen have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury,—still practiced by avaricious and grasping men . . . A small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.⁶¹⁰

Von Ketteler, Villeneuve-Bargemont, Ozanam, de Mun, might have used the same words.

(2) "To remedy these evils," the Encyclical continued, "the Socialists, working on the poor men's envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies."⁶¹¹ This communistic ideal, Leo XIII contended, was "so clearly futile for all practical purposes" that if it were carried out "the workingmen would be among the first to suffer." Furthermore, communism was "emphatically unjust" and "must be utterly rejected" because it denied the natural right of private property. The Socialists were also condemned for justifying State interference with family life, and for preaching "the idea that class is naturally hostile to class, and that rich and poor are intended by nature to live at war with one another." It should be noted that the Encyclical in condemning "Socialism," did not in any sense condemn either governmental or trade-union ownership of public utilities, railways, factories, mines, *etc.*; it condemned only the extreme collectivism which would prevent private ownership of land, the saving of wages, and the accumulation by the laborer of a reserve fund or patrimony of "profitable property" sufficient to keep his family from "want and misery." In truth, the argument about private property, while it was frankly directed against "Socialism" or complete communism, implicitly condemned landlordism even more emphatically than Socialism: "When man . . . spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion

of nature's field which he cultivates . . . and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own. . . ." ⁶¹²

(3) Only a few pages of the Encyclical were written in refutation of Socialism; the pope was more concerned with enunciating the Catholic principles of social reform. ⁶¹³ True social reform, he maintained, must avail itself of the combined efforts of three agencies, the Church, the State, and the labor organization. The Church "does its best to enlist the services of all ranks in discussing and endeavoring to meet, in the most practical way, the claims of the working classes." The Church warns the rich that "it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by"; that "to make one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine"; that "to defraud any one of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of Heaven"; and that in the words of Aquinas, "Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need." On the other hand, the poor are taught by the Church to work honestly, to cultivate virtue, and "never to employ violence . . . nor to engage in riot and disorder." It is the Church which has ever exalted the dignity of labor. No "practical solution" of the labor problem could ever be found, without recourse to religion, which teaches men not merely to be just, but to cultivate "that true Christian Charity," — "the mistress and queen of virtues," — which is always "ready to sacrifice itself for others' sake, and which is man's surest antidote against worldly pride and immoderate love of self." ⁶¹⁴

The second agency of reform, the State, "must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working people"; it must protect private property; it should restrain revolutionary agitators; it must prevent disturbance of the public peace by violence arising from strikes; and it must intervene in case employers laid unjust burdens upon the workmen, or degraded them with conditions that were "repugnant to their dignity as human beings." ⁶¹⁵ "The more that is done for the working population by the general laws of the country,

the less need will there be to seek for particular means to relieve them." ⁶¹⁶

As to the third instrument of reform, namely, labor organization, the Encyclical was very insistent. The formation of associations, that is, guilds or unions, in the various trades was a reform of capital importance, deserving the whole-souled support of Catholics. But while strongly encouraging the guild or trade-union idea in principle, Leo XIII carefully avoided any too dogmatic pronouncement regarding the exact form which the guild or union should take. A more precise definition of the ideal guild might have been useful at the time, but it would have fettered the future. Leo XIII, fortunately for the Social Catholic Movement, had the wisdom to phrase his endorsement of the guild or union idea in comprehensive terms. "We do not deem it possible," he said, "to enter into definite details on the subject of organization; this must depend on national character, on practice and experience, on the nature and scope of the work to be done, on the magnitude of the various trades and employments, and on other circumstances of fact and time—all of which must be carefully weighed." Hence the pope took sides neither with those ~~who~~ advocated "mixed unions" of employers and workingmen nor with those who insisted on separate unions, or, rather, he approved both. Whether composed of workingmen alone or of workingmen and employers together, trade unions were to be commended. Preferably, Christians should form their own unions, in order that they might not be exposed to irreligious influences. Among the purposes to which the trade unions or modernized guilds might well devote their efforts, he mentioned insurance against sickness, accident, old age, and misfortune, and the provision of a continuous supply of work. They should strive to "infuse the spirit of justice into the mutual relations of employer and employed." In case either a master or a workman deemed his rights injured, "nothing would be more desirable than that there should be a committee composed of honest and capable men of the Association itself, whose duty it should be, by the laws of the Association, to decide the

dispute," — in short, industrial arbitration was recommended.

The state, said Leo XIII, instead of legally prohibiting such workmen's associations, as had been done in many countries during the nineteenth century, should "watch over them" and respect the right of association. The government should not "thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and organization, for things move and live by the soul within them, and they may be killed by the grasp of a hand from without." The unions should not only be free to exist, but "to adopt such rules and organization as may best conduce to the attainment of their objects."⁶¹⁷

(4) Finally, the program of immediate reforms to be striven for, as laid down by Leo XIII in the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*,⁶¹⁸ is decidedly interesting, especially if compared on one hand with Count Albert de Mun's program and on the other hand with the laws actually passed by the Third French Republic in subsequent years. To facilitate such a comparison, the three schedules are set down in parallel columns:

COMPARATIVE TABLE

REFORMS PROPOSED BY LEO XIII IN THE YEAR 1891	PARALLEL PROPOSALS MADE BY COUNT ALBERT DE MUN	LAWS ACCOMPLISHING THESE REFORMS COM- PLETELY OR IN PART
(a) Trade unions and joint associations of capital and labor should be permitted and promoted.	Speeches of 1872, 1876, 1879, 1882, 1883, 1884, etc. Same principle. Specific applications.	Incomplete legalization of trade unions with restricted rights by law of March 21, 1884; of mutual aid societies, April 1, 1898. Right of government employees to form trade unions not legally recognized. Trade unions still restricted as regards property rights.
(b) Minimum wage. Wages must be at least sufficient "to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort"; the minimum to be adjusted in each trade by industrial organizations (presumably representing capital and labor), with the sanction and support of the law.	Advocated minimum wage legislation in interview with English journalist, Oct., 1889. Presented bill to prepare data for such legislation, Dec. 7, 1889. Bill for minimum wage in sweated industries, April 2, 1909.	
(c) Social Insurance, i. e., provision against accident, old age, and sickness, to be instituted by trade organizations.	Same idea. Program for Catholic party, 1885. Sickness, Insurance, and Old Age Pensions Bill, 1886. Accident Insur-	For miners only, by law of June 29, 1894. Accident compensation for industrial workers, April 9, 1898; for agricultural

REFORMS PROPOSED BY
LEO XIII IN THE
YEAR 1891

PARALLEL PROPOSALS MADE
BY COUNT ALBERT
DE MUN

LAWs ACCOMPLISHING
THESE REFORMS COM-
PLETELY OR IN PART

(d) U n e m p l o y -
m e n t. Labor organiza-
tions to "try to arrange
for a continuous supply
of work."

(e) S a n i t a t i o n,
hygiène, and safety in
factories, workshops, *etc.*,
to be secured by regu-
lations of trade organiza-
tions, with "approval and
protection" of the State.

(f) Arbitration and
conciliation to be provided
for under the law.

(g) R e s t r i c t i o n
of hours of labor. "It
is neither justice nor hu-
manity so to grind men
down with excessive labor
as to stupefy their minds
and wear out their
bodies." "Daily labor,
therefore, must be so
regulated that it may not
be protracted during
longer hours than
strength admits." "Prop-
er rest for soul and
body" must be allowed.

ance Bill, 1886.

Same idea. Bill pre-
sented in 1906.

Same idea. Bill pre-
sented in 1906.

Bills presented in 1887
and 1889.

Bill presented in 1889
for 58-hour week for
adults, men as well as
women. Eight-hour day
advocated in interview
with English journalist in
Oct., 1886

workers, June 30, 1899;
for commercial em-
ployees, April 12, 1906.
Old age and infirmity
assistance (5 to 20 fr.
per diem), law of July
14, 1905. Obligatory in-
surance against old age
and premature infirmity,
by laws of April 5, 1910,
and Feb. 27, 1912. Sick-
ness insurance for sailors
by laws of Dec. 29, 1905,
and July 14, 1908; for
railway workers, July 21,
1909, and Dec. 28, 1911;
voluntary sickness insur-
ance for others.

Law of March 17, 1904,
requiring all communes
of over 10,000 inhabitants
to maintain employment
bureaus.

Law of June 12, 1893,
prescribing regula-
tions for industrial
plants. Regula-
tions drafted and en-
forced by the State. Ex-
tended to commercial es-
tablishments, July 11,
1903.

Law of Dec. 27, 1892,
providing for voluntary
arbitration and concilia-
tion by special, non-per-
manent boards. Decree
of Sept. 17, 1900, and
law of July 17, 1908,
establishing trade boards.

Law of March 22, 1841,
eight-hour day for chil-
dren under 12 yrs. and
twelve-hour day for chil-
dren under 16. Decree
of March 2, 1848, ten-
hour day in Paris, eleven
in provinces. Law of
Sept. 9, 1848, twelve-
hour day in industry.

Law of Feb. 22, 1851,
ten-hour day for appren-
tices under 14 yrs.;
twelve-hour day for those
between 14 and 16. Law
of May 19, 1874, six-
hour day for children
under 12 yrs. and twelve-
hour day for young per-
sons.

Law of Nov. 2, 1892,
ten-hour day for children
under 16; eleven-hour
day for adolescents (16
to 18) and for women.

Law of March 30, 1900,

REFORMS PROPOSED BY LEO XIII IN THE YEAR 1891	PARALLEL PROPOSALS MADE BY COUNT ALBERT DE MUN	LAWS ACCOMPLISHING THESE REFORMS COM- PLETELY OR IN PART
(h) "Sundays and cer- tain festivals" must be observed as holidays.	Bills presented in 1886 and 1889.	eleven-hour day (reduced to 10½ hours in 1902 and 10 in 1904) for chil- dren under 16, women, and men employed in same factories. Law of June 29, 1905, eight-hour day for miners. Law of April 25, 1919, eight-hour day for in- dustry generally.
(i) Child-labor. Chil- dren must not be em- ployed "in workshops and factories until their bodies and minds are sufficiently mature."	Bill presented in 1889 for exclusion of children under 13 years, and re- quirement of medical cer- tificate for children un- der 16.	Law of Nov. 18, 1814 (poorly enforced, abro- gated in 1880), general rule for observation of Sundays and feast-days. Law of March 22, 1841, Sunday holiday for chil- dren in factories. Law of Feb. 22, 1851, for apprentices. Law of May 19, 1874, for children. Law of Nov. 2, 1892, one day rest weekly for minors and women. Law of July 13, 1906, general Sunday holiday in industry and com- merce, subject to impor- tant exceptions.
(j) Women, should be excluded from certain trades.	Bill presented in 1889 excluding women from mines and unhealthful trades.	Law of March 22, 1841, excluding children under 8 yrs. from factories. Law of May 19, 1874, excluding children under 12 years, or 10 for cer- tain industries. Law of Nov. 2, 1892, excluding children under 13 years, unless they have a primary school diploma and are at least 12 years old. Applies only to industry, and cer- tain other employments.
(k) Small holdings. The law should encour- age workmen to ac- quire land. A large class of small land-owners will cement social solidarity, augment production, and check emigration.	Similar ideas expressed in speech at Saint- Etienne, 1892, and on other occasions.	Law of May 19, 1874, excluding women from subterranean work in mines and quarries. Laws of April 12, 1906, April 10, 1908, Dec. 23, 1912, facilitating acquisi- tion of homes and garden plots.

THE POLITICAL INTERVENTION OF LEO XIII: THE
"RALLIEMENT"

Within less than a year after the promulgation of *Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII issued his famous "Letter to the Archbishops, the Bishops, the Clergy, and all the Catholics of France," February 16, 1892. In the Encyclical of 1891 he had given the Social Catholics of all nations an authoritative charter of social reform; in the Letter of 1892 he gave to French Catholics a program of political action.

Before the Letter of 1892, the acceptance of the Republic by the French Catholics had been often suggested, and even begun. Count Albert de Mun as early as 1885 had proposed to subordinate constitutional to religious questions and had attempted — unsuccessfully — to form a Catholic party.⁶¹⁹ After the Boulangist fiasco in 1889 he refused to enter the royalist group.⁶²⁰ In 1886 Raoul Duval had addressed to the monarchist Right in the Chamber of Deputies the sensational rebuke: "It is a policy of fetishism to wish to condemn the country to misery until the day when it will accept the form of government which you wish to impose."⁶²¹ An even more scathing criticism of the monarchist policy, and a remarkable exhortation to accept the Republic, appeared in the *Nouvelle Revue*, December 1, 1888, over the signature of a prominent Conservative, the Marquis de Castellane, two of whose sons subsequently figured as Republicans in the Chamber of Deputies.⁶²²

Shortly after the general election of 1889, a practical but not a very fruitful attempt to form a "constitutional" group of converted monarchists was made by M. Jacques Piou, a bourgeois lawyer and politician of Toulouse, who had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a Conservative Orleanist in 1885 and again in 1889. Piou's small parliamentary group, though bitterly attacked by monarchists, stubbornly struggled along.⁶²³ The leader himself, in an interview with the editor of the *Soleil*, declared that the conservatives could never really dispute power with the Radicals unless "the battle is no longer waged,

either overtly or covertly, against the form of government, but only against the manner of governing." "I am convinced," he said, "that the conservative party, reconstituted on this basis, and augmented by the adhesion of elements today separated from it, would reconquer the majority in the country and would gain legal and peaceful possession of power."⁶²⁴

In its program as published in the *Figaro*, March 30, 1890, M. Piou's group of the "Independent or Constitutional Right" firmly took its stand on the solid Republican platform of "respect for the national will and recognition of the rights of universal suffrage." Renouncing once and for all the idea of revolution against the Republic, the Constitutional Right would strive to build up a parliamentary majority favorable to freedom for Catholic worship and Catholic schools, patriotism, financial retrenchment, and simplification of administrative machinery. One phrase of this program contains the promise of social reform, though vaguely:—

"Constant study of labor questions, so as to afford the full protection of the law to the workingmen and the weak."⁶²⁵

No list of members was published. Perhaps it would have been too short!

The tendency of men like de Mun, de Castellane, and Piou, to abandon Monarchism was significant as an indication that a few Catholics were beginning to discern the unpleasant truth that alliance with Monarchism was not only futile, but was bidding fair to become fatal.

By attacking the Republic, the clericals had simply afforded the Republicans ample justification for anticlericalism. In particular the most recent episode of the Monarchist campaign—the Boulanger affair—had borne bitter fruit in a law requiring ecclesiastical students to perform one year of military service⁶²⁶ and in a crushing electoral defeat (1889) for clericals and Monarchists.⁶²⁷

The political sagacity of a M. Piou was reinforced by the enthusiasm of a Cardinal Lavigerie.⁶²⁸ As the ardent director of Roman Catholic missionary enterprise in northern Africa,

Cardinal Lavigerie learned to look to the Republic for protection and to regret the factional dissensions which prevented the Catholics of France from transforming the Republic into an even more powerful instrument for the advancement of Christianity and civilization. At a banquet in honor of the officers of the French squadron, at Algiers, November 12, 1890, Cardinal Lavigerie startled France by making the toast:

Please God . . . that the union which is now manifest among us . . . may soon reign among all the sons of our mother-country! . . . When the will of a people has clearly declared itself; when the form of a government in itself is in no way contrary—as Leo XIII recently proclaimed⁶²⁹—to the principles which alone give life [*peuvent faire vivre*] to Christian and civilized nations; when in order to rescue one's country from the abyss which threatens it there is nothing else to do but to give unreserved adhesion to the form of government; the moment arrives to declare at last that the trial has been concluded and, in order to put an end to our dissensions, to sacrifice all that conscience and honor permit, nay command each of us to sacrifice for the welfare of the country.⁶³⁰

The "toast of Algiers" stirred up a tempest in France.⁶³¹ The Marquis de l'Angle-Baumanoir urged the Senate to suppress the stipend of Cardinal Lavigerie⁶³²; Paul de Cassagnac inveighed against the Cardinal with amazing asperity;⁶³³ Mgr. Freppel, writing in the *Anjou*, strenuously upheld the clerico-monarchist coalition and denied that the Republic was acceptable to Catholics.⁶³⁴

At the opposite extreme, a number of young and enthusiastic journalist-priests, notably Abbé Dabry, Abbé Fesch, Abbé Garnier, Abbé Naudet, Abbé Lemire, and Abbé Gayraud, seemed to be quite as belligerent and as uncompromising as the monarchists. Just as the monarchists insisted upon identifying the cause of the altar with the cause of the throne, so these "Christian Democrats" wished to link Christianity with thoroughgoing political and social democracy.⁶³⁵

Men of moderate temper found it difficult to discover a middle course. They could no longer make restoration of monarchy the central feature of their political program nor could they, on the other hand, instantly transfer their affections

to democracy. A Catholic party, more or less neutral as regards the form of government, seemed to be the most promising escape from the dilemma.

The "Constitutional Right" recently founded by Jacques Piou was such a party. It required its members merely to acquiesce in the existing constitution, but not necessarily to believe in republicanism. Much encouraged by Cardinal Lavigerie's famous Toast, and by an interview with the pope (February 2, 1891), Piou worked energetically to strengthen his party, despite the attacks which the monarchists made upon his policy.⁶³⁶

Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris, conceived a more ambitious idea. A great Catholic union (*L'Union de la France Chrétienne*) was to be formed for the defense of religious interests, without regard to political opinions. Whether they were royalists or republicans, all who wished to defend the liberty of the Church would be welcomed as adherents. The great difficulty was to select a committee to lead the forces of the Union. If the committee was dominated by republicans, the monarchists would be estranged; if by monarchists, the Union would appear to be nothing more than a royalist movement. After much negotiation, a "Committee of Religious Defense" was finally constituted, including as members some of the most prominent Catholic politicians and publicists. Chesnelong was president; Keller, Baron de Mackau, Albert de Mun, and d'Herbelot were vice-presidents; and editors of *L'Univers*, *La Croix*, *Le Monde*, and *La Défense*, were among the members. In its statement of policy, June 19, 1891, the committee declared, ". . . We ask the help of the Christians and of all fair-minded men, whatever their political opinions, for the purpose of defending and claiming by common accord the civil, social and religious liberties of which they are despoiled. . . ." ⁶³⁷

About the same time, the Bishop of Grenoble, Mgr. Fava, attempted to establish a "Catholic Party" of sectarian character and anti-masonic tendency.⁶³⁸ More significant was the "*Association catholique française*" organized in 1891 by Jules

Bonjean to merge the endeavors of Catholics, forgetful of political and partisan controversies, in an ardent campaign to carry out the "religious and social doctrines" of *Rerum Novarum* and to secure "the physical and moral amelioration of all those who suffer in body or in soul."⁶³⁹ It is interesting to remark that de Mun soon transferred his support from the *Union de la France Chrétienne* to the *Association catholique française*.⁶⁴⁰

The Catholic secession from monarchism became ever more pronounced during the year 1891. Journals propagated the new policy. Séverin Icard formulated the slogan, "*Catholiques et républicains, rallions-nous!*"⁶⁴¹ A Dominican theologian, Père Maumus, justified the *ralliement* in a convincing pamphlet entitled *La République et la politique de l'Eglise*.⁶⁴² Gaston David inaugurated a lively campaign, in the name of the *Ligue populaire*, to federate all existing groups "for the defense of political, social, and religious liberties."⁶⁴³

Such was the chaotic situation in France when Leo XIII at length decided to intervene.⁶⁴⁴ On February 16, 1892, he issued the Letter "to the Archbishops, the Bishops, the Clergy, and all the Catholics of France."⁶⁴⁵ Four features of the letter should be noticed. (1) All Catholics as good citizens must render obedience to the Republic, and refrain from conspiracies to overthrow the government by force,— "all the more so, because insurrection stirs up hatred among citizens, provokes civil war, and may throw the nation back into the chaos of anarchy." (2) The main purpose of the letter was obviously to induce the Catholics of France to cease their ruinous factional strife and to make common cause in defense of religion and country. "Far from them [the Catholics] be these political dissensions which divide them; all their efforts should be combined to conserve or restore the moral greatness of their country." In other words, the way to protect the Church against "the vast conspiracy which certain men have formed for the annihilation of Christianity in France," was not to strive for the overthrow of the Republic, but unitedly to demand liberty and justice and "the inalienable rights of the

Catholic Church," under the Republic. (3) The privileged position of the Church under the Concordat must be maintained, and separation of church and state opposed. (4) In the realm of "speculative ideas," Catholics, "as all other citizens, have full liberty to prefer one form of government to another." Neither Monarchism, nor Republicanism, nor Democracy was condemned in principle.

The Encyclical of February 16, 1892, was supplemented by letters to six refractory cardinals (May 3, 1892),⁶⁴⁶ to M. Chesnelong (May 5, 1892),⁶⁴⁷ and to Mgr. Fava (June 22, 1892).⁶⁴⁸ To the Cardinals, the pope reiterated his assertion that the Republic must be accepted; he urged "a sincere submission" and he reproved the identification of religion with party:

The men who would subordinate everything to the triumph of their particular party, even under the pretext that it appeared to them to be the most favorable to religious defense, would by that very fact be convicted of placing, in effect, by a ruinous inversion of ideas, the policy which divides above the religion which unites. And it would be their fault if our enemies, exploiting their divisions as they have only too frequently done, should finally succeed in crushing them all.⁶⁴⁹

And to Mgr. Fava, advocate of a sectarian Catholic Party, the pope explicitly affirmed the advisability of coöperating politically with "all honorable men," even non-Catholics:

While holding firm in the affirmation of dogmas and refusing all compromise with error, it is Christian prudence not to repulse, or rather to be able to enlist, the help of all honest men in the pursuit of good, whether individual or, above all, social.⁶⁵⁰

In consequence of the papal instructions, M. Chesnelong's *Union de la France Chrétienne* and Mgr. Fava's Catholic party collapsed.⁶⁵¹ The main purpose of papal intervention was, it seemed, to discourage both the tendency to make Catholicism a political party and the tendency to make Catholicism an annex of the monarchist party or of any other party.

IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE ENCYCLICALS

Even the most cursory examination of the political and religious situation in France during the last decade of the nineteenth century will show how the papal encyclicals of 1891 and 1892 necessarily had the effect of transferring the allegiance of Social Catholicism in France from the ideal monarchy to the actual Republic, and at the same time of intensifying the factional conflict within French Catholicism as a whole.

For a variety of reasons, the most ardent Social Catholics in France, monarchists though they were by tradition, were among the first to obey the papal letter recommending acceptance of the Republic. In the first place, from its very inception, the Social Catholic movement had been unmistakably ultramontane. One of the first acts of the "Committee for the Establishment of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs" ⁶⁵² had been to send an address to the pope, December 25, 1871. ⁶⁵³ In recognition of their loyalty to the papacy, the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs had received frequent testimonials of papal favor. ⁶⁵⁴ Moreover, the Social Catholics had learned to look upon Leo XIII as the special protector of their social work. De Mun and Harmel had been cordially received on their pilgrimages to Rome. And by promulgating the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* the supreme pontiff had earned their unbounded gratitude. The Count de Mun, furthermore, as a politician and as a member of parliament, had discovered to his own discomfiture that if Social Catholicism hoped ever to better the condition of the poor and to win the confidence and support of the masses, it must not be saddled with anti-republican plots and schemes. Although they still proclaimed the "Counter-Revolution," the Social Catholics were in general concerned more with the social and religious than with the political Counter-Revolution.

Count Albert de Mun's acceptance of the two Encyclicals was prompt and enthusiastic. In speeches at Grenoble (May 23, 1892) and Lille (June 6, 1892) he announced his resolution "henceforth to place my political action on a constitutional

platform, in order to conform my attitude to the directions of the Sovereign Pontiff." ⁶⁵⁵ Still more emphatically, in a notable speech at Saint-Etienne on December 18, 1892, he translated the papal preachments into a definite political, religious, and social program. Politically, he proclaimed himself a "*rallié*," *i. e.*, a monarchist who accepted the Republic. In religious matters, he championed the interests of Roman Catholicism without reserve or hesitation. His social program is important enough to reproduce here *in extenso*:

In my opinion, our demands taken altogether should tend to guarantee to the people the enjoyment of their essential rights, which are not recognized by the individualist régime: — legal representation of the people's interests and needs, instead of a purely numerical representation; preservation of the home and of family-life; the possibility for every man to live and to support his family by the product of his labor, with a guarantee against the insecurity resulting from accidents, sickness, unemployment, and old age; insurance against unavoidable destitution; opportunity for the workman to share in the profits, and even, by coöperation, in the capital of the enterprises to which he contributes his labor; finally, protection against the profiteering and speculation which exhaust the savings of the people and condemn the people to indigence while, in the words of the Encyclical, "a minority, in absolute control of industry and commerce, diverts the flow of riches and draws all the sources of wealth to itself."

Two forces should coöperate in realizing this program: professional organization and legislation.

Industrial organization, for which we demand the most complete liberty, will furnish the means to ensure the public representation of labor in the elected assemblies of the nation, to determine the amount of a just wage in each industrial or agricultural profession, to guarantee indemnities to the victims of accidents, of sickness, or of unemployment, to create a fund for old-age pensions, to prevent conflicts by the establishment of permanent arbitration-boards, to organize on the guild basis the relief of paupers, and, finally, to establish a certain collective property in the possession of the workers, consistent with, and without infringement of individual property.

Legislation will protect the home and family life by restricting the employment of women and children, by prohibiting night-work, by limiting the working-day, by enforcing the Sunday holiday, and, as far as agriculture is concerned, by safeguarding [against seizure

ralliés, the *Vérité* did not openly repudiate the papal letters: that was not necessary. It was easier, and more expedient, to "interpret" the pope's words. Said Arthur Loth:

As the established government the Republic has a right to the submission of the citizens, to the payment of taxes, to the fulfilment of the various civil and military obligations. . . . To go further than that, for France, would be to falsify the intention of the pope and to deny the facts. . . . It [the Republic] rests neither on legitimate right nor on popular acclaim. It has only actual possession and the fact of being established.⁶⁶⁵

Tirelessly the *Vérité* reiterated that the pope had forbidden French Catholics to be rebels but had not bidden them to become Republicans; that the *ralliés* were mistakenly making terms with the error of "Liberalism" and accepting religious liberty instead of demanding the preservation of the union of Church and State; that the *ralliés* were coöperating with non-Catholics in politics. The effect of the *Vérité's* campaign was to keep alive that very antagonism between monarchist and republican Catholics which it had been Leo XIII's obvious purpose in 1892 to dissipate. Monarchist agitation of this type furnished the anticlericals with a permanent argument for anti-Catholic legislation,—the argument that clericalism was the enemy of the Republic.

It was not surprising, then, that on January 30, 1895, Cardinal Rampolla as papal secretary of state should have addressed a letter to Auguste Roussel, editor-in-chief of the *Vérité*, containing a sharp reproof:

. . . I cannot conceal it from you, although it pains me to say so, that the program hitherto followed by the editors of the *Vérité* does not correspond in fact either to the rules given or to the desires expressed by His Holiness. . . . Notwithstanding the claim it makes to be seconding the views of the Holy See, it [the *Vérité*] is in disagreement with the Holy See. In effect, its articles are rather designed to excite people's minds against the Republic, although it [the *Vérité*] accepts the constitutional fact; they nourish in the minds of the readers the conviction that it is in vain to expect religious peace with such a form of government.⁶⁶⁶

This direct personal rebuke seems to have had little more effect than the Encyclical.

The *Vérité* splendidly illustrates the combination of political and religious with social intransigence. In one and the same article, the *Vérité* alluded with evident admiration to the Syllabus of Errors as "that venerable charter, now cast aside [by the Christian Democrats, presumably], of the old *monarchical*⁶⁶⁷ Catholicism," and in the next breath inveighed against "the young party of *ralliés* and Christian Socialists," which "shows us only too clearly that it hardly concerns itself any more with the old principles and that it believes itself capable of founding a new Christianity on new bases."⁶⁶⁸

In this spirit of intransigence, the monarchists will be found, as our story progresses, uncompromisingly hostile to *ralliés*, Christian Democrats, and Social Catholics. They will compass the defeat of de Mun in the elections of 1893; they will be bitter antagonists of the Popular Liberal Party. The effect of the papal intervention in 1891-1892 was to divorce monarchism from Social Catholicism.⁶⁶⁹

The attitude of the monarchists not only aggravated the dissensions among French Catholics, and thereby weakened the powers of the Catholics to resist anticlerical attacks; far more, by combining an almost arrogant championship of the privileges of Catholicism as state religion with a disdainful repudiation of republicanism and of social legislation, the monarchists enabled anticlerical politicians to persuade the masses that "clericalism" was unalterably opposed not only to the Republic but also to the interests of the workingman. Intransigent monarchism was not the only cause, but it was a very powerful cause, of the anticlerical coalition of bourgeois radicalism or anticlericalism with socialism, and of the consequent growth of socialist-radicalism.

It must be remembered that since 1882 each step in the progress of socialism had been followed by a bid for proletarian support on the part of bourgeois radicals. In the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1885 five Socialists appeared, whereas in the preceding legislature there had been but one.⁶⁷⁰ Two

months after the elections of 1885 one of the leading radicals, M. Clemenceau,—who in 1884 had rejected the principle of social insurance,⁶⁷¹—adjured his colleagues: “Let us enact factory laws, a good law of public assistance [for the aged and the infirm, presumably], good credit laws; let us reduce the cost of justice; let us effect a better adjustment of taxation. . . .”⁶⁷² The appointment of Lockroy, in 1886, as minister of commerce and industry in a Radical coalition cabinet,⁶⁷³ was a direct overture to the workingman, inasmuch as Lockroy, by advocating emancipation of the trade-unions,⁶⁷⁴ had achieved great popularity and in the elections of 1885 had received more votes than any other candidate in Paris.⁶⁷⁵ Lockroy immediately proposed several moderate measures, such as industrial arbitration, the development of vocational training, prohibition of child labor (under thirteen years), regulation of the labor of women and young persons, and the establishment of a council to represent industry and commerce. But other matters diverted attention, and little was done.⁶⁷⁶

A few years later the continued growth of socialism again caused the bourgeois republicans to make a bid for proletarian support. In 1887 the Socialists elected ten representatives (one “Blanquist” and nine “Possibilists”) to the municipal council of Paris.⁶⁷⁷ In 1888 eighteen deputies formed a Socialist group in the national Chamber of Deputies.⁶⁷⁸ The Republicans, as a concession to the Socialists, proposed to set aside two sittings weekly for the discussion of social legislation.⁶⁷⁹

The Boulanger agitation, in 1888 and 1889, served as a “red herring” to distract attention from social problems. Some of the Socialists (the Possibilists⁶⁸⁰) joined with Radicals like Clemenceau, feeling that it was necessary to defend the Republic. Thanks to the Boulanger scare, the bourgeois Republicans were able to win the general elections of 1889 on the familiar platform of defense of Republican liberty against monarchist plots and clerical intolerance.⁶⁸¹

This was the situation when the publication of *Rerum Novarum*, in 1891, gave renewed confidence to Social Catholics

and Christian Democrats and called public attention to the fact that Catholicism, no less than socialism, advocated certain definite measures of social legislation, presented an ambitious social program, and claimed to champion the welfare of the masses. In the Chamber of Deputies, Count Albert de Mun could now invoke the authority of the Encyclical for what had hitherto appeared as his own personal and somewhat paradoxical compound of religious conservatism and social radicalism. Would it be possible for the Socialists and the clericals now to coöperate in forcing social legislation through the Chamber of Deputies, overpowering the opposition of the bourgeois Republicans? One of the most conspicuous of the Marxian Socialist leaders, Paul Lafargue, seemed to think that such a combination was not only possible but desirable.

The very suggestion of such a combination was sufficient to throw the Chamber of Deputies into an uproar. It was in the debate of December 8, 1891, that Lafargue made his appeal.⁶⁸² He had taken the floor to plead for the release of imprisoned labor agitators, and to denounce the Government's policy of persecuting labor. The minister of the interior, he had declared, treated "the Socialists and the workingmen with a brutality and an illegality to be found only in despotic states." The alternative to the Government's policy of blind repression was a policy of social reforms and appeasement. This was the real issue, he declared; it was the one transcendent issue. The religious question, which had so long been given first consideration, was only a diversion, a distraction. Lafargue himself was anti-Christian, as far as religion was concerned. "I am an atheist; I am a materialist," he frankly announced. But he considered the labor problem more important than religious controversies. Religion, he thought, was a personal affair. He did not ask people whether they were Christians, or whether they were eager for the separation of Church and State. The question of separation of Church and State was only a "toy," with which the bourgeois politicians had "amused" themselves during the last twenty years. But he did ask, he went on to

say, "are you for the suppression of the wage-system? Are you for the socialization of the means of production? Are you for socialist reforms?"

Regardless, therefore, of religious differences, he wished to solicit "the coöperation of all who desire labor reforms, of all who wish to alleviate human sufferings." "We address ourselves," he continued, "as much to this side of the Chamber [the Right] as to that [the Left]."

When Lafargue attempted to reinforce his plea by mentioning Leo XIII's Encyclical on the labor problem, indignant exclamations from the anticlericals of Center and Left cut him short.⁶⁸³ Even the president of the Chamber of Deputies temporarily forgot his function as impartial moderator and delivered a stinging retort. Frenchmen, said the president, had not waited for the pope's authorization to become socialists.

Another remark of Lafargue's created a sensation. "One of the best socialist speeches" which had been delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, he asserted, was made by the Social Catholic orator, Count Albert de Mun. After the noise had subsided, an anticlerical jeeringly remarked, that Lafargue had good reason to express such views since the "reactionaries had voted for him." Another deputy called him "a soldier of the pope." Still others interjected sarcastic comments.⁶⁸⁴

After several other speakers had taken the floor, either to uphold the policy of the Government⁶⁸⁵ or to assert that the Church was attempting to turn the socialist movement into channels serviceable to clerical interests,⁶⁸⁶ or to reject the proposed amnesty because it was a "political manifestation accompanied by a suggestion of alliance between socialism and Catholic socialism,"⁶⁸⁷ Count Albert de Mun, in his turn, arose and replied to Lafargue.⁶⁸⁸

First of all, Count de Mun explained that he never had and never would call himself a Socialist, because socialism was "entirely opposed," in its point of departure, to his own religious convictions, and because he considered the collectivist ideal to be "neither just nor practical." But, this reservation made, he said,

I do not need to tell anybody here that in effect I am agreed with the socialists, with the speaker [Lafargue] who has just addressed you, regarding the criticism of the present economic order and regarding a very large number of social reforms which are daily demanded by the laborers. [Applause from the Left.]

M. Lafargue could rightly say that, on these points, I was much more in agreement with him and with his friends than with a large number of members of the majority of this Chamber. [Noise in the Center.]

De Mun then went on to say that, although he was separated from the Socialists by his religious convictions, he was even more widely separated from the bourgeois Republican majority.

There is unquestionably a profound disagreement between us [Social Catholics and Lafargue], an abyss which will not disappear; it results from the firmness of my religious convictions. But this abyss,—I regret to say,—I perceive not only between myself and him, but also between myself and the greater number of the members of the majority [applause from various benches] and I must add that furthermore I am separated from the majority by an equally profound disagreement touching social reforms, in principle and in application.

When de Mun, continuing, affirmed that the social reforms which he and the Socialists had incessantly demanded were to be realized not by attacking the Church, but with the aid of the Church, members of the Left interrupted him, saying that there were only seven "socialists" in the Right, and that de Mun's own friends were opposed to his social doctrines. De Mun replied,

Do I not know, as everybody knows, that between myself and many of my friends there are disagreements on these questions of social reforms? Have I ever drawn back from the painful duty of defending my ideas here against my best friends? No, never!

His profound convictions, he said, could be influenced neither by the regret that his friends refused to support him, nor by the applause, sincere in some cases, and ironical in others, of the other parties.

As for the specific question under debate, namely the amnesty

for labor leaders, he could not agree with Lafargue. It was not right to "efface the condemnations pronounced against the men who have stirred up and excited popular passions." He considered violence in labor disputes to be unwise and deplorable. The wiser course was, not to condone class warfare and violence, but to satisfy the legitimate claims of labor. This latter course he would defend with all his heart.

It was high time for bourgeois anticlericals to take alarm. With both Social Catholicism and Revolutionary Socialism promising the workingman solid material benefits, would mere middle-class Republicanism be able to survive? As Eugène Spuller, a prominent anticlerical politician, pointed out,

It is certain, in fact, that at the present hour the general principles of the Revolution are being battered down with redoubled vigor by all the Socialists. Whether it be the pretendedly scientific socialism of Karl Marx or the Christian socialism of men who claim to draw their inspiration from the teachings of the Church, little matters. There is evident a movement against the liberty of labor and even against the principle of property, as these principles were understood and comprehended by the Revolution, and the social evolution of the Church can only give new force to this movement.⁶⁸⁹

The Church, Spuller believed, was endeavoring to dominate the masses, to seize the leadership of the people. Apparently he was much perturbed by the prospect of what might happen "if the Church, taking the lead, starts to excite the masses in what they call their social claims." Again he said, "the Church is taking a step in the direction of the masses, now that she is detached from the princes and monarchies and needs another support; and this is what must be clearly perceived and pondered."⁶⁹⁰ To quote still further from the same author,—

Nothing is more interesting to follow than the great and profound movement of opinion which may be observed almost everywhere and which is pushing the Catholics of all countries into the front rank of those who place social questions above political or dynastic questions.

... Turned in this direction, and marching in this path, with the power of rejuvenation and of transformation of which her long

history gives so many proofs, the Church is preparing to play an infinitely more important rôle than is commonly believed in the great affairs of the twentieth century, of which we are beginning to catch the first glimpses.⁶⁹¹

While Spuller was pointing out how old-fashioned bourgeois anticlericalism and Republicanism were exposed to the twofold peril of proletarian socialism and "Christian socialism," a few of the younger and more enterprising bourgeois anticlericals, far from seeing a menace in socialism, were going over to the proletarian movement and assuming its leadership. Republicanism and anticlericalism, they thought, should logically lead to socialism, and could not be established on a firm basis without socialism. Jaurès and Millerand were the most conspicuous of these younger leaders, who annexed the popular doctrines of socialism to the older principles of bourgeois anticlerical Republicanism or Radicalism. This new move on the part of the Radicals was a direct challenge to Social Catholicism and as such vitally affected the latter movement. The point will perhaps be made clearer by a brief review of the tactics which Millerand and Jaurès pursued.

Alexandre Millerand, a young lawyer, began his political career as a Radical. It was as a Radical that he figured in the Paris municipal elections of 1884. His transition to socialism occurred during the later 'eighties. In 1885 he was elected to the Chamber by a combined Radical and Socialist vote. In 1888 we find him subscribing to the socialistic (it was hardly Marxian) program of the "Socialist Group" in the Chamber. In 1891, as counsel for the Marxist Paul Lafargue, who was then on trial for expressing violent proletarian sympathies in the warfare of the classes, Millerand identified himself more emphatically with collectivism. And on November 28, 1891, he joined with Goblet, Lockroy, Sarrien, and Peytral in publishing a proclamation in the *Petite République*, calling upon all Socialists and all Republicans to coöperate in disestablishing the Church, limiting the working-day, restricting child-labor and female labor, establishing old-age pensions, and enforcing hygienic conditions in the factories.⁶⁹²

It was Alexandre Millerand who, in the famous debate of December 8, 1891, pointed out to the Republicans the peril of a *rapprochement* between socialism and Social Catholicism. The social trend of the Church made clericalism more than ever the enemy. He said,

Yes, we have to sustain a conflict with the Church at this moment. . . . Today, in fact, everybody knows that it is a conflict without mercy . . . between the Republican idea and the Church, . . . the Church which—as M. de Mun has just told you—thinks to draw to herself the toiling masses by holding before their eyes the hope that socialist doctrines will be defended by none better or more eloquently or more effectively than by those who, like M. de Mun, vaunt the Catholic doctrine.⁶⁹³

The Republican party, said Millerand, must make some reply to this doctrine. Should that reply consist merely of speeches? Did they believe that the laboring classes would content themselves indefinitely with the promises showered upon them, promises which “hitherto have not been followed by realities”? Did the Republicans not see that promises must be accompanied by deeds? Labor laws had long been discussed but had not been voted. Bills regarding accident-compensation, old-age pensions, and many other questions, “slumber in the legislative pigeon-holes and have not yet assumed, in the eyes of the worker, of the laboring class, the aspect of living realities.” The Government and the immense majority of the Republican party had made promises which they had not yet honored. “Do you not understand,” he asked them impatiently, “that you must seize eagerly every occasion to prove to the workingmen that your promises and your declarations are not merely vain words?”⁶⁹⁴ Millerand, then, was a bourgeois anticlerical who thoroughly understood the importance of bringing anticlericalism and socialism into alliance.

Jaurès, another bourgeois intellectual, a university lecturer, in fact, certainly gave no outward sign of marked socialistic inclinations when he entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1885. He took his seat among the middle-class anticlericals of the

Left Center. In 1888 he was still sufficiently a bourgeois to remain outside the parliamentary "Socialist Group." Being defeated in the elections of 1889, he returned to academic life. When next he appeared in politics, it was as a collectivist candidate from Carmaux, in the elections of 1893. It is significant that in espousing collectivism Jaurès did not forsake Radicalism. He declared it necessary to "annex to the economic program of Socialism the political program of Radicalism." The Radicals, discerning that Jaurès would be more valuable as an ally in the bourgeois struggle against clericalism, militarism, and monarchism than dangerous as an apostle of the proletarian revolution, helped to elect him in 1893. He fulfilled their expectations. He rendered splendid service in the Dreyfus case; he approved socialist coöperation with the bourgeois Republicans during the years 1899-1905, when anticlerical legislation occupied parliament's time much to the disadvantage of social legislation; and under his tactful and conciliatory leadership the Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies, though they waxed in numbers, were a menace less to the Radical bourgeoisie than to the clericals and the militarists.⁶⁹⁵

The entry of bourgeois anticlericals like Jaurès and Millerand into the Socialist movement, coinciding almost exactly in point of time with the Catholic *ralliement* to the Republic, meant that the Social Catholic republicans or *ralliés* had to encounter extremely vigorous opposition from the Socialists as well as from the reactionaries. In the electoral battle of 1893 the *ralliés* were raked by a cross-fire of criticism from the socialistic Radicals or parliamentary Socialists on one hand, and from uncompromising monarchists on the other hand. The predicament was embarrassing.

Despite their embarrassment, the *ralliés* were determined not to mince words. Their foremost orator, Count Albert de Mun, not only declared and reiterated his decision to accept the Republic, but, going still further, he challenged the conservatives no less boldly on the social question than on the constitutional issue. Imagine the consternation of wealthy reaction-

aries when they read in the morning papers that the most brilliant orator of the Right, a member of the hereditary aristocracy, had uttered words such as these:

The great problem of the moment is socialism. There are two ways of attacking this problem: in alliance with the capitalists or in alliance with the people. To make an alliance with Judaism⁶⁹⁶ and High Finance is to prepare the path for a socialism which will go to no one can tell what excesses. At the risk of appearing as one crying in the wilderness and as an extremist, I say: that which needs to be protected is not capital, it is labor! We must not allow the belief to exist that the Church is a cassocked policeman who throws his weight against the people in defense of, and in the sole interest of capital; it must be understood, on the contrary, that the Church acts in the interest of and for the defense of the weak. When the people know this, when they are thoroughly convinced that the Church is not made for wealth, then our efforts will be on the threshold of success, and the idea of the Holy Father will be realized. "Repeat that," he said to me, "speak often of the social action of the Church."⁶⁹⁷

The ire of the conservatives at this speech need not be left entirely to the imagination of the reader. Some faint indication of their frame of mind may be gathered from the following passage which appeared in a royalist journal:

To speak of forming an alliance with the people against the capitalists, to take the part of labor against capital systematically, and of the workingmen against the employers, is nothing more nor less than preaching class war [*la guerre sociale*]; it is speaking like the leaders of the militant Socialist party, like those who desire the destruction of society.⁶⁹⁸

From M. Piou, whose nature was more that of a shrewd lawyer-politician than that of an ardent apostle of Christian Socialism, we should expect less resonant words than those of de Mun in regard to the social question. Even M. Piou, however, ventured to say that the way to defeat socialism was not by uncompromising opposition, but by magnanimous concession of complete justice to labor. "It is by conceding all that is just that we can block the path to socialism." No

hesitation existed in his mind that, "at least," any "democratic legislation" ought to favor the organization of industry, foster more intimate relations between labor and capital, develop industrial arbitration, social insurance, profit-sharing, and old-age pensions. These proposals may sound conservative enough to many a twentieth-century reader, but they were not conservative when they were made. In 1893 the trade-unions were still hampered by restrictions; social insurance was virtually nonexistent; and an old-age pension law was still seventeen years in the future.

Nevertheless, labor legislation was with M. Piou a minor issue, subordinate to the great controversial questions of republicanism and religion. For, as the political leader of the Constitutional Right, he was busily engaged in organizing the forces of his party for the impending electoral contest of August, 1893, in which the great question would be whether the Catholics would follow the pope's advice and accept the Republic.

On the eve of the elections, M. Piou met with about two hundred Catholic leaders at the residence of Baron Hély d'Oissel and organized the group of the Republican Right. Prince d'Arenberg was given the presidency of the party, at least in name, and a Delegation of Studies (*délégation d'études*) was formed to study the policies which the new group should adopt. In the list of the members of the Delegation, we recognize the name of M. Piou, and also of MM. D. Guibert and A. Viellard, members-to-be of the future Popular Liberal Party.⁶⁹⁹

At a party banquet on June 20, two months before the elections, M. Piou defined his plan to build up the party of the Republican Right (*Droite républicaine*), "to accept the Republic" unequivocally, and to defend "order, authority, religious liberty, social justice." France, he said, was weary of revolutions, and athirst for tolerance, justice, and reform.⁷⁰⁰

It was not easy to turn a deaf ear to those who would have led the new party astray from the path of republicanism, religious liberty, and social reform marked out by M. Piou.

On one hand, the monarchist d'Haussonville invited the *ralliés* to cast their lot with him, and generously offered, while remaining a monarchist, to say nothing about it in the electoral campaign.⁷⁰¹ Had the *ralliés* yielded to his inducements, the whole movement of Republican Social Catholicism might have been derailed and perhaps irreparably damaged. For d'Haussonville and his fellow-monarchists, as has been pointed out, were no less reactionary in social than in political questions. What negation of de Mun's Social Catholic doctrine, or of Leo XIII's doctrine, could be more complete than d'Haussonville's rhetorical question: "Why seek to compromise the Church in questions in which it has no call to meddle?" and his reply, "the Church has been involved only too frequently in our political conflicts; let us not involve it in our economic struggles?"⁷⁰² Fortunately for the Social Catholic movement, d'Haussonville's words were not heeded.

On the other hand, the moderate Republicans, particularly the Progressists, sought to incorporate the *ralliés* into an essentially conservative, anti-socialist, republican coalition. M. Étienne Lamy, a Republican of recognized standing since the 'seventies, painted a glowing picture of a two-party system, in which the alternation of conservatives and liberals in power would propel France gently and safely along the path of conservative progress.⁷⁰³ Would M. Lamy's vision, imported from England, win the favor of the *ralliés* and be realized in the formation of a Tory or conservative party in France?

To the vision of a coalition party, moderate or conservative in temper, such as M. Lamy had in mind, M. Piou was not at all blind. In one of his more sanguine moments, he gave utterance to the hope that from the small beginnings of 1892-1893 there would grow a great "*parti tory*" or "*parti conservateur démocratique*," with the motto emblazoned on its banners of "A Republic open to all, tolerant, and fair" (*République ouverte, tolérante et honnête*). "All those," he went on to prophesy, "who mean to resist the apostles of socialistic Neo-Radicalism and the fanatics of Free-Masonry, will take their place in our ranks, and they are legion!"⁷⁰⁴

M. Léon Say, a wealthy economist, an abhorrer of socialism, and owner in part of the *Journal des Débats*, felt something of the same longing for a party of aristocratic conservatism, uniting the Progressist Republicans and the *ralliés*, as a counterpoise to the socialistic tendencies of the Left.⁷⁰⁵ A coalition of this sort, with the Center of the Chamber of Deputies, would have been formed at the expense of M. Piou's social program, since on the benches of the Center, among the Progressists were to be found very few friends of any but the mildest social legislation. In truth, MM. Léon Say, Frédéric Passy, Yves Guyot, and other leading Progressists were indomitable foes of any law that smacked of socialism. Had M. Piou and his followers become simply Progressists, de Mun would have been more than ever "a voice crying in the wilderness," almost alone in his Social Catholicism.

As a matter of fact, M. Piou's Republican Right was a little too strong in its clericalism, a little too emphatic in its opposition to the classical school of political economy, to lose its identity in a merger with the moderates and Progressists, who were for the most part anti-interventionists and individualists. However, a number of the *ralliés*, mostly those who were least touched by Count Albert de Mun's social message, showed a very strong inclination toward such a merger, and in the course of the decade from 1893 to 1903 many of them preserved a divided allegiance between the Republican Right and the Progressist group; two score of them definitely went over to the Progressists in 1897⁷⁰⁶; while others maintained their ambiguous position until several years after the formation of the Popular Liberal Party.⁷⁰⁷ It might be said with much truth that the more conservative a *rallié* was in his attitude toward social reform, the more he tended to drift from the Republican Right toward the Center. In fact, in questions of social justice, the Chamber presented the appearance of an army whose wings were advancing rapidly, eager for the fray, while the center hung back in caution, loath to leave the shelter of its comfortably intrenched position.

The question quite naturally arises, why did not the more

ardent clerical reformers, those who like de Mun were called Christian Socialists, ally themselves with the Socialists of the Extreme Left, so that in very truth the two wings would advance together toward a new conception of social justice, dragging the reluctant Progressists and other moderates of the Center willy-nilly behind them? Had not the Socialist Paul Lafargue declared, in 1891, that "one of the best Socialist speeches which has been delivered here [in the Chamber of Deputies] was made by M. de Mun"? And had not de Mun, on his own part, confessed that he was more in sympathy with Lafargue than with the Center?⁷⁰⁸

In practice, the two extremes of the Chamber were frequently found arrayed on the same side in economic controversies,—both opposed to the Center and Left Center. But any solid coalition of Socialists and Social Catholics was quite impossible. With the exception of Lafargue and perhaps one or two others, the parliamentary Socialists and Socialist-Radicals went out of their way to repudiate the assistance of the Right⁷⁰⁹ and found a working agreement with the anticlerical defenders of capitalism far less repugnant to their taste than a combination with the clerical advocates of social reform. The Socialists showed more interest in the spiritual welfare than in the material condition of the masses. By a paradoxical inversion of their own materialistic interpretation of history, the Socialists seemed to act as if philosophical questions of religious opinion were far more substantial and weighed incomparably heavier in the scales of their decision than did the solid, material, economic class-interests of the proletariat. The paradox is hard to understand unless one remembers that Jaurès, Millerand, and not a few other leading Socialist politicians were not *bona fide* "proletarians" at all, but sons of the middle class.

Perhaps the reader will not find it surprising, then, that instead of heaving a sigh of relief when an important group of monarchist-clericals became converted to the Republic and to social reform, the Radicals and many of the Socialists gave signs of positive indignation. It was *their* Republic; what right had the *ralliés* to intrude? If the Church became Repub-

lican, what would become of Alexandre Millerand's famous phrase that "between the Republican idea and the Church" there was "a struggle without mercy"?⁷¹⁰

The *ralliés* could not be genuine Republicans! It was inconceivable. Alexandre Millerand, who had succeeded to the editorship of Gambetta's celebrated journal, the *Petite République*,⁷¹¹ as well as to Gambetta's anticlerical apostolate, joined with his fellow-Socialist Jean Jaurès and with Camille Pelletan, who was far from being a Socialist, to sound the battle-cry against clericalism and to sign a manifesto urging the union of "all true Republicans in the Social Republic."⁷¹²

The party in power, Charles Dupuy and the Radicals, could not have been better pleased. Once more clericalism rather than capitalism would be the enemy. The premier could regard the parliamentary Socialists as allies against rather than allies of the Christian Socialists and *ralliés*, whom he scornfully styled "*résignés*."⁷¹³ With one hand he could invite the Socialists to take their stand with the Left and even with the Center on a bourgeois platform of three planks only, to wit, (1) vague promises of labor legislation, to be conceived in the spirit of "Republican solidarity," (2) tax reform, (3) enactment of an Associations Law (which would strike at the monastic orders).⁷¹⁴ At the same time, letting not his left hand know what his right performed, he could sternly curb the labor movement by forcibly suppressing, on July 7, 1893, the Paris Labor Exchange, which had served as a hotbed of Revolutionary Syndicalist agitation.⁷¹⁵

Such was the situation in the summer of 1893, when the new party of the *ralliés* or the Republican Right, out of which was to grow the Popular Liberal Party, entered its first general electoral contest. The group was fiercely assailed, both by the monarchists upon whom it had turned its back and by the "true" Republicans or anticlerical bourgeois Radicals and Socialists, whom it had attacked in the name of social reform without revolution and republican liberty without anticlericalism.⁷¹⁶

The result was bitterly discouraging for the men who had

thought to blaze a trail in which all Catholic Frenchmen might follow, as Republican *ralliés*, toward a happier state of democracy and social justice. Of the 95 *ralliés* who presented themselves as candidates, only 35 were elected. Most disastrous of all, the leaders went down in defeat. To lose Count Albert de Mun and Jacques Piou, both, was a heavy blow. What added to the sting of defeat was the knowledge that certainly in de Mun's case⁷¹⁷ and probably in the case of Piou,⁷¹⁸ the disaster was caused by the opposition of monarchists who refused to accept the Republic and who were determined to punish the leaders of the *ralliement*.

If the new group of *ralliés* was, so to speak, decapitated by the loss of its leaders, the groups of Royalists, Bonapartists, and Boulangists were quite as grievously dismembered. Whereas in the preceding election these three groups had made a very respectable showing with 211 seats, they retained only 58 seats in 1893. The French nation in 1893 pronounced decisively the doom of monarchism. Hitherto the avowed enemies of the Republic had been influential and numerous. Henceforth their number was destined to decline until the dwindling monarchist group in the Chamber all but disappeared.⁷¹⁹

The losses of the monarchist Right were the gains of the Center, the Left, and the Extreme Left. The moderate and "opportunistic" Republicans, who had possessed 245 seats in 1889, swept all before them in 1893 and entered the new legislature with an absolute majority of 317 seats. The quarrels of the clericals and the anticlericalism of the Socialists were probably responsible in no small part for this gain.

The Extreme Left, that is, the Radicals and Socialists, made a distinct advance. Altogether there were 122 Radicals and about 50 Socialists in the new legislature, as compared with 119 Radicals and Socialists in the old.⁷²⁰ With orators like Jean Jaurès, Jules Guesde, René Viviani, Alexandre Millerand, Marcel Sembat, and Edouard Vaillant, the Extreme Left and particularly the Socialist group were not likely to prove a negligible factor in the new Chamber of Deputies. Nor was it

likely that the bourgeois Republicans would be allowed to forget that the Socialists had polled something like 600,000 votes.⁷²¹ Well might middle-class politicians ponder the words of the Socialist Jaurès:

You have silenced the old lullaby [*i.e.*, religion] which stilled human poverty, and human poverty, awakening with cries, confronts you and demands its place today, its large place in the sun of the natural world, the only one which you have not darkened. . . . It is you who have raised the revolutionary temperature of the proletariat, and if you tremble today it is your own work.⁷²²

CHAPTER VII

"THE NEW SPIRIT"

1893-1899

As Jaurès pointed out, there lay a grave danger for middle-class Republicanism in the very fact that, thanks largely to the diversion provided by the *ralliés*, the monarchists had been routed, the clerical cohorts disordered, and the Republicans, apparently, more securely than ever intrenched in power. Having defended the Republic for the bourgeois parties, the Socialist working-classes might now attempt to conquer it for themselves.

From the very first, the Socialist group in the newly-elected Chamber of Deputies of 1893 gave unmistakable signs of an aggressive disposition. Hardly had the session opened before Jean Jaurès in an eloquent oration,⁷²³ unfurling, so to speak, the red flag of the social revolution, led the Socialist deputies in a vehement attack on the ministry. It was the siege of Jericho reënacted. The oratory of Jean Jaurès, like the trumpetings of the Israelites of old, brought the enemy's fortress crashing down in ruin. In reality, however, the ministry was less like a fortress than like a house divided against itself, for the president of the council, Charles Dupuy, could not agree with his Radical minister of finance, Peytral, on controversial questions such as the desirability of an income tax. Because of its internal weakness, the Dupuy ministry collapsed when Jaurès sounded the attack, and tendered its resignation on Nov. 25, 1893.⁷²⁴ But it was not the Socialists who stepped into Dupuy's place.

An interesting illustration of the permanence of social structure which enabled the same aristocratic or wealthy families to remain in positions of power and affluence though kingdoms and empires might rise and fall and republics have their day was the choice of Jean Casimir-Périer, a wealthy capitalist and

grandson of Louis-Philippe's famous minister, to succeed Charles Dupuy as head of the cabinet, Dec. 3, 1893.⁷²⁵ With a homogeneous Moderate ministry, Casimir-Périer undertook to stand at bay, protecting the existing capitalistic régime against socialist onslaughts and at the same time defending the anticlerical legislation of the Republic against Catholic attacks.⁷²⁶ A series of anarchistic exploits, particularly the hurling of a bomb in the sacred precincts of the Chamber of Deputies itself,⁷²⁷ gave the new ministry an opportunity to inaugurate its campaign against agitators, call themselves what they might, who menaced the social order. Four drastic bills, conferring extraordinary powers upon the administrative authorities for the swift and sure repression of every conspiracy against property or life, were hastily consented to by the Chamber.⁷²⁸ As the Radicals and Socialists with one accord protested against his harsh policy, Casimir-Périer tended more and more to look toward the Right of the Chamber of Deputies in hope that there he might find additional support. Perhaps with the aid of the *ralliés* a new and a stronger Moderate majority might be built up as a bulwark against socialism and anarchism. But to gain the *ralliés'* votes the ministry would have to make certain concessions in religious matters.

The Casimir-Périer ministry made its offer to the *ralliés* by the mouth of Eugène Spuller, minister of public education, who had been the friend and counsellor of the great Gambetta, and who was the brains of the Moderate or Opportunist party. Spuller's much-quoted speech of March 30, 1894, may be regarded as the Moderate Republicans' formal response to the *ralliement* of the Catholics to the Republic.

In effect, Spuller offered a truce in the battle against clericalism if the clericals would join in a crusade "against all fanaticisms, whatever they be, against all sectaries, to whatever sect they belong," *i. e.*, chiefly against Revolutionary Socialism and Anarchism. Spuller's words created enough of a sensation at the time to warrant the quotation of a few sentences here:

It is my profound conviction that after twenty-five years of existence, after the proofs of its independent vitality and power of

resistance which the Republic has given, this struggle [against the Catholic Church] should, if not cease, at any rate assume a different character. I maintain that the Church itself is changing, that it is evolving, despite its claim of immutability. I say that now, instead of serving as a bond for the parties of monarchism, you behold the Church rushing to the front [of the forces] of democracy. I say that in this movement the Church will perhaps drag you, you Republicans, further than you wish to go, for, if you do not take care, it will recover among the masses the influence which you have lost.

That is why, gentlemen, I believe that nothing must be abandoned of our old traditions in our incessant battles for the advantage of secular and civil society; but I also believe that it is necessary that a *new spirit* should animate this democracy and those who represent it. . . .

This new spirit is simply this: instead of petty, mischievous, vexatious warfare [interruptions by the Extreme Left]. . . . This new spirit of which I speak, I do not mean to say that under any pretext it should be a spirit of feebleness, of condescension, of surrender, of abdication; on the contrary, I say that it should be a lofty and a broad spirit of tolerance, of intellectual and moral renovation . . . quite different from that which has hitherto prevailed. . . . I demand that we be inspired by the spirit of tolerance. . . . Tolerance today, tolerance tomorrow . . . always tolerance. It is the future of free societies.

We can have no other if we genuinely desire that the Republic shall inaugurate in this country the reconciliation of all Frenchmen, the rallying of all citizens around the flag of *la patrie*, if we wish that this Republic which we have founded shall live and repose on the perfect and mutual agreement of all spirits, of all hearts.⁷²⁹

Spuller's remarkable speech was probably motivated not only by the ardent hope of uniting the forces of "order" and patriotism in the Republic, but also by the conviction that the Church would not be a menace to the Republicans if tolerated by them. In his interesting book on *The Political and Social Evolution of the Church*, a reprint of articles which he had written during the critical years of the *ralliement*, Spuller discusses the liberal forces at work in the Church, and defends the thesis that the Catholic conservatives who had accepted the Republic would prove willing to help support conservatism, with the bourgeois Republicans, against subversive social agita-

tion. Spuller was thinking merely of political expediency; he certainly was not moved by any sympathy for Catholicism. "If philosophy, if free-thought, have ever had a loyal and convinced champion, it is myself. . . . Opportunist I have always been and will always remain." Such was his own profession of faith. As he said, he was "emancipated from all positive religion" and the cause of the Church was not his.⁷³⁰

The "New Spirit" proclaimed by Spuller did not mean that the *ralliés* would be permitted to enter into the cabinet. It was enough of a privilege to vote for the ministry; to ask more would have been presumptuous of these novices. Casimir-Périer himself took pains to make that point clear. While he solicited the support of all "fair-minded men" (*honnêtes gens*) for the maintenance of the social order, nevertheless he declared that "to confide the republican standard to them (the *ralliés*), to give the guardianship of our constitution to them, these neophytes, would be a grave imprudence."⁷³¹ And Spuller also admitted, subsequently, that "it never entered the heads of true Republicans to go and seek our adversaries in order to put them in our places. . . . We are not likely, after twenty-four years [of Republican rule] to say to them: 'The place is warm, won't you be so good as to take it?'"⁷³²

Even though the New Spirit gave promise of at least a temporary respite from the aggressive anticlerical campaign, the Catholic Republicans or *ralliés* could not entirely relish the bargain that was offered. To be sure, they were more than willing to join a crusade against Revolutionary Socialism as well as against anarchistic terrorism; but those who shared de Mun's philosophy of Social Catholicism soon found themselves joining with the Socialists to defend the rights of labor against the Government.

The first part of the foregoing assertion, relative to the readiness of the *ralliés* to aid Casimir-Périer against Revolutionary Socialism, was beautifully illustrated in a debate on April 30, 1894.⁷³³ The most eloquent of the Socialist orators, Jean Jaurès, had opened fire on Casimir-Périer, whom he accused of forming an anti-Socialist coalition with clericals and monarch-

ists and of regarding the Right as, "if not a necessary part, at least an ornament of the Government's majority." Jaurès simultaneously attacked the *ralliés*, particularly Count Albert de Mun, whom he styled a "Christian Socialist" and whom he accused not only of having "endeavored to borrow from socialism all that you could in order to restore in this country the influence of Christianity as constituted in the Church [to this accusation de Mun retorted, "Quite the contrary!"]", but also of having accepted the Republic only at the bidding of the pope and in order to combat the Republican policy." Social Catholic writers and orators, Jaurès went on to say, were quite as vigorous as the Socialists or the Anarchists in condemning the existing capitalistic exploitation of the masses, and quite as much a menace to "the social order."

Count de Mun's reply, delivered on the spur of the moment, was one of his most brilliant speeches, considered merely as a model of the orator's art. In substance, it was a violent attack upon socialism. He accused the Socialists of attacking two fundamental principles, property and authority, which were absolutely necessary in human society. He traced the philosophical ancestry of socialism back to the doctrines of the *Encyclopédie*, of Rousseau, of Diderot; he proved that at least some of the Socialists were preaching the necessity, nay the inevitability, of a violent social revolution; and, while proudly pointing to his own record of unflagging zeal in behalf of tangible social reforms during the past twenty years, he upbraided the Socialists for retarding real social reforms by teaching the working classes to look for an unreal Utopia which nobody, not even a Socialist, could describe. Let de Mun speak in his own words:

Very well. With such doctrines [social revolution, class struggle, *etc.*] do you know what you are doing? I say it with the accent of a sorrowful conviction, you are delaying, you are retarding, perhaps you are rendering impossible the most just, the most necessary, the most urgent social reforms. . . .

Turning to Alexandre Millerand, who had interrupted him, de Mun continued:

For twenty years past I have demanded, here in this tribune, the most precise social reforms; it is not my fault if hardly a single one of them has been achieved. My responsibility is absolutely cleared. It is yours that is in question.

You teach the people to expect nothing, to hope for nothing, from the progress of ideas, of institutions, of laws, and to seek in their labor organizations not the means of defending their rights but a weapon of combat, preparing by means of continual violence for civil war. You display before their eyes the ideal prospect of a collectivist society, the functioning of which not a single one of you can explain. . . .

There was developing in this country, little by little, an immense movement of generous pity which more and more turned the living forces and the intelligence of the nation toward the sufferers, the weaklings, life's disinherited children. I make bold to say, since you ask what I have done, that I have borne my share in this great movement of charitable work and of ideas. [Approving shouts of "*Très bien!*" showed that other members of the Chamber agreed.]

The need of justice was convincing every heart. But your fear-inspiring doctrines, your terrifying deeds of violence, will check this movement, perhaps, and the responsibility will be yours. I say it with profound conviction: you have cruelly betrayed the cause of the people.

For these reasons de Mun regarded the Socialist party as "a permanent peril to public security" and promised to support the Government in combating Socialism, overlooking differences of opinion on other matters.

Wrathfully arising from the Socialist benches, Alexandre Millerand declared, in answer to de Mun, "We have before our eyes a Government which lives by the support of a Republican and clerical majority." Turning to the Government, he warned Casimir-Périer that the ministry must choose between the Left, with social reform, and the Right, with the support of "the Church and High Finance."

Casimir-Périer refused to make any such choice. As a result, when the vote of confidence was put, he was opposed by the Socialists, the Radicals, and a number of clericals, who refused to sanction his policy of conciliation, and was upheld by de Mun and other *ralliés*, as well as by the moderate Republicans.

The economic views of those *ralliés* who were also Social Catholics made it impossible to preserve such an alignment of parties. On specific economic questions, the tendency was toward a combination of these *ralliés* with the Socialists against the Government, for the Government was hostile to Catholic as well as to Socialist ideas of labor reform. In fact, Jonnart, the minister of public works, had once condemned both Socialism and Social Catholicism in a single epigram: "M. de Mun would like to lead us back into the middle ages; his friends of the Extreme Left dream of taking us back into primitive society." ⁷³⁴

The following incident will make this point clearer. On May 22, 1894, Jonnart was interpellated by the Chamber on the question of his refusal to permit the employees of the national railways to participate in a trade-union congress. Jonnart justified his repressive policy by declaring that "the formation of trade unions by the employees of the state is the destruction of all discipline and of all administration." ⁷³⁵

This claim no sincere Social Catholic could admit, since the desirability of labor organization was a cardinal principle of Social Catholicism. Therefore, a group of Catholics, among whom de Mun was the most conspicuous, voted against the Government and with the Socialists on this issue. Thus for a moment Socialists and Social Catholic *ralliés* found themselves uniting against the Government.

On the other hand, it should be remarked that a few of the *ralliés* joined with men like Léon Say, Deschanel, Barthou and the opponents of social legislation in general in supporting the Government. ⁷³⁶ This conservative or, more accurately speaking, individualist, wing of the Republican Right will bear watching, for it will be a source of great weakness to the Popular Liberal Party after 1902.

The Casimir-Périer ministry was overthrown by the combined votes of Socialists, Radicals, and Social Catholic *ralliés*. But a new ministry representing any or all of these groups was not possible at that time. President Carnot gave the Radicals an opportunity to form a cabinet, but they found the

task too great for their strength.⁷³⁷ Consequently the cabinet crisis resulted in merely a change of persons, not of principles, and Moderate Opportunism remained in power, with Charles Dupuy in place of Casimir-Périer. The new ministry, like the old, was pledged to defend the existing economic and religious order against Socialists and clericals.⁷³⁸

Possibly these details regarding the politics of the early 'nineties are wearisome, and they may seem irrelevant to the subject of this monograph, but they show how fluid the political situation was at this time. The Social Catholic *ralliés* like de Mun were alternately voting with the Center against the Socialists and with the Socialists against the Center. The confusion arose from the fact that there were two fundamental and conflicting lines of division in the Chamber. The Social Catholic *ralliés* were favorable to social legislation, especially legislation tending toward the autonomous organization of industry, and were opposed to anticlerical legislation. The Center was opposed to social legislation and inclined to compromise on anticlerical legislation. The Radicals were inclined to compromise on social legislation, but were zealously favorable to anticlerical legislation. The Socialists were favorable to both.

The Opportunists or Moderates of the Center, intuitively perceiving that they could not permanently stand alone, against *ralliés*, Radicals, and Socialists alike, made many false starts, sometimes leaning to the Left and sometimes seeming to incline toward the Right. Upon their action much depended; indeed, their ultimate decision is the key to the subsequent political history of France.

If the Center should seek support from the *ralliés* it would have to enact labor laws and favor labor organization, while declaring a truce on the religious question. The "New Spirit" would come into its own. Such an alliance would enable the Social Catholic *ralliés* to devote more attention to constructive social reform and less to negative defense of religious interests. If, on the other hand, the Center sought support from the Left, it would have to make some concessions to state

socialism unless it could persuade the Extreme Left to devote most of its attention to anticlerical legislation. In this latter case, the Social Catholic *ralliés* would be foredoomed to a position of negation and almost of impotence, since they would be ever on the defensive in religious matters and would be unable to sympathize with state-socialistic legislation in economic matters; consequently they would be free to develop their own program but would lack the power to realize it.

Because so much depended upon the ultimate alignment of the parties, and incidentally because there is no better way of depicting the spirit and temper of the times out of which the Popular Liberal Party grew, it may be worth while to follow a little further the story of the Center's hesitations and false starts, and the resulting evolution of the other parties.

After several cabinets had attempted to maintain their attitude of opposition to both Right and Left, a move was made in 1895 toward a combination of Center and Left. In October of that year President Faure asked Léon Bourgeois, a member of the Radical group, to try his hand at forming a cabinet. By adroitly drawing into his Government, along with his own Radical followers, several more moderate men, notably Ribot and Poincaré, Bourgeois succeeded in patching together a precarious majority which he described as being "independent of the adversaries of the Republic and of those who have accepted the form of our institutions without accepting their spirit and their political and social consequences [one can almost see the *ralliés* writhing under this taunt]; independent likewise of those who believe that progress can come of the class struggle and of violence."⁷³⁹

The Bourgeois cabinet, brief as was its duration (less than six months), gave the country its first taste of the new Radicalism, which consisted essentially of anticlericalism tinged with socialism, but no more than tinged. The former quality was seen in the Government's proposal to enact a law against the monastic orders; the latter in its ineffective advocacy of progressive inheritance and income taxes, and in the reopening of the Paris Labor Exchange, which had been closed by the

Moderate Dupuy. The docility of the Socialists during the Radical administration was a significant portent.⁷⁴⁰

When the Radical Ministry was at length forced out of office, mainly by the opposition encountered in the Senate, the New Spirit once more resumed its sway, and for more than two years, from April 29, 1896, to June 15, 1898, the tendency was toward a coalition of Center and *ralliés*. If the new president of the council, Jules Méline, a Moderate, tended to conciliate the *ralliés*, the Radicals had only themselves to blame, for they had refused his invitation to enter the cabinet. And reasons of political necessity made it compulsory for Méline to secure a safe majority in the Chamber by conciliating either the Left or the Right.

Méline's Moderate Government, then, showed itself distinctly friendly toward the *ralliés*. Méline might almost have been suspected of clericalism, had his personal convictions not been so well known as to make such a suspicion absurd. No clerical could have attacked the anticlericalism of the Radicals more vigorously. For example, in October, 1897, Méline declared:

We show a sincere respect for religion, and that is what most offends a certain party which regards religion as a relic of servitude, which should be extirpated. Instead of war, we seek pacification in the domain of religion. Does not history teach us that religious quarrels are always a cause of weakness, in internal as well as in foreign affairs?⁷⁴¹

Rebuking the Radicals for "treating as monarchists all those who are not republicans of yesterday, and for excommunicating those whom they contemptuously call *ralliés*," he exclaimed:

As though after twenty-seven years of the Republic, it was not permissible to open our ranks to sincere and loyal men, like our colleague the Count d'Alsace, whose every vote, without an exception, since the beginning of the legislature, has been as republican as ours! I do not hesitate to say that the support of such men is an honor to the Government, and that they lend it greater strength than certain revolutionary collectivists whose names I need not mention.⁷⁴²

The Count d'Alsace, to whom Méline referred, had recently led about forty *ralliés* into the Progressist fold where they might prove their sincere republicanism without becoming anti-clerical.⁷⁴³ Obviously Méline was bidding, quite frankly, for further support from this quarter.

One of the most interesting features of Méline's administration was the enactment of several measures of social legislation. The policy of the Government was the policy of which de Mun had long been the foremost champion, *viz.* the policy of adopting tangible, conciliatory reforms for the amelioration of the condition of the laboring classes, while opposing Revolutionary Socialism.

To Méline the French workingmen owed their first Workmen's Accident Compensation Law (1898). To Méline's administration the mutual aid societies of France owed the great "charter of mutualism," the law of 1898. Old-Age Pensions, which he promised,⁷⁴⁴ and the further restriction of child labor, and regulation of the employment of women and young persons, were among the other reforms proposed, but which could not be carried through the legislature.⁷⁴⁵ Nor was de Mun's demand granted, that France should take the initiative in convoking an international congress for social legislation.⁷⁴⁶

In making this suggestion, it may not be altogether irrelevant to add, the Catholic Social orator again reproached the Socialists for preventing immediate reforms while they dreamed of Utopias. But, and this is the important point, he offered to cooperate with the Socialists, if they were willing, in promoting labor legislation. The Socialist Jules Guesde replied by calling de Mun and his friends the *enfants perdus* of Socialism, whom it was not even worth while to "take the trouble of combating," since they were really helping "to destroy the social order at the very moment when they believe they are flocking to its rescue."⁷⁴⁷

It requires no very profound reflection to understand why the New Spirit, as embodied by the Méline Ministry of 1896-1898, was predestined to return once more to the realm of departed spirits, after its brief incarnation. Three major rea-

sons might be assigned: (1) the attitude of the Socialists; (2) the revival of anticlericalism in the Dreyfus affair; (3) the quarrels among the *ralliés*.

Consider first the attitude of the Socialists. During the Radical administration of Léon Bourgeois, from Nov. 1, 1895, to April 23, 1896, they had been unwontedly mild; they had been sincerely anxious to avoid any incident which might overthrow the Ministry, although the Ministry was, after all, a "bourgeois" Ministry and had explicitly repudiated collectivism. One month after the replacement of Bourgeois by Méline, a great Socialist gathering was held at Saint-Mandé.⁷⁴⁸ Millerand, Jaurès, Edouard Vaillant, Jules Guesde,—all were there. With the applause and consent of his associates, Alexandre Millerand there formulated a program on which all the various Socialist factions could agree, in his opinion. The program included three essential points: (1) intervention of the State to convert from capitalistic into national property the different categories of the means of production and exchange in proportion as they become ripe for social appropriation; (2) capture of the Government through universal suffrage; (3) international understanding among the workers.⁷⁴⁹

In relation to the development of French Social Catholicism, Millerand's famous Saint-Mandé speech is interesting in two respects. In the first place, the speaker took special pains to flout Social Catholicism, calling it "Christian Socialism, which is only a sham Socialism, since, far from working to set men free, it works only for the rule and domination of imperilled theocracy." In the second place, Millerand took such care to repudiate violence and bloody revolution, and to avoid emphasizing the "class struggle," and to reconcile "Internationalism" with patriotism, that he started parliamentary socialism well on the road towards the status of a respectable bourgeois party. If the "Social Revolution," the very thought of which had struck terror into the hearts of order-loving bourgeois, simply meant the gradual nationalization, one by one, of certain great commercial and industrial enterprises as they became "ripe," the "menace of socialism" would vanish, or

at least be lost in the dim purple vapors of the distant horizon. And if the Socialists, instead of fomenting strikes, appealing to class hatred, and coquetting with "direct action," intended henceforth to exert themselves principally in gaining votes and winning parliamentary elections, why should a coalition of Socialists, Radicals, and even Moderates be inconceivable?

Certain of the Socialists themselves undoubtedly had this very possibility in mind. Basly, for example, on Sept. 6, 1896, declared: "It would be better to devote our attention to giving the country a Radical Ministry than to preaching doctrines which will appear fantastic even in the year 2700."¹⁵⁰ In other words, the Socialists were beginning to pluck at the sleeve of the middle-class Republicans, who seemed too much inclined to walk arm in arm with the *ralliés*.

Nor should it be overlooked that Millerand emphasized precisely that part of the Socialist program which was least acceptable to Social Catholics. Had he proposed to devote attention to reducing the working-day, or to building up labor organization, or to authorizing the fixation of a minimum wage in each industry, de Mun and his friends might have given valuable help. But government-ownership of public utilities and of "ripe" industries was considered by the Social Catholics to be of no real advantage to the workingman, dangerous to organized labor and destructive of liberty.

While the Socialists, under Millerand's guidance, were preparing themselves for a coalition with the Radicals, certain clericals were engaging in the antisemitic campaign which led straight to the Dreyfus Affair and provoked an anticlerical counter-movement. This was the second of the reasons mentioned in an earlier paragraph, for the failure of the New Spirit and the formation of an alliance between bourgeois anticlericals and Socialists.

For several years past, a savage antisemitic campaign had been conducted by a group of journalists and politicians who apparently believed that the best way to defend Catholicism was to assail Judaism. Since 1892 Edouard Drumont's flamboyant newspaper, *La Libre Parole*, had been engaged in stir-

ring up race-hatred, denouncing the Jews as cruel capitalists, as treacherous enemies of national patriotism, as corrupt politicians.

The charge which the antisemites constantly repeated was that a clique of Jewish financiers was intriguing with venial politicians to dominate the Republican government, to honeycomb the army, to ruin the nation, and to oppress the masses. A fair specimen of antisemitic literature may be found in Paul Lapeyre's book on *Social Catholicism*.⁷⁵¹ As a cure for "the Jewish pest,"—that "devouring canker,"—he prescribes the total expulsion of the Jews and their transportation to some "fertile but desert country" where they would have to "reform their habits or die of want." The "modern Jews," he says, "are descendents of those who crucified Jesus."

Or one may turn to the pages of another Catholic writer, the Marquis de La Tour du Pin, who in an article published in 1898 proposed this program: "(1) Treat the Jews as aliens, and dangerous aliens; (2) recognize and forswear all the philosophical, political, and economic errors with which they have poisoned us; (3) reconstitute in the economic as well as in the political order the organs of our own life, which will render us independent of them and masters of our own house."⁷⁵²

Echoes of the antisemitic campaign soon reached the Chamber of Deputies. For example, Viscount d'Hugues, a clerical deputy, in 1894 caused a sensation in the Chamber by claiming to have in his possession proof positive that the great Jewish financier Rothschild had given money to anarchistic agitators in order that they might disorganize and disgrace the labor movement.⁷⁵³

"*Juiverie*" (Judaism) and "High Finance" were almost invariably coupled together in denunciation by clerical demagogues. The revelation of outrageous financial irregularities in the Panama Canal enterprise, in which Jewish bankers and Republican deputies were concerned, furnished new grist to the antisemitic mill, and seemed to lend some justification to the charges of the agitators.⁷⁵⁴

The economic aspect of antisemitism as a crusade against immoral "high finance" appealed irresistibly to the so-called Christian Democrats, a school of ardent young priests, journalists, and politicians, who most vehemently championed democracy, political and social. At their congress at Lyons, in 1895, these Christian Democrats enthusiastically elected as their honorary president one of the most aggressive antisemites, Drumont. And one of the speakers at the congress, Gayraud, extravagantly demanded "the expulsion of all the social excrements, and notably of the Jewish excrement."⁷⁵⁵

This frenzied antisemitic campaign led straight into the historic "Dreyfus Affair."⁷⁵⁶ In the year 1894-1895 an obscure Jewish captain of artillery, Alfred Dreyfus by name, had been convicted as a spy and a traitor and deported to Devil's Island. Suspecting that injustice had been done, several Jews, including Joseph Reinach, Bernard Lazare, and the accused man's own brother, inaugurated a campaign to "revise" the penal sentence. Several Protestants,—Scheurer-Kestner, Ranc, and Gabriel Monod,—likewise rallied to the defense of the Jewish officer. And Emile Zola's historic letter, "*J'accuse*," published in a Parisian journal, dramatically charged the military authorities with having committed a crime against Dreyfus. On the other hand, the antisemitic Christian Democrats, the monarchists, and many patriotic ex-officers like de Mun, stoutly maintained that the honor and patriotism of the army were at stake, and that traitors such as Dreyfus well deserved condign punishment. It remained only for the anticlerical Republicans to make of the Dreyfus controversy a momentous political and religious issue, in which Jews, Protestants, Free-Thinkers, Radicals, Opportunists, and Socialists would unite in accusing the clericals of religious intolerance, of conspiracy against the Republic, and of shameful perversion of justice.

Had the antisemitic agitation been more temperate in past years, the contention of the pro-Dreyfus party, that Dreyfus had been made the victim of an antisemitic plot, might have lacked plausibility. As it was, the two-edged sword of religious intolerance, which the antisemites themselves had forged,

was now effectively turned against them. Once more clericalism was "the enemy" and Socialists were ready to join with middle-class anticlericals in defending the Republic.⁷⁵⁷

The Dreyfus Affair, then, was the second of the circumstances which we have indicated as reasons for the failure of the New Spirit. At first the president of the council, Méline, was inclined to assert "there is no Dreyfus Affair."⁷⁵⁸ He insisted that clericalism was not a real menace to the Republic, but only a scare-crow rigged up by the Radicals for the purposes of party politics. "If clericalism did not exist," he declared, "you would invent it."⁷⁵⁹ Méline's attitude was almost cynical. He said:

Clericalism has become the great electoral platform of the Radical party. It is, for that matter, the old tactics, the well-known tactics of the party [to denounce clericalism]. Every time the Radical party finds itself in a tight place and feels itself squeezed too uncomfortably by the Socialists, it lugs out the specter of clericalism to create a diversion and to restore order among its routed troops. The manœuvre is very convenient and makes it unnecessary to have a program.⁷⁶⁰

"Specter" or reality as it might be, "clericalism" became once more the issue of the day with the advent of the Dreyfus Affair, and the New Spirit of tolerance took its departure in 1898.

As a third cause of the New Spirit's failure, the quarrels among the *ralliés* have been mentioned, but not explained. That the *ralliés* or Catholic Republicans continued to be assailed by the monarchists was hard enough, but that they, the *ralliés*, should exhaust their strength and fritter away their energy by combating each other was positively ruinous. The trouble arose in this wise. The energetic Assumptionist Fathers, who had already established a very influential journal, the *Croix*, with wide-spread provincial branches, created in 1895 an agency called the "Justice-Equality Office" (*Secrétariat Justice-Egalité*).⁷⁶¹ This agency speedily developed into a committee, with far-reaching ramifications, devoted to the most vigorous kind of politico-religious propaganda, fiercely

brandishing the sword, or rather the pen, against the Free Masons, Free-Thinkers, and Jews, who were accused of persecuting the Catholic Church. The Justice Equality committee's policy was so strenuous that even mildly anticlerical Republicans would be antagonized. It was the kind of an organization to which the Radicals could point the accusing finger when they cried, "*Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi!*"

On the other hand, there was the Christian Democratic movement, already mentioned. Of the Christian Democrats, little need be said in this place, save that with the unrestrained enthusiasm of young and altruistic men they made of democracy almost a dogma; that by their whirlwind campaigns for very radical social reform, as well as by their quasi-religious faith in democracy, they flustered and angered the more conservative Catholic Republicans; and that their furious anti-semitism furnished the anticlericals with splendid campaign material.

Another cross-current among the *ralliés* was created by the group which followed the Count of Alsace into the Progressist camp and sought to draw other Catholic Republicans along with them, thinking it better to pursue a policy of "peaceful penetration" than of unremitting hostility toward the Republican majority in the Chamber. Their strategy much resembled that later employed by Piou, in the Popular Liberal Party, except that Piou asked all fair-minded Republicans to rally round the standard which he himself had raised, whereas the Count of Alsace asked the Catholics to follow the banner of an existing Republican group.

Had the Catholics who accepted the Republic gradually drifted apart and filtered into the various Republican groups, it is conceivable that the clerical issue might have disappeared. But events so shaped themselves that while the most moderate, conciliatory element became Progressist, the remaining elements, each strongly determined to follow out its own particular aim — antisemitism, monarchism, clericalism, militarism, or what not, — were thrown together in confusion, much as when several swiftly running currents in a turbulent river

suddenly rush together in swirling, boiling, eddying tumult.

That the various Catholic currents were tending to converge, of their own accord, was shown by the convocation of a Catholic Congress in 1896 and by the creation of a Federation in 1897 to promote Catholic interests in the elections of 1898. The managing committee of the Federation included two representatives of each of seven important Catholic groups: (1) the Justice-Equality committee, (2) the Young Men's Catholic Association,⁷⁶² (3) the Catholic Committee (an off-shoot of the Chesnelong Committee of Religious Defense),⁷⁶³ (4) Lamy and his followers,⁷⁶⁴ (5) the National Union, (6) the Union of Commerce and Industry, and (7) the Christian Democrats.⁷⁶⁵ For its program, the Federation adopted three cardinal principles: acceptance of the republican constitution, reform of anti-Catholic laws in so far as they offended liberty and justice (*droit commun*), and sympathetic coöperation with all lovers of liberty and justice.⁷⁶⁶

The Dreyfus Affair in 1897 and 1898 accentuated this movement of union and at the same time threw it into confusion. While the coalition of Jews, Protestants, anticlericals, and antimilitarists supporting Dreyfus caused the various Catholic factions to huddle together in opposition, feeling that the pro-Dreyfus coalition was really anti-Catholic, at the same time the excitement caused each Catholic faction to become more extreme in its particular direction. The Christian Democrats became more antisemitic, the Justice-Equality committee more militantly clerical, and so on. Harsher discord rather than closer unity was the result. Worst of all for the clerical cause, it led the Catholic Republicans to accept, in some measure, the support of clerical monarchists who like Paul de Cassagnac alluringly pictured the advantages of Catholic political solidarity. The defenders of "Republicanism" and denouncers of "clericalism" could ask nothing better. Here was proof that the clericals were foes of the Republic.

Entering the electoral contest of 1898 with their unwieldy Federation, the Catholic groups manœuvred so clumsily that their more agile antagonists, the Radicals and Socialists, easily

carried off the victory. On the first ballot, where no strategy was required and each party simply voted for its own candidates, the *ralliés* proved stronger than the Socialists, for the former elected 31 deputies,⁷⁶⁷ the latter only 26; and the Moderate Republicans (now generally styled the Progressists⁷⁶⁸) had 182 seats as against the 143 of the Radicals and Socialists, and the 77 of the various conservative groups (*ralliés*, Nationalists, and Conservatists or monarchists). The disciples of the New Spirit might well have been pleased with the first ballot; the Government would be stronger than before.

But two weeks later, when the second ballot was taken in the 181 constitutencies where no candidate had received an absolute majority, and when it was necessary to combine with other parties or be lost, the unwieldiness of the Federation became painfully apparent. Of the 181 seats in dispute, the Catholic groups of the Right gained only 17, the Progressist Republicans 77, while the Radicals and Socialists by their skilful combinations won no fewer than 92.⁷⁶⁹

The second ballot thus reversed the effect of the first. In the new Chamber the Extreme Left, including 57 Socialists,⁷⁷⁰ 74 Socialist-Radicals, and 104 Radicals, was so nearly equal in size to the ministerial party, the Progressist Republicans, with their 254 votes, that the ministry would certainly be compelled to rely pretty definitely upon outside support from the Right, or else to make terms with the Radicals. As we shall see, presently, the latter course was taken, and the left wing of the Progressist group associated itself with the Extreme Left to form a ministerial majority for Waldeck-Rousseau, and to exorcise the New Spirit.

Just a word of explanation may be necessary to show clearly how the Catholics defeated themselves on the second ballot in the elections of 1898 and placed the New Spirit in so sorry a predicament. Where the clerical *ralliés* pursued a policy of whole-hearted coöperation with the more moderate Republicans, such as had felt the touch of the New Spirit, they were brilliantly successful. For example, in the Socialist stronghold of Roubaix,—Jules Guesde's beloved "Holy City" of Socialism,

— a young Republican Catholic by the name of Eugène Motte (who was one of the group that subsequently founded the Popular Liberal Party) took great care to affirm his sincere republicanism; from every campaign mass-meeting he sent formal greetings to the president of the Republic; and the result was that he wrested the seat, with an overwhelming majority, from one of the strongest Socialist leaders.⁷⁷¹ Similarly in the district of Carmaux the *rallié* Marquis de Solages (likewise a member-to-be of the Popular Liberal Party), ousted the Socialist Jean Jaurès from his seat.⁷⁷² In some cases, also, where a *rallié* was competing with a Progressist and a Radical, he withdrew on the second ballot and threw his votes to the Progressist in order that the Radical might not win.⁷⁷³ Had these tactics been universally followed, the sincerely Republican *ralliés* and the New Spirit Progressists would have been strongly dominant in the new Chamber.

But many New Spirit Progressists,—if the term may be used for those Progressists who were inclined to conciliate the Church,—who would otherwise have been glad to cast their votes for *ralliés* on the second ballot, were probably prevented from so doing by the knowledge that the Catholic Federation comprised what they regarded as fanatically clerical and ill-disguised monarchist elements as well as moderate Republican elements. And, futhermore, in a number of cases, the extremist elements in the Federation assisted Radicals to defeat Moderate Republicans. This paradoxical manœuvre on the part of the clerical extremists was inspired by the mistaken idea that the election of Radicals would lead to such excesses of anticlericalism that there would soon appear an irresistible national revulsion of feeling against Radicalism and perhaps even against Republicanism. It was said that the best way to discredit the Radicals was to vote for them!

Concrete instances are eloquent. At Dôle, in the Jura, 1,700 strongly clerical voters held the balance between Jean Baptiste Bourgeois, a radical anticlerical, and Cyrille Léculier, a Moderate. By abstaining from voting, the clericals allowed Bourgeois to win, by 52 votes.⁷⁷⁴ At Grenoble, a Socialist and

one of the most violent of all anticlericals, Alexandre Zévaès, was elected because the clericals refused to vote for a Moderate Republican who had declined to give a written promise that he would labor for the repeal of existing anticlerical legislation.⁷⁷⁵ The number of such cases, where the clericals could have prevented but did not prevent the election of strenuous anticlericals, was no less than 62, according to the *Journal de Roubaix*.⁷⁷⁶ In other districts, clericals of the Justice-Equality type induced a Moderate Republican deputy to make the promise that he would advocate the repeal of anticlerical legislation, and as a result a number of his voters deserted him, so that a vigorous anticlerical was elected. In still other cases, the extremists supported royalists against liberal Catholic candidates endorsed by the Government, or needlessly attacked men like Charles Dupuy and thus angered the Moderate Republicans.⁷⁷⁷

The sequel to the elections of 1898 is quickly told. Immediately upon the assembling of the new Chamber, the Radicals and Socialists by means of an interpellation attempted to compel the Méline Ministry to choose definitely between an *entente* with the *ralliés* and an *entente* with the Extreme Left, between the New Spirit and militant anticlericalism. In his embarrassment, the president of the council half turned his back on the Right, but nevertheless opposed a resolution which would compel him to rely upon "an exclusively Republican majority." Foreseeing that the left wing of his own party would not tolerate a coalition with the Right, and no less clearly divining, on the other hand, that the support of the Radicals would be too dearly purchased at the expense of his principles, Jules Méline resigned, on June 15, 1898. His had been a longer term of office than any since the days of Thiers.⁷⁷⁸

The Radicals now took the helm as masters, with Henri Brisson as the chief of a Radical ministry. But the new ministry proved too frail to weather the fierce storms of popular excitement aroused by the Dreyfus case. Clumsily the premier allowed himself to be drawn into a test of strength on the simple issue of patriotism, of suppressing the agitation of the pro-

Dreyfus extremists as injurious to the *morale* of the army. On this issue, the majority of the Chamber turned against him. Brisson resigned.⁷⁷⁹

Following the short-lived Brisson cabinet,— it had lasted only four months,— Charles Dupuy formed his third cabinet, October 31, 1898, and for a brief space France slipped back once more into the old, smooth-worn groove of Moderate Opportunism. But times had changed. Dupuy found himself incessantly colliding either with the aggressive Radicals and Socialists or with reactionary antisemites; the Dreyfus Affair grew more and more troublesome; and at length the Moderate Government was jolted out of office, June 12, 1899.⁷⁸⁰ With Dupuy, the era of Moderate Opportunist cabinets passed away, and the New Spirit, which had still been hovering wistfully in the background, now altogether vanished from sight.

CHAPTER VIII

REPUBLICAN DEFENSE AND PIOUS DILEMMA

THE ministerial crisis of June, 1899, marked a turning-point in the history of the Republic. For the men of the Moderate Opportunist or "Progressist" group, holding the balance between the Right and the Left in the Chamber of Deputies, were compelled by the force of circumstances to make the most momentous decision of their career. Too weak to govern alone, they must choose either Catholics or Radicals and Socialists as collaborators. Upon this decision depended the future of France. Between Socialist advocates of class warfare and Catholic advocates of class conciliation; between the anti-militaristic internationalism of the Extreme Left and the militant patriotism of the Right; between religious "pacification" on the basis of liberty of conscience and religious warfare for the extirpation of Catholic monastic orders and Catholic schools—between the two extremes the Moderates must choose, and France must accept the decision.

For ten days the destinies of Moderate Opportunism and of France hung in the balance, while among the party leaders negotiations went on for the formation of a new cabinet. Finally, on June 23, the names of the new ministers were published.⁷⁸¹ It was to be a cabinet of all the contradictions, rather than of "all the talents," one might have said at first glance. There was René Waldeck-Rousseau, that "furious anti-Socialist," corporation lawyer, disciple of the great Gambetta's Moderatism,—as president of the council, selecting for the post of minister of commerce an avowed Socialist, none other than Alexandre Millerand! There was an army officer of the Second Empire, a man who had helped to extinguish the Commune in the blood of proletarians,—General Gallifet,—

joining hands as minister of war with an antimilitarist Radical like Caillaux and a Socialist like Millerand as fellow-ministers! The lion was lying down with the lamb in truly millennial fashion. What could it mean? Simply that a Moderate Opportunist leader had formed a Moderate-Radical-Socialist coalition, a coalition the elements of which were fundamentally disagreed on the social question, on the fiscal question (*i. e.*, the income-tax), on the military question, on the colonial question, on almost every question indeed, excepting the question of anti-clericalism. It was a "Ministry of Republican Defense" (*défense républicaine*) against the clericals and monarchists who were considered to be conspiring for the overthrow of the Republic.

The presence of a "Revolutionary" Socialist in the Government was, on second thought, not so very revolutionary.⁷⁸² Alexandre Millerand's speech of 1896 at Saint-Mandé, robbing the Social Revolution of its terrors and making it an affair of slow political evolution, might well have convinced even so redoubtable an antagonist of socialism as Waldeck-Rousseau that such a Socialist as Millerand, if actually confronted with the practical problems of government, would prove little different from any bourgeois politician. As Waldeck-Rousseau himself said, socialism was a very remote peril, whereas the "reactionary peril," the clerical-nationalist-monarchist peril, was much closer at hand. And, in fact, through all the trying debates on the Associations Bill (which was in part directed against the monastic orders), he found the Socialist minister and the Socialist deputies trusty allies, excellent anticlericals. So faithful were some of the Government's Socialist supporters that on occasion they did not hesitate to vote a motion of confidence in the Government, even when that motion formally and explicitly condemned the fundamental Socialist doctrine of collectivism.⁷⁸³

To be sure, some few concessions had to be made to the economic program of the Socialists, as the price of the new alliance. Millerand⁷⁸⁴ was permitted to issue decrees improving the condition of workingmen employed by contractors

doing government work; ⁷⁸⁵ he made the consultative Superior Council of Labor partly elective; ⁷⁸⁶ he created Trade Boards (*conseils du travail*) to settle disputes between capital and labor and to supervise labor conditions. ⁷⁸⁷ His greatest work was the Millerand-Colliard Law of 1900, ⁷⁸⁸ which established an eleven-hour working day, to be reduced to 10½ hours after two years and to ten hours after four years, for women and children and also for men working in the same factories. When it is considered that hitherto the legal maximum for children had been ten hours and for women, eleven, Millerand's law, salutary as it undoubtedly was, can hardly be classed as revolutionary. Socialism had indeed grown moderate, almost tame. One or two other projects were taken up: old-age pensions were one item of the Government's program, but Waldeck-Rousseau allowed the Senate to hold up the bill which the Chamber passed on this subject and then he allowed the Chamber to adjourn a new Pensions Bill which his Government introduced; the matter was not important enough, in his eyes, to be made a question of confidence. ⁷⁸⁹ Similarly a bill for the protection of railway servants was passed by the Chamber, then mutilated in the Senate, and nothing came of it. ⁷⁹⁰ Again, the Government proposed an inheritance tax, with progressivity up to a million, but when the Chamber of Deputies, more unkind than the Government to millionaires, insisted upon extending the principle of progressivity beyond the million mark, the Government allowed the Senate to reduce the rate fixed by the Chamber. ⁷⁹¹ It was plain that the heart of the premier was not in these economic reforms. Waldeck-Rousseau was interested in other matters.

One fact stands out with unmistakable clearness in the record of the Waldeck-Rousseau-Millerand cabinet. The Government of Republican Defense reincarnated the spirit of Gambetta's militant anti-clericalism, hostile to Spuller's New Spirit of tolerance. The idea of Spuller and Méline had been to conciliate the Catholics by tolerance in order to combat the Socialists; the guiding principle with Waldeck-Rousseau was to conciliate the Socialists in order to combat the Catholics.

Had all the Catholics been *ralliés*, *i. e.*, had all Catholics been whole-heartedly and scrupulously obedient to the spirit of Leo XIII's admonitions; had they made it their aim merely to change the personnel and policy of the Government but not the form of the constitution, Waldeck-Rousseau's cabinet would have been impossible. But a certain number of Catholics continued to look with ill-disguised approval, if not with open sympathy, upon the agitation conducted by so-called "Nationalists" like Paul Déroulède and Jules Guérin;⁷⁹² a few eminent Catholic writers, like the Marquis de La Tour du Pin,⁷⁹³ continued to pen glowing descriptions of the theoretical superiority of a Christian monarchy over a parliamentary republic; and it was easy for anticlericals to charge that clericalism was hostile to the Republic. Moreover, the strenuous denunciation of Judaism and Free-Masonry by certain antisemitic Catholic journals enabled the anticlericals to accuse the Catholics of religious intolerance and bigotry. And the Government was not disposed to let any manifestation of anti-Republicanism or antisemitism go unproved. Dreyfus, the Jewish captain of artillery against whom the wrath of the antisemites had been especially directed, was granted full pardon by the president of the Republic, who acted, of course, at the dictation of the ministry, although Dreyfus had just been found guilty in a second trial.⁷⁹⁴ The house of the antisemitic agitator, Jules Guérin, was melodramatically besieged by troops, until after thirty-seven days' resistance he capitulated and was dragged away to trial for alleged conspiracy against the Republic; he was sentenced to ten years' detention.⁷⁹⁵ Sixty-seven "suspects" were arrested and brought up for trial. Paul Déroulède and other men who had been prominent among the Nationalists were exiled.⁷⁹⁶

Still further Waldeck-Rousseau carried his campaign of Republican Defense. Not only the principal antisemites and monarchist agitators, but also the Catholic monks who were accused of sympathizing with them, must be punished. In November, 1899, the Government instituted proceedings against the Assumptionists — the monastic order which had founded

the *Croix* and the Justice-Equality committee — as enemies of the Republic, and in course of time a decision was obtained ordering the dissolution of the order.⁷⁹⁷ Priests and bishops who protested were deprived of their salaries.⁷⁹⁸ But this was only a beginning.

The great work of Waldeck-Rousseau was the Associations Law of July 1, 1901. The idea had long been a favorite one with him. Almost twenty years previously, as minister of the interior in the Ferry cabinet, he had proposed an attack on the monastic orders. The bill, as presented in November, 1899, permitted great liberty for political and other associations, but provided that no association including foreigners,—and that meant the monastic orders,—could be founded without previous authorization by act of parliament (art. 13) and that any association involving renunciation of the right to marry or to own property was illegal and could be dissolved by simple ministerial decree (arts. 2, 6).

Despite the protests of the Catholics, Waldeck-Rousseau carried the bill through triumphantly and placed it upon the statute books, July 1, 1901.⁷⁹⁹ Only one regret troubled him. The Education Bill (*loi du stage scolaire*), a companion to the Associations Bill, had been defeated; had it been passed it would have closed to graduates of Catholic schools all public offices for which a secondary education was required, by prescribing that the three last years of secondary education must be taken in a public school as a condition of eligibility to careers in Government service. There was a great outcry against the Education Bill, however, as too flagrant a violation of liberty of conscience, and it was stifled in committee.⁸⁰⁰

For the purposes of this study the anti-Catholic policy of Waldeck-Rousseau's Government is interesting only so far as it helps to explain the political and social-political situation out of which grew the Popular Liberal Party. Waldeck-Rousseau's anticlericalism threw the Catholic *ralliés*, whether belonging to Piou's Republican Right or to the right wing of the Moderate (Progressist) group, into the sharpest kind of opposition to the ministerial majority. On some occasions in

the past decade, the Social Catholics of the Right had shown a remarkable tendency as social reformers to join forces with the Socialists in overcoming the repugnance of the Moderates to social reforms. Now, against the anticlerical Moderate-Radical-Socialist ministerial combination, the Social Catholics as Catholics found themselves almost irresistibly impelled toward alliance with that part of the Moderate or Progressist group which defended religious liberty and opposed the Government.

There were but two courses open. Either the Social Catholics must become members of the Progressist Opposition in order to defend religious liberty, and thereby run the risk of having their own special program of social reconstruction submerged by Progressist individualism, or else they must form a distinct party organization of their own, which might preserve their politico-social program and at the same time form one of the elements, with the Progressists, in a liberal *bloc*, opposed to anticlericalism, Radicalism, and Socialism. It was Piou's decision to form such a separate party, and Count Albert de Mun's decision to join him, that brought into existence the Liberal Group, which was subsequently called the Popular Liberal Party, and which became the chief exponent in the Chamber of Deputies of the Social Catholic view of economic reforms.

Piou, it should be remarked, and several other founders of the Liberal Group, were hardly very advanced in their social program, but the fact that de Mun and other vigorous Social Catholics joined with Piou, and ultimately imposed their program upon the party officially, made the Liberal Group a real representative of Social Catholicism as well as of democratic political liberty.

Both elements were necessary, if the Liberal Group was not to be entirely impotent in questions of social legislation. Without the principles of Social Catholicism, the Catholic Republicans would be philosophically unable to meet social problems in a constructive spirit. Without a willingness to accept and use political democracy, Social Catholics living in a republican

nation would be practically unable to realize their desires and would be little better than Utopians, dreaming of an impracticable reconstruction of society by an improbable Christian monarch. Only by combining a loyal acceptance of democracy with a vigorous advocacy of social reforms could the Catholics in France hope to prevent the anticlericals, Radicals, Socialist-Radicals, and Socialists from winning in increasing numbers the votes of the workingmen, even of Catholic workingmen, who failed to understand why the Christian religion should be incompatible with a republican form of government or with social justice.

CHAPTER IX

THE POPULAR LIBERAL PARTY

THE PRODUCT OF A CENTURY OF EVOLUTION

THE Popular Liberal Party is the most influential political organ of the Social Catholic movement in France. Numerically, it is stronger than the Socialist party and more powerful, probably, than the Syndicalist movement. Moreover, the present trend of public opinion toward social legislation, toward functional representation, toward industrial arbitration and conciliation, and toward labor-participation in industrial management augurs well for a party which has long been advocating such principles and elaborating plans for their application.

By way of introduction to a discussion of the program and present influence of the organization, it may not be amiss to suggest the significance of the Popular Liberal Party in relation to the two greatest features of nineteenth-century history, namely, democracy and industrialism. The nineteenth century,—to revert to the theme discussed in the first chapter of this book,—was largely concerned with efforts to adjust modern society to two new and revolutionary facts, the fact of the Industrial Revolution and the fact of the democratic revolution. The Popular Liberal Party's program represents the culmination of century-long endeavors on the part of French Catholics to make such an adjustment. The Popular Liberal Party accepts industrialism and democracy as facts, and proposes a whole series of political and economic reforms as the means by which society and government may be adjusted to the new situation.

The Popular Liberal Party's program, it has been said, is the culmination of a century-long evolution. A brief review of the story told in the foregoing chapters will make clear the meaning of this statement.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution in France was beginning to bring forth its first fruits of "progress and poverty," and when the generally accepted teachings of "economic Liberalism" or *laissez-faire*, seemed to condemn the working classes to a lot little better than slavery, there appeared among the leaders of Catholic thought a movement of sympathy for the workers and a protest against the doctrines of the economists. The *laissez-faire* theory, said these Catholics, had been used as a pretext for destroying the guilds and prohibiting any organization of labor; the result had been industrial anarchy; and in his isolated and defenseless condition the workingman had fallen a victim to ruthless exploitation. In the absence of industrial organization and of protective legislation, individual employers, be they ever so philanthropic, could not pay decent wages or dispense with child labor or grant shorter working hours, without being ruined by less scrupulous competitors. Absolute industrial liberty, in short, was responsible for social injustice which no Christian could condone. A Christianized political economy, based on respect of the human rights and dignity of labor, must be substituted for "economic Liberalism."

In some cases, no doubt, this denunciation of "Liberalism" in economics was simply a taunt which resentful clericals, aristocrats, and monarchists, eager to undo the work of the French Revolution, might cast in the teeth of the Liberals, who were, in their turn, glorifying the Revolution and opposing Church, aristocracy, and monarchy. In other cases, the social reaction of the Catholics seems to have been an impulsive protest against injustice. In still other cases, it was inspired by the idea that the Church had a great mission to fulfil in achieving the spiritual uplift of the masses. But whatever the motives, the result was the development of a rudimentary program of social reform based on Christian principles and opposed to economic Liberalism.

To combine this Catholic reaction against industrial liberty with a movement for political liberty might seem paradoxical. Nevertheless, in the second quarter of the century a group of

so-called Liberal Catholics — men such as Lamennais, Maret, Ozanam, and de Coux,—had endeavored to fuse the two elements, political liberty and Christian social reform, in the glowing fire of their own ardent enthusiasm; but their striving had been in vain, and the fire they had kindled flickered out in the chill atmosphere of scientific economic individualism and of political reaction under the Second Empire. With the advent of the Third Republic, the disjunction of democracy and Social Catholicism seemed complete.

In the early years of the Third Republic we find that the Catholics who are denouncing economic Liberalism are also repudiating political Liberalism; they are proclaiming the necessity of a monarchical restoration, a "Counter-Revolution." Such was the gospel of Count Albert de Mun and of La Tour du Pin before 1892.

When Leo XIII opportunely intervened in 1892, urging all French Catholics to cease their futile anti-Republican agitation, many of the monarchist Social Catholics obediently abandoned their political program of monarchical restoration and leaned all the more heavily upon their Catholic social program, much as a man deprived of one leg would contrive to get along on the other. A lifeless loyalty to the constitution as a *fait accompli* served some of these "*ralliés*" or former monarchists as a useful crutch. Others, like La Tour du Pin, refused to part with their monarchism.

Consequently, during the 'nineties there could be seen, from the viewpoint of social politics, at least seven different types of Catholics: first, monarchists who were indifferent to social reform, being reactionary in politics and liberal in economics; second, Social Catholic monarchists, who held that monarchy was essential to social reconstruction, and who were anti-liberal in both politics and economics; third, Social Catholic Constitutionalists or *ralliés*, who were anti-liberal in economics but attempted to be neutral in politics; fourth, other *ralliés* who were liberal in economics, *i. e.*, opposed to extensive social legislation; fifth, Progressists, who sincerely accepted the Republic and hoped that their own presence in the moderate

Republican group would serve as a leaven, making the whole lump more tolerant in religious matters,—men who were usually liberal both in politics and in economics; sixth, Christian Democrats, who seemed so eager not merely to reconcile but absolutely to identify Christianity with political and social democracy that they fell under the suspicion of being more democrats than Christians; and finally, those indifferentists, all too numerous, who from discouragement or from sheer indolence held aloof from all programs and parties.

The need for a constructive politico-social program and a fighting organization was revealed by the Dreyfus affair, which began as a skirmish between the most belligerent clericals and the most alert anticlericals, and developed into a general battle in which the ill-organized Catholic groups found their scattered forces no match for Waldeck-Rousseau's strong anticlerical *bloc* or coalition of Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists. Convinced that the Catholic religion in France was menaced by the anticlerical *bloc*, some of the most resolute champions of Catholicism stepped forward from the various groups just enumerated, and drew together to concert a plan of action. Liberal Constitutionalists, Social Catholic *ralliés*, and Catholic Progressists, and perhaps even a few individuals from among the other groups, were ready to rally around a new standard, if only a leader courageous and wise enough to raise it could be found.

It was at this moment that Jacques Piou, that veteran Constitutionalist, stepped forth from the Republican Right and unfurled the banner of "liberal action" (*Action Libérale*). Says Count Albert de Mun,

The whole work of Jacques Piou rests upon these ideas. At the moment when the great crisis of the *ralliement* [*i. e.*, the acceptance of the Republic by Catholics] so profoundly divided the Catholics, he offered . . . the practical means enabling them, without abandoning aught of their principles, to follow the inspirations of their conscience, to join in an honest *entente* with those whose aid was indispensable for the success of their cause, and to consecrate themselves—free from the confusion of constitutional struggles—to the championship of religious liberties, to the promotion of social

reforms, to the service of the nation. It is enough to entitle him to their perpetual gratitude.⁸⁰¹

In the passage just cited, de Mun implies that the new party founded by Piou was neutral as regards the question of political liberty. But as a matter of fact, the party when it came to work out its program not only accepted the Republic, but proposed a very remarkable series of thoroughly democratic reforms, calculated to make the French Republic much more liberal than it actually was. And with its democratic program of political reform, the party combined the program of social reconstruction which de Mun and other Social Catholics had been elaborating. Thus the Popular Liberal Party, like the Liberal Catholics of 1830-1848, attempted to accept Liberalism or democracy in politics, while repudiating Liberalism in economics; or, to say the same thing in different words, it succeeded in the task which the Liberal Catholics had failed to achieve, the task of adapting the Catholic social program to political democracy.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY

The Popular Liberal Party (*Action Libérale Populaire*) grew out of the Liberal Group (*Action Libérale*)⁸⁰² which was formed in 1899 by a group of Catholic deputies,⁸⁰³ resentful of Waldeck-Rousseau's aggressively anticlerical policies.⁸⁰⁴

Jacques Piou, the man of politics, keenly alive to the strategy of party manœuvres, was the center of the group and became the president of the managing committee (*comité directeur*); his influence as the chief of the old "Constitutionalist" group of the "Republican Right" entitled him to the place of honor no less justly than his alertness and activity in constituting the new party qualified him for the post of greatest responsibility.

Piou represented the group of Catholics who out of respect for the clearly manifested will of the people had accepted the Republic, but still held aloof from the recognized Republican parties and in practice acted for the most part on a negative program of resisting anticlericalism, combating socialism, de-

nouncing antimilitarism. Baron Amédée Reille, a naval officer who joined with Piou, was of a more conservative, aristocratic type, the type which from that day to this has supplied the Popular Liberal Party with what might be called a right wing, tremendously patriotic, emphatically Catholic, firmly convinced that the mission of the nobility is to serve faithfully the interests of France, of the Church, and of the People. But the most distinguished member of the triumvirate⁸⁰⁵ which founded the party was Count Albert de Mun, whose recent admission to the *Académie Française* had designated him as one of the foremost orators of France, and whose services in founding the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, and in championing the cause of Social Catholicism, had won him universal recognition as the spokesman of the rising Social Catholic school of economics. Modestly enough, de Mun consented to lend the full support of his influence and the prestige of his name to the party, without claiming the honor of its presidency. To quote the eulogistic words of an admirer:

The authoritative voice of the Count de Mun encouraged him (Piou), or rather this encouragement was expressed by an act, the acceptance of the vice-presidency of the future association. Thus M. de Mun, by the impulsive warmth of his conviction and of his heart, gave to all a model of union and of discipline. Like a proud godfather who does not claim paternal authority, he brought a precious gift to the cradle of the Liberal Party.⁸⁰⁶

Or as a writer in *l'Association catholique*⁸⁰⁷ a little less picturesquely declared, "the name of M. de Mun, whatever place it may occupy, is a banner [*drapeau*] for the party to which he belongs." It was de Mun's influence which gave the nascent party its Social Catholic character.

The deputies who flocked to the standard raised by Piou, de Mun, and Reille formed a heterogeneous group. Of the fifty-eight members of the Liberal Group as shown by the *Annuaire du parlement* of 1901, sixteen had been classed as *ralliés* in previous issues of the *Annuaire*, three as *Républicains libéraux*, one as a *Républicain progressiste*, two as *nationalistes*, one as an *indépendent*.⁸⁰⁸

From another point of view, one might say that the group was formed by the affiliation of certain former Monarchists and "Nationalists" as well as certain Progressists with the bulk of Piou's Constitutionalist group, the Republican Right. This fact is clearly shown by a count of the members of the Liberal Group (in 1901) who continued at the same time to be members of other groups, espousing the new without forsaking the old. No fewer than 18 of the 58 members of the Liberal Group in 1901 called themselves Progressists as well as Liberals,⁸⁰⁹ and 22 were inscribed in the group of National Defense, as Nationalists.⁸¹⁰ The Nationalist group, it should be explained, was recruited mostly from antisemitic patriots, most but by no means all of whom cherished Monarchist sympathies, avowed or disguised as the case might be. There remained something like thirty simon-pure "Liberals."

Upon analysis, the social elements appear no less heterogeneous than the political components of the Liberal Group in this earliest stage of its career, from 1899 to the elections of 1902. Of the seventy-four deputies who were affiliated with the Liberal Group (including a number, at least fourteen, who were only transiently so affiliated), about thirty were owners of landed estates, sixteen belonged to the legal profession; there were fifteen industrial capitalists and engineers, including Eugène Schneider of the famous Creusot munition works, and Armand Viellard-Migeon, administrator of the Suez Canal; several members were bankers, journalists, magistrates; Jules Jaluzot, proprietor of the famous *Magasin du Printemps*, represented mercantile interests; Jules Gaillard had been an *attaché d'ambassade*; Abbé Gayraud, an "apostolic missionary," had formerly been a Dominican professor of theology and scholastic philosophy at the Catholic University of Toulouse; Louis Passy had achieved distinction as *savant* and economist, Henry Cochin as something of a *littérateur* and medievalist; de Mun's gift of oratory had won him membership in the *Académie française*, while his economic studies had given him some eminence in the field of social science.

With a membership of this character,—including aristocratic

landowners and army officers, industrial capitalists, lawyers, publicists — the group might quite naturally have been expected to manifest a most reactionary spirit of opposition to all measures of political progress or of social justice. But *mirabile dictu*, this naturally conservative coalition was destined to become one of the most radical parties in France, in the sense that it adopted an elaborate constructive program of political and economic reforms, boldly conceived in a spirit of democratic progress.

Perhaps for the sake of a clear understanding, it would be well to examine the organic structure of the party before attempting to study its program. The Liberal Group (*Action Libérale*), founded in 1899, was not a full-fledged political party, in the Anglo-Saxon sense, but merely the embryo of such a party, merely an informal group of deputies in the Chamber. As the general elections of 1902 drew near, the leaders of the group, considering that some public declaration of policy was necessary, delivered program speeches before a meeting in the Hall of the Agriculturists of France (*la salle des Agriculteurs de France*), July 5, 1901; ⁸¹¹ a permanent secretariat was established and an office opened at 7, rue Las-Cases, and the managing committee organized the electoral campaign.⁸¹²

The brain of the party was there, but as yet the body had not formed. After the elections, however, the body was added to the brain, and the Liberal Group became the Popular Liberal Party (*Action Libérale Populaire*). The addition of the adjective "Popular" was significant. It meant that the party "appealed to the mass of the electors and no longer solely to the elected, and that it was determined to rest upon the democratic foundations of the country."⁸¹³ As the membership-certificates declared,

It [the party] styles itself *Popular* because, on the one hand, it desires to derive its strength from the people by the number of its adherents; on the other hand, it is solicitous above all to defend the interests of the workingmen, which are constantly betrayed by those who promise everything before the elections and hold none of their promises afterwards.⁸¹⁴

The Popular Liberal Party was the first legally constituted political party in the Third Republic. In other words it was the first to take advantage of the Associations Law of July 1, 1901, by depositing its constitution at the office of the prefect of police, May 17, 1902.⁸¹⁵ And it was a pioneer in the path which other French parties have subsequently followed, the path of firmer party organization and clearer definition of programs. To the student of comparative government this feature is of particular interest, as marking a definite stage in the evolution of the French parliamentary system from the irresponsibility of loose, overlapping groups, ever in a state of flux, and with the vaguest of platforms, toward a system of well-knit party-organizations, with clear-cut programs, and a genuine responsibility before the electorate for a sincere endeavor to fulfill electoral promises.

From the embryonic stage of the Liberal Group, the Popular Liberal Party developed at once into a state if not of maturity at least of organic perfection. In the eyes of the law, the Liberal Popular Party was an association, legally incorporated, and represented by a Central Committee (*Comité central*). The Central Committee,⁸¹⁶ being composed of founders together with new members chosen by coöptation, served as a general staff, ensuring not only effective discipline⁸¹⁷ but also unswerving perseverance in the plan of campaign. A party, to serve as a genuine representation of the views and interests of a popular following, must have sufficient continuity of program to prove its own sincerity and to enable the voters to pass upon its merits intelligently; a party which constantly veers in its aims, and makes its appeal to the passion of the moment or to personal loyalty cannot easily contribute to the stable development of constructive policies. As the practical fulfilment of electoral promises, of course, would naturally be the duty of the parliamentary representatives of the party, it is of interest to note that most of the members of the Central Committee were also members of the group of the Popular Liberal Party in the Chamber of Deputies; usually, also, one or more senators were included in the Central Committee, but

the party was too thinly represented in the Senate to warrant the creation of a separate party group in that chamber.

The ranks of the party were filled by Sustaining Members (again I use an equivalent, rather than a translation, of the French phrase — *membres sociétaires*) and Ordinary Members (*membres adhérents*), the former paying 500 francs as a life-subscription or 25 francs a year, the latter subscribing one franc annually.⁸¹⁸ Women, as well as men, were eligible. By exacting an annual payment of at least one franc from each of its members, the party excluded indifferent adherents from its membership, and voluntarily kept its membership strength much inferior to its voting strength; when, therefore, the party claimed 160,000 members in 1904⁸¹⁹ and 265,000 in 1911,⁸²⁰ no more convincing proof could be asked that a genuine and a numerically important popular foundation had been laid for the parliamentary group. The Unified Socialist Party, it should be remembered, had only 35,000 members in 1905 and approximately 63,000 in 1912;⁸²¹ that is, the Popular Liberal Party had more than four times as many members, although it exacted four times as heavy a payment from its members by way of dues.

True to one of the cardinal principles of its politico-social program, the Popular Liberal Party in its own organization endeavored to give a living demonstration of the virtues of decentralization. In their local groups and committees, the members of the party enjoyed entire freedom of self-administration; the national party did not even demand that the property of the local groups should be vested in the name of the National Organization;⁸²² the only requirement was fidelity to the purpose and spirit of the party. The local committees were more or less spontaneously organized on the basis of the *commune*, of the *canton*, of the *arrondissement*, and of the *département*. In course of time, as the number of local committees became unwieldy, passing the thousand mark, a tendency developed to form provincial or regional federations as intermediaries between the Central Committee and the local committees. A Federation of the North, a Federation of the

Southwest, a Regional Committee of Lyons, a Federation of Languedoc, of Provence, sprang into being. "Even in its method of organization, the Popular Liberal Party reacts against the Jacobin tradition," by returning to the ancient "provinces" as more natural divisions than the modern "departments" — those "bureaucratic fictions" created by the Revolution.⁸²³

As an army must have its officers' training camps, its stations, its economic auxiliaries, and manifold other supporting services, so a political party, if it would achieve victory through superior organization, has no less need of training camps, recruiting stations, of economic and social auxiliaries.

The officers' training camp, one might say, of the Popular Liberal Party was the National Young Men's Liberal Federation (*Fédération Nationale de la Jeunesse Libérale*), an organization affording an outlet for the energies as well as training for the faculties of the young men who in the coming generation would furnish the officers — the local leaders, the deputies, the secretaries — of the party. The *Jeunesse Libérale*, as it was commonly styled, rendered valuable service in extending propaganda, in supplying watchers for election-day, in keeping order at public mass-meetings, and in a thousand different ways.⁸²⁴

Alongside of the *Jeunesse Libérale*, it may be remarked parenthetically, there was also an *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* (French Young Men's Catholic Association), which, being organized on a broader basis, — a religious rather than a partisan basis, — was not directly ancillary to the Liberal Popular Party, but indirectly brought added strength and new recruits to the party by stimulating the Social Catholic propaganda in France.⁸²⁵

Of the various other organizations auxiliary to, or, rather, affiliated with, the Popular Liberal Party, this is not the place for an extended description, but only for the barest mention. The Patriotic League of French Women (*Ligue patriotique des françaises*), founded in the same year that the Popular Liberal Party was legally constituted, was very closely in sympathy with the party and exerted a powerful social influence in its

behalf. Within less than five years from its foundation, the Patriotic League had attained a membership surpassing three hundred thousand.⁸²⁶ Less imposing in numerical strength, but quite interesting in their way, were the Union of Free Workingmen (*Union des travailleurs libres*)⁸²⁷ and the Federal Unions (*Unions fédérales*)⁸²⁸ of Catholic employers, both of which supported the Popular Liberal Party.

Returning to the party itself, we find that in its methods no less than in its organic structure it was designed as a well-knit, powerful association rather than as a loose political group. Beginning in 1904 it held national congresses or conventions (1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, 1914)⁸²⁹ at which the program of the party was studied and formulated with something like scientific thoroughness. By way of illustration, one might mention the fact that, preparatory to the congress of 1904, a detailed *questionnaire* regarding the question of the labor-contract (between employer and workingman) and the problem of workingmen's pensions was sent out to the local committees, and an analysis made of the replies, as a preliminary basis for the discussion of those topics at the convention.⁸³⁰

But the national conventions were by no means the sole or even the most important manifestation of the association's unity and energy. In the interim between the conventions, the Central Committee continued its incessant labors of direction and organization; the parliamentary group knew little rest in its political opposition to the Government or in its legislative championship of the party's program; public speakers (*conférenciers*) were constantly engaged in carrying the propaganda of the party into every nook and corner of the country; and by the written as well as by the spoken word an uninterrupted campaign was waged. The party published a weekly Bulletin (*Bulletin hebdomadaire*), a Quarterly Bulletin (*Bulletin trimestriel*), popular tracts, and an almanac.⁸³¹ In addition, many local committees issued departmental or regional bulletins; members and friends of the party were active on the editorial staffs of many a newspaper⁸³² and penned articles for period-

icals such as the *Correspondant* or the *Association catholique*, not to mention books on controversial political and social questions.

Most striking and aggressive of all the methods of action adopted by the Popular Liberal Party were its Popular Secretariats, its Employment Bureaus, its Industrial Unions, its People's Halls, and its Legislative-Political Museum. Possibly the political value of social propaganda and of labor unions was suggested by the dependence of the Socialist Party upon "Red" trade unions;⁸³³ but it may equally well have been suggested by de Mun's Catholic Workingmen's Clubs,⁸³⁴ which antedated both the trade unions⁸³⁵ and the Socialist Party by many years; or it may have been suggested by the activities of either the Belgian Clerical Party or the German Center Party. At any rate, the Popular Liberal Party laid great stress upon social propaganda as one of its principal means of action. It urged its local committees to found, and many of its committees did actually establish, *sécrtariats populaires* — People's Secretariats or Bureaus — which offered free assistance, advice and information to workingmen about industrial or agricultural questions or about the perplexing provisions of the tax-laws and the military service law.⁸³⁶ Many of the local committees became actively interested in the formation of industrial trade unions, and of provident societies of divers sorts.⁸³⁷ In some of the larger cities, the Liberal Committees established People's Halls (*Maisons du peuple*), where the offices of the People's Secretariats might be located, where workingmen's organizations or study-clubs might find a home, or lectures be given, and where an employment bureau could be maintained.⁸³⁸ The employment bureau, be it remarked, was an audacious and an original method of party propaganda. Dr. Léon Jacques, the eminent student of French political parties, has the following vigorous commentary to make on this point:

It is melancholy to note how, among men of the greatest sincerity, political preoccupations can trammel the true practice of religious sentiments. The A. L. P. [Popular Liberal Party] expects that the possessors of the power of employment (capitalists, merchants,

manufacturers, landowners — and most of them are either Catholics or non-Catholics who are equally anxious to recruit their employees among men of order — and the possessors of the power of consumption will do their duty, their imperious duty, and will reserve their personal preferences, their recommendations to their friends, to their coreligionists, to the members of the A. L. P. The result would be, if these instructions were followed to the letter, that the workingmen or employees and the merchants not belonging to the A. L. P. would find neither work nor clients, respectively, in circles sympathetic to this party! The A. L. P. is the first political organization in France, we believe, that has introduced such considerations in the economic sphere and has advocated such methods of combat (employment bureaus and lists of preferred tradesmen).⁸³⁹

The originality and the serious character of the Popular Liberal Party may be seen also in the establishment, soon after the organization of the party, of a Bureau of Research (*Section d'études*). The Bureau of Research, under M. Maze-Sencier's direction, conceived the remarkable idea that a political organization posing as the champion of definite social and political principles ought to possess scientific compilations of all available data regarding those principles. With industry equal to his originality, M. Maze-Sencier and his colleagues set to work and not only collected a library of books on political and social problems, but also accumulated and classified public documents — laws, bills, reports, decrees — of France and of foreign countries, so that any deputy belonging to the party might, when drafting a bill or preparing a speech, avail himself instantly of a *dossier* or file of documents on the subject in hand, already classified. At first the collection extended back to 1889; subsequently it was pushed still further back. Not only official documents, but even articles from domestic and foreign journals and magazines were methodically collected and classified. A careful record was made of elections, and a political chart of France kept up to date. A circulating library was created. A catalogue of parliamentary and other documents was published, and pamphlets were prepared and distributed. In its novel enterprise of laying a solid scientific foundation

for its political program, the Popular Liberal Party was unquestionably conscientious.⁸⁴⁰

DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM

From the foregoing exposition it should be clear that the Popular Liberal Party, growing out of the embryonic Liberal Group of 1899, very rapidly developed into a highly organized association, with a vigorous organic life. We are now ready to ask the question: toward what end did the party direct its efforts?

As one follows the evolution of thought in his speeches, from year to year, the conclusion is inevitable that Jacques Piou, founder of the Popular Liberal Party, was at first much clearer about the general nature of the party which he was creating than about the details of its program. On July 5, 1901, when the Liberal Group was beginning to strengthen its organization for the coming electoral conflict of 1902, Piou delivered a "program speech,"⁸⁴¹ setting forth very eloquently the mission and the spirit of the group, but defining very vaguely its legislative program. The supreme mission of the Liberal Group was to combat "the Collectivist-Jacobin-Sectarian" coalition, *i. e.*, Waldeck-Rousseau's Anticlerical-Radical-Socialist Government. "Our watch-word is simple," he said, "it is: repulse the artisans of national destruction, and chase them out of office; deliver ourselves . . . from counter-revolutionists and clericals." The real counter-revolutionists, he hastened to explain, were the so-called Republicans whose anticlerical passions led them to destroy liberty; the real "clericalism," most to be feared, was Free-Masonry, which he regarded as an intolerant religious sect whose ecclesiastical potentates grasped after political power and endeavored to use the government to oppress other religions, particularly the Catholic religion. Against the Free-Masons and the Socialists, Piou hoped to see a great Opposition *bloc* take shape, in which the Liberal Group would be one of the several "army corps."

We who defend by constitutional methods⁸⁴² all the ideas of order,

of progress, of justice, which alone can assure to society a stable equilibrium,—we have desired in our turn to enter the fray and to urge those who are of our way of thinking to contribute their contingent of efforts in the forthcoming struggle. I say, their contingent of efforts; for you understand, of course, that we have no idea of marching forth to battle entirely by ourselves; we are only one of the corps of the great electoral army. . . .

The issue, he believed, would be clear-cut:

Whether you like it or not, France today is divided into two camps: on one side are all the violent fanatics, all the Jacobins, all the bigots, supported by the Collectivists; on the other side are all the patriots, all the independents, all the liberals, all the moderates supported by the conservatives. Henceforth it must be a choice between one and the other of these camps. The time for hesitation and for diffidence is past.

In his speech of July 5, 1901, Piou seemed convinced that the Liberal Group should be just one of the army corps in the mighty host of the Opposition; but a few months later he seemed to have a more ambitious vision of a huge liberal and Catholic association somewhat like the German Center or the Belgian Clerical Party, the largest parties of Germany and Belgium respectively.

Over and above all individual enterprises, there is a general, collective enterprise which would soon modify the forces and the equilibrium of the parties. Can you imagine what would be the power of an immense association grouping under a single banner, in a single effort, towards a single goal, the advocates of the most popular of all liberties, the liberty of conscience? It would very soon count its adherents by the thousands and thousands. It would very soon radiate throughout the entirety of France. Men of the North and men of the South, rich and poor, savants and workingmen, intellectuals and peasants, all would form just an immense army corps, capable of resisting the allied forces of Free-Masonry and Collectivism, and of sweeping away at the first onslaught bourgeois Radicalism with its stale claptrap and its threadbare shams. . . .

Those who doubt it do not even need to thumb the pages of history, although for that matter every page of history tells the story of the miracles accomplished by free association. Merely let

them look across our frontiers to the East and to the North and they will see how the Belgians, defeated, crushed, have accomplished the most audacious and at the same time the most fecund political and social reforms; how the German Center after getting the better of the *Kulturkampf* and of the Iron Chancellor himself, made itself the arbiter of the parties.

The day that France has her people's association,⁸⁴³ the reign of the bigots will be ended.

But an organization can succeed only on a double condition: severe discipline, a precise program.⁸⁴⁴

Though he had no program to offer, indeed, he stoutly maintained that a successful program "must be the work of neither one man, nor of one group," but a joint product. Piou was acutely conscious that a program was vitally necessary. "A program," he said, "which corresponds to the problems occupying public opinion and to the interests which move the masses is the necessary bond of every association which desires to live." Again,— "A long campaign is not a guerilla warfare; it presupposes a plan concerted in advance and followed out." The general spirit of the program he indicated in his peroration, when he exhorted his hearers:

You are being denounced to your country as the spoiled children of the great national family, as morose stragglers whose eyes are ever turned backward, toward the Past. Tell the country, prove to the country, that you are its loyal sons, its ardent servants, that you love all that it loves,—social justice, scientific progress, political liberty,—and that your supreme ambition is to be of assistance in its onward march toward the light and toward fraternity.⁸⁴⁵

More definite are Piou's ideas in his Rheims speech, January 26, 1902. He declares that the mission of the Liberal Group is to restore respect for justice, to put the army above politics, to establish equality before the law (in other words, to repeal the provisions of the Associations Law which denied to monastic orders the rights enjoyed by other associations), to establish liberty of conscience without privilege, in short, "to repair all the evil which has been done" and to "substitute for the Jacobin Republic the Liberal Republic." In passing, he paid

his respects to the Government's progressive inheritance-tax bill. The Government, it seemed, had planned to subject even very small inheritances to the tax, but had been unduly generous toward multi-millionaires by refusing to extend the principle of progressivity above the million mark, whereas Piou had advocated the exemption of small inheritances (under 2,000 francs) and the imposition of progressive supertaxes on inheritances above a million.⁸⁴⁶

Count Albert de Mun likewise inveighed against the rule of the "Jacobins" and Socialists. Ever more interested in social matters than was Piou, de Mun dealt in detail with the social-economic policy of the Government and pointed out that much if not all of the really valuable constructive work of the Socialist minister, Millerand, had been prepared by his predecessors. The application of the accident compensation law was a case in point; or, to take another example, Millerand's idea of establishing trade boards (*conseils du travail*) and of making part of the Superior Trade Board (*Conseil supérieur du travail*) elective had long been advocated in principle by Catholics. Millerand's law on industrial disputes and arbitration, declared the Catholic orator, was distasteful both to workingmen and to employers; Millerand might have profited by borrowing the Social Catholic scheme of industrial conciliation along with the idea of industrial representation.⁸⁴⁷ Summarizing his program, de Mun declared, "We are determined to protect religion against the bigots, the nation against the cosmopolites who menace it, the people against those who deceive them in order to exploit them and profit thereby."⁸⁴⁸

Vague in its constructive program and immature in its organization, the Liberal Group went into the elections of 1902 with one guiding principle very clearly conceived and faithfully followed,—to fight in alliance with the other moderate and conservative groups against the anticlerical and Socialist coalition. "If the moderates remain divided, or even scattered, they are lost," declared the Liberal Group's campaign manifesto. "In opposition to the Ministerial and Collectivist coalition there must be a patriotic and liberal coalition." In many constitu-

encies the policy of moderate coalition was very successfully practised by the Liberal Group, the Opposition Progressists, and the Nationalists.⁸⁴⁹

The result of the elections was such as to encourage the new group to adhere to its general policy and to elaborate its organization and program. In the expiring legislature, the Liberal Group had claimed the allegiance, at one time or another, of more than seventy Deputies, but as almost a score of these proved disloyal, the group hardly comprised more than fifty-six or fifty-seven members. Now although sixteen of these members were defeated in the election of 1902 (mostly by Radicals and Radical-Socialists, but a few by Republicans and two or three by Socialists),⁸⁵⁰ besides three lost by retirement and one by death, nevertheless the Liberal Group as a whole registered noteworthy gains, and the election of thirty-six new members, not in the preceding legislature, more than counterbalanced the losses. With old members reelected, members newly elected, and converts from other groups, the Liberal Group in the new legislature boasted no less than eighty Deputies,⁸⁵¹ — a gain of more than twenty members, or forty per cent.

The electoral victories of the Liberals, it is interesting to note, were mostly at the expense of the moderate Republicans and Radicals; whereas the nine new converts came, with two exceptions, from the Extreme Right or from the Nationalists. Thanks in no small part to the fresh vigor displayed by the Liberal Group, the Right as a whole (including "Conservatives," "Nationalists," and "*ralliés*") regained some of the ground it had lost in previous elections. In 1898 it had comprised only 94 members; in 1902 it comprised 119. And in addition, the large "Progressist" fraction, including Méline, Ribot, and Poincaré, which had broken off from the moderate Republican group, and opposed the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry, might be counted as lending the support of its 127 votes to the Right, on certain questions. Of the moderates who supported the Government, only sixty-two held their seats. The Radicals, to be sure, gained eight new seats, and the Radical-

Socialists forty-three; but the Socialists suffered a severe reverse, losing fourteen of their fifty-seven seats. Altogether, the coalition,—which became known to history as the *bloc*,—of 62 Republicans, 233 Radicals and Radical-Socialists, and 43 Socialists, upholding the Government, could muster 338 votes, as opposed to the 252 votes of the Opposition groups (5 dissident Radicals, 127 Progressists, 35 *ralliés*, 43 Nationalists, and 42 Conservatives, according to the official *communiqué*).⁸⁵²

The Liberal Group was a sort of leaven permeating the various other opposition groups, since some of its adherents were Conservatives, some Nationalists, some *ralliés*, some Progressists, at the same time that they were Liberals. This situation was most promising. The Liberal Group bade fair to become the organizing spirit, the nucleus of an Opposition *bloc* which might realize Piou's long-cherished dream of a great conservative-liberal party, a party favorable to social and political reforms but opposed to Revolution, favorable to religious liberty and opposed to the establishment of Free-Thinking and Free-Masonry as state religions, favorable to patriotism and opposed to anti-militarism. Said Piou, when the first returns of the elections became known,

A mere sketch of an organization, begun almost under the enemy's fire, has sufficed to check, sharply, the progress of the Socialistic Radicalism in the nation. A more complete organization would soon assure the defeat of Socialistic Radicalism: this organization is the task of tomorrow. It will be accomplished.⁸⁵³

Perhaps it was a real advantage, for the organization of the Liberals, that their leader, Jacques Piou, was defeated in the elections of 1902. However unwelcome his relief from parliamentary duties may have been, it afforded him an opportunity to devote his entire energy to the enormous task of creating the first well-organized, legally-constituted political party in the history of France. The result, the organization of the party, is already known to us. It remains to be seen how with the organization the program developed.

When the first regular national convention of the Popular

Liberal Party assembled at Paris in 1904, the Party had, properly speaking, no detailed constructive program of social and political reforms. In the constitution (*Statuts*, art. 2) of the party, to be sure, we read that

The Popular Liberal Party has for its aim to defend public liberties on the basis of loyalty to the Republican form of government [*sur le terrain constitutionnel*], by all legal means, particularly by electoral propaganda; to favor legislative reforms, to create or develop benevolent societies and social institutions; to ameliorate the condition of the working classes.

Moreover, de Mun and a few other Social Catholics among the Liberal ranks had their own distinctive program of social reconstruction. And Piou, as well as other Liberals, had spoken eloquently of the defense of liberty, of the army, of the workingmen's interests,—but usually in a negative sense or in general terms. The party as a whole still lacked an official program of specific constructive reforms.

A valiant beginning was made by the first party convention (Paris, 1904).⁸⁵⁴ Thanks to the happy device of sending out a *questionnaire* to the local committees and analyzing the returns systematically, in advance of the congress, it was possible for the assembled delegates to formulate their views with but little wrangling and without resort to that oracular vagueness which the Unified Socialists have sometimes employed to conceal their differences. Resolutions were adopted favoring Old Age Pensions for Workingmen (and specifying the method of organizing the pension fund),⁸⁵⁵ legal recognition of collective bargaining in industry, Sunday rest, a law rendering an attempt at conciliation obligatory in industrial disputes, a law regarding the discharge of employees, a law regulating payment of wages in kind, certain important extensions of the legal capacity of the trade-unions, completion and codification of labor legislation.⁸⁵⁶ A series of interesting constitutional reforms was proposed: among them, proportional representation with the *scrutin de liste*; a law obliging all voters to vote; the restriction of campaign placards to certain spaces, equal for all parties; the use

of identical paper for ballots of all parties and the enclosure of the ballot in an envelope (in order to put an end to the notorious violation of the secrecy of the ballot by the use of distinctive ballots for Government candidates) ; observation of the ballot-counting by watchers, equal in number for each party.⁸⁵⁷

Each convention, thereafter, set itself the task of elaborating the party program, a few details at a time. For example, the Convention of 1905 devoted special attention to the problem of educational institutions and to the problem of labor organization ; most interesting was the resolution adopted at this time, favoring parallel trade-unions of workers and employers, with mixed boards as bonds of union.⁸⁵⁸ The convention of 1906 extended the party platform by laying down planks on the legal limitation of the maximum working-day, on vocational training, on electoral frauds, on the desirability of writing a Declaration of Rights into the Constitution, of creating a Supreme Court, of altering the method of presidential elections, on professional representation, on the verification of legislative elections by the Supreme Court, on the referendum, and on decentralization.⁸⁵⁹

In the convention of 1908 ten " fundamental principles " were adopted as the basis of a draft for revision of the national constitution. The principles were :

1. The necessity of harmonizing the prescriptions of the constitution with the moral law and with those of the natural laws, the application of which is most favorable to man, and consequently to societies ;

2. Recognition of the Republic as the form of Government accepted by the country ;

3. Electoral reform, proportional representation, *scrutin de liste*, obligatory and secret voting.

4. Principle of decentralization and regionalism.

5. Professional organizations and trade-boards.

6. Constitution of a central executive power and modification of the mode of election and the powers of the president of the Republic.

7. Maintenance of the principle of the two Chambers, with representation of interests by the Senate.

8. Establishment, at the summit of the organization of the country, of a Supreme Court to protect public liberties and to guard the Constitution.

9. Right of constitutional revision.

10. "The convention furthermore resolves that a special committee of five members . . . shall be joined to the Committee of Social Studies, to collaborate on the preparation of successive reports on each of the articles of the draft constitution and to submit them to later conventions, and, subsequently, to the judgment of public opinion."⁸⁶⁰

The convention of 1909, continuing the work, dealt with the important problems of the minimum wage, professional representation, and the status of government employees.⁸⁶¹ That of 1911 adopted resolutions in favor of the referendum, arbitration and conciliation boards, old-age pensions, and state subvention of schools in proportion to the number of scholars.⁸⁶² It is hardly necessary, in this connection, further to amplify the list; the manner in which the program developed should already be sufficiently clear.

In short, the Popular Liberal Party, evolving from the Liberal Group, however vaguely its program and character may have been conceived at the outset, in course of time not only became elaborated into an organization which furnished a model to other French political groups, but also worked out a constructive program which, regardless of its strength or weakness in other respects, was unequalled by that of any other French political party in scope and precision.

In a sense, the program was not original, at least in its elements. Proportional representation, certainly, was not a novelty. Professional representation had long been advocated by certain Monarchists.⁸⁶³ The organization of industry by parallel trade-unions, with mixed boards, was a favorite idea of the Social Catholics. And so one might continue. But the virtue of the Popular Liberal Party was its ability to prepare a synthesis and a practical expression of these ideas, and to im-

pose that synthesis upon a heterogeneous group of Catholic politicians as a working program. In this circumstance lay the great service of the Popular Liberal Party to Social Catholicism; for the first time, French Social Catholic principles, with slight modifications, were proclaimed by an effective political organization.

SOCIAL CATHOLIC INFLUENCE ON THE PROGRAM

When the program of social reforms advocated by Count Albert de Mun and other Social Catholics during the 'eighties and 'nineties is compared with the program adopted by the Popular Liberal Party in the first decade of the new century, a remarkable similarity appears, a similarity so striking that the historian must instinctively connect the two programs and ask himself whether the second was evolved from the first, and in what manner.

The question has already been answered, in part. The Liberal Group formed by Jacques Piou in the legislature of 1898-1902, with little or no program except of constitutional opposition to Waldeck-Rousseau's coalition of anticlericalism and Socialism, happened to include a few men like de Mun, de Gailhard-Bancel, and de Grandmaison, who had not only contagious enthusiasm but also a definite, well-matured program of Social Catholic reforms. Count de Mun's prestige and eloquence gave additional weight to the Social Catholic program. Some of the other elements in the group were indifferent to social reform; some inclined toward the individualistic doctrine of non-intervention; but none had a rival program which could stand comparison with that of the Social Catholics. It was inevitable that the merely Catholic elements of the group should be leavened by Social Catholicism. The addition of the adjective "Popular" to the name of the group in 1902, and the insertion in the party's constitution of the words, "to ameliorate the condition of the working classes," were evidence of the growing influence of the Social Catholics.

The organizer and president of the party, Jacques Piou, who had hitherto appeared to be more interested in purely political

and ecclesiastical questions, now began to concern himself more and more actively with the social problem. When Piou had dealt with the social problems in 1901 it had been to denounce the socialists. Speaking before the annual meeting of the *Société d'économie sociale*, May 30, 1901, he accused socialism of being the chief cause of class antagonism, and he urged his hearers (who, by the way, represented the extremely timid wing of the Social Catholic movement, if indeed they could be called Social Catholics at all) to struggle with all their might against the menace of socialism, which would establish

materialism in place of religion, militias armed with intelligent bayonets in place of permanent armies, the State as an educational institution [*l'État éducateur*] in place of the family, free love in place of the family, capital under the domination of the labor union, taxes with the object of equalizing wealth, the levelling of all classes by law, and finally the idea of patriotism evaporating into I know not what cosmopolitan sentimentalism.

Even the most promising passage of his speech was very vague:

If this socialist movement had no other aim than to obtain for labor its legitimate share in the production of wealth, to multiply charitable and provident institutions, to leave the field open for collective or individual initiative, to render the acquisition of property and capital easier by means of thrift and mutual aid, an agreement [*entente*] could soon be effected and social peace would not be a hope which has almost become a dream. Today where is the man so unfeeling that he has no compassion for the condition of the workingmen who are confronted each morning with the problem of obtaining their daily bread, and in whose path both destitution and unemployment lie in wait? Where is the employer so forgetful of his interests and of his duties as not to respect the liberty, the interests, the rights of his workingmen? Where is the politician who does not take pride in embodying in our laws, and through the laws, in our customs, this sentiment of solidarity, this spirit of justice, which are the guarantees of social harmony?⁸⁶⁴

It is only fair to add that the orator hastened to daub a few streaks of qualifying realism over the too roseate picture he had just painted. Many of these well-wishers, he feared, were "more sincere than active," and the masses, misled by social-

istic "illusions," seemed determined to hurl themselves in vain against "the power of facts, the resistance of reason, and of economic laws." Consequently "the antagonism between capital and labor becomes more embittered every day."⁸⁶⁵

Two months later, in another speech to the *Société d'économie sociale*, he heaped more crushing denunciations upon the socialists, accusing them of wishing to substitute free love for marriage. He warned his hearers that "the crusade of atheism [apparently referring to socialism, one infers from the context], which pursues relentlessly its satanic mission, no longer confines itself to attacking the child and the workingman, but now attacks the young girl and the married woman. The enemies of the social order have thoroughly grasped the fact that they will triumph only when they have conquered the women." In passing, he asserted that the Old Age Pensions Bill then before the Chamber of Deputies was laudable and necessary in its purpose, but false and socialistic in its method.⁸⁶⁶

In 1903, however, we find Piou dealing with the social problem in a much more constructive spirit. Though his principles may have remained unaltered, his emphasis has shifted; whereas in 1901, his words were the words of a disciple of Le Play, placing chief emphasis upon provident societies among the workingmen and paternal benevolence among the employers, as the alternative of socialism, his speeches in 1903 have more of a Social Catholic ring, and with the Social Catholic he places emphasis upon the necessity of social legislation and of industrial organization. Socialism is now described not as the incarnation of "atheism" but as a "warning and a punishment to societies materially opulent but morally bankrupt."⁸⁶⁷ The great "error of the century just ended was to ignore, too frequently, the importance of social responsibility." To the problem of social justice the Catholics must give their immediate attention.

If the violent conflict joined between the Jacobin policy and the Liberal policy should cause us to forget the poverty, the sufferings, the injustices which surround us, our indifference would serve the

cause of the destructionists [the Socialists] better than does their own indefatigable activity.

And the Liberals must strive to remedy the maladies of modern capitalistic society not merely by preaching benevolence and thrift! Trade unions must be fostered, and social legislation promoted. On the subject of social legislation his remarks were particularly significant. France, he said, should

press forward to the goal and complete her social legislation, founding it upon this double basis: obligation in matters touching general interests placed under the guardianship of the State; liberty in all those matters touching private rights and interests.

As for the rôle of the Liberals,—

I hope that our friends of the Liberal Party [*Action Libérale*], the progress of which is so rapid, may some day have the opportunity to put the finishing touches on this legislation, and that in the meantime it should be the subject of their chief concern and the basis of the program which they will submit to the country when the time comes [for an election].

Moreover, he did not disdain to enter into details — pointing out how shamefully social reforms had been neglected, and how much remained to be done. The law of 1864 permitting labor coalitions was “the A B C of justice”; the law of 1884 legalizing trade-unions was a “tardy victory (*revanche*) of the ancient rights of labor over the sophisms of the Revolutionary philosophy.”

How many years and how many injustices it required before women and children were effectively protected against the excesses of homicidal overwork? It is hardly five years ago that mutual aid societies obtained a charter which might be called almost liberal. As for the law on old age pensions, that is still to be enacted.

Another thing which is still to be done, is the creation of an Industrial Code. Property has its code, commerce also; both voluminous and bulky. There are a number of rural codes and a forest code; but the code of the laborers is not yet in existence. . . .

The wage-contract is nowhere defined and regulated; no legal representation is assured to the workingmen, the famous trade

boards conceived by M. Millerand being still-born; no gratuitous and expeditious jurisdiction save the very incomplete jurisdiction of the trade-boards,⁸⁶⁸ which does not include clerks — protects them against the ruinous delays of ordinary justice. . . .

Arbitration exists only in name. . . .

As for the trade-unions, they are not permitted to unite in groups, or to engage in commerce, or to possess property, the bill which granted them these rights having been cast, together with its elder brother regarding trade-boards, into the *oubliettes* of parliament. . . . What they could be, what they would be, these trade-unions [*syndicats*] under a régime of wise and prudent liberty, my friend M. de Gailhard-Bancel has told you with that ardent conviction and that high competency which have made him one of the initiators and one of the chiefs of the unionist movement in France.

There is a domain where law is sovereign, a domain which is placed under the direct protection of the law; it is the domain of major social interests, such as hygiene, safety, morality, assistance; how many parts of this domain remain unexplored?⁸⁶⁹

In 1904, Piou gives voice to the emphatic statement: "If State Socialism is a peril, the complete abstention of the state is a desertion. The law must not only arm individual and collective initiatives with powerful means of action; it has also the duty of regulation, even of constraint, in all matters touching hygiene and safety, protection of the weak and repression of abuses."⁸⁷⁰

If we allow two more years to elapse, and then once more measure the Liberal leader's progress, we find that by 1906 he has arrived at a point where his social program is definite, precise, confident, constructive. "In the face of the growing antagonism between capital and labor," he writes, the Popular Liberty Party

desires to play the part of the peace-maker, by assisting to restore fraternity in our manners and customs, and justice in our laws.

In its conferences, in its journals, in its conventions, it studies and advocates the reforms which appear to it to correspond best to the wants and aspirations of industrial democracy: labor legislation and trade boards, trade organization and labor representation, the right of property for trade unions, obligatory conciliation of industrial disputes, Sunday rest, limitation of the working-day for women and children, workingmen's pensions, *etc.*

At the same time it constantly appeals to the initiative of its com-

mittees and of its adherents for the creation of social service institutions, people's bureaus, mutual societies, popular libraries and clubs, loan funds, dwellings, workingmen's gardens, *etc.* To facilitate the establishment of such institutions, it [the party] has a Research Committee, admirably organized, always ready to place at the disposal of its friends information about everything that is being done in France and abroad, complete documents regarding all sorts of social institutions, and model constitutions and by-laws.

The party's dominant idea is that the hour has come to leave the realm of speculation to enter into that of practical applications. All these questions have been studied thoroughly: the social program of the Catholics has been worked out again and again. Those who are still searching for it, dwell in the clouds.

There is not a meeting of the Young Men's Association, not a congress, not a social week [*i.e.*, a week's course of popular lectures in sociology] at which the program is not developed, elaborated, with an abundance of details which leaves nothing in obscurity.

What is lacking is not a program, it is the realization of the program.⁸⁷¹

What contributed, probably as much as anything else, to lend precision to the social program of Piou and his party, was the vigorous campaign waged by the Social Catholic writers who contributed to the *Association catholique* — the magazine founded as the organ of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs and devoted to social questions.⁸⁷² In 1898, on the eve of the formation of the Liberal Group, the *Association catholique* exhorted the Catholic Deputies in the Chamber not to content themselves with strengthening the old Liberal Left Center, but to raise their own distinctive standard of Catholic Social reforms.⁸⁷³ This, it will be observed, was exactly what the Popular Liberal Party undertook to do. Again, in 1899, the editor of the *Association catholique*, Henri Savatier, warned the Catholics, who were at that moment rejoicing over the formation of their Catholic Federation for campaign purposes, that,

"Catholic electoral organization is doubtless very necessary, but it will not produce serious and lasting results unless it is in a position to reap the fruits of social action."⁸⁷⁴

Almost literally this advice became the fundamental idea of the Popular Liberal Party; for the Party devoted itself so earnestly to social work as a foundation for political propaganda that it was really more than a political party; — as a literal translation of its name would suggest, it was an association for Popular Liberal Action (*Action Libérale Populaire*), social and political.

Not only did the Social Catholic organ point out in advance the general path which the Popular Liberal Party followed in fact; the social program no less than the general tactics of the Party were foreshadowed in the *Association catholique*. Commencing with the issue of November 15, 1895, the magazine always published in the front of each number a "Program," which had been decided upon by the editors on June 15, 1895. The "fundamental reform," according to this Program, was the "corporative reorganization of Society"—*i. e.*, the reconstruction in modern form of the medieval organization of trades into guilds or *corporations*. This fundamental idea, the Popular Liberal Party inscribed at the head of its own social program. The *Association catholique's* Program also included a series of other reforms which might be realized immediately before the slow process of social reconstruction was completed. These reforms were:

II. "Liberty of the Church in its establishment, in its recruitment, in its instruction." The Popular Liberal Party, it will be observed, demanded the same liberty for the Church.

III. Preservation of the family by recognition of the indissolubility of the marriage bond and the rights of the father and by protection of the home.

IV. The organization of trades in autonomous bodies (*corps*).

V. The grant of additional legal rights and capacities to trade unions (whether composed of laborers or of employers or of both), "the right of owning property, as extensive as the needs of association require"; "the right of professional jurisdiction over their members"; the right of representation before the government. Trade unions which "unite without confusing the different elements (*i. e.*, capital and labor) of the profession

should have Conciliation and Arbitration Boards, and should be empowered to draft regulations which, when approved by a referendum to all members of the trade and confirmed by the Government, should be binding upon the whole trade." We shall find the Popular Liberal Party introducing a bill to this effect in 1906.

VI. These self-imposed trade regulations, supplemented by legislation, should assure the protection of women and children, the limitation of the working-day "according to the conditions of the trade," and the interdiction of Sunday work in factories and workshops.

VII. Coöperative societies of consumers and of producers, mutual provident societies, and mutual credit associations should be organized among agricultural workers, farmers and landowners.

VIII. "This régime of organized trades should establish wages on a basis sufficient for the support of an average family and for the maintenance of benefit funds to provide for the expenses resulting from accidents, sickness, old age, *etc.*" This became one of the characteristic contentions of the Popular Liberal Party, that "social insurance" against accidents, sickness, unemployment and old age although supervised and rendered obligatory by the State, could best be organized by the trades, without creating a new army of public officials.

IX. International agreements regarding labor legislation and the regulation of banking.

X. Eradication of the "usurious speculation" which "consists in legally appropriating the products of the labor of others."

Still more striking becomes the evidence of the *Association catholique's* influence upon the Popular Liberal Party's program, when one turns to the program drafted by the so-called Union of Reviews of Christian Social Economy (*Réunion des revues d'économie sociale chrétienne*) in 1898. Formed in 1897, and including *La Justice sociale*, *La Sociologie catholique*, and *Le XX Siècle* as well as *L'Association catholique*, the Union of Reviews was in reality an enlargement of the circle of influ-

ence of *L'Association catholique*.⁸⁷⁵ The program of the Union of Reviews was simply a more precise elaboration of the Program of 1895. Dealing first with the question of trade organization, the Union of Reviews recommended:

1. That all members of each trade should be registered by the government, in the same way that the registered seamen (*inscrits maritimes*) were already enrolled.

2. That these registered men should form, for each trade, the Trade Corps (*corps professionnel*).

3. That each Trade Corps should have regulations binding on all members.

4. That in each trade, that is, within the Trade Corps, trade unions (*syndicats*) should be permitted to develop freely.

5. That at the head of each Trade Corps there should be a Board (*Conseil*), composed of delegates of the trade unions, "in such a way as to afford equal representation to the different elements of the trade."

6. That the Board of each Trade Corps should apply general labor laws to the particular trade, and should formulate the regulations (*coutumes*) of the trade.

7. That the regulations of the Boards should require validation (*homologation*) by the Government and, if demanded, sanction by referendum to all members of the trade.

8. That the Boards should have certain judicial functions, and also authority to levy assessments or dues.

9. That the Boards should "nominate the representation of the trade in the next higher degree."⁸⁷⁶ Here we have in its bold outlines the scheme of industrial reconstruction later proposed by the Popular Liberal Party. To be sure, certain features will be modified, and emphasis shifted; but in the large, the scheme is the same.

The program of the Union of Reviews also contained an interesting section on Property and one on Speculation. As for the former, the Union advocated the legal protection of family property, favoring the acquisition of inalienable "homesteads" and permitting parents to will the home to one child, excluding the others from share or compensation; also,

corporative property was to be recognized, all public, professional, or charitable associations being permitted to own property, with the proviso that the Government should regulate the amount and the use of the property. Regarding Speculation, the Union of Reviews formulated a curious and interesting system: all stock-exchanges were to be controlled by a "body representing all trades," and expert delegates of the trades were to assist the brokers; brokers must be registered and must pay a special tax; misrepresentation of stocks should be penalized, "bulls" and "bears" punished, fictitious operations interdicted, and negotiable bonds—which encourage stock gambling—abolished. In the long run, it was hoped, the reconstruction of trade-organizations and the revived moral influences of Christianity would go to the heart of the evil.⁸⁷⁷ In all this, the principles of the Union of Reviews were quite as closely in accord with the ideas of the pioneers of French Social Catholicism as they were prophetic of the program of the Popular Liberal Party.

One other circumstance,—unimportant in itself, perhaps, like a straw floating in the river, but very significant as a sign which way the tide is flowing,—may be noted as an evidence of the decisive influence of the Social Catholic element in the formulation of the Popular Liberal Party's program. When the first national convention of the party assembled, in 1904, to work out a social program on the basis of an analysis of the social committee's replies to a *questionnaire*, it was a Social Catholic writer, a contributor to the *Association catholique*, who prepared the report on the results of the *questionnaire*, and by his skilful classification of the replies from the committees assisted the convention to come to definite conclusions, embodied in resolutions.⁸⁷⁸

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Social Catholic element was completely victorious in forcing the adoption of its entire program upon every member of the party. The party, in strict truth, was more or less eclectic. Its aim was to present a working program, and to gain all possible support for that program. There were always a few members of the party who

had small sympathy for the extreme demands of the more ardent Social Catholics, and who evinced a marked inclination to clamber down off the social platform of the party. The same can be said of any party or movement, of the Socialist movement as well as of the rest. On the whole, however, the Popular Liberal Party officially accepted and faithfully advocated — as its record in parliament will testify — the greater part of the practical program of the Social Catholic Movement. A Social Catholic writer, M. Zamanski, in the *Association catholique* (May, 1910), even while expressing some criticism of the personnel, hastens to affirm that the policy and aims as well as some of the most notable leaders of the party were genuinely Social Catholic.

"The name of M. de Mun, in whatever place it may be found, is a banner for the party to which he belongs. In its official declarations his party [the Popular Liberal Party] has most frequently based its views upon the studies pursued in the School [*i. e.*, the Social Catholic school], its orators, like M. Lerolle and M. de Gailhard-Bancel, have candidly acknowledged its inspiration, and the names of several of its reporters, M. de Clerq, M. Maze-Sencier, will be found signed to articles in the magazine.

"One might wish that the Party's parliamentary representation were more homogeneous and more compact in the social conflict, especially when that conflict is waged about a Bill where our principles are at stake. Replenished with new elements which had been effectively trained in the study of labor problems, it might be, in our modern debates, the great social voice of Christianity, like the German Center.

"However, the Popular Liberal Party has not too much restricted its ambitions: the labors of its committees, of its congresses, the foundation of associations for social work and of social institutions, the researches, the opinions of its Research Committee, at any rate prove that it has aspired to be an active association which might translate into facts the social doctrine with which its leaders were inspired." 879

SUMMARY OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAM OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

A lover of epigrams might sum up the social philosophy of the Popular Liberal Party by saying — in terms of Hegelian

logic — that economic Individualism was the “thesis,” Socialism the “anti-thesis,” and the Popular Liberal program the “synthesis,” of the modern doctrine of economic liberty. Individualism, said the Socialists, exaggerated individual liberty to such an extent that the laboring masses fell under the tyranny of their employers; Socialism, said the Liberals, ignored individual liberty to such an extent that the laboring masses, and also the upper classes, would be crushed by the tyranny of the Socialistic State. True liberty, declared the Popular Liberal Party, could be assured neither by individual liberty without social authority, nor by social authority without individual liberty, but only by the moderation and reconciliation of the two opposite ideals. This was the essence of the social program of the Popular Liberal Party: to safeguard the workingman both against the abuses of individual liberty and against the abuses of the power of the state.⁸⁸⁰

The characteristic feature — one might call it the cornerstone — of the Popular Liberal Party’s scheme of social reconstruction was the reintegration of the trades, industries, and professions. Economic individualism had endeavored to regard each industry as a fluid and ephemeral association of free economic units — individuals. Socialists and Syndicalists had regarded the workingmen and the employers in each industry as natural enemies, irreconcilably separated. But the Popular Liberty Party considered each trade or industry a natural social entity, in which capital and labor should be intimately associated in the harmony of common endeavor. The perfectly organized trade, as conceived by the party, would comprise all the capitalists, all the clerks, all the common laborers in each industry, each class organized in one or more trade-unions (*syndicats*), and all these classes represented and united by a board or trade council, containing an equal number of delegates from each class. A well-knit industrial organization of this kind would most effectively prevent capital from tyrannizing over labor, or *vice versa*, it was held, and at the same time serve as a bulwark against excessive interference and unintelligent bureaucracy on the part of the state.

Since, quite obviously, such a régime of organized trade corps could not spring into maturity over night, like a mushroom, the Popular Liberal Party proposed, as a beginning, first, to foster by every possible expedient the rapid development and extension of the existing trade unions, which could serve both to train their members in the responsibilities of association, and to provide the nuclei for the future organized trades. The Liberals became even more radical than the Socialists in demanding privileges for the trade unions. In the second place, the Liberals believed that the Government should immediately take the initiative of preparing a complete list of the persons engaged in each industry, declaring that all persons engaged in a given industry—in a convenient geographical division—should constitute a “Trade Corps,” and elect a “Trade Council,” by classes. The Trade Council should be recognized guardian of the interests of the Trade; it should be consulted on all labor legislation, authorized to administer and apply general labor laws in its own particular trade, and empowered to devise regulations for the Trade, subject to referendum. The Trade Council, in other words, should be the government of the Trade.⁸⁸¹

Whatever one may think of its practical value, one cannot but admire the intellectual symmetry of the scheme of social reconstruction which the Liberals based upon their idea of the Organized Trade. Industrial conciliation and arbitration would no longer be perplexing problems, they would be normal functions of the Trade Councils. In years past, all labor legislation had been opposed and many desirable reforms retarded or blocked by the argument that laws passed by the national legislature were too rigid, failing to take into account the special conditions in particular industries; with the Trades organized, not only would general laws be referred to the Trade Councils for specialization and adaptation, but it would be very easy for the Trade Councils to impose additional regulations, drafted with expert knowledge. Labor legislation would be placed on a scientific basis. Vocational training, sadly neglected heretofore, could be supervised and fostered

by the Trades with real efficiency, contrasting sharply with the blundering benevolence of the central government. Collective bargaining could be recognized and legalized. Social insurance — against old age, accident, sickness, unemployment, — could be developed without the disagreeable necessity of creating a host of unproductive parasitic public officials and office-seekers. Best of all, it was hoped that the intimate relations between capital and labor, as represented in the Trade Councils, would gradually substitute class coöperation in place of the class-struggle. The Revolutionary Syndicalists believed that the worker must save himself by battling — rather blindly, perhaps — for his mystical faith in the “social myth” of the general strike; the Revolutionary Socialists promised to save the workingman by imposing upon industry a ready-made and not very precisely elaborated system of collective-ownership; the Popular Liberal Party was content to bring employers and workingmen in each trade together, for amicable collaboration, and then to wait for common-sense and fraternal sentiments to do their work, spontaneously as far as possible.

The organization of industry may be regarded as the first and most important chapter of the Popular Liberal Party's social program. Regarding the remaining chapters — on the regulation of hours and conditions, on social insurance, on wages, only the briefest suggestions need here be given. Suffice it to say that the party advocated drastic curtailment if not the interdiction of the employment of women and children in industry, the limitation of working-hours, even for adult male workers, the enforcement of Sunday rest, the protection of the health of the workers; as far as social insurance is concerned, the party firmly believed obligatory insurance against old age, sickness, infirmity, unemployment, and accident to be most desirable and urgent; as for wages the party accepted the principle of the minimum wage and its spokesmen were generally inspired by the papal doctrine that every workingman is by justice entitled to a living wage, sufficient to support his family decently, educate his children properly, and provide against the day of need. In all these matters, the party desired

the initiative to be taken by the state, the administration and application to be entrusted to the Trades.

Certain other aspects of the Party's social program ought at least to be indicated in this place, to show the scope of the plan. Financial speculation and usury should be curbed. Stock-exchange operations should be taxed and regulated. Agricultural coöperation and mutual aid societies should be encouraged. And by various methods — especially by favoring the acquisition of small inalienable family patrimonies, and by reinforcing the legal authority of the father — the family should be strengthened and preserved as a fundamental institution of Christian society. In the Popular Liberal Party's vision of the future reconstructed society, the Family and the Organized Trade stood like supporting columns, with the Church ensuring the stability of the social order, and at the same time protecting the liberties of the people by preventing the burden of the national government from bearing directly with all its crushing weight upon the isolated individual.⁸⁸²

As a closing remark upon this subject, it may be added that to the minds of the Liberal leaders religion must be the ultimate solvent of social problems. The problem of usury and capitalism, they held, had developed because Jews and Protestants disregarded the Church's teachings regarding the sinfulness of usury. The chaotic condition of labor had resulted from undue interference of irreligious monarchs and of the anti-Christian Revolution with the old organization of industry. The degradation of the workingman was the logical consequence of unmoral economic systems founded upon false "scientific" theories instead of upon Christian morality. In the words of Jacques Piou,

The social question, which exists in fact, whatever Gambetta may have said to the contrary, is above all a moral question. The augmentation of wages, easier access to property, a better distribution of capital, will remain inefficacious palliatives if the spirit of the people fails to shake off the yoke of materialistic doctrines and fails to rediscover its divine ideal. . . . The Decalogue and the Gospel are the great factors of true social progress. . . .

A divine law is not violated with impunity. France is learning that fact today by sad experience. In the measure that she breaks with her religious traditions, she grows weaker, she becomes disorganized, depopulated, loses her rank in the world and her confidence in her own destinies. Foreigners dare to say that she is the first of the dying nations. . . .

The solution of the social problem is in Christianity. The Socialists will never find anything to surpass the Sermon on the Mount, or to replace it.⁸⁸³

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND POLITICAL THEORIES

With its ambitious program of social reconstruction, the Popular Liberal Party combined a scheme of political or constitutional reforms hardly less remarkable in their combination of radicalism and conservatism. At the outset, as the reader will recall, the Liberal Group, growing into the Popular Liberal Party, could hardly agree upon any clear or comprehensive theory of government, for the group was constituted by the combination of the most diverse elements,—conservative nationalists sighing for a return to monarchy, reluctant *ralliés*, sincerely endeavoring to swallow the bitter medicine of republicanism without making too wry a face, and convinced Republican Progressists. Their only common ground was defense of the Church and of the social order against anticlericalism and Socialism. Their leader, however, though he might be linked to monarchism by his friendships, and by the necessity of political alliances, cherished at heart the conviction that since the mass of the nation seemed determined to maintain the Republic, it was the duty of conservatives to join together in a great “Tory party,” a party of conservative progress, with a program of reconstruction to preserve and ameliorate existing institutions, as an alternative to the program of the parties of the Left, which, to his way of thinking, was essentially a program of negations, destructive rather than constructive in aim.

This conviction, which may be regarded as the keynote of his party’s political philosophy, Jacques Piou very clearly explained two years before the formation of the Liberal Group

in an article in the *Revue des deux mondes* (June 15, 1897), entitled "The Conservatives and Democracy."

The institutions of France do not depend any longer upon a constitutional formula. The crisis through which France is passing is not of such recent origin, nor are its causes so trivial. Since 1789 she has been pursuing a task without precedent in history.

From the aristocracy which she was, she wishes to transform herself into a democracy. No nation, before her, has ever realized or even conceived a like enterprise. So prodigious a transformation appears as the most extraordinary ambition, or rather the most foolhardy. In order to realize it, France has hazarded her destinies in revolutions on five or six occasions; and, behold, after a century of pains and of conflicts, she seems to have victory in her grasp. This victory is not complete, but it is sufficient to render any retreat impossible. *The old organism having been destroyed, we must complete the new, whatever the price, or perish. . . .*

* * *

The hour has come, even for the most obstinate "to pardon the inevitable" and to think of their children more than of their ancestors. So let the conservatives overcome their diffidence, let them forget the affronts received, the injustices suffered, the calumnies, all these detestable legacies of a century of revolutions: one does not revenge oneself on his country. It depends upon them whether democracy shall be the most beneficent or the most perverse of powers. In the midst of many sorrows, a few happy omens seem to presage better days. . . .

Shall we be present to witness the first gleams of a new aurora? Are the Conservatives going to decide, at last, to follow the nation in its evolution and to second it in its efforts? ⁸⁸⁴

Though the details of the Popular Liberal Party's program were worked out piecemeal, according as public interest veered from one quarter to another, there runs through the whole program and history of the party, with a logical consistency rather unusual in politics, this basic idea enunciated by Piou, to enlist the naturally conservative elements of the nation in the patriotic endeavor to make democracy in France a truly beneficent agency, tolerant of popular liberties, genuinely representative, sanely constructive in social questions, strong and stable enough to command respect at home and abroad. In particular, the constitutional reforms advocated to this end are

interesting in their combination, if not altogether original in their conception.

A. Parliamentary Reform

In the program of the Popular Liberal Party we find a broad conception of parliamentary reform. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, said the Liberals, did not truly represent the desires and interests of the people. In four respects the existing system of representative government was really misrepresentative, *viz.*, (1) a large number of voters never participated in elections, (2) the elections were not fairly conducted, (3) the parliamentary strength of the parties was not proportional to their voting strength, and (4) representation was based entirely on geographical divisions, rather than on economic interests. How were these defects to be corrected?

I. To begin with, the party from its very first national convention demanded that voting be made obligatory, as in Belgium (and subsequently Spain). The justification for this demand was "that there is no right without a duty"; moreover, "under a régime of universal suffrage the national will is effective only if it is exercised by the totality of the citizens." As a practical reason for the measure, the party pointed to statistics showing that in the national elections of 1902 no fewer than 2,284,027 electors, or almost 21% of the total number of those qualified to exercise the franchise, abstained from voting. As a large proportion of these abstainers might safely be counted as conservatives, compulsory voting would probably be as advantageous to the party as to the nation.⁸⁸⁵

II. At the same party convention of 1904 was proclaimed a second demand or group of demands, for the protection of "the sincerity and security of the vote." Under the existing system, the secrecy of the ballot was notoriously violated, and electoral frauds were all too frequent.⁸⁸⁶ The safeguards proposed by the Popular Liberal Party were: (1) codification of the election laws; (2) the use of the same kind of paper for the ballots of all parties, and the enclosure of ballots in

envelopes (under the existing régime, the Government supplied the voter with an official ballot, which he might cast for the Ministerial candidate, while the Opposition candidates furnished their own distinctive ballot-papers, and as the ballots were not enclosed in envelopes there was practically little secrecy about them); (3) the restriction of campaign-posters to spaces equal for all parties; (4) substitution of a civic pass-book (*livret civique*) in place of the voter's identification card, as a more certain means of identifying voters; (5) the registration of each elector solely in the district where he had resided for six months; (6) recognition of the right to contest registrations; (7) the right of any voter or candidate to prosecute any elector or official for failing to execute the law; (8) appointment of official tellers and watchers, an equal number for each party. The mere enumeration of these demands is an illuminating commentary on the susceptibility of the French electoral laws to fraud and injustice.⁸⁸⁷ In its convention of 1906, the Popular Liberal Party, again considering the question of electoral frauds, made several interesting additions to its program: that in large districts, the list of voters should be printed and distributed; that a private booth should be provided for marking the ballot; that severe penalties should be laid on the exercise of undue partisan pressure by government officials; and that the verification of elections should be entrusted to a Supreme Court.⁸⁸⁸ The last-mentioned point was important, since the number of Opposition deputies whose election was invalidated by the decision of the parliamentary majority was ordinarily considerable. In 1906, for example, twelve seats were "taken" from the Popular Liberal Party if we may believe the *Bulletin* of the party.

III. Not content with demanding an honest vote and an obligatory vote, the Popular Liberal Party advocated with great earnestness the restoration of the large constituency (*scrutin de liste*) system with proportional representation.⁸⁸⁹ The Liberals were among the first and remained among the most ardent champions of this great democratic reform. One of the earliest proportional representation bills on record

was that drafted by Jules Dansette, a leading Liberal, in 1900.⁸⁹⁰ Despite rebuffs, Dansette and other Liberals persisted in bringing in proportional representation bills, in legislature after legislature,⁸⁹¹ until in time, as other parties swung into line and even assumed the leadership of the campaign, proportional representation became one of the leading issues of the day.

There seems to be little question that the existing system of voting with the *scrutin d'arrondissement* resulted in the election of grossly misrepresentative parliaments. According to one calculation,⁸⁹² the elections of 1906, had they been conducted under the system of proportional representation, would have given the right wing of the Chamber (including Conservatives, Nationalists, Liberals, and Progressists) 248 seats in place of the 185 actually obtained, and the "Republicans," Radicals, and Socialists would have suffered a corresponding loss. Indeed, more than one of the orators who denounced proportional representation was candid enough to confess that this fact lay at the root of the opposition to electoral reform. To cite one instance, the Radical-Socialist René Renoult, speaking in the name of "a large number of my Radical-Socialist friends," declared,

We only know that it appears from minute and conclusive calculations, computed on the basis of the elections of 1906 and of 1910, that more than 100 seats would pass from the Left to the Right [if proportional representation were adopted].

M. Joseph Denis interjected the remark, "In that case, you occupy them without right." But Renoult continued, in an alarmist tone, "and no one can give us assurance that if this should happen the Republican party and even the constitution itself would not be exposed to a grave crisis."⁸⁹³

The leading advocates of proportional representation,—Liberals, Progressists, and Conservatives,—naturally felt no aversion to the transfer of a hundred seats from Left to Right. Nor were they ready to believe that the safety of the Republic depended upon the size of the Radical party. Jacques

Piou believed that proportional representation would make the Republic more stable than ever, by reconciling opposing elements. "Proportional Representation," he said, "would be the Edict of Nantes of modern times, the great pacifying measure which by tolerance and justice will prepare the way for the necessary reconciliations."⁸⁹⁴ If the Republican régime was in danger, it was only because some "Republicans" had preferred party advantage to justice. To show how strongly the Liberals were supported in this view by the Progressist Republicans, we quote the following paragraph from a speech of Joseph Reinach,—

If the parliamentary régime is perhaps on the eve of entering into a crisis more serious than all those which it has passed through, it is because the Chambers no longer appear to be dominated by solicitude for public interests. And if the solicitude for public interests has wavered in the Chambers, it is because the latter have been chosen by majority vote, by the *scrutin d'arrondissement* which cannot be anything but a majority vote, and because the *scrutin d'arrondissement* is the most absurd of majority systems by reason of the inequality of the constituencies, since in the same department, in the same city, 4000 votes are sufficient to elect a deputy in one constituency while just across the river, or across the street, 15,000 or 20,000 votes are required; at the same time the *scrutin d'arrondissement* is the most pernicious of majority systems for all those other reasons, political, administrative, moral, which you will excuse me from repeating, since they have been presented twenty times in this tribune.⁸⁹⁵

When after many a heated debate, a scheme of departmental *scrutin de liste* with a modified form of proportional representation came to a final vote in the Chamber of Deputies, July 11, 1912, the Popular Liberal Party unanimously voted in the affirmative and had the lively satisfaction of seeing the great reform of which they had been the first champions approved by a handsome majority (339 to 217). It is interesting to note that the most solid support for the bill came from the Liberals and the Progressists; the Unified Socialists gave rather weaker assistance; but the groups in between the two wings were for the most part opposed. Thomson (Democratic

Left), Clémentel (Radical Left), Caillaux (Unified Radicals), Augagneur (Republican-Socialist),—such are the names one finds in the column of those who voted "*Contre*."⁸⁹⁶

Immediately, Combes and Clemenceau and other eminent anticlerical Republicans formed a committee to make a last stand, in the Senate, in defense of the majority system and the Radical party. And so indomitable was that last stand, that, what with amendments and endless debates, the Electoral Reform Bill was first mutilated, then stifled.

A last desperate expedient to overcome the senatorial opposition was suggested by Paul Pugliési-Conti (who had been affiliated with the Liberal Party in the previous legislature) on January 30, 1914. He proposed a sort of referendum, an "*enquête*." Each voter should be asked:

"(1) Are you in favor of maintaining the majority system?"

"(2) Are you in favor of establishing the representation of minorities by the system of proportional representation with the quotient?"

The Radicals and Radical-Socialists condemned this proposal out of hand as a disguised plebiscite, smacking of "*boulangisme*," and a majority of the Chamber helped to defeat it; but the Popular Liberal Party, some other members of the Right, and some Socialists supported it.⁸⁹⁷ Not many months afterwards, the outbreak of the Great War caused proportional representation to be laid on the shelf, with other domestic problems, until the return of peace.

In July, 1919, an Electoral Reform Bill establishing proportional representation was finally carried through and placed upon the statute-books. The reform was not complete, since in the new law there was a provision that every candidate receiving an absolute majority of the votes cast in his district should be elected; but proportional representation was to be applied in all other cases. The law of 1919, therefore, may be regarded as a partial fulfilment of the demand which the Popular Liberal Party had inscribed in its program.⁸⁹⁸

IV. The most interesting of the four reforms advocated by

the Popular Liberal Party to improve the representative system remains to be mentioned. Philosophically, it rests upon the same fundamental principle as proportional representation, to wit, that the members of the national legislature should in justice and reason represent the convictions and interests of the different elements of the nation, rather than the arbitrary geographical divisions called *arrondissements*. Proportional representation would make the Chamber a more faithful portrait of the state of the parties in the country at large. But to afford a true index of the vital economic interests of the nation, something more was needed, "Professional Representation" or "Functional Representation" as it is sometimes called. The Popular Liberal Party committed itself very definitely to this idea. At the party convention of 1909, this resolution was passed:

The convention resolves that pending the time when representation of professions can be established in the great assemblies of the country,—and the convention favors such representation in principle,—there should be constituted a general representation of the professions, emanating from a scheme of trade organization analogous to that proposed by a group of Deputies of the Popular Liberal Party in July, 1906; and that, henceforth, the existing professional organizations should be obligatorily consulted on all laws concerning the professions.⁸⁹⁹

The scheme of trade organization referred to was outlined in a bill, of which the provisions will be discussed in a later chapter; in this connection it may be explained, however, that the bill contemplated the establishment of "corps" in each trade or profession. All lawyers would be enrolled in the law corps, physicians in the medical corps, ironworkers (including capitalists, managers, clerks, and workingmen) in the iron-industry corps, and so on. Given this groundwork of industrial organization, it would be a simple matter to rear from it a form of political representation, say in a "*Sénat professionnel*," each trade corps being assigned a number of senators proportionate to its membership. But until the

foundation had been laid, and all men enrolled in their proper trade corps, it would be idle to dream of establishing a Professional Senate. For this reason the Liberals thought it unnecessary to bring in a bill delineating the scheme. They contented themselves, in the Organization of Labor Bill of 1906, with the hope that France might achieve "some day, the reality and the plenitude of national representation by the representation of interests in an upper chamber."⁹⁰⁰

B. Safeguards against Parliamentary Despotism

The four reforms just enumerated, namely, obligatory voting, precautions against election frauds, proportional representation, and professional representation, had as their general object the better representation of the people in the parliament. A second group of political reforms was advocated by the Popular Liberal Party with the aim of safeguarding the country against the dangers of a centralized and despotic parliamentary government. Under the French governmental system, as it existed, the entire power of government was focussed in a council of ministers nominally appointed by the president of the republic but really depending upon parliament, and chiefly upon the Chamber of Deputies. The hierarchy of prefects, sub-prefects, miscellaneous government officials and government employees constituted a vast bureaucracy under the control of the national ministry. Local autonomy was reduced to the vanishing point. The entire political life of the nation was in the grip of whatever group of parliamentary leaders happened to be in power. Incessant cabinet changes, due to shifting combinations of parliamentary groups, rendered the system as unstable as it was despotic.⁹⁰²

The introduction of proportional representation for the Chamber of Deputies, and the creation of a Senate representing organized economic or professional interests would go far, it was hoped, to make parliament both more representative in membership and more stable in its policies. But, as addi-

tional safeguards of liberty, the Popular Liberal Party proposed the following measures: (a) inscription of a declaration of rights and liberties in the constitution; (b) creation of a supreme court as guardian of the constitution; (c) strengthening of the position of the president of the republic, (d) civil service reform, (e) decentralization, (f) the referendum. A word about each is necessary.

(a) The constitutional laws under which the Third French Republic is governed are almost unique among modern constitutions in that they contain no declaration of the inviolable rights of citizens and impose no effective restriction upon the powers of parliament. The French constitutions of 1791, 1793, and 1795, the Charter of 1814, the constitution of 1830, the constitution of 1848, even the constitution of 1852,—all had contained declarations of rights and liberties. But the constitution-framers of 1875, disregarding the historical tradition, omitted any such declaration.⁹⁰³ Since then, in the view of a prominent member of the Popular Liberal Party, "the citizens have been delivered over to the caprices of parliament, as the citizens of the ancient pagan state were subjected to the caprice of Cæsar."⁹⁰⁴

The Popular Liberal Party therefore proposed that a series of declarations, based on the historic Declaration of the Rights of Man, but amended and rectified, should be inserted in the constitutional laws. The declarations should safeguard: the liberty of the individual within the law; inviolability of the private domicile except in cases of crimes and misdemeanors specified in the penal laws; liberty of conscience; and freedom for the various religious confessions to follow their own rules of organization; liberty of education, and freedom for the parent to choose between public and private schools for his children; liberty of association and of assembly; freedom of the press; freedom of work; "and all other liberties the enjoyment of which is compatible with public morality and the respect of the equal rights of others."⁹⁰⁵

(b) To secure observance of these constitutional prescriptions, some body independent of the legislative and executive

powers was considered necessary. In other words, a Supreme Court must be created and invested with authority to pass on the constitutionality of administrative decrees and legislative acts. This idea was quite frankly borrowed from the constitution of the United States. M. Souriac, whose very interesting report on constitutional reforms provided the basis for the party convention's resolutions, made the following statement:

. . . We believe that a new organ is needed, and we believe that we may find in the celebrated Supreme Court of the United States a model which may be adapted to our country, to our needs. Almost a hundred and twenty years the constitution of the great American republic has been in existence, and during this time profound changes have occurred in society, in political customs, in conditions of life, with the dizzy rapidity which accelerates all events in that country. The Supreme Court, immutable in its organic structure, impassive in the midst of social upheavals, inaccessible to fear as to money . . . has remained what the authors of the act of 1787 made it, like a central point about which everything gravitates, moves and changes, without ever affecting it.

Such an example, coming from a nation which has found much strength and prosperity under a republican form of government, is well calculated to attract us. . . .⁹⁰⁶

But the Popular Liberal Party did not propose an exact duplication of the American model. The method of appointing the Supreme Court in the United States was held to be "not absolutely perfect," since the president's choice of members must be submitted to the Senate, "which is sometimes very much influenced by political [partisan] considerations." Moreover, the Supreme Court, instead of reviewing all legislation and definitely annulling unconstitutional acts, waited until some citizen made complaint about a given law, and then did not annul, but merely refused to apply it.

In designing a tribunal for France, the Liberals hoped to correct these defects. The Supreme Court would have the right to annul unconstitutional laws, and would review the acts and ordinances of the executive power and of administrative officials. With so large a function, the court would

necessarily be larger than the American Supreme Court. It was suggested that there should be 125 judges, of whom 25 should be appointed by the president of the republic, 25 by the Senate, 25 by the Chamber of Deputies, 25 by regional assemblies, 25 chosen by trade organizations and from the "*bâtonniers de l'ordre des avocats près des Cours d'Appel*." Once constituted, the Court would fill any vacancy in its membership by choosing from a list of candidates proposed by the same authorities that selected the original incumbent of the vacant post. Furthermore, the Supreme Court would maintain a representative in each region of France to bring to the attention of the court all cases subject to its jurisdiction.⁹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the Supreme Court would be intrusted with the duty of verifying the powers of members elected to the two chambers of parliament.⁹⁰⁸

(c) Another constitutional reform obviously inspired by admiration of the United States concerned the election and the powers of the president of the republic. Under the existing constitutional laws of 1875 the president was nominally invested with very considerable powers; he could dissolve parliament, demand reconsideration of laws, propose legislation, appoint ministers of state and civil and military officers, negotiate treaties, and issue administrative decrees.⁹⁰⁹ But in practice, the president was a dignified figurehead, the chief ceremonial officer rather than the chief magistrate of France, and his important political functions were exercised by the council of ministers responsible to parliament.⁹¹⁰ This state of affairs was most distasteful alike to the more patriotic politicians, who considered a strong and stable executive essential to the maintenance of the country's international prestige, and to authorities on constitutional law, who deplored the concentration of all authority in the hands of a fluctuating parliamentary majority.⁹¹¹

The Popular Liberal Party ascribed the weakness of the president to the fact that he was elected by the legislative chambers, rather than to any inadequacy of constitutional powers. Therefore it was proposed that the president should

be chosen by "a great body of independent electors, truly representative of the nation," *i. e.*, by an electoral college based on universal suffrage. His term of office should be four instead of seven years, so that he would not lose contact with the people, but he might be reelected after an interval of four years. Moreover, he should have the right to submit to the Supreme Court any laws which appeared to him to be unconstitutional.⁹¹²

(d) Among the measures designed to curb the power exercised by the parliamentary majority through the cabinet, not the least important was civil service reform. Government officials and employees, in the opinion of the Popular Liberal Party, were not adequately protected against the arbitrary authority of the ministry. This was all the more serious because government employees were so numerous. France, said the general secretary of the party, "is certainly one of the countries that has the most government employees, every year their number increases, in such proportion that there are at the present time . . . more than a million, that is, one government employee to every forty inhabitants."⁹¹³ In the words of Jacques Piou, the president of the party,

these government employees who have no protection are, like us, without a constitution. . . . Their advancement, their rights as heads of families, their liberty of conscience, all are subject to the discretion of petty tyrants who reign like lords and masters in their districts, and of petty Cæsars who populate the benches of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The government employees must have not only these rights secured to them,—and that will be a great novelty in this country,—but also the right to vote freely, because they are citizens on the same footing as the others. To refuse this, is to say that universal suffrage is a universal lie.

Piou went on to explain that the government employees at present could not vote freely. "What sort of political liberty is it, when they receive their ballot-papers from the hands of the prefect or of the minister?"⁹¹⁴

Favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of government employees were perhaps the most fla-

grant evils. By way of remedy, the Popular Liberal Party proposed that appointments should be based on the results of competitive examinations, and that candidates fulfilling the requirements could not be rejected by the arbitrary will of a minister. The reason for rejection must be stated, and appeal might be carried to the council of state. Promotion, likewise, was to be safeguarded against personal favoritism and partisan or religious discrimination; the minister, in making promotions, must follow the recommendation of a commission elected by the employees. Furthermore, government employees should have the right to form unions for the defense of their professional interests; the right to strike, however, should not be granted to the *personnel* of public utilities vital to national defense, *i. e.*, government railways, posts, telegraphs, and telephones. Finally, no government employee should be subject to disciplinary punishment for having manifested, outside of his official office or his government work, political or religious opinions at variance with those of the government.⁹¹⁵

Such a charter of civil service reform would not only protect the rights of the government employees as individuals; it would also have an appreciable effect upon the general political situation. The army of government employees would no longer be an effective instrument of party control, for patronage and discrimination would have been reduced to a minimum. Thanks to this reform, in conjunction with the electoral reforms already mentioned, the government employees would become free voters; their emancipation might even affect the political balance of power, for, as M. Piou pointed out in 1909, it was a long time since the opposition had been defeated by a majority as large as the number of government employees.⁹¹⁶

(e) Another measure aimed against bureaucratic centralization was the restoration of local autonomy and "regionalism." The idea was by no means novel; as M. Piou said at the Convention of 1907, it was a question about which Frenchmen talked constantly but never thought,—the exact inverse of their attitude regarding Alsace-Lorraine.⁹¹⁷

The faults of the existing, centralized system of government

were many and grave,—“expensive and inconvenient administration, indifference to public affairs, regression of private initiative and progress of bureaucracy, extinction of local industries, sickly and factitious art and literature, stupidly uniform education, ignorance of economic interests, destruction of everything that is picturesque and of all differentiation. . . .”⁹¹⁸

Under the existing régime, France was divided into 86 administrative districts, the *départements*, on lines laid down more or less arbitrarily by the National Constituent Assembly in 1790, regardless of historic traditions, and of local sentiments and interests alike. Local self-government had almost disappeared, partly because the *département* rarely corresponded to any lively local sentiment or regional interest, partly because the departmental assemblies (*conseils généraux*) had very restricted powers, their decisions being subject to veto by the central government. The real power in the *département* was the prefect, appointed by the minister of the interior.

As opposed to this system, there has grown up recently in France a strong “regionalist” movement, which aims at the creation or restoration of larger administrative units corresponding to the thirty-odd “provinces” of the old régime, and the grant of considerable powers of local self-government to such regions or provinces. Much is said in defense of their plan by the advocates of regionalism. It would simplify administration; it would reduce the number of local-government centers from 86 to about 30, it would therefore cut down administrative expenses and diminish the army of bureaucrats. Moreover, if the boundaries of the new provinces were drawn with due regard to geographical unity, economic coherence, and historic tradition, local government would become a genuine expression of local interest, rather than a lifeless bit of political mechanism. Most of all, the provincial assemblies would be able to resist what many regarded as the despotic sectarian tendencies of the central government.

Such were the arguments put forward in the conventions of the Popular Liberal Party. The question of decentralization

came up, rather unexpectedly at the convention of 1906, when the draft of a "liberal" constitution was under discussion, and the following clause was added to the draft, by a unanimous vote:

8. That the provincial and municipal régimes should be established on the basis of a large measure of decentralization: (1) safeguarding local liberties and franchises; (2) constituting genuinely autonomous regions, held together by the bonds of an irreducible national unity and solidarity, but working for the interests of the nation by means of the free, competent, and harmonious administration of local interests; (3) loosening, so far as possible, the chains of administrative control, which should exercise its authority only in very grave cases and always subject to possible appeal to a supreme jurisdiction against abuses.⁹¹⁹

A lively debate arose at the next party convention in 1907, where the majority sentiment in favor of regionalism was vigorously opposed by minority speakers. M. Souriac, who had analyzed the replies to a questionnaire on the topic, presented the case for decentralization and regionalism. Geographical environment, he observed, has a profound influence upon human life; hence arises the necessity of allowing men living in the same environment to seek the most suitable means of adjusting themselves to the local situation. If each region were allowed freely to develop its own prosperity, general prosperity could only be promoted.⁹²⁰ It was not proposed to restore exactly the historic "provinces." Some of them had been unwieldy in size, others far too small. Moreover, railways, canals, and the development of modern industry had created new local interests and affiliations. The new regions should conform to the economic facts of today quite as much as to the historic facts of yesterday. Twenty-one was suggested as the number of regions.⁹²¹

In each region a representative assembly would be created, elected perhaps by the organized economic and professional interests. Questions concerning local roads, railways, other public utilities, and local economic interests could well be transferred from the national government, which too often

acted with partisan bias, to the regional assemblies. As there would be only 21 instead of 86 local government centers, each would become more important; it would be the seat of the regional court of appeal, the local university, the army-corps, as well as of the assembly and the administration. Around it would grow up a flourishing local sentiment. Local customs and fêtes would be revived. Local history and traditions would be taught. Provincial journalism and literature would be stimulated. And while a picturesque and colorful differentiation between the regions of France might arise, national patriotism had nothing to lose thereby. National life would but be enriched and national loyalty intensified by the increased devotion of all Frenchmen to their country, their customs and traditions.⁹²²

A vision of the future, this, not an immediately practicable plan. For the present, M. Souriac recognized, only a modest beginning could be demanded of a government hostile to the regionalist ideal. He therefore proposed for the immediate future, that the general councils of neighboring *départements* be permitted to hold joint sessions and to deal with such questions as local railways, asylums, normal schools, agricultural schools, and, possibly, poor relief. The expense of such enterprises would be covered by surtaxes (*centimes additionnels extraordinaires*).⁹²³

Furthermore, the communes should be granted a larger measure of autonomy. Specifically, they should have greater freedom in financial matters, greater control over public services and primary education; and they should be free to grant subventions to religious bodies. As a check on the possible abuse of such power, the referendum should be adopted and the right of appeal to the Supreme Court should be established.⁹²⁴

M. Souriac's picture of the existing situation, which these reforms were designed to correct, is worth reproducing as a commentary on centralized government:

If the existing régime manifests, in the departments, its lack of logic and its disregard of the most natural laws, it demonstrates

its oppressive character even more clearly in the communes, where it takes the form of administrative bureaucracy, the yoke of which . . . tends to become more and more crushing as the Jacobin policy feels the need of imposing its odious machinations on the country. The formidable power of the prefects constantly annihilates the authority of the mayors and municipal councillors. Sometimes this is done directly, in the extremely numerous cases where the prefect can substitute his own action for that of the mayor, or annul his acts and the deliberations of the municipal council; at other times [the prefect asserts his supremacy] indirectly, by menaces. . . . "If you dare to take such a decision against us," he tells the municipality, "we will pay you back by refusing to approve your budgets or by blocking all the measures for which you need our help." Certain prefects have thus come to exercise a scandalous pressure at the time of elections, constraining mayors and councillors to influence the persons under their administration (and God know all that signifies!) in favor of a candidate who often represents opinions opposed to theirs.⁹²⁵

(f) One other important political reform remains to be mentioned, the referendum. Here again, the dominant motive is distrust of irresponsible parliamentary majorities as unrepresentative of the popular will. Increasingly democratic nations have felt the force of Jean Jacques Rousseau's criticism of representative government, that the nation was free only at the time of elections.⁹²⁶ Once elected, parliaments can not be compelled to obey the public opinion. Moreover, where elections are contested on diverse issues, one cannot even be sure what is the opinion of the majority. The referendum is often proposed as the logical corrective of parliamentary irresponsibility, as the most accurate means of ascertaining public opinion.

At its convention of 1906, the Popular Liberal Party cautiously proposed that the referendum be introduced in municipal affairs, and gradually extended to questions of regional and professional scope.⁹²⁷ In 1911, however, the party took a bolder stand. "Considering,"—so ran the resolution adopted by the 1911 convention,—

that the laws voted by parliament are not always the expression of the will of the nation, and that the unlimited power of parliament

constitutes the most dangerous of dictatorships; be it resolved that the nation should be called upon, by means of the referendum to pronounce judgment upon important laws of general interest touching the rights and liberties of the citizens.⁹²⁸

“LIBERALISM” AND RELIGION

While its program of political reforms would entitle the Popular Liberal Party to call itself “liberal” in the sense often given to that term in Anglo-Saxon countries, to imply that the party was “liberal” in all matters would be a gross error. It is certainly not “liberal” in the manner of the classical economists, to whom liberty meant the freedom of industry from regulation. And most of all it would be a mistake to assert that the party represented “liberalism” or “modernism,” as opposed to “ultramontanism” or to the strict interpretation of religious dogmas.

As regards religious questions, it must be observed, at the outset, that the party is not an exclusively Catholic party, but rather a political and social party. It opens its ranks, in the words of an official pamphlet, “to all those who accept our program of true liberty and social justice.”⁹²⁹ It does not make religious belief a condition of membership, or an article of its program. In short, it takes no position as a party, respecting theological dogmas or purely religious questions.

In its membership, however, the party is predominantly if not exclusively Catholic, and this because its political program, in so far as it concerns the relations of church and state, does not appeal to non-Catholics. Moreover, the leaders of the party have been drawn from among the most ardently Catholic politicians. M. Piou, the president of the organization, has rarely neglected an opportunity to defend the interests of the Catholic Church. Count Albert de Mun, who held the office of vice-president until his death, was in his private life most devoutly religious, and in his public life most emphatically Catholic; his unreserved acceptance of papal authority, moreover, marked him as an “ultramontane”; his membership in the party would of itself be sufficient proof that the organiza-

tion was not in any sense heterodox, or "modernist," or opposed to ultramontaniam.

The "liberalism" of the Popular Liberal Party, therefore, cannot be interpreted as liberalism in dogmas or in faith, but merely as advocacy of certain liberties in politics. "In political matters," said M. Piou, "liberalism properly understood is a germ of progress; in matters of religious doctrine it is the abandonment of the truth and the beginning of confusion."⁹³⁰ M. Eugène Flornoy, an enthusiastic admirer of the party, phrases this conception tersely:

The word [liberal] needs to be defined; it means the defense of religious, civic, and economic liberties, menaced by Masonic, Jacobin, and socialist tyranny, not a philosophic thesis inherited from dogmatic liberalism. The distinction is essential. It must be insisted upon, since some minds are troubled about it. . . .

Free-Masonry refuses religious liberty to Catholics, Jacobinism refuses civic liberty to citizens, socialism denies economic liberty to the various elements of labor. To this triple denial, the Popular Liberal Party replies with a triple affirmation.⁹³¹

By what means the Popular Liberal Party sought to preserve industrial liberty while safeguarding the rights of the workingmen, and to secure political liberty with democracy, the foregoing sections have attempted to explain. It remains to be seen what was understood by religious liberty.

In the first place, it meant liberty of ecclesiastical organization, "the right for the Church to organize itself as it will." In the constitution of the Republic, the Popular Liberal Party would inscribe, as an inviolable right, "freedom of conscience, and of belief, and, therefore, of the various religious confessions, which should be allowed to observe their own particular rules of organization."⁹³² This right of independent organization was violated by the law of Dec. 9, 1905, separating Church and state. Under the terms of the law, the churches and the former property of the church (or at least so much of the property as was not confiscated) were to be handed over to "associations for religious worship" (*associations cultuelles*), organized on lines laid down by the law. In case several rival

associations professing to represent the same religion disputed possession of a given church, the council of state was to judge between them.⁹³³ The Catholics disliked this provision, first, because it tended to substitute lay associations for the clergy in the control of religious worship, and, secondly, because it virtually made a political, non-Catholic body, the council of state, the supreme judge of orthodoxy.⁹³⁴ This was not freedom of religious organization. Count Albert de Mun declared that no legal organization of the Church in France was possible without a previous agreement with the Holy See, and his view seems to have been accepted by the Popular Liberal Party in its convention of 1909.⁹³⁵ In other words, if the state attempted to legislate upon the subject of church organization, the principle of religious liberty demanded that the proposed laws be acceptable to the supreme representative of the religious organization in question.

In the second place, the Popular Liberal Party demanded liberty of association for the Catholic monastic orders as well as for non-Catholic organizations. "Liberty for all, so be it!" said M. Piou in 1901, "but liberty for the religious orders just as well as for Free-Masonry and for the Socialist Union."⁹³⁶ Now the Associations Law of 1901 required that no religious order could exist without special authorization by an act of parliament defining the functions of the order (art. 13). Religious orders already in existence must obtain such authorization or disband (art. 18). No new establishments (such as the hospitals or schools) could be founded even by authorized religious orders without the permission of the council of state (art 15). Moreover, the council of ministers was given the power to revoke the authorization of any order (art. 13).⁹³⁷ This law placed the monastic orders at the mercy of the anticlerical majority in parliament. A large number of the demands for authorization were flatly refused, and religious orders were suppressed by the score. The convents and property of the unauthorized orders were confiscated, leaving their former inmates homeless. Hundreds fled to foreign countries, where they found greater tolerance than

in France.⁹³⁸ Freedom of association, therefore, was a very real issue. What the leaders of the Popular Liberal Party demanded was equality of rights for Catholic and non-Catholic associations. They felt that it was unjust to require a special legislative act for the authorization of a religious order, when other associations could be formed freely. In the words of M. Piou,

If it requires a law to permit the Trappists to cultivate the soil in silence, or the Carmelites to rise at night for prayer, why does it not require a law for these trade-unions in which the world of labor concentrates its millions of adherents, or for this Socialist Union which covers the entire country with its groups, or for this society [Free-Masonry], at once official and secret, cosmopolitan and French, which may be described as a sword with its hilt in the Grand-Orient and its point wherever one governs, wherever one administers . . . ?

Either legal authorization for all, or legal authorization for none.⁹³⁹

In the third place, religious liberty implied liberty of religious education. Upon this point, the Popular Liberal Party laid great stress. There were two principal grievances. First of all, the public schools, for which Catholics and non-Catholics alike were taxed, were theoretically "neutral" as regards religion, and practically,—since many teachers were hostile to Catholicism,—anti-Catholic. That this was the case was proved by M. Piou and by other Liberals in the Chamber of Deputies, in 1910.⁹⁴⁰ The Catholic deputies alleged that the original attempt at religious neutrality had succumbed in recent years before the inroads of an aggressive atheism which was intolerant enough even to expurgate mention of God from literary selections in school-books. For example, La Fontaine's couplet,

"Petit poisson deviendra grand
Pourvu que *Dieu* lui prête vie"

had been somewhat ludicrously revised to read:

"Petit poisson deviendra grand
Pourvu que *l'on* lui prête vie."

With the aim of proving that the purpose of the party in power was to use the public schools as a weapon against Christianity, M. Piou cited numerous speeches and writings of anti-clerical statesmen. For instance, M. Viviani (quoted by M. Piou) had said,

The Republic calls to herself the children of the workers, and of the peasants, and into these darkened minds, into these darkened consciences, the Republic has poured, little by little, the revolutionary ferment of education. That has not been enough. Through our older citizens, through our parents, we have snatched religious belief away from human consciences.

This situation had arisen as the result of two laws,—the law of March 28, 1882, which while making primary instruction obligatory and establishing free public schools, omitted religious instruction from the curriculum of the public schools,⁹⁴¹ and the law of Oct. 30, 1886, providing for the laïcization of the teaching staff in the public schools.⁹⁴² Secondly, the members of the Catholic religious orders were forbidden to teach either in private or public schools. The Law of Associations of 1901 had prohibited members of the unauthorized orders to give instruction.⁹⁴³ The law of July 7, 1904, had gone a step further, decreeing that “teaching of every grade and of every kind is interdicted in France to the congregations [*i. e.*, religious orders].”⁹⁴⁴ Since the Catholic private schools were for the most part conducted by the religious orders, these laws struck a severe blow at Catholic education; to continue their schools, the Catholics had to create a staff of lay teachers,—no easy task.

In the face of these difficulties, the Popular Liberal Party inscribed in its program “liberty of education and of paternal or tutelary authority as concerns the education of children”⁹⁴⁵ and “*Répartition proportionnelle scolaire.*” The former implied that members of Catholic religious orders should be free as other citizens to teach or to maintain schools, and that the right of Catholics to have private schools should not be contravened. Parents should be free to choose to which school

they should send their children and, if they so desired, to prevent their children from receiving what they considered immoral or irreligious instruction. By the awkward phrase, *Répartition proportionnelle scolaire*, was meant that the public funds, derived from taxation of Catholic and non-Catholic citizens alike, should be used for the support of Catholic and non-Catholic schools alike, in proportion to the number of children attending each. It was admitted that the state should not be asked to bear the cost of founding private schools, or to support private schools whose attendance was small and existence precarious. But for well-established schools, the principle of proportional subvention should apply to the running expenses and to the supplies (food, clothing, *etc.*) given to poor children. This, said the orators of the party, was the minimum of justice and liberty. In M. Piou's words,—

What? The Government requires all the citizens to contribute for the support of education, and uses the taxes which the Catholics pay to impose on their children an anti-Catholic, anti-Christian doctrine! But that is robbery! . . .

What should be done then? Employ the system . . . of subsidized liberty. Each will found the kind of school he wishes, and the State will be obliged to share the expenses of these schools in proportion to the number of their pupils.⁹⁴⁰

Répartition proportionnelle scolaire was one of the principal points in the program of the Popular Liberal Party. It was often referred to as "R. P. S.," and associated with *Représentation proportionnelle* and *Représentation professionnelle* to form a trilogy, the so-called "three R. P.'s," the best-known feature of the party platform.

By way of criticism, Léon Jacques, historian of "The Political Parties under the Third Republic," observes that if the principle of educational freedom with the R. P. S. were granted, the revolutionary syndicalists would have quite as good a right as the Catholics to found separate schools for the dissemination of their particular philosophy, and to claim government support for such schools. "That is the danger," he concludes, "of too simple formulas, 'of ideas of blind

justice.' The school question is much too complex and too delicate to be solved by the R. P. S. alone." ⁹⁴⁷

SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

It has been necessary to indicate the religious program of the Popular Liberal Party, because religious questions have played so large a rôle in the politics of the Third Republic. Perhaps it will not be without interest also to suggest the relation between the religious question and the social question, as regards the attitude of the party.

In the first place, it must be recalled that the program borrowed by the Popular Liberal Party from the Social Catholic movement was based, in principle, upon Christianity. To strive for the amelioration of the condition of the working classes was considered a duty imposed by religion. This was a thought which the party's leaders never tired of repeating. M. Piou, speaking at the party convention of 1906, expressed the idea in these words:

Reforms, even bold reforms, which tend to bring the different conditions of men closer together, to give the greatest possible well-being to those who earn their bread by the sweat of their brow, to alleviate so many unjust sufferings, to relieve so much unmerited wretchedness, do not inspire us with the slightest terror. We regard them as the acquittance of a sacred debt which a sublime law has imposed upon the fortunate and the powerful in favor of the disinherited and the weak.⁹⁴⁸

He made it even plainer in an address at the convention of 1907:

A distinguished atheist once said,—and that time he was right,—“If all the Christians did their duty, the social question would be solved.”

If all do not do their duty, let us do ours at least. We alone shall not solve the social problem; but if we succeed in alleviating some unmerited sufferings, in contributing a little to the well-being of some disinherited homes, in pacifying some spirits by justice, some hearts by kindness, we shall have satisfied our consciences and rendered good service to our country.⁹⁴⁹

On another occasion, Piou declared that to be truly a Christian was to observe, as regards the workingman, the first of the divine laws, "to be the friend, the brother of the humblest and hold out both hands to lift him from his poverty and to help him to rise."⁹⁵⁰

Similarly Count Albert de Mun, vice-president of the party, affirmed unequivocally that reforms in the interest of social justice were dictated by Christianity.

Therefore, gentlemen, Catholicism being essentially a social religion,—which nobody among us disputes,—its action must necessarily be extended beyond personal questions, beyond individual relationships: it must be extended to the very life of society, to all the relationships to which it gives birth, and particularly to those engendered by economic life, for economic life involves all the questions which most directly concern humanity,—the family and its subsistence, property and its use, public peace and the prosperity of the nation.

In this order of ideas, it is not merely a question of alleviating poverty and succoring destitution, it is a question of guaranteeing social rights; it is no longer a question merely of charity, but a question of justice.⁹⁵¹

And de Mun went on to develop the corollaries of this proposition: social legislation favorable to labor organization, insurance of the workers against accidents, sickness, and old age, and protection against unsafe or unhealthful conditions. The program is already so familiar to the reader of these pages that it need hardly be repeated here.

But the Popular Liberal Party emphasized its social program not merely because of a sense of duty. There was also an element of political calculation. As the anticlericals became increasingly aggressive in their attitude toward the Church, the Popular Liberal Party, desiring to avert further anti-Catholic legislation, would have preferred that parliament concern itself more with the workingman and less with the pope. One of the most interesting cases in point was the parliamentary debate of February 10, 1905.

At that moment, it was a question whether the Chamber of Deputies should devote itself to the long-pending question of

old-age pensions for workingmen, or to the question of separating Church and State. M. Théodore Denis, a member of the Popular Liberal Party, wished to interpellate the Government "on the necessity of discussing and voting the law on workingmen's pensions before the bill for the separation of Church and State."⁹⁵² His interpellation was postponed by the Government, but another interpellation, on the strictly ecclesiastical question of what was to be done about the nomination of bishops to fill certain vacancies, was discussed at great length. After several hours of debate, M. Denis rose to remark —

Well, gentlemen, you have passed an agreeable afternoon. (*Laughter*) . . . For three hours we have been talking about the religious question! For my part, I begin to feel a sentiment of shame. During the past six years we have been spending four-fifths of our time discussing problems of comparative theology. (*Laughter and applause from various benches*) . . .

I said that for six years past the French Chamber has transformed itself into an interminable conference, in which Huguenots and papists, turn and turn about, come and argue without sparing us the least detail of their religious controversies.

We have returned to the height of the sixteenth century, with the difference that in place of arquebuses we use stamped paper, which is quite as formidable, and that instead of putting the vanquished to death, one is content to despoil them of their belongings.

For six years past, Protestant pastors, Free-Mason preachers, unfrocked priests or cassocked *curés* (*Laughter*) monopolize our discussions and argue us deaf, dumb, and blind, while we serve as a laughing-stock for rival nations, which during that time have progressed in the vast international field of commerce and industry and have realized praiseworthy social ameliorations at home (*Applause from the Center and Right.*)⁹⁵³

This was a little more than the Government could bear in silence. The president of the council himself hastened to rebuke M. Denis for asserting that France was a laughing-stock. Did not many nations come to borrow from France? Whereat M. de Ramel, a clerical, exclaimed that "the French Republic is more backward than all the monarchies, as concerns social reforms." Unwilling to let such a taunt pass, M. Devèze, a

socialist, retorted, "It is the clericalism of France which is the laughing-stock of Europe."⁹⁵⁴

M. Denis, continuing his speech after these interruptions, said that the question was really very simple and very clear. "Yes or no. Does the Chamber wish to decide, at last, to keep the promises made so long ago to the workingmen?" As the time was short, the Chamber must choose between voting the separation of church and state, for which it had no mandate, and voting a law on old-age pensions, which had been promised for years.

Whereas the separation of church and state was promised by less than a hundred deputies, a large majority among us pledged ourselves to vote the workingmen's pensions. Why should we deliberately break these pledges today?

The time had come, he declared, for the Republicans to change their policy. Two courses were open. Some people held it would be better "to think much less about the pope and much more about the people" (*Applause on the Right*). Others thought it better to keep on interminably rolling the Sisyphus' rock of religious war. Speaking for the Popular Liberal Party, M. Denis added, "we ask the Chamber not to sacrifice the interests of millions of workingmen to the fantasies of a handful of fanatics." Accordingly, M. Denis proposed the following motion:

The Chamber, affirming its confidence in the Government, and resolved to bring the law on workingmen's pensions to completion, decides that the discussion of this law will be placed on the agenda immediately after the vote of the Army Bill.⁹⁵⁵

As M. Denis took his seat, amidst the applause and congratulations of his friends, Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, another member of the Popular Liberal Party, ejaculated, "The people will see, once again, who are its friends." The anticlerical majority, however, rejected the motion, and decided that the Budget, the Army Bill, and the Separation of Church and State should be given precedence over Workingmen's Pensions.⁹⁵⁶

The question arises, why were the opponents of the Popular Liberal Party so much more eager to enact laws unfavorable to the Church than laws favorable to the workingmen. M. Piou offers an explanation, which we quote because it illumines his point of view, but regarding the merits of which the reader must be left to judge for himself.

Twenty-five years ago there was founded, in our country, a school [of politicians] which had no program other than anticlericalism; it lived on that issue and on that alone. This school is composed of men who had called themselves reformers, ready to change the whole aspect of society; they wished to destroy all, to reform all. Once in power, they deemed it simpler to inhabit the house which they had proposed to destroy; the arrangements seemed comfortable, and the furniture, though a little in the style of the Empire, was much to their taste. The old abuses, so often denounced, became pillows, whereon the new masters enjoyed the most agreeable repose, *otium cum dignitate*.

When the people become impatient, when the clients complain and demand the promised reforms, they start to cry: "The government of priests is advancing against us, down with clericalism!" And the crowd, seized with fear, and believing that it sees a black spectre rising up before its eyes, repeats, "No government of priests; down with clericalism!"⁹⁵⁷

Having employed the Socialists as parliamentary allies against clericalism, the bourgeois Republicans were still unwilling to pay the price of the alliance by conceding economic reforms. Nothing remained but to raise the cry of "Clericalism, that is the enemy," more strenuously than ever. For, M. Piou declared, they judged it "easier and less dangerous to sacrifice the Catholics than to satisfy the Socialists."⁹⁵⁸ Seated comfortably at the "banquet table" themselves, they used "clericalism" as a bugbear to frighten others away.⁹⁵⁹

The Socialists, on the other hand, had allowed themselves to become the tools of the bourgeois anticlericals, said Count Albert de Mun, who showed the reverse side of the picture painted by Piou. Prior to 1893, according to de Mun, parliament had voted some social reforms, with much hesitation to be sure; but at any rate the law of 1884 on trade-unions, that

of 1892 on the employment of women and children, and that of 1893 on accidents and hygiene, had been enacted. It was not the socialists who had achieved the reforms, for the socialists at that time counted for little in the legislature; the reforms had resulted from the collaboration of men of all the parties, and had been prepared by studies and researches in which, said de Mun, the Social Catholics had borne "a very large part." Since 1893, when the socialists had entered the Chamber of Deputies, and especially since 1898, when they became "masters of the majority," what had they accomplished? "Nothing has been done for the people," de Mun replied; "there have been inflammatory speeches, confused expositions of collectivist doctrines, but as for results, nothing except the Dreyfus Affair, the Associations Law, the disorganization of the army, and the religious war, that is to say, the preparation for the social war."

That is what, in five years, the Socialists have given the people. On the contrary, look across the border, and see what is happening in Belgium; there the Catholics have been in power twenty years and no state in Europe today has a more advanced, a more constantly and boldly progressive social legislation. It is a striking contrast, and I advise you to present it frequently before the eyes of the country.⁹⁶⁰

The fatal mistake of the Socialists, as de Mun saw it, was to have so vaunted the anticlerical program while they were in the opposition that they knew no other when they arrived in power.

They reduced their ideas of government, the ideas which had given them their strength, to the narrow measure of a program of persecution, urged on . . . by that hatred of Christianity which underlies all the revolutionary doctrine; . . . and, instead of remaining an independent party, proud of its ideas, they subordinated their policy to that of Free-Masonry, of the Free-Masonry which adores negations, as Goyau says, and which has need neither of affirmations, nor of programs, nor of reforms, since all its doctrine is reduced to negation, to hatred of Christianity. . . . For the Socialist party, it is the beginning of bankruptcy.⁹⁶¹

There was undoubtedly an element of truth in de Mun's observation. Certain of the Socialist leaders, it can hardly be denied, gave anticlerical legislation precedence over economic reform. Other Socialists and Syndicalists who wished economic reforms to come first, did not fail to point out the danger of diverting attention from economic to religious questions. For example, Raoul Briquet, writing for the *Mouvement socialiste* of Aug. 15, 1902, declared that the capitalists were using the religious question as a red herring to throw the Socialists off the scent.

These curé-eaters [*i. e.*, bourgeois anticlericals] do not care to be "eaten" by the workingmen. For them anticlericalism is a convenient diversion, by which they win the support of the proletariat against the clericals while at the same time they can avert from capitalism the ardor of their fiery ally. Indeed, whilst anticlerical demagoguery rages in Socialist circles, labor policy is suffering a prolonged check: social laws remain unfinished on the parliamentary work-table; every day the courts of commerce revise with monstrous partiality the decisions of the trade boards; the civil tribunals interpret in a reactionary sense the law on accidents; the Millerand-Colliard law⁹⁶² is systematically violated, and on the very day when the Republican and Socialist press celebrated the triumph of the ministry in the Chamber, M. Trouillot [minister of commerce, industry, posts, and telegraphs] published a decree still further weakening the law. It is deplorable that the socialist party should be absorbed by the anticlerical passion to the point of neglecting its essential function.

Alexandre Millerand was another of the Socialists who came to feel that too much attention was being given to clericalism, too little to socialism. But when Millerand, in 1904, complained that the campaign against the religious orders threatened to eclipse entirely the question of social legislation, the great socialist leader, Jean Jaurès, impressively warned him not to forget that anticlericalism was the only means of holding the Republican and Socialist coalition, the famous *bloc*, together for later social reforms. "Ah, take care!" cried Jaurès, ". . . you imagine perhaps that by leading the majority to renounce what you call the absorption, the hallucina-

tion, the fascination of the clerical peril,—you imagine that you will have more strength, more energy for social reform. But no! . . . You will have injured, if not broken, the instrument of action [the *bloc*] and you will not repair it.”⁹⁶³ To Jaurès, it was a question of tactics. Though the economic program of socialism might temporarily be neglected in favor of anticlerical legislation — for which the Socialists were as eager as the bourgeois parties — a time would come when out of gratitude the bourgeois parties must help the Socialists to vote social reforms. Moreover, it is an indisputable fact that some of the Socialists held their economic program before the Chamber most persistently. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand why France, with so large a Socialist delegation in Parliament, did not make more rapid progress in social legislation,— unless the explanation offered by de Mun is given some weight.

The very fact that the Socialists were inclined to emphasize the anticlerical rather than the economic side of their program made the Popular Liberal Party more insistent upon the social value of Christianity. If the Socialists, while accusing Christianity of keeping the poor in subjection, were doing little themselves to help the workingmen economically, the wisest course for the Catholics would be to act as the genuine champions of social reform, and to contrast the services of Christianity with the services of socialism to the people. Hence we hear Piou, at the party convention of 1906, declaring that although the Socialists pretended to have a monopoly of devotion to the people, the Popular Liberal Party was really the most faithful servant of the masses.

We desire their progress; we wish the condition of the lower classes to be improved; . . . we desire that all those who earn their bread by the sweat of their brow should have an easier life, wages more sufficient for their needs, labor more in proportion to their strength; we wish poverty to be alleviated, suffering consoled; and we ask our friends all over France, above all, to promote enterprises for the assistance of the toilers and of the down-trodden. . . .

If the government is animated by a sincere love of the people, if it proposes reforms which are just, we are ready to lend our aid.

Resolute as we are to defend our religious convictions against the government. . . we are just as strongly disposed to collaborate with it, if it wishes, when dealing with social reforms which are marked with the seal of justice. (*Applause.*) But what we will not do is to deceive the people. . . .⁹⁶⁴

Above all, the leaders of the Popular Liberal Party strove to refute the charge that Christianity was "other-worldly," in the sense that its aim was to hold out the promise of future rewards for passive submission to social injustice in this life. "To defend Christianity," said Piou, "is to defend the social order."

But the defense will be effective only on two conditions: first, that we keep in full view, always, the divine beauties of its social teachings, of that law of love and fraternity which has regenerated the world and which alone prevents the world from returning to paganism; second, that we never permit the masses to suppose that the prospect of eternal happiness obliges them to submit passively to their present wretchedness and forbids them to improve their so unhappy condition.⁹⁶⁵

That Christianity had been accused of indifference to social injustice was in part the fault of the Catholics, said Count Albert de Mun. He was the antagonist, he said, not only of the "alarming progress of socialism," but also of "the inertia of Catholics who abandon to socialism the duty of assuring the protection of the weak, and thus abandon a part of their heritage." He protested,

not merely against the calumny which discredits the Catholics in the minds of the people, but against the abdication which favors this calumny, and which denatures their religion, to the point where it appears, to deceived eyes, as a sort of social gendarmerie, instituted for the security of the rich.⁹⁶⁶

Too often, said de Mun, "the Catholics have forgotten the fundamental character of their faith, and it is thus, as I said . . . that they have allowed socialism to despoil them of a portion of their heritage."⁹⁶⁷

That the Socialists had derived from Christianity the idea of

human fraternity, of indignation against injustice, of pity for suffering, Piou most vigorously maintained. Christianity, he said,

lives even in the materialist systems, almost all of which borrow its morality, and do not endure, perhaps, except by virtue of this part of the Christian heritage, which they have not been able to repudiate.

It is found even at the bottom of socialism, in its pity for human suffering, an entirely Christian sentiment, by which socialism fascinates and attracts the crowds.

Materialists and Socialists unwittingly undergo the influence of the Church, which they call "the eternal enemy"; they render it homage even in their denials; they proclaim themselves and believe themselves to be free-thinkers, when they are only ungrateful tributaries of the Gospel.

What more striking proof of its permanent vitality, in our troubled times, could there be, than this obsession with social reforms by which all minds are haunted, than this immense effort made by individuals and by governments to ameliorate the condition of those who labor and suffer?

Of all the laws, of all the institutions, springing up during the last century from the idea of assisting the unfortunate and doing justice to the workingmen, one might make a great collection which would be a glorious monument to the honor of humanity and a marvellous act of faith in honor of Christianity.⁹⁶⁸

All that was really good in socialism had been borrowed from the precepts of the Christian religion. This was a favorite reply to attacks on the Church by anti-clerical Republicans and Socialists.

To sum up the foregoing remarks, it might be said that the relation between the social question and the religious question as affecting the Popular Liberal Party was twofold: on one hand, when the Church was attacked by anticlericals, the party tended to assert the social value of Christianity with all the more vigor; on the other hand, when socialists and bourgeois republicans devoted themselves more to religious than to labor problems, the party perceived and exploited at its full value the opportunity to accuse its opponents of being less sincere than itself in the desire to befriend the workingmen.

PATRIOTISM

Before concluding the sketch of the Popular Liberal Party, one other great political issue should at least be mentioned, namely, patriotism. For patriotism was one of the most strongly marked characteristics of the party.

If no mention of patriotism is found in the program of the party before 1914, if the issue is almost ignored by the party conventions from 1904 to 1911, it is not because of indifference; it is because the attitude of the members was taken for granted. They were not merely patriotic, but ultrapatriotic. A party numbering among its members so many army officers and noblemen could hardly be otherwise.⁹⁶⁹

Patriotism, to the leaders of the Popular Liberal Party, signified in the first place pride of country and devotion to the national progress. Piou, de Mun, and other members of the party incessantly recalled the historic greatness of France, rebuked the anti-patriotic tendencies of socialism, syndicalism and Free-Masonry, and exhorted their fellow-citizens to work together in harmony for the greater glory and prosperity of France.

In the second place, it meant a strong army. The members of the party were invariably to be found among the most vehement parliamentary opponents of antimilitarism, among the most vigorous upholders of military efficiency. When the great political contest arose in 1913-1914 regarding the Three Year Military Service Law which the socialists opposed as militaristic, the Popular Liberal Party made support of the Three Year Law one of the principal planks in its platform for the elections of 1914.⁹⁷⁰

Patriotism also meant insistence upon national prestige and defence of national interests abroad. Count Albert de Mun was ever proclaiming the necessity of a strong policy in Africa.⁹⁷¹ Piou was quite as emphatic on the subject of French interests overseas. Perhaps a brief quotation from Piou's speech of July 7, 1900, on the Far Eastern Question will best exhibit his attitude:

We did not enter China for humanitarian considerations alone, but also for high political reasons.

We have to defend there not only our own nationals, but also all those whom secular conventions have placed under our protection. We have to defend a religious protectorate which has long given us an unrivalled primacy in that country and which, despite the mutilations it has suffered, still ensures us a place among the élite there. We have to defend there, finally,—do not forget,—an important material interest, that is to say, our Tonkin protectorate. In the past we could disagree regarding the necessity of acquiring that protectorate. Today, it is our own property, and belongs to our national patrimony. The soil of Tonkin, sprinkled with so much blood, has become a prolongation of the French mother-country, and we must defend it as we would defend the mother-country itself.⁹⁷²

With their almost chauvinistic emphasis on the army and on colonial interests, the leaders coupled a patriotic sentiment of a more constructive nature. Patriotism meant not merely military prowess or colonial expansion, but also a fervent desire to make the mother-country a shining example of social justice. Speaking at the party convention of 1914, Piou expressed this sentiment in eloquent terms:

We believe that the highest ambition of a nation nourished on the marrow of the Gospel is not for riches, but for fraternity; that true glory for such a nation consists less in victories won by fire and sword in wars with its neighbors, than in victories won by devotion and justice in the war against poverty and human suffering.⁹⁷³

The great war of 1914–1919, for the time being at least, sealed the patriotism of the Popular Liberal Party with the approval of public opinion. That France was not better prepared for the conflict, was said to be the fault of Socialists, Syndicalists, and antimilitarists generally, who had delayed the Three Year Service Law, who had honeycombed the army with doctrines of antimilitarism, internationalism, and insubordination; it was the fault of the successive cabinets which had been so occupied with the campaign against clericalism that they had allowed military efficiency to be impaired by favoritism, by

discrimination against Catholic officers, and by corruption. As one of the political groups which had most consistently advocated military preparedness and most impressively warned the country against the perils of antimilitarism, the Popular Liberal Party found in the war an endorsement of its patriotic stand.

During the war partisan activities were virtually suspended. The young men among the leaders and parliamentary representatives of the party were in active service with the armies in the field.⁹⁷⁴ One of the most promising members of the parliamentary group, Lt. Col. Driant, was killed heroically at Verdun, exhorting his men to die rather than yield before the German attack. Perhaps the most pathetic sacrifice was that of Count Albert de Mun. Military service was, of course, out of the question for a man of his age. He could not even devote his gift of oratory to the national cause, for he had long suffered from a heart-disease which would have made an attempt to speak in public tantamount to suicide. Any unusual exertion threatened his life. His sword and his voice had failed him; the pen alone remained. He, therefore, plunged into journalism; every day a patriotic article appeared over his name in the *Echo de Paris*. So influential were his articles, that he soon won the name of "minister of public confidence." When the government decided to publish a *Bulletin des Armées* for the benefit of the soldiers in the field, de Mun, though a "clerical" and formerly an opposition leader, was one of the first writers whose collaboration was invited. Fully aware that his daily articles and his feverish activity were killing him, he persisted, refusing to spare himself, and continued his work until death arrested his pen, on the night of October 6-7, 1914. "Albert de Mun veritably fell on the field of battle, having deliberately and voluntarily sacrificed his life for France."⁹⁷⁵

The vacant seats, decorated with a ribbon, in sign of mourning, in the sector of the Chamber of Deputies where sat the Popular Liberal Party, gave mute but eloquent testimony to the manner in which the party had met the test of patriotism. And even a casual observer of the Chamber's debates in 1919 could not fail to be impressed with the change which the war

had wrought in the alignment of parties. Now it was the Right (including the Popular Liberal Party) and the Center which supported Clemenceau on every test of patriotism; it was the Extreme Left which opposed him. As far as patriotic questions were concerned, the party had become a member of a new *bloc*, hostile to the Bolshevik and pacifist or internationalist tendencies with which the left wing of the Socialist party had become identified.

This new alignment of parties held good in the general elections of November, 1919, when the Popular Liberal Party entered an electoral coalition with other patriotic parties for the purpose of combating Bolshevism. By presenting combined lists of candidates, the coalition parties were able to achieve a notable victory. And when, after the elections, the *Bloc national républicain* — as the coalition was styled — held a great banquet to celebrate its triumph, a representative of the Popular Liberal Party was found among the principal speakers of the evening, joining with the leaders of the Democratic Republican Alliance, of the Republican Federation, and of the Radical and Socialist-Radical Federation of the Seine, in the expression of a desire to perpetuate the "Sacred Union" which had been cemented during the war.⁹⁷⁶

Indeed, it appeared that for the time being at least the "New Spirit" of religious tolerance and reconciliation had reappeared. The moderate Republicans, it seemed, had revoked the decision of 1899 and had chosen to lean on the Right, rather than on the Extreme Left, for support. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the altered situation was the fact that Alexandre Millerand, as premier, introduced a bill for the reopening of diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Was this the Alexandre Millerand who, not so many years ago, had declared that "between the Republican idea and the Church" there was a "struggle without mercy"?⁹⁷⁷ Was this the Socialist who in 1899 had joined the bourgeois anticlerical cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau and by so doing had personified the policy of the anticlerical *bloc*? It was a long road that Millerand had travelled since 1899!

SOME CRITICISMS OF THE PARTY

It is too early to predict to what extent the patriotism evinced by the Popular Liberal Party during the war will disarm hostile criticism in the future. Perhaps it would not be rash, however, to assert that the situation will not be fundamentally altered, because the intransigent reactionaries, on the one hand, and the more anticlerical among the Republicans on the other hand, will still see in the Popular Liberal Party an enemy of their own special aims.

Criticism of the party has been consistently contradictory. One critic complains that the party is too cold, a second, that it is too hot. The reason for this situation is that the critics see the party from opposite viewpoints. For objective historical study, this cross-fire criticism is distinctly advantageous, for each critic corrects the other.

The controversy is waged most hotly on the question whether the Popular Liberal Party is a genuinely republican and liberal group, or merely a disguised monarchist and ultraclerical faction. From the anticlerical Republican standpoint, M. Debidour in his scholarly history of *L'Église catholique et l'état sous la Troisième République*⁹⁷⁸ asserts that the members of the party were "pious noblemen" and "well-intentioned bourgeois" who "too manifestly preserved their royalist — and at the same time ultramontane — preferences." Similarly, Professor Georges Weill, in his *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France*,⁹⁷⁹ describes the members of the party as either "republicans by submission or resigned monarchists" (*républicains de résignation ou monarchistes résignés*) and seems to sympathize with the view of the "Catholics of the Left," who "know that it is simply the former Conservative Union, reorganized under a new title."

M. Léon Jacques, in his admirable work on *Les Partis politiques sous la III^e République*,⁹⁸⁰ devotes six pages to a critique of the Popular Liberal Party, and expresses the same conviction that it is not genuinely republican and liberal, that it is too clerical. A genuine republican party, he argues, would not

content itself with recognizing that "the Republic is the constitutional government of the country" and abstaining from all direct or indirect action against the Republic while asking no one to renounce his own person preferences. A political party, says M. Jacques, requires its adherents to make the choice among the various possible forms of government and, by reason of this sincere and definitive choice, demands their unreserved adherence to the entire program of the party. Because it fails to take so strong a stand either in favor of republicanism as the best possible form of government or in favor of some other constitution, the Popular Liberal Party, in the opinion of M. Jacques, cannot be considered a full-fledged political party; it is only "a powerful party organization, the organization of a party which is striving to find itself, which tries to constitute itself, groping its way, uncertain of its elements and of the terrain on which it is to fight." M. Jacques suspects that the liberalism of the party is only contingent and provisional, that it is only a matter of tactics. Unwilling to take the party program at its face value, he insists that the "veritable goal" of the party is obscure. He hints that some of its members would not be reluctant to profit by favorable circumstances to effect a *coup d'état*. M. Jacques quotes toasts made by Major Driant and M. L. Millevoye at the Popular Liberal Party banquet, June 11, 1911. M. Millevoye concluded his toast with the words, "we engage ourselves here, that if ever the day comes — and it is not so far distant as you suppose — when you and I, in a mutual understanding, in a common fraternity, can seize [*saisir*], can take possession of [*emparer*] the machinery of the government of this country, well then, for the sake of France and in the name of France we will not leave [office]." ⁹⁸¹ To construe this as an appeal to violence requires disregarding the context and reading a very great deal between the lines. Major Driant's speech was more bellicose.

I do not fear to say quite openly . . . that there exists in Paris a Military League determined to employ itself for the preservation [*salut*] of the country, should the occasion arise. . . . The day when a grave crisis breaks out in Paris, of whatever nature, whether

it come from a general strike, or an internal crisis, or an external crisis, we will convoke all the members of this League at the Wagram Hall,—and we will convoke you at the same time. And the day when we do that, you will say to yourselves that you must come in large numbers, disciplined, silent, and resolved. From that meeting we will go out by fours, like a troop, and we will go on that day wherever the genius of France leads us. If it gives us no direction, I will give one: to begin with, it will be to the Grand-Orient [Masonic headquarters].

This last remark was greeted with salvos of applause. Another speaker at the same banquet, M. Chaligné, raised his glass “to the hope of seeing our liberal republican young manhood combat, even by force if necessary, the unjust laws decreed by this sectarian government and Masonic dictatorship against the freedom of education.”⁹⁸² These speeches made it quite clear that certain members of the Popular Liberal Party would be inclined to resort to violence, under extreme circumstances, for the defense of religious liberty or to save the nation in case of foreign menace; but they do not at all prove the existence of any ulterior motives, any mental reservations, in favor of monarchism. In fact, at this very convention of 1911, the president of the party emphatically declared, “Political program, social program, religious program, economic program, you have formulated them in such fashion that I venture to say no party in France can invoke a clearer or more precise program. If tomorrow, fortune, to speak the language of the secularists, or rather, if Providence, as I would say, permitted that the collection of Jews and Free-Masons, of Liberal Protestants, of atheists of every brand, who have won influence in parliament, and inspire the legislation there, if all those people were overthrown and you arrived in power, you would have nothing to do but to take this program, which has been drafted during the last seven years: it contains everything.” And this program, be it remembered, was both republican and democratic. As for those who accused the party of having no program, M. Piou said, they “simply admit that they have not taken the trouble to read it.”⁹⁸³

Some of the more extreme “Christian Democrats,” who

make democracy almost an article of faith, agree with the anticlericals in accusing the Popular Liberal Party of insincere republicanism and of sham liberalism. Abbé Naudet, for example, complains that the party is neither popular nor liberal.⁹⁸⁴ And Abbé Dabry, another ardently democratic priest and journalist, bitterly arraigns the party on the same grounds. In his more or less autobiographical book, *Les Catholiques républicains*, written in 1905, Abbé Dabry sustains the charges which he made in 1901 against the Piou committee out of which the Popular Liberal Party developed. The charges were:

1. That the committee comprised, as members, elements strongly suspected of hostility to the Republic; 2. That it adopted as its sole electoral platform religious demands, and that thus it presented itself to the country essentially as a party of reaction.⁹⁸⁵

"All the hypocritical *ralliés* are arrayed under his [Piou's] banner, to combat us," Abbé Dabry complains.⁹⁸⁶

Abbé Dabry is especially emphatic in his argument that the Popular Liberal Party, far from being a liberal political party, is merely a reactionary faction, which attempts to unite all Catholics into a clerical party. Such tactics, he holds, are contrary to the desires of the Holy See and are worse than inexpedient. The policy of Leo XIII, Abbé Dabry believes, was to induce the French Catholics to abandon their isolation and to merge with the Republican parties. He writes:

We are the leaven of society, and we must be also the leaven of the political groups; to be that, we must enter into all of them, excepting those which from different points of view are opposed to the traditions or the doctrines of the Church, as are the royalists and the Socialists. That, to my mind, is why the exclusive grouping of Catholics under any [party] name whatsoever is an error, and why, also, supposing the Piou group were to disappear, there would be no interest in replacing it. Quite the contrary!⁹⁸⁷

The union of Catholics for religious interests, Abbé Dabry holds, is thoroughly commendable, but such a union must not enter into partisan politics. Solemnly he utters the warning:

For the love of our country and of religion, let no one think of

demanding, under whatever name it may be—Catholic party, Catholic Republican party, Liberal party,—the union of Catholics for political action! Let as many parties be founded in the Republic as you will, but let it be with a political and not with a confessional program; let it be in the name of a political party and not at all in the name of religion.⁹⁸⁸

The result of the Popular Liberal Party's insincere republicanism and exclusive clerical policy, according to Abbé Dabry, has been nothing short of disastrous.

And of the Liberal Party [Action Libérale], M. Piou, what have been the results? The suppression of the religious orders, the assassination of Christian education, the denunciation of the Concordat, Hell risen up from the abyss to govern us! What trophies!⁹⁸⁹

Curiously enough, another journalist-priest, Abbé Emmanuel Barbier, attacks the Popular Liberal Party not on the ground that it is a confessional party, or that it is insincere in its liberalism and republicanism, but precisely for the contradictory reason that it is not exclusively Catholic and that it is genuinely liberal and republican. Abbé Barbier, in fact, asserts that M. Piou and his friends insist so strongly upon republicanism that "it has become impossible to remain a good Catholic without being a republican, and that, after all, this qualification of republican takes precedence over that of Catholic."

It is the same with the title of liberal. M. Piou has imposed it in such a manner that not only does one no longer dare to declare himself a liberal candidate, but if someone—and I am reporting actual facts—happens to say to the electors: we, liberal Catholics . . . his friends rebuke him for his imprudence in not calling himself just simply liberal.⁹⁹⁰

Citing various actual cases in which the Popular Liberty Party refused to support Catholic monarchist candidates against republicans or socialists, Abbé Barbier bitterly accuses the party of not being even Catholic. Its own candidates, he asserts, "declare themselves Democrats, Frenchmen, Patriots, every-

thing except Catholics.”⁹⁹¹ In another place, he says, “The Liberal Party [*Action libérale*] . . . is not a frankly Catholic organization. . . . Contrary to its *raison d’être*, it is a political organization; it is such necessarily, by the vice of its origin.”

Indeed, Abbé Barbier does not hesitate to assert that the Popular Liberal Party is disobedient to the doctrines of the Church. To be sure, the leaders of the party had received much encouragement from Rome, but such encouragement was based upon a misunderstanding of the party’s policy. Rome “could not” show favor to an association whose program demanded merely liberty and equal rights for the church. On the contrary,

The (Popular) Liberal Party, which is proposed to us and which imposes itself as the organized embodiment of the papal policy, places itself thereby in manifest contradiction with the doctrine of the Church and, above all, with the instructions of Leo XIII in the Encyclical from which the *Ralliement* [Catholic acquiescence in the Republic] was born.⁹⁹²

Abbé Barbier therefore concluded that, as far as the Popular Liberal Party is concerned, the name, the program, and the policy must be changed; “the rest may be preserved, if one so desires.” For, “the name is equivocal, the program is false, the policy bad.”⁹⁹³

And just as Abbé Dabry ascribes all the reverses of the Catholics in France since 1899 to the Popular Liberal Party’s lack of sincere liberalism and to the party’s exclusively Catholic composition, so Abbé Barbier ascribes the same reverses to diametrically opposite causes, namely, the fact that the Popular Liberal Party is not a primarily Catholic party; and that it is really republican and liberal. Abbé Barbier argues that the Republic has never been really popular with the people⁹⁹⁴; it is therefore a mistake to base electoral appeals on republicanism. He illustrates his point by analyzing the elections of 1902 and 1906. According to his calculations, the “monarchist, Catholic, and independent” and other clerical candidates who were not comprised in the Popular Liberal Party,

and who were "more determined in political opposition as well as in Catholic defense," gained 333,555 votes in 1906 above their total in 1902. On the other hand, the "Liberals" [Popular Liberal Party] lost 248,064; the "Nationalists," 245,731; the Progressists, 233,580.⁹⁹⁵ The conclusion is implied that the Popular Liberal Party is politically inexpedient for the Catholic cause.

An interesting comparison may be made between Abbé Barbier's figures and the statistics quoted by supporters of the party. At the party convention of 1908, a report was read stating that the strength of monarchism had steadily declined since 1885. The total number of votes received by candidates declaring themselves monarchists compared with the number of votes received by republican candidates was:

Year	Republican Votes	Monarchist Votes
1876	4,028,153	3,202,333
1877	4,367,202	2,577,882
1881	5,128,442	1,789,767
1885	4,327,162	3,541,484
1889	5,026,583	2,795,314
1893	5,382,622	1,202,213
1898	7,060,939	876,737
1902	7,758,268	711,998
1906	7,842,221	610,925

M. Louis Hosotte, a Catholic historian of the Third Republic, gives a table⁹⁹⁶ which shows the same striking phenomenon, the dwindling away of monarchist sentiment in politics. The table is reproduced here in abbreviated form, omitting the figures for the anticlerical Republican, Radical and Socialist parties, and adding the figures for 1914 and 1919.

National	200	Orleanists
Assembly	200	Legitimists
1871	30	Bonapartists
Chamber of	55	Orleanists
Deputies	25	Legitimists
1876	75	Bonapartists

1877	207 Conservatives (<i>i. e.</i> , monarchists of various factions)
1881	90 Conservatives
1885	202 Conservatives
1889	105 Royalists 59 Bonapartists 47 Boulangists
1893	58 Conservatives 35 <i>Ralliés</i> (Catholic monarchists who had become Republicans)
1898	44 Conservatives 32 <i>Ralliés</i> 18 Nationalists (mostly clerical and republican)
1902	41 Conservatives 35 <i>Ralliés</i> 43 Nationalists 132 Progressists or dissident Radicals
1906	78 Conservatives or Liberals (evidently including Popular Liberal Party) 24 Nationalists 79 Progressists
1910	19 Conservatives 34 Popular Liberal Party 76 Progressists
1914	32 Conservatives 33 Popular Liberal Party 50 Progressists
1919	27 Conservatives 3 <i>Action française</i> 100 Popular Liberal Party 106 Progressists.

The table is obviously incomplete and faulty. Nevertheless, it shows clearly enough that the monarchist parties have almost disappeared, their decline being very marked since the papal encyclical of 1892, and that the Progressists and Popular Liberal Party are the only remaining solid groups friendly to the Church.

The same conclusion might be drawn from the figures given by M. Léon Jacques, a Republican unfriendly to the Popular Liberal Party, and by the *Annuaire du Parlement*, although exact statistics are quite out of the question because until 1910 the groups in the Chamber of Deputies overlapped and shaded into one another in a most bewildering fashion. The only fact that is really clear is that the Monarchist factions have almost entirely disappeared from parliament, whereas the Popular Liberal Party and the Progressists have continued to receive a very large number of Catholic votes. In the elections of 1914, the Progressists polled a million votes, the Popular Liberal Party three-quarters of a million, and the Right (including the monarchists) only 345,000.⁹⁹⁷

We are now in a position to sum up and evaluate the contradictory criticisms of the Popular Liberal Party with respect to political liberalism. In the opinion of Republicans and Christian Democrats the supreme defect of the party is its failure to become a genuinely liberal Republican party rather than an exclusively Catholic party of uncertain Republicanism. In the opinion of clerical Monarchists, the supreme fault of the party is its insistence upon republicanism and liberalism, its refusal to be more Catholic than liberal. The Christian Democrats and the Monarchists agree — but for contradictory reasons — in blaming the party for Catholic electoral reverses.

The explanation of these contradictions seems reasonably clear. In the first place, the charges levelled at the party by Republicans and Christian Democrats are true, in part. The party has never made belief in republicanism as the best conceivable form of government an article of faith. And it is Catholic in its membership and in its policies. Moreover, many of its members were formerly Monarchists. The party insists on acceptance of the republic merely as a *fait accompli*, as the constitution desired by the people, not as an abstract ideal. To Republican enthusiasts, this coldness, this objectivity, is so exasperating that the Popular Liberal Party remains suspect even when it inscribes at the head of its "Political Program" the unequivocal declaration,

The Republic is the constitutional government of the country; the Popular Liberal Party recognizes it, and, without requiring any one to renounce or abandon his inmost preferences, absolutely forbids, by its very statutes, any direct or indirect action against the Republic.⁹⁹⁸

That the party accepts the Republic passively, there can be no question. The party convention of 1908 unanimously voted a resolution approving "recognition of the Republic as the form of Government accepted by the country."⁹⁹⁹ And in the party's official bulletin for July 15, 1919, the following declaration is found:

From the first day, the A. L. P. (Popular Liberal Party) declared that the form of government was not to be discussed. Its loyalty was never denied for an instant. . . .

Today, the situation is clear. The Republic has held the flag of France during four years and carried it to victory. It is indisputably the national government of France entire, crowned by the victory of right and the admiration of the whole world.¹⁰⁰⁰

While such an attitude of definitive passive acceptance was not enough to satisfy Republican critics, it was too much to suit Monarchist critics. It meant the utter abandonment of monarchist political agitation.

In short, the party is subjected to a cross-fire from Monarchists and extreme Republicans, not because its own policy is ambiguous or paradoxical, but because it is so definitely neutral, because it accepts the existing Republic without expressing any opinion as to the relative merits of republicanism and monarchism in general. Because it is exposed to a cross-fire, such a policy is perhaps not the easiest to popularize. But whether the party would have gained more votes by swinging to one or the other extreme, is a question which partisans answer according to their individual prejudices, and to which no scientific answer can be made.

One other general criticism should be remarked. M. Léon Jacques declares that the economic program of the Popular Liberal Party is "perhaps a little theoretical and abstract." Continuing, he observes:

The mentality of the workingmen has changed since Le Play's time, and, besides, a number of the workingmen no longer practise any religion. Should one not fear that they would feel ill at ease in [industrial] organizations more or less directly but effectively inspired by the Christian ideal of gentleness, of hope in the "beyond," and of resignation? ¹⁰⁰¹

Such a criticism rests upon a misconception or ignorance of the development of the Social Catholic doctrine since Le Play's time and, in particular, of the wide gulf that separates the program of the Popular Liberal Party from the program of Le Play.

In the first place, the Popular Liberal Party derives its economic program from the Social Catholic school, rather than from the School of Le Play. It is an advocate of radical social legislation and of public recognition and promotion of trade organization,—two principles upon which it is frankly at variance with Le Play's doctrine. Le Play was essentially a non-interventionist; the party is conspicuously interventionist.

In the second place, the Popular Liberal Party does not ask, as M. Jacques implies that it asks, non-Christian workingmen to belong to Christian labor organizations. It aims to foster Christian trade unions, to be sure, but it leaves a place for non-Christian unions. It plans that both should be freely organized. The only compulsory organization in the party's scheme is a general regional organization of the trades for the purposes of trade representation and for the promotion of trade interests. Into such an organization both the Christian and non-Christian trade unions, freely and voluntarily constituted, would fit as subordinate units. Just how the Christian ideal of hope in a future life would be impressed upon such an organization, M. Jacques might find it difficult to explain. But as concerns the Christian ideal of "gentleness," perhaps M. Jacques is right; the scheme is certainly not inspired by the ideal of class-conflict and industrial warfare.

In the third place, M. Jacques betrays either ignorance or prejudice when he asserts that the economic program of the Popular Liberal Party is "theoretical and abstract." What-

ever may be its faults in other respects, the program is anything but theoretical or abstract. Its most striking characteristic, as any one familiar with the program can hardly fail to recognize, is its insistence upon practical, specific reforms rather than upon vague general formulae such as "the social revolution," "collective ownership," *etc.* It is the one party which more than any other has consistently declared that social legislation must deal with the real diversity of conditions and interests actually existing in industry, commerce, and agriculture, and that, therefore, all such legislation should be adapted to local and special conditions by the representatives of the trades and regions concerned. Events have increasingly tended to demonstrate the practical character of the program. The principle that representatives of capital and labor in the organized trade should have at least a consultative voice in regard to industrial legislation has finally triumphed, after long opposition; it was the principle upon which the Government proceeded in carrying through the eight-hour day law of 1919.¹⁰⁰² The conception of joint industrial boards, representing capital and labor, is one to which prominent business men are turning as to the only escape from an *impasse*; it is the idea which the British Government adopted in its reconstruction program. It is not an entirely idle boast which the Bulletin of the Popular Liberal Party makes when, in its issue of July 15, 1919, it declares:

The social program of the Popular Liberal Party is not distinguished, as is well known, from that of the "Social Catholic School" founded by Count Albert de Mun. For this reason it has sometimes been said that the Popular Liberal Party was "very advanced" from the social point of view.

Eulogy or reproach — but, as for ourselves, we have always considered it a eulogy — the statement was correct. And it is not today, or yesterday, that we became accustomed to occupying a position of advanced guard in social matters.

Our oldest readers will perhaps recall that one day, a score of years ago, our friend, M. de Gailhard-Bancel, expounded from the floor of the Chamber of Deputies some of our social principles concerning the organization of labor, and that his ideals, much too novel in that assembly, provoked "commotion" [*Mouvements divers*] in

certain parts of the house. M. Millerand, visibly interested, interrupted to say: "Those are ideas of the future."

In the mouth of this experienced politician, always well-posted on social questions, this was a profound remark of great significance.

In effect, subsequent experience has not ceased to confirm this forecast, for the ideas of the Social Catholic School do not cease to receive from events and from time the most brilliant confirmations.

Whether it is a question of the legal rights of trade unions, or of the weekly holiday—which we in the Popular Liberal Party more accurately style the Sunday holiday,—whether it is a question of workingmen's pensions or of mutual aid, of collective bargaining or of trade jurisdictions,—on all these questions and on many others, besides, the Social Catholic School's solutions—our solutions—have ultimately, little by little, imposed themselves, and constitute today the most solid and beneficial parts, as well as the most practical parts, of contemporary social legislation.

But it is interesting to signalize as a particularly solemn and valuable confirmation of one of the most important principles of this doctrine of the future, that which has been received at the hands of the Peace Conference and which is inscribed, with incomparable authority, in the Treaty of Versailles.

We have the right to assert, not without pride, that the first article of the international labor legislation, sanctioned by the signatures of the Powers, bears witness clearly to an indisputably Catholic idea and Catholic initiative, even in its terminology, and reproduces the formula of one of the most essential revindications of the social program of Leo XIII and of Count Albert de Mun.

Respectfully we quote this great text:

"In right and in fact the labor of a human being should not be treated as merchandise or an article of commerce. . . ." ¹⁰⁰³

In conclusion, it may be noted again that the Popular Liberal Party is only one manifestation of and not the inclusive organization of the Catholic social and republican movement in France. As representative of the Catholic republican movement, it shares Catholic votes with the Progressists and with other Republican groups. As representative of the Social Catholic movement it is the only group which has so formally and fully accepted the Social Catholic program of social legislation, but there are numerous deputies outside its ranks who advocate the same program. Moreover, the Social Catholic

Movement seems unwilling to identify itself with a political party; it prefers to work by means of non-partisan social propaganda rather than by means of party politics. Its influence, therefore, may be regarded as a broad stream in which the Popular Liberal Party is only one current.

The influence of the Popular Liberal Party is difficult to evaluate. The party has now about one hundred representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (some of these members sit in the Progressist and other parliamentary groups). It is, therefore, larger at present than the Socialist Party, as regards parliamentary representation. But the influence of a political party is not always to be calculated by simple arithmetical processes.

In the deliberations of the Chamber of Deputies it has played a rôle more important than its numbers and its status as an Opposition group (prior to the war) would warrant. Especially in social legislation, in the question of proportional representation, and in the agitation for decentralization, it has been very conspicuous. Its ideas have had more telling effect than its votes.

Perhaps the party would have exerted a still stronger influence had its membership been more homogeneous. Its members vary from enthusiastic advocacy to passive acceptance in their attitude toward democratic government, and in their attitude toward labor problems they run through the same gamut. Moreover, so many great capitalists and aristocratic landowners are included in the party that workingmen might possibly feel inclined to suspect the sincerity of its professed desire for "amelioration of the condition of the workingmen." Indeed, certain of the deputies belonging to the parliamentary group are, if not insincere, at least unenthusiastic, in their advocacy of the social legislation demanded by the party platform. On the other hand, the party includes too many peasants and workingmen, too many strenuous champions of labor interests, too many candid critics of capitalism, to be acceptable to men of wealth who have not been to some degree affected by the Social Catholic reform movement.

In other words, the heterogeneity of the party militates against success. But this very heterogeneity makes the indirect influence of the party greater. To begin with, the party is genuinely national, it represents all the various elements of national life—labor, capital, peasantry, landed aristocracy, liberal professions, shopkeepers, the army and navy, the intellectuals,—and it represents all regions of France. Such a party, in attempting to solve economic problems, must necessarily act as an instrument of class-conciliation; it must seek solutions which will be acceptable to agriculture and commerce as well as to industry, to capital as well as to labor, to the middle and professional classes as well as to laborers and employers. Furthermore, such a party is particularly fitted to break down the traditional resistance of the upper classes to labor legislation. In this respect the Popular Liberal Party has had a very marked effect. It has been exceedingly influential in leading aristocrats and bourgeois to take an active interest in social questions and to adopt a positive and constructive program of social legislation, just as it has provided a bridge by which many former Monarchists could pass over from royalism to democratic republicanism. And at the same time it has accustomed the working-class elements which it has reached to regard the upper classes as possible allies and friends, rather than as uncompromising enemies. Such a rôle of social conciliation, when coupled with a very advanced program of social and political reforms, is undoubtedly of great though imponderable service to social and political democracy.

The service is imponderable because it is a service of propaganda and of influence more than a service of votes. The Popular Liberal Party is even more an association for propaganda than a political group. Herein lies its most solid element of strength. Its 250,000 or more dues-paying members; its 2,000 committees scattered through the length and breadth of France; its propagandist literature; its social clubs, its affiliated organizations,—all these give it an influence that is difficult to measure.

Should the party realize its hope of forming a new parlia-

mentary *bloc* favorable to social legislation, to democratic constitutional reforms, and to religious liberty, the patient work of study and propaganda might suddenly reach the stage of fruition. The post-bellum situation, with the loyalty and patriotism of the party vindicated, with social problems in the foreground, with anticlericalism temporarily at least in the background, is peculiarly favorable for such hopes. But even should these hopes prove illusory as regards the immediate future, the Popular Liberal Party would still have its major task to perform, its task of education or propaganda. Said M. Eugène Flournoy, in his book defending the party, the great aim is to train a working-class *élite*, inspired with the ideas of the party. To train an *élite* is a painfully slow process. But it is a process which oftentimes leads to ultimate success, and which always leaves its impress upon the spirit of the age.

The task of the sower is perhaps more important than that of the reaper. There are always parties ready to gather in the harvest when the ideas have been popularized and have matured. The Popular Liberal Party is at present a sower of ideas; who reaps the harvest is of little importance, for the sower, rather than the reaper, determines the nature of the crop.

CHAPTER X

SURVEY OF THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN FRANCE

GENERAL SURVEY

THE contemporary Social Catholic movement in France is an extraordinarily complex and at the same time a very simple phenomenon: complex in its manifold and interrelated organisms and manifestations; simple in its doctrines and impulse.

Its external manifestations embrace a whole congeries of social and political associations and of social-service institutions. In politics, it is more or less faithfully, but not entirely or exclusively, represented by the *Action Libérale Populaire* or Popular Liberal Party, an association exceptionally well developed in its constitution and program, relatively weak in its parliamentary representation, relatively strong in its dues-paying membership. In the non-partisan sphere of social research and propaganda, it is represented by the extraordinarily active *Action Populaire* of Rheims, by the "Social Catholic Study Union," by important national congresses (*Semaines sociales*) held every year for the discussion of social and economic problems, and by local conferences and conventions, held more frequently, for the same purpose. In the press, it is represented by a serious monthly review, *Le Mouvement social* — a veritable mine of information on social developments and social studies the world over,—by an important fortnightly review, *Le Correspondant*, by many other periodical publications which appeal less to the learned world than to the people, by the *Année sociale internationale*, which is probably the most comprehensive and pretentious international year-book on social and labor questions, by series of pamphlets, by innumerable books concerning the detailed specific applications as well as the fun-

damental principles of social theory.¹⁰⁰⁴ Among the workingmen, it has formed "Catholic Workingmen's Clubs," Catholic trade unions and industrial federations; among the employers it has formed parallel organizations; among the consumers it has organized a Social League of Consumers (*Ligue sociale d'acheteurs*) with twenty-eight local sections. Among the young men its influence is disseminated by the French Young Men's Catholic Association (the A. C. J. F. or *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*), an offshoot of Count Albert de Mun's Workingmen's Clubs. It maintains people's secretariats, workingmen's garden associations, social information bureaus, mutual aid and insurance societies.¹⁰⁰⁵ These are a few of the manifestations of the movement. The works of private charity conducted by the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul and by the clergy are not touched on here, because they aim not so much at reform of the social order as at relief of the wretchedness incident to that order.

Complex as it may be in its organs of action, the movement is simple enough in its fundamental principles. The impulse in back of all the above-mentioned enterprises arises from the conviction that, in the first place, neither the labor problem nor the social questions of the day can be solved except in harmony with the doctrines of justice, charity, and the dignity of man,¹⁰⁰⁶ doctrines inculcated by the Christian Church, and, in the second place, that for individual Christians it is an urgent duty — a duty enjoined by charity and by justice as well as by the necessity of removing the grievances which give revolutionary socialism its strength — to engage actively in social service. In a most general way, the characteristic features of the Social Catholic doctrine are: (1) recognition that the existing organization of industry, involving as it oftentimes does the inhumane exploitation of human labor, stands in need of reform; (2) insistence that such reform, to be beneficial, must be in harmony with Christian principles, and that Christians should take an active part in it; (3) opposition to revolutionary socialism and revolutionary syndicalism, on one hand, and to the individualistic, non-interventionist teachings of the classical or Liberal economists

on the other hand; (4) acceptance of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter "On the Condition of the Working Classes" (1891), together with subsequent papal encyclicals on the same subject, as the platform of the Catholic movement for social reform; (5) assertion that the conditions of labor should be such that the workingman may be able to enjoy needful leisure and repose, that he may observe Sunday as a holiday, that his wife and children may not be swallowed up by the factory, that he may obtain a wage sufficient to maintain a decent home, support his family and provide against accident, sickness, unemployment, and old age; (6) advocacy of social legislation, national and international, to assist in realizing such conditions and to develop institutions which will ultimately relieve the state, to a large extent, of all except a general supervision of such conditions; (7) great emphasis on a modernized guild organization of industry, that is, the encouragement of trade unions and the formation of joint boards of capital and labor, for the purpose of protecting the rights of labor, of settling industrial disputes amicably, of regulating wages, hours of labor and industrial conditions, of conducting social insurance, of maintaining vocational training, of increasing pride of trade, skill of work, and intensity of production,—in short, of solving the labor problem without recourse to state socialism or social revolution; (8) defense of the right of property, coupled with a desire to generalize the enjoyment of this right by increasing the number of small holdings and by fostering thrift; (9) championship of small holdings and agricultural coöperation as the twin principles of agrarian reform; (10) favorable attitude towards divers schemes of coöperative production, profit-sharing, and co-partnership which, although often admitted to be inapplicable to large industries, tend to bridge the chasm between capital and labor, and to improve conditions at least on a small scale.

Through the whole program of the Social Catholics there runs the thought of reconciling liberty with authority, of avoiding both the *laissez-faire* régime, in which the individual is everything, and the socialist régime, in which the state is every-

thing, and of building up a régime in which modernized guilds will act as buffers between the state and the individual, a régime in which the perils of unmitigated individualism and of socialism will alike be obviated, while the liberty of the individual and the interest of the group will both be secured in just measure. It is an attempt to find a new point of view from which the two greatest politico-social ideas of the modern age, individualism and collectivism, will be seen as exaggerations of complementary verities rather than as merely mutually contradictory conceptions.

The essential unity of the contemporary French Social Catholic movement is a matter of historical development as well as of doctrine. Perhaps a bird's-eye review of the rise of the movement will enforce this statement.

The origins of the movement may be traced back, as the early chapters of this book attempt to demonstrate, to the unorganized and more or less sporadic protests of Catholic intellectuals in the first half of the nineteenth century, protests against the so-called "liberal" or orthodox school of political economy, which made labor a mere merchandise, to be bought as cheaply as possible, and forbade the state to protect the workingman, protests also against the destruction of the guilds and the interdiction of all industrial combinations or labor unions by the French Revolution. With Lacordaire and Ozanam these protests were perhaps most eloquent; with Villeneuve-Bargemont they were the inspiration of a serious attempt to rewrite political economy from a Christian and social, as contrasted with a non-Christian and individualistic, point of view.

Under the Second Empire the movement to create a Christian social economy gained headway, under the leadership of Le Play and Périn. But under the leadership of these sociologists, the movement was given a less practical, though more scientific direction.

With the Third Republic, the organized movement begins to take form. It is in a very real sense the child of the past; it inherits its ideas, and particularly the idea that Christian social economy is the true solvent of social problems and the true

corrective of social errors, such as individualism and socialism, from Périn and Le Play; and the maxims of Ozanam and Lacordaire are on its lips. But it shows a more practical spirit, partly because it is organized for practical purposes, and partly because it has found in Germany a model for emulation.

The beginning of the organized movement is the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, created by the zeal of Count Albert de Mun and Marquis de La Tour du Pin, in 1871, with the object of disseminating Catholic ideas and combating socialism among the workingmen, of fostering a spirit of social service among the upper classes, and of reviving the ideal of the Christian guild. The guild conception was tremendously strengthened when the Association in 1873 found an ally in Léon Harmel, a Catholic manufacturer, who had actually formed something resembling a guild in his own factory. As the Association expanded, more rapidly perhaps than its founders had dared hope, the need of a well-defined social-economic doctrine became increasingly apparent. Consequently, the enterprise which at the outset had been merely an organization for practical social work, disclaiming any desire to become a new "school" of economic thought, in opposition to the schools of Le Play and Périn, gradually developed a doctrine distinct from, even opposed to, that of the followers of Le Play and Périn. Out of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs grew the so-called "Social Catholic School" of sociology and economics.

The Council of Studies formed by the Association in 1872 was the nucleus around which clustered a group of Social Catholic writers. The monthly review, *L'Association catholique*, founded in 1876, served as their organ. Strive as they might to remain eclectic and to conciliate the older schools, the new group found itself irresistibly impelled, by the stimulus of popular propaganda, by the influence of German and Austrian Social Catholicism, and by de Mun's entry into politics as its spokesman, to adopt a more and more advanced social program, a more and more distinctive social viewpoint. As friction with the older and more conservative schools increased, it

became necessary to divorce the review from the Association in 1891, to the end that the former might be freer and the latter less embarrassed by doctrinal controversies.

About the same time, in May, 1891, appeared the papal encyclical on the Condition of the Working Classes. This pronouncement from Rome immensely encouraged and stimulated the nascent Social Catholic school. The Association, which had lost its initial impetus, gained new life. The *Association catholique* became more aggressive. Hope was stimulated that the whole body of Catholic thought might be won over, that the rival schools of Catholic sociology might be brought together.

In 1896 the editors of *L'Association catholique* took the initiative in establishing periodical conferences of the directors of Catholic reviews dealing with social questions. Through these *Réunions françaises des Revues catholiques sociales*, as they were called, the influence of *L'Association catholique* was widely extended.¹⁰⁰⁷ Moreover, out of the *Réunions* grew the Social Catholic Study Union or *Union d'études des catholiques sociaux*, in 1901-1902, an organization under the chairmanship of Henri Lorin, one of the group that had grown up around the Council of Studies of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs.¹⁰⁰⁸ Out of the Study Union, in turn, grew the *Semaines sociales*, the great annual congresses, beginning in 1904, in which the leading French exponents of Social Catholicism come together for the discussion of social questions.¹⁰⁰⁹

Probably the most conspicuous organizations at present carrying forward the Social Catholic movement in France are the *Semaines sociales* and the *Action populaire*, the *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*, and the *Action Libérale Populaire* or Popular Liberal Party. How the *Semaines sociales* resulted, indirectly, from the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs has just been explained. The Popular Liberal Party, as was shown in the foregoing chapter, took the presiding genius of the Workingmen's Clubs, Count Albert de Mun, as vice-president, and borrowed its social program. The *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*, originating in

1886 as an offshoot of the Workingmen's Clubs, was fostered by Count Albert de Mun, and consistently maintained the closest relationship with the parent association as well as with the organizers of the *Semaines sociales* and with the Popular Liberal Party. In fact, a sort of interlocking directorate of leaders is very noticeable in these three organizations.¹⁰¹⁰ Finally, the *Action populaire*, founded at Rheims in 1903, as a general central bureau of propaganda and information, inherited not only the doctrines of the Social Catholic school, but, in 1909, took over the monthly review, *L'Association catholique*, which was now rechristened *Le Mouvement social*. The *Action Populaire*, it may be added, is, like the A. C. J. F., on terms of closest intimacy with the Popular Liberal Party, the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, and the *Semaines sociales*. In short, all four enterprises are overlapping in membership, harmonious in doctrine, and kindred heirs of a common legacy.

With the many less conspicuous or subsidiary organizations which help to make up the contemporary Social Catholic Movement in France, it is impossible to deal in this preliminary survey. Some of them will receive passing attention, in the following sections, others will be totally ignored, else the narrative would become too involved.

It is the purpose of the following sections to give some idea of the nature and aims of those branches of the contemporary Social Catholic movement which have been neglected thus far. Regarding the Popular Liberal Party, which was described in the preceding chapter, and the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, which was dealt with in Chapter III, nothing more need be added.

THE ACTION POPULAIRE AND ITS PUBLICATIONS

The *Action Populaire*¹⁰¹¹ owed its inception to Abbé Leroy, a young French priest who was then engaged in work among the people, and who had conceived the idea of founding a sort of *Volksverein* in France. The German *Volksverein*, or People's Union, which served as a model for the enterprise, was a powerful Catholic association (embracing more than three-

quarters of a million members in 1913); and at the same time it served as a social secretariat and propaganda bureau, printing and distributing Social Catholic literature, and organizing study-courses and conferences on social questions. In the year 1912-1913, for example, the *Volksverein* organized 3,427 meetings and distributed 851,145 books and brochures and more than 11,000,00 leaflets, tracts, and journals.¹⁰¹² Abbé Leroy's idea was to imitate the *Volksverein* as a social secretariat and propaganda bureau, not as a popular association; perhaps he did not consider the time ripe for the latter, in France. The *Action Populaire* was to serve as an information bureau; it was to build up a great social library comprising contributions from Catholic sociologists and experts, both lay and clerical, and it hoped to publish, for popular distribution, a great series of thirty-page pamphlets.

Because the financial support was wanting, the beginnings of the enterprise were modest, even humble. At first, a few secretaries and editors housed in a kitchen and a shed at Rheims constituted the *Action Populaire*. Gradually it expanded. A quaint eighteenth-century hotel, the Institut Maintenon, 5 Rue des Trois-Raisinets, in the shadow of the great Rheims cathedral, was taken over as headquarters. By 1912, the central office employed sixteen editors — ten priests and six laymen — besides twenty-seven secretaries; ten persons were kept busy sending out the mass of literature which was daily dispatched from the bureau; several travelling secretaries were engaged in visiting libraries and booksellers in the interest of the organization; it had several hundred collaborators and correspondents in France and abroad; and in its admirable library some 400 French and foreign reviews, besides a remarkable collection of social and economic treatises and official documents, were on file. It became, in the words of a prominent Social Catholic, "a sort of permanent bureau of Social Catholicism."¹⁰¹³

From the outset, the *Action Populaire* regularly published a series of five-cent yellow pamphlets, three a month, each about thirty pages in length. This pamphlet series attained a circulation of about three thousand within a year or two and is very

widely known. It now comprises over three hundred monographs on social questions, monographs contributed by the foremost French Social Catholic writers, by foreign social Catholics, and by non-Catholic economists. Old-age pensions, mutual aid, coöperative associations, labor unions, mixed industrial boards, housing problems, strikes, representation of trades, employment service, apprenticeship and vocational training, child-labor, workingmen's gardens, education, accident compensation, consumers' leagues, the C. G. T., socialism, factory inspection, income taxes, alcoholism,—such are the subjects treated.

In addition to these yellow pamphlets, the *Action Populaire* subsequently inaugurated other series. A series called *Les Actes Sociaux* made the principal laws, papal pronouncements, and other documents on social matters available at five cents each. Another series, *Les Plans et Documents*, comprised documentary and doctrinal monographs, designed for social study clubs. A third, *Les Tracts Populaires*, consisted of mere leaflets. A fourth, *Les Feuilles Sociales*, was made up of brief summaries, in the form of questions and answers, of various longer pamphlets, and was destined for popular propaganda.

Besides the pamphlets and leaflets, the *Action Populaire* published several series of manuals and annuals. The earliest of these was the *Guide social*, published annually since 1904, a volume of about four hundred pages. This is a serious and well-documented annual survey of the various aspects of the social problem, a survey which aims rather to give accurately the latest information, statistics, and bibliographical data than to set forth doctrines or dogmas. The latest issue,¹⁰¹⁴ for example, opens with a calendar of parliamentary debates, laws, decrees, and ordinances on social matters. There follows a collection of recent papal documents on social questions, with a brief description of the principal agencies and the difficulties of Catholic social action. This by way of introduction. Part One of the volume analyzes the census of 1911, quotes the leading opinions on the problem of the declining birth-rate, and on possible remedies, and provides a seven-page bibliography of official documents, books, and articles on the subject; there

follow statistical and documentary studies of the housing problem, and of hygiene, with bibliographies. Part Two deals with trade-unionism, syndicalism, labor organization, employers' unions, and the coöperative movement, giving statistics, quoting opinions, and providing bibliographies. Part Three is devoted to labor legislation; Part Four to Accident Insurance, Workingmen's Pensions, and Mutual Insurance. The *Guide social*, said the preface to the edition of 1911, "aims to reproduce, as on a moving-picture film, the living and moving image of realities in perpetual motion."¹⁰¹⁵

The *Guide social* proved so useful and so popular,—within a year or two its circulation had reached six thousand,—that the *Action Populaire* in 1910 resolved, while continuing it, to prepare also a much larger and more pretentious annual on the same general model. The *Année sociale internationale* for 1910, a volume of 978 pages, was followed by the *Année sociale internationale* for 1911, for 1912, for 1913–1914, the last issue being a ponderous tome of 1256 pages. The *Année* has become a truly monumental work. Though it is very frankly a Catholic publication, its range and accuracy of information make it an invaluable handbook and bibliographical guide for any student of social problems, of labor problems particularly. Primarily French, and Catholic, it is nevertheless genuinely comprehensive and international. Turning to the section on trade-unionism, for example, one finds not merely a survey of Catholic trade-unions in France, but also a much longer account of the revolutionary Syndicalist trade unions and of the C. G. T., with copious quotations from Syndicalist writers, reports of the C. G. T. officials, and a review of the C. G. T. congress of 1912 at Havre; there follow sections on trade-unionism in all countries,—on the Christian trade unions and the Socialist unions alike,—the most recent available statistics being given under each country together with a brief statement of recent tendencies and developments; then one finds an account of the various Socialist, Christian, and neutral international trade-union organizations; a special section is devoted to feminine trade-unionism, another to a statistical summary of the strength of

organized labor in all countries, a third to a survey of strikes in all countries and of recent legislation.

It is the boast of the *Action Populaire* that,

Nowhere does there exist, even in Germany, where social writers are legion, any publication even remotely resembling the *Année sociale*. It was established to fill a gap: its success is witness to a need, a universal need we venture to say, for from all countries, even from the most distant, the *Action Populaire* receives demands for the *Année sociale*.¹⁰¹⁶

But the *Année* is not designed uniquely as an international work of reference. "It is above all a breviary of action; each of its pages urges the reader to act."¹⁰¹⁷ In this sense, it provides the historian of the French Social Catholic movement with a comprehensive survey of the fields in which that movement is active, of the directions in which it endeavors to make its influence felt. In the first place comes the work of social propaganda, education, and research, a work in which the Catholic Employers Association of Northern France, the Workingmen's Clubs, the Fraternal Union of Commerce and Industry, Study Clubs, the *Action Populaire* itself, social secretariats, social libraries, national and local congresses, and the Social League of Consumers, appear as the active organizations.

Part One groups under the general rubric of "The Family," a series of reforms in which the Social Catholics interest themselves. They are alarmed by the low birth-rate, which means a stationary or declining population in France, and they would combat the evil by opposing religion to neo-malthusianism. They would provide cheap and salubrious dwellings for the poor, and are interested in legislation with this object. They have already made much progress in giving workingmen the use of garden plots. They desire legislation designed to aid each family to acquire and hold securely a small property or a house. They support the campaign against unsanitary conditions, infant mortality, contagious diseases, tuberculosis, adulterated foods, alcoholism, obscenity and pornography, criminality. They would reduce the high cost of

living, encourage saving, promote domestic training, reform divorce legislation so as to stabilize the family, repress the white-slave traffic.

Part Two deals with "Producers and Consumers." A paragraph summary of interests of the Social Catholics in this field is almost impossible. Legislation favorable to trade unions is to be enacted, Catholic labor unions and employers' unions are to be promoted, joint industrial boards are to be created, arbitration and conciliation are to be substituted for strikes and lockouts, farmers' unions are to be developed, trade organizations are to build up systems of vocational training and employment bureaus, coöperative societies are to be encouraged, financial speculation is to be controlled.

Part Three takes up the relations between "The State and the Workingmen." Here the Social Catholics are interested first of all in immediate labor legislation, secondly, in effective factory inspection, thirdly, in the transfer of industrial regulation to trade organizations, and finally, in the internationalization of labor laws. The fields of state action with which the *Année* deals are hygiene and security, limitation of the working day, night-work, holidays and vacations, employment of women and children, protection and fixation of wages, civil-service reform.

Part Four gives a survey of socialism and anarchism, two movements which the social Catholics combat as dangerous errors.

Finally, Part Five deals with social insurance and mutual aid. Ever desirous of promoting mutual aid societies, especially in connection with trade organizations and trade unions, the Social Catholics are in general hostile to the exclusive management of old-age pensions, accident insurance, sickness insurance, and unemployment insurance by the state. Their desire is, rather, that these social insurances should be made compulsory by the state but actually conducted by private mutual aid societies and by trade unions.

A third manual published by the *Action Populaire*, beginning in 1910, was designed as a practical handbook for those who

wished to found or were engaged in directing social service institutions such as labor unions, employers' unions, coöperative societies of credit, consumption or production, people's secretariats, workingmen's gardens, societies to provide cheap dwellings, employment bureaus, domestic science schools, mutual aid societies, agricultural unions. The nature of this *Manuel social pratique* may be judged by turning to a particular chapter, say to the chapter on coöperative production. One finds there a section on the utility of coöperative production societies, a section on the legal form of organization to be adopted, a third section on the taxes to which such a society is subject, a fourth on practical considerations such as the provision of capital and the establishment of a *clientèle*, a fifth on methods of profit-sharing, a sixth on the privileges which such a society enjoys, a seventh on the central organizations with which such a society should affiliate.¹⁰¹⁸

Perhaps it is unnecessary to describe in detail the other handbooks,—the Manual of Practical Law,¹⁰¹⁹ the Practical Guide to the Public Assistance Laws,¹⁰²⁰ the Economic and Social Vocabulary,¹⁰²¹ the Illustrated Almanac,¹⁰²² the Practical Manual of Religious Action,¹⁰²³ the Guide to Religious Action,¹⁰²⁴ the Guide to the Free School.¹⁰²⁵

In 1908 the *Action Populaire* entered still another field of social propaganda. It began to publish social reviews. The first was *La Revue de l'Action Populaire*, a little green-covered magazine published the tenth of the month and the twentieth of every other month, and aiming to encourage religious and social action; the review frequently contains useful judicial studies of social legislation as well as detailed information regarding practical social work. Subscribers to the review also received, on the thirtieth of each month, the Study Club Courier (*Le Courrier des Cercles d'Etudes*), which provided material for discussion by study-groups, and on the twentieth of every other month, Trade Union Life (*La Vie Syndicale*), a review designed to encourage Catholic trade-unionism.

Among the *Action Populaire's* numerous periodical publications, *Le Mouvement social* is by far the most important. *Le*

Mouvement social was simply the continuation, under a new name, of *L'Association catholique*, the review of social and labor questions founded by the Association of Catholic Workmen's Clubs in 1876. The review had served as the organ of the clubs until 1891, and had led a more or less independent existence as the principal French Social Catholic review from 1891 to 1908, inclusive. Under its old management, *L'Association catholique* had made itself not only the forum for Social Catholic discussions, but also one of the most informing and best documented French reviews of labor questions. To continue that tradition, the *Action Populaire* was preëminently well equipped, with its editorial staff, its social information bureau, its contact with Catholic social opinion. Accordingly, in 1909, the *Action Populaire* took over *L'Association catholique*, renamed it *Le Mouvement social*, and entrusted it to Abbé G. Desbuquois — director of the *Action Populaire* — and Joseph Zamanski as joint editors. In the first issue of *Le Mouvement social*, the new editors paid tribute to the past work of the review and proclaimed the identity of their own spirit with that which had dominated *L'Association catholique*.¹⁰²⁶ The continuity of the review was indisputable.

The characteristic of *Le Mouvement social* which first arrests the attention of the reader is the wealth of documentation. It reprints labor laws and important bills. It provides a critical bibliography of books on social and economic questions, in all languages. Every year more than eight hundred social or economic articles from the leading French foreign reviews are analyzed, significant portions being quoted. These bibliographical notes are so arranged and printed that the reader may — and is urged to — cut them out and by pasting them in a scrap-book provide himself with a very thorough and up-to-date topical bibliography on any or all social questions. Moreover, the principal social legislation, parliamentary discussions, social and labor congresses, investigations, reports, and events of the month are noted in news items. Finally, the leading articles each month are usually either very serious and detailed studies of economic and legislative problems, or careful

expositions of social and economic theory. Sometimes they deal with French, sometimes with foreign labor problems. Often they are written by foreign experts, and printed in English, German, or Italian, with a French translation as supplement.

Besides its pamphlets, manuals, and reviews, the *Action Populaire* distributes books on labor questions. The type of book may be judged by a few specimens. In 1908 the *Action Populaire* published a volume by Léon de Seilhac on *Labor Congresses in France*, a scholarly contribution to the history of the *Confédération Générale du Travail*.¹⁰²⁷ The following year, was published a book entitled *Toward Professional Organization*, by Eugène Duthoit, professor of political economy at the Catholic University of Lille; the book examined in turn the problems of labor legislation, employment of women, the wage contract, unemployment, and trade-unionism, with a view to proving the importance and necessity of trade-organization as the core of social reform.¹⁰²⁸ Similar in aim, but different in method, was O. Jean's book on *Trade-Unionism*, which reviewed the history of trade-unions from the time of the medieval guilds down to the present, and discussed the rôle of trade unions in social legislation, industrial pacification, co-operative production, mutual aid, etc.¹⁰²⁹ One finds among the *Action Populaire's* publications such works as the practical legal commentary on workingmen's pensions, by J. Hachin and A. Agasse,¹⁰³⁰ or the discussions and reports of conventions of the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs relative to apprenticeship, and the formation of a Catholic labor *élite*.¹⁰³¹

Even the drama and the novel serve their turn as instruments of social propaganda. *Toward the Humble*, a three-act play by Maurice Rigaux,¹⁰³² and *When the Soul is Right*,¹⁰³³ a novel by the same author, are examples. Charles Calippe's study of *Balzac's Social Ideas*,¹⁰³⁴ likewise published by the *Action Populaire*, and René Johannet's *Evolution of the Social Novel in the 19th Century*,¹⁰³⁵ show how even literary criticism is drafted to serve the social cause.

Altogether, the *Action Populaire* distributed about 1,000,000

pamphlets, 200,000 almanacs, 150,000 leaflets, and 60,000 volumes, from 1903 to 1912. This is, presumably, in addition to its periodical reviews.¹⁰³⁶

That the *Action Populaire* served not merely as a distributing and editorial centre for social literature, but also as an information bureau has already been suggested. Every year thousands of inquiries are received by the office at Rheims, and thousands of replies sent out, telling the inquirers how to found a trade union, or a mutual aid society, or where to find authoritative information on the question of social insurance, or what speaker to obtain for a public meeting. One correspondent asks what works he should consult on the fundamental principles underlying the social sciences; another desires to know what employment young girls, leaving their home village, should seek; a third wishes to get in touch with a reliable society for the provision of cheap dwellings. Or again, the *Action Populaire* will be requested to send an expert to help organize a social-service institution, of one sort or another.¹⁰³⁷

Finally, the *Action Populaire* has of late years engaged increasingly in the work of organizing study-courses, participating in social conferences, organizing popular conventions. Its representatives make extended speaking tours. Particularly important are the conventions held by the *A. P.* at Paris and at Rheims, since 1907, sometimes for the clergy, sometimes for the workingmen, sometimes for social workers. By 1911, representatives of the *A. P.* had spoken at about 200 conventions.¹⁰³⁸

DOCTRINES OF THE *Action Populaire*

Thus far we have been preoccupied with a mere catalogue of the means by which the *Action Populaire* strives to realize its aims, and have given little heed to the nature of the aims themselves. To correct this omission, we turn to Abbé Desbuquois, director of the organization and editor of *Le Mouvement social*, for an exposition of his views.

In a series of articles in *Le Mouvement social* for 1912,

Abbé Desbuquois sets forth the fundamental principles of "Social Catholic Action" as he conceives them. At the outset, the writer announces that he finds his chief inspiration and authority in *Rerum Novarum* and the other papal encyclicals on the social question; the statement is significant, as evidence that the Social Catholic Movement in France is decidedly ultramontane.¹⁰³⁹

By way of historical preface, Abbé Desbuquois explains how economic questions have come to play as important a rôle as they do in modern society. The industrial revolution created terrible extremes of wealth and poverty, and made industry more fluid and dynamic. On the other hand, the advent of political democracy placed the weapon of universal suffrage in the hands of the masses, who naturally attempted to wield it in their own economic interest. "Hence, during the past sixty years, the progressively social character of legislation, the birth and development of a labor code." At the same time, "the employers, jealously defending their rights or their interests, exert a parallel influence on the same public authorities, and often in opposition to the efforts of the wage-earners." Political as well as social life is overshadowed by economic interests.

Social and political life having become so predominantly economic in character, the measure of religious influence is its ability to penetrate economic life. Accordingly, Catholicism must work for the organization of modern industry on a basis acceptable to Christian morality.

Now from the viewpoint of Christian morality two fundamental laws of human existence lie at the basis of social philosophy. First, man must work in order to live. Secondly, man must live "toward God." And the second of these commandments is greater than the first. Labor, in the eyes of Christianity, is dignified as the means by which mankind may exist in its aspiration toward God. Because of this relationship between work and man's moral aim, the labor question must be regarded as moral, quite as much as it is economic. Considerations of morality run through all problems of capital and

labor. Thus, the wage question involves the moral principles of contractual equality, commutative justice, the living wage, legitimacy of property.

The necessity of Christian action in behalf of morality in labor questions, says Abbé Desbuquois, has been proclaimed by Leo XIII and Pius X. So important is the task and so binding the obligation, that a Catholic is not truly a Catholic unless he is "social." The term "Social Catholic" is employed at present only because not all Catholics have awakened to their responsibility; with the progressive awakening, it is hoped, the adjective "social" will become unnecessary.

The function of Social Catholicism, in the Abbé's opinion, is not merely to render charitable service in giving bread to the hungry, a home to the homeless, care to the sick, work to the unemployed. Preventive rather than palliative action is to be preferred. The aim should be to restore the social organisms which are capable of preventing destitution, to create employment bureaus which will reduce idleness to a minimum, to build airy and sanitary dwellings in which the plague of tuberculosis will not find easy lodging, to organize industry so that injustice will not prevail, to Christianize manners and thought, to combat irreligion, intemperance and vice. The mission is twofold: it embraces spiritual influence and temporal reform.

The errors to be combated, in the realm of economic ideas, are Socialism and Liberalism (*i. e.*, economic *laissez-faire*),—"the two poles of contemporary social error." These doctrines, says the director of the *Action Populaire*, rest upon a pagan materialism repugnant to Christianity. Socialism represents numbers; Liberalism, wealth; neither, justice. Socialism on the one hand, and individualistic "plutocracy" on the other hand, "both aspiring to tyranny, would condemn mankind either to the despotism of numbers or to the despotism of wealth." Either of these alternatives would be "brutal and materialistic."

Liberalism (or economic *laissez-faire*) refused to permit the state or the guild to protect the workingman against pitiless

exploitation. By its excesses it gave birth to revolutionary Socialism.

Both errors, Abbé Desbuquois believes, have misled many Catholics. Liberalism, for its part, has induced many to regard economic laws as something apart from morality and to forget the fact that labor is a human activity, not a merchandise. Contrary to the opinion of Liberal economists, economic laws are in truth human laws, rather than physical laws, and as human laws they must be based upon morality. Hence, political economy, rightly conceived, should become a moral science, conditioned in part by material conditions but rising above and dominating them. In a direction contrary to Liberalism, many sociologists have rushed to the opposite extreme, ignoring the material basis of economic science, and pursuing will-o'-the-wisp utopias. Error lies in either extreme, truth in the balanced consideration of both material facts and moral laws.

Similarly, the exaggeration of either liberty or equality as a philosophical concept leads to social error. Liberalism's fundamental defect is that it exaggerates individual liberty to the point of destroying all real equality. Socialism, on the contrary, exaggerates equality to the destruction of all liberty. Christian sociology seeks a middle course, assigning to both liberty and equality their proper values, because it posits the twofold nature of man, social and individual. As an individual being, man has certain imprescriptible rights,—above all, the right to the pursuit of happiness, *i. e.*, salvation. This right implies an inalienable liberty, in which all men are born equal. On the other hand, as social beings, men have reciprocal and unequal rights and duties, and are subject to social laws. They play different rôles in the family, in the commune, in the church, in the association, in the state. The child has neither the same rights nor the same duties as the parent: to treat them as equals is absurd. Human beings are unequal in strength, in wisdom, in wealth, in age, in sex, in social responsibilities. Christian sociology recognizes such social inequality and its corollary: the necessity of social laws.

Having disposed of opposing social philosophies in this manner, Abbé Desbuquois proceeds to explain his constructive program in detail. The organization of labor is the first point considered.

The principle of unionism or association in industry, he reminds us, had been emphatically declared by Leo XIII and Pius X as a major remedy for the evils of anarchic industry, but the precise form which the principle of association was to take,—whether in labor unions, parallel unions of employers and workingmen, mixed unions, or coöperative unions,—had not been specified. Catholics were therefore free to favor different forms of labor organization.

Abbé Desbuquois himself considered mixed trade unions of capital and labor an unpractical ideal, popular as it had formerly been with Count Albert de Mun and other Social Catholics a generation ago. A more practical scheme was the formation of separate or parallel employers' unions and labor unions, and the establishment of joint boards, representative of both unions, harmonizing the interests of capital and labor. Such "guilds" or inter-unions, if we may use the word, of capital and labor, would form great federations or "labor corps" uniting all persons engaged in each of the general categories of economic employments—industry, agriculture, commerce, the liberal professions. The proper name for such a system of guild organization, observes Abbé Desbuquois, would be "syndicalism," had not a false, revolutionary meaning been attached to that term.¹⁰⁴⁰

In opposition to many advocates of the guild system, Abbé Desbuquois does not believe that membership in the trade unions should be made compulsory by law, or that the trade unions should have the right to enforce the "closed shop" and to impose regulations upon organized workers. Such rights, he fears, would injure the guild movement in two ways: first, they would arouse antagonism, since the trade unions at present embrace only a small minority of the workers and are unrepresentative of the majority; second, they would make the trade unions too much the creatures of the government,

dependent upon state support and subject to political control, whereas their true mission is to serve as autonomous social organizations, as bulwarks against state socialism. Ultimately they should take over the functions of industrial regulation and insurance, but as autonomous private organizations, rather than as shadows of a socialistic state. With this goal in mind, the trade unions must be encouraged, consulted, fostered. Gradually they will become more representative, less revolutionary. A kind of customary law for industry will grow up under their influence. The process must be slow and organic rather than abrupt and despotic. In this, as in all social matters, liberty and authority must be harmonized and balanced.

Social legislation constitutes the second important element of constructive social reform. After a preliminary observation that most civilized states have found social legislation necessary, Abbé Desbuquois discusses the attitude of the various schools of thought on this question. His classification of the "non-interventionist," "ultra-interventionist," and "interventionist" doctrines is not without interest.

Among the "non-interventionists," *i. e.*, the opponents of labor legislation, he includes the famous "Manchester School" of Liberal political economy, and the contemporary Liberal school represented by economists like Yves Guyot. The latter, in an opportunist spirit, make practical concessions to the demand for social legislation, but cling in principle to the ideal of economic liberty. With them belongs also a group of Catholic sociologists, who resemble the Liberals in their distrust of the state and their concern for liberty, and who tend to draw closer to the classical or Liberal political economy.

The "ultra-interventionists" are, of course, the Socialists, ranging from revolutionary Marxian collectivism to the state socialism and reformism of Millerand, Viviani Briand, Benoît-Malon, Fournière, Delville. Revolutionary syndicalism, born of Marxism, belongs with this group historically, but aims to substitute itself for the state.

The "interventionist" group includes several schools. The Social Catholic school is interventionist in that it asks the state

to promote public welfare, but it assigns to state intervention only a "secondary rôle," and regards the organization of industry as the principal reform. The "Democratic" school is more individualist; it demands intervention in the interest of the individual rather than of society or of social organisms. The "Solidarist" school borrows from biology and sociology the principle of union for preservation of life, the idea of social solidarity; it asks the State to coöperate in protecting public interests, to remove obstacles impeding free association, to repress abuses, to impose on all the duties of providence and solidarity. Finally, the "Eclectic" school deems that the State should protect the weak, in the general interest.

In the opinion of the Social Catholics the non-interventionist and ultra-interventionist positions are equally false. The state should be neither a policeman whose sole duty is to protect private rights, nor an omnipotent source of all rights. It should, in the opinion of the Social Catholics, (1) protect individual rights, and (2) promote public welfare, not by substituting itself for private authority, for the trade union, for the family, but by fostering and supplementing the activity of private individuals and social organisms. It should give juridical force to moral obligations.

This is not a "vague compromise between socialism and liberalism"; it is not a bastard system. If it pursues a middle course, declares Abbé Desbuquois, it is because the truth habitually lies between contradictory errors. Social Catholic interventionism is an organic doctrine based on the very nature of society and of the state. Nor is it an *a priori* doctrine, as was the Liberalism of Ricardo or the Socialism of Marx. It is based upon historical study and economic observation as well as upon deductive reasoning. In this respect, it is much sounder than its rivals. The Marxian thesis of the concentration of capital is not borne out by facts; Abbé Desbuquois observes that certain industries, to be sure, are concentrating, but that small industries still subsist, in which small enterprises are the rule, and that in agriculture the number of small holdings is increasing in 52 departments of France.

Liberalism is no less at variance with the facts when it asserts that economic liberty is the best assurance of social peace and progress; the facts prove quite the contrary.

Elaborating further the Social Catholic theory of intervention, Abbé Desbuquois sets limits to state action. The state should not assume functions which can be discharged equally well or better by private organization; for example, the state should leave the administration of social insurance to private associations. Moreover, the State is not as well fitted as the guilds or the industrial unions to draft detailed regulations for industry. In general, his reply to the ultra-interventionists is that modern society is suffering from excessive state intervention, prejudicial to individual liberty and to freedom of association.

On the other hand, as against the non-interventionists, he asserts that the state is obliged,—by its very *raison d'être*,—to protect public welfare by ensuring justice, repressing abuses, eliminating dangers. The right of private property and the freedom of labor are conditioned by man's individual right to existence and by man's social character. Thus, one individual's rights to property, or to labor, may be limited by the right of other individuals to existence. The rights of the strongest and richest may be limited, to increase the rights of the weak and the poor; the result will be increased general welfare in which all will share. The state is bound to make sure that workingmen are not condemned to excessive labor; that they enjoy leisure on Sundays; that women, and above all, children are not employed to their detriment. Abbé Desbuquois is convinced that this conception of social legislation is in harmony with papal doctrine.

Much remains to be done in France, he points out, in the field of social legislation. In the sanction of the Sunday holiday, the limitation of the working day, the protection of women and children, the formulation of a "charter" for the guild system, the organization of social insurance, and the protection of workingmen's savings, French legislation is woefully incomplete and imperfect. But under the influence of

the Socialists and Radicals, the state, instead of completing its proper task, is arrogating to itself functions to which it has no right and is assuming administration of enterprises which properly belong to private organizations. Government ownership of economic enterprises is necessary in certain cases, but it is always a danger, because the state has such power over its employees; against the danger, a genuine civil service reform might be some safeguard.

As he arrives at his conclusion, Abbé Desbuquois grows eloquent. We are living, he writes, in an age of enormous possibilities. It is an age when new inventions are continually revolutionizing industry. Who can foresee the effects of the single fact of aerial navigation? Moreover, the laboring class is restless, stirring uneasily with the force of new ideas, dreaming of international proletarian uprisings. International finance, at the opposite extreme of the social scale, is more powerful than ever before; it pulls the strings of diplomacy; it decides war and peace. Startling developments of industry, proletarian insurrections, devastating capitalistic wars are not "chimerical" perils.¹⁰⁴¹

In the face of these eventualities, the social order seems to require "a stronger authority, a more extensive right of surveillance and control, a right of prompt and sure repression." Consequently, "revolutionary tradition," hoping to legitimize and prolong "a century of encroachments and oppression," exalts the state as the unique authority, the source of all authority. In this, revolutionary tradition gravely errs. Granted that the state is the supreme organ of law and justice in society, granted that it is the promoter of public prosperity, nevertheless it should utilize for the accomplishment of its mission such social authorities as are independent by origin. Its imperious social duty will be all the more difficult to perform if the state persists in laying its own hand — often clumsy and heavy — directly upon the delicate and intricate fabric of society and industry. It will therefore be an historic moment when the state, conscious of this peril, decides to recognize the authority of social institutions such as the commune and

the province and trade organizations and associations,—when it authenticates the statutes or customs, the privileges, which will enable these organizations to become stabilizing institutions, endowed with limited but certain powers, alleviating the burden of the central government, touching the springs of national life with a delicacy of which the state itself is incapable, and adapting themselves infinitely better than the state to the complexity of a society in which everything is interrelated and interdependent. There need be no fear lest the state's supreme authority be impaired; for, free and autonomous as the various minor social organisms may be in their proper spheres, they will still be subjected, in so far as national interests are concerned, to national surveillance.

As equilibrating and stabilizing elements, coming between the state and the individual, trade unions, guilds, and professional organizations are especially to be favored, fostered, and developed. Such institutions will protect society against the tyranny of the state, on the one hand, and against the peril of anarchic individualism on the other hand. Nor is this their only merit. They are peculiarly fitted to develop social leadership, to train the “*élites*” so sorely needed in modern life.

Facing these grave and complicated problems, Abbé Desbuquois concludes, the Social Catholics rely confidently upon the inspiration of the Church, and are firm in the conviction that, in measure as they succeed in realizing the Social Catholic program, the state will become the instrument of justice without becoming, by excessive intervention, the embodiment of a new tyranny.

Such are the aims and the principles of the *Action Populaire*. The remark may be added that the organization seems to have been particularly successful in winning the approbation not only of Social Catholic leaders, but also of the higher clergy in France and of the Holy See.¹⁰⁴²

THE SEMAINES SOCIALES ¹⁰⁴³

If the *Action Populaire* of Rheims may be styled the central office of the Social Catholic Movement, the “Social Weeks”

or *Semaines sociales* might well be called the national congresses of the movement. For it is in the *Semaines sociales* that leading Social Catholics of all shades and parties, representing all regions of France, annually foregather for the discussion of social problems. These assemblies have become so important that even anticlerical Socialists and Syndicalists recognize them as impressive manifestations of the numerical strength and intellectual vigor of the movement.¹⁰⁴⁴ Everybody knows what the *Semaines sociales* are, says Étienne Lamy.¹⁰⁴⁵ In the words of a contributor to the *Revue hebdomadaire*,

Today, all courses and all classic works treating of economic doctrines give a large space to the study of Social Catholicism. And all signalize the "*Semaines sociales*" as the most characteristic and most notably scientific manifestation of this sociological school.¹⁰⁴⁶

The institution is not peculiar to France. The German Social Catholics under Hitze's leadership had organized social study courses and conferences at München-Gladbach and at other places since the 'nineties. The Belgians held their first "agricultural week" in 1905, and their first "labor week" in 1908. Holland inaugurated a "social week" at Utrecht in 1906. Spain and Italy followed the example in 1907. The Poles inaugurated similar conventions at Warsaw, Przemysl, and Posen — that is, in each of the three sundered fragments of Poland — in the same year. The Lithuanian Roman Catholics held their first "social week" at Kovno, in January, 1909. Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, and other countries developed similar institutions. Even Latin America adopted the idea in 1912, when Uruguay convened the first "social week" of South America. The "social week" is now almost universal in Catholic countries, and the more important of these congresses are usually attended by numerous foreign delegates, so that the movement is at once national and international in character.¹⁰⁴⁷

The *Semaine sociale* of France was originated in 1904 by the

joint efforts of a group of enthusiastic young Social Catholics belonging to the "Federation of the South-East," a regional organization of study-groups whose organ was the *Chronique sociale de France*, and of the Social Catholic Study Union which had been formed in 1902 under the chairmanship of Henri Lorin — one of the leaders trained up in the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs under the influence of Count Albert de Mun and the Marquis de La Tour du Pin. The *Semaines sociales*, therefore, represented a continuation of the movement inaugurated by de Mun and La Tour du Pin.¹⁰⁴⁸

The purpose which the founders of *Semaines sociales* had in mind was explained by Henri Lorin. As practical Catholics, he said, they wished to recognize clearly the implications of Catholic doctrine from a social point of view. They wished the "requirements of justice, as implied in the affirmations" of their faith, to be realized in the details of social relationships. Furthermore, he added,

We desire to discover in the doctrines which attempt to solve the social question whatever unconsciously Catholic and, therefore, profoundly true elements they may possess, and we wish to give to the men who thus unwittingly participate in the ideas which are ours, knowledge of their affinity with the Christian conception, knowledge of the extent to which they have borrowed from it and of the agreements into which logic should guide them.¹⁰⁴⁹

The *Semaine sociale*, as its founders conceived it, was to be a sort of migratory popular university for social research. In one city after another, year by year, it would enable the leading Catholic experts on social and economic questions to instruct serious students as well as large popular audiences, in short one-week courses.

At Lyons in 1904 the first *Semaine sociale* was attended by 231 French laymen, 222 French priests, and 19 foreigners. The bulk of the assembly merely attended the popular lectures, but a hundred or so more earnest students attended the conference courses religiously and took copious notes, as one might do at any university. The next year, at Orléans, seven or eight

hundred persons attended. At Dijon, in 1906, a still larger crowd — about 1200 — was attracted. At Amiens, in 1907, there were about 1400. At Marseilles, in 1908, at Bordeaux in 1909, at Rouen, in 1910, at Saint-Etienne in 1911, at Limoges in 1912, at Versailles in 1913, the “social week” continued to draw the same large attendances. Some 1500 persons visited the *Semaine* at Versailles,—the largest of all,—including 24 delegates from Belgium and smaller delegations from Algeria, Germany, Brazil, Canada, England, Spain, Italy, Holland, Argentine, Switzerland.¹⁰⁵⁰ During the war, the *Semaines* were suspended; in 1919, however, a *Semaine* was held at Metz.

To attend as a student at one of the *Semaines sociales*, says Abbé Charles Calippe, is no “sinecure.” From eight o’clock in the morning until eleven at night, the student “has hardly time to breathe.” In the morning, he attends two lecture-courses, each lasting an hour and a half; after lunch, he is taken to visit neighboring factories, coöperative societies, trade unions, or workingmen’s gardens; late in the afternoon, there is another lecture-course; and, finally, in the evening there is a general lecture, open to a more popular audience as well as to the real students.¹⁰⁵¹

Representatives of all social classes,—excepting only the socially inert,—attend the *Semaines*. Professors, lawyers, journalists, and engineers, representing the intellectual bourgeoisie, rub shoulders with ordinary workingmen and with aristocratic landed proprietors. Many, if not most, represent some active social interest: they are chairmen of study clubs or of young men’s associations, organizers of trade unions or of mutual-aid societies, founders of workingmen’s gardens, or writers on social questions. Particularly important, considering the future development of the movement, is the large attendance of the clergy. The *Semaines* are usually held under the patronage of the local bishop or archbishop, and receive many encouragements from the episcopacy. Every year several hundred of the clergy attend; sometimes there are five or six hundred. By the *Semaine sociale* the clergy are kept in touch with lay experts on social legislation, with lay economists and

sociologists, as well as with priests, like Abbé Antoine, Abbé Calippe, Abbé Sertillanges, and Father Rutten, who are leaders in social action and social theory.

Thus the clergy are kept abreast of new developments in social reform and in economic doctrine, and return to their parishes inspired with ideas, which they can hardly avoid transmitting to their parishioners. They act as a leaven, which has not yet thoroughly permeated the Catholic masses, but is bound to have a very wide influence, and will in all probability produce—in the course of time—a substantial unity of social doctrine among French Catholics.

Another factor which may tend to promote such unity is the care with which the speakers at the *Semaines sociales* are chosen so as to represent not only the main body of Social Catholic thought, but also more or less divergent wings of the movement. For example, Urbain Guérin and Georges Blondel, eminent economists belonging to the *Réforme sociale* or Le Play school, represent the right wing, more conservative than the school of de Mun. Max Turmann, professor at the Catholic University of Fribourg, member of the French academy, and author of a book on the development of Social Catholicism, is one of the representatives of the left wing, which shades into the Christian Democratic movement, more radical than de Mun's school in its attitude toward democracy and social legislation. Abbé Lemire, father of the "workingmen's gardens" and one of the most prominent and radical political representatives of Christian Democracy, was among the speakers at one of the *Semaines* (1905); if he was omitted from the program of later years, possibly it was because he got into difficulties with his ecclesiastical superiors.

To name the lecturers at the *Semaines sociales* would be almost the same as giving a list of the leading Social Catholics of France (and Belgium). To those already mentioned, should be added,—and even then the list is by no means complete,—the names of Abbé Desbuquois, director of the *Action Populaire*; Joseph Zamanski, joint editor of *Le Mouvement social* and a member of the *secrétariat social* of Paris; Raoul

Jay, professor in the faculty of law of the University of Paris, member of the Superior Council of Labor, secretary of the French Association for the Legal Protection of the Workingman, and an eminent authority on social legislation; Jean Brunhes, founder of the French Social League of Consumers, and professor at the Catholic University of Fribourg; Étienne Martin-Saint-Léon, librarian of the *Musée social* and historian of the guild movement; Eugène Duthoit, professor of political economy at the University of Lille, and one of the "masters" of French Social Catholic theory; Professor Boissard, likewise of Lille; Professor Chénon, of the Paris Faculty of Law; Abbé Antoine, formerly professor at Angers, one of the foremost students of the theological principles involved in social questions; Charles Broutin, a common laborer — a "fitter" — active in the Christian labor movement in northern France; Abbé Calippe, professor at the theological seminary of Amiens, and author of several works on the Social Catholic movement; Abbé Sertillanges, one of the greatest preachers of Paris, and professor at the Catholic Institute; Maurice Deslandres, of the University of Dijon, vice-president of the Social League of Consumers; Moysset, editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*; Étienne Lamy, editor of *Le Correspondant*. The number of professors is worth noting; it means that in the Catholic Universities the social doctrines of the *Semaines sociales* are being imparted to the rising generation of Catholic intellectuals.

Among the foreigners who speak at the French *Semaines sociales*, Belgian Social Catholics are the most numerous. Carton de Wiart, Belgian premier during the Great War of 1914, was one of the speakers at the *Semaine* of 1910. Mgr. Deploige, rector of the *Institut de philosophie* of Louvain, delivered a lecture at the *Semaine* of 1913, criticizing the theories of Durkheim, the great Belgian sociologist. Most interesting of all is Père Rutten, a Dominican, who out of sympathy for the proletariat exchanged his white friar's habit for the miner's smutty frock, lived the toilsome life of a day-laborer, and eventually became the active leader of a hundred thousand Catholic trade-unionists in Belgium.

In scope and tendency the deliberations of the *Semaines sociales* closely resemble the *Guide social* or the *Année sociale internationale* of the *Action Populaire*. Above all, they are concerned with the development of industrial organization or unionism, social legislation, the protection of family life, the popularization of Christian conceptions of the dignity of labor, of social justice, of social responsibilities.

The predominant tendency of the *Semaines sociales* has been favorable to democratic social politics. The studies pursued in the annual conferences, says Étienne Lamy, have prepared even "those Catholics who are most distrustful of the state" to recognize the necessity of labor legislation, such as measures against child labor, restriction of the employment of women, protection of the Sunday holiday. It was only natural that many Catholics should distrust state intervention in economic questions, since state intervention in religious questions had been so hostile and illiberal toward the Church. "It was by becoming atheist that the state became anti-social." Nevertheless, the idea of the social duties of the state had triumphed, and the Social Catholics in the *Semaines sociales* had even approved in principle certain of the reforms proposed by the Socialists. However, unlike the Socialists, the Catholics desired to increase the autonomy and authority of industrial organizations, rather than to centralize all the functions of social supervision in the national government.¹⁰⁵²

Lamy's statement that the *Semaines sociales* had converted even the most anti-interventionist Catholics to the cause of social legislation is probably an exaggeration. Certain it is, at any rate, that from the more conservative wing protests arose against the too radical spirit of the congresses. For example, in *La Réforme sociale*, the organ of Le Play's disciples, we find an article by Eugène Rostand, a Catholic and former president of the Society of Social Economy, rebuking the socialistic tendencies manifested by the "young Catholics" in the *Semaine sociale* of Bordeaux (1909). Prefacing his rebuke with an expression of sympathy for the generous intentions of the younger Social Catholics, Rostand endeavored "to put these

sincere and ardent spirits on their guard against an orientation which is false in itself and dangerous to the cause to which they are devoted." There was an alarming drift, he asserted, towards "interventionism and state socialism." Catholics who denounced capitalism were playing into the hands of the Socialists and Syndicalists. To apply Christ's social teachings and moral maxims to modern society, as the radical Social Catholics were doing, was to commit a grievous fallacy. Moreover,—and here Rostand proceeds to use the very method of argument he has just condemned,—Jesus sanctioned inequality among men as well as the right of property. Catholics, he concluded, should beware of social legislation, although exceptions might be made in favor of legislation to enforce the Sunday holiday, encourage thrift, protect women and children, combat alcoholism, and foster the acquisition of homes by workingmen.¹⁰⁵³

The *Semaines sociales*, we may conclude, are far from producing, at present, any genuine unanimity among the various Catholic groups interested in social reform. The conservatives still attack the radicals. But the fact that all take part in the discussions, and in an amicable spirit, is perhaps a circumstance favorable to the increase of harmony, and to the further spread of the strongly positive doctrine of the genuine Social Catholics. Even though among conservative economists opposition to that doctrine may continue to be encountered, the fact is indisputable that the *Semaines* are rapidly popularizing among the Catholic clergy and laity, and above all among the intellectuals of the rising generation, a constructive conception of social reform. And this service is the more significant because the purpose of the instruction at the *Semaines* is to equip Catholic leaders not merely with general theories and principles, but also with specific knowledge and practical information, to the end that they may be prepared for practical service in behalf of labor reform and social welfare. This purpose explains the brief but expressive phrase chosen as the motto of the *Semaines sociales*: "Science for Action," — "*La Science pour l'Action.*"

THE YOUNG MEN'S CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION

The French Young Men's Catholic Association (the A. C. J. F. or *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*), another important organization participating in the contemporary Social Catholic movement, serves in some sort as a recruiting bureau for the Popular Liberal Party, the *Action Populaire*, and the *Semaines sociales*. It contributes the enthusiasm and the progressive spirit of youth to the social movement.

It was precisely for this rôle that the A. C. J. F. was founded, in 1886, by Count Albert de Mun, as an offshoot of or rather as a preparatory school for the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs. The A. C. J. F. is therefore a lineal descendant of the Workingmen's Clubs Association, which is universally acknowledged as the parent organization of the contemporary Social Catholic Movement in France.

In March of 1886, Robert de Roquefeuil and five other young men gathered at the Paris office of the workingmen's clubs. Count Albert de Mun, father of the workingmen's clubs, there addressed them, describing his dream of a great army of young men, organized in local groups, united by a central committee, devoted to the mission of reforming society in accordance with Christian principles. Inspired by the veteran leader's enthusiasm, the six youths then and there formed the *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française*, a national association with six members.¹⁰⁵⁴

Enthusiasm was theirs if nothing more. And enthusiasm soon bore fruit. In the short space of fourteen months the association of six members had become a federation of twenty local groups, embracing a thousand members. The first general convention, held in May, 1887, at Angers, received the valuable encouragement of Mgr. Freppel, the local bishop. The second general assembly, at Paris, in June, 1889, was patronized by Cardinal Richard and by Léon Harmel, the wealthy manufacturer who had organized his textile mills on the guild model. The third convention, at Lyons, in April, 1891, represented

sixty groups. In June of that year the A. C. J. F. was powerful enough to organize a meeting of 8,000 young men at Notre Dame; in September, to organize a pilgrimage of 1,500 to Rome, where the tricolor flag of the Association was blessed by the pope. Year by year the Association grew in numbers and its general conventions gained in importance. At the convention of Besançon, for example, in 1898, the list of speakers included the most brilliant intellectual and political leaders of Catholic France: Count Albert de Mun, deputy and orator, Léon Harmel, apostle of the guild idea and leader of the Christian Democrats, Abbé Lemire, initiator of the workingmen's gardens movement and one of the most active advocates of social reform to be found in the Chamber of Deputies, Brunetière, a convert to Catholicism from positivism whose literary genius had won him an international reputation, and Social Catholic writers such as Georges Goyau, Fonsegrive, and Savatier. At the time of its convention at Chalon-sur-Saône, May, 1903, the Association comprised 631 groups and about 30,000 members. Less than a year later, the number of local groups had increased to 850. Thus the Association continued to expand.¹⁰⁵⁵

Thanks to the large autonomy which they enjoy, the local branches have developed a remarkable diversity of character. There are rural groups and urban groups. Some are simply study clubs, others are very active in social welfare work, in the charities of the Saint Vincent de Paul Society, in forming rural credit societies, in founding trade-unions, in social secretariats. Some groups are composed of young aristocrats and bourgeois, others of peasants, others of young laborers, others of clerks, others of college students. The original type was essentially bourgeois. Its members were young men of the middle and upper classes, just finishing their collegiate work, or entering the professions, who gathered regularly for the discussion of science, literature, art, philosophy, religion,—of everything except politics,—but, above all, of social questions. Since 1891, and more especially since 1902, the association has taken on a less bourgeois character, and made rapid headway

among the peasants and also among the laborers, especially, in the latter category, among the miners and metallurgical workers. At about the close of the year 1903, it was calculated that the farmers' groups represented 45 per cent., the laborers' groups 35 per cent., and the others (clerks, students, bourgeois) 20 per cent. of the total.¹⁰⁵⁶

From its birth, the A. C. J. F. was in the truest sense of the word a child of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, that enterprise in which Count Albert de Mun and Marquis de La Tour du Pin, with their associates and disciples, had constituted the original nucleus of the contemporary French Social Catholic Movement. Alexandre Souriac, vice-president of the A. C. J. F., writing in the year 1913, gave the clearest possible proof that the A. C. J. F. continues to regard itself,—in his words,—as the “daughter of the Association of Clubs.”¹⁰⁵⁷ Count Albert de Mun, for his part, wrote in 1903 that the A. C. J. F. was founded “in close agreement with the principles and ideas of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs.”¹⁰⁵⁸ De Mun, it may be remarked, took a paternal interest in the younger organization; he was the most welcome of all orators at its conventions and banquets, and when his ill health forbade him to speak on such an occasion, he sent a long letter to be read in lieu of an address.¹⁰⁵⁹

The social ideas of the A. C. J. F. are the ideas of the Social Catholic movement with which the reader is already familiar. Alexandre Souriac, as spokesman of the association, in 1913, contributed an article to the *Réforme sociale*, summarizing these ideas under three general headings. In the first place, comes the family, the primary unit of society. The A. C. J. F. advocates a series of reforms, such as the legal interdiction of night-work, the legal enforcement of the Sunday holiday, the representation of family interests in municipal councils, and legislation enabling each family to acquire an inalienable “family patrimony,” and other measures calculated to promote family life and to prevent the destruction of the workingman's home by economic causes.

In the second place, the A. C. J. F. believes in the scheme of

industrial unionism,—the interorganization of labor and capital,—advocated by de Mun and other Social Catholics. The first step in this direction is the creation of trade unions (only a minority of the French workingmen are unionized, one should remember), and so far as possible the establishment of mixed boards or other organizations bringing capital and labor together. The government should foster the movement toward trade organization and should recognize the unions as the representatives of trade interests. The final step is the extension of the rôle of the trade organizations to include such matters as prevention of unemployment, provision of old-age pensions, management of social insurance, regulation of shop conditions and hours of labor, determination of wages.

Thirdly, as regards the political aspect of social reform, the A. C. J. F. favors much the same program as the Popular Liberal Party: social legislation, increasing recognition of organized economic interests, decentralization, *etc.* Religious policy is regarded as having an important connection with social policy, because the A. C. J. F. considers Christian principles such as charity, fraternity, class conciliation, social justice, and obedience to authority as indispensable bases of social reform. It is declared, therefore, that the state should adopt an attitude friendly rather than hostile to the Church.¹⁰⁶⁰

It was remarked, at the beginning of this section, that the A. C. J. F. served as a recruiting bureau for the *Action Populaire*, the *Semaines sociales*, and the Popular Liberal Party. By way of conclusion, it may not be inappropriate to return to this assertion, for it explains the chief significance of the organization. A few illustrations will serve to bring out the point more forcibly. One of the most valuable members of the staff of the *Action Populaire* is Joseph Zamanski, who, with the collaboration of Abbé Desbuquois (director of the *Action Populaire*) edits the most important organ of that organization and of the French Social Catholic movement,—*Le Mouvement social*. This brilliant young sociologist served his apprenticeship in the A. C. J. F.; he was a member of its executive committee at one time. One of the incidents of his career in the

A. C. J. F. will bear repetition. At a time when the *apaches* had taken a fancy to invade the Paris churches in ruffianly fashion, Zamanski with other members of the A. C. J. F. fought off the invaders and came away bleeding and bedraggled, but victorious.¹⁰⁶¹

Zamanski serves likewise as a link between the A. C. J. F. and the *Semaines sociales*, for he has been a prominent lecturer in the more recent sessions of the *Semaines*. At the *Semaine* of 1911 he delivered lectures on "How to realize justice in the wage-contract" and on "Labor legislation in France"; at the *Semaine* of 1912 he lectured on "the employment of women"; at the *Semaine* of 1913, on "the responsibility of labor."¹⁰⁶²

Jean Lerolle, at one time president of the A. C. J. F., is another personal link with the *Semaines sociales*. In 1910 he discussed the employment of children at night; in 1911, "the question of labor"; in 1912, "the family and the problem of pensions"; in 1913, "the legal protection of children."¹⁰⁶³

To the Popular Liberal Party also, the A. C. J. F. has contributed energetic and able recruits. Jean Lerolle, whose name has just been mentioned, became in 1912 a member of the parliamentary group of that party, as deputy from the 7th *arrondissement* of Paris. Henri Bazire, who preceded Lerolle as president of the A. C. J. F., took an active part in the national conventions of the Popular Liberal Party, and became a member of the executive committee of the party.¹⁰⁶⁴ Alexandre Souriac, another officer of the A. C. J. F., was selected to prepare very important reports for the party conventions of 1906 and 1907.¹⁰⁶⁵

With the Popular Liberal Party, in fact, the relations of the A. C. J. F. have been extremely cordial. Count Albert de Mun, to whose inspiration the foundation of the A. C. J. F. was due, took so active an interest in the Popular Liberal Party, of which he was vice-president, that he urged the former association to aid the latter. The Popular Liberal Party, he told the A. C. J. F., aimed to unite all those "who sincerely wished to give satisfaction, by means of honestly prepared reforms, to the legitimate demands of the workingmen, and to aid

them to shake off, by the strength of trade organization, the yoke of Socialist trade unions." Such a program, he declared, agreed with the fundamental principles of the A. C. J. F., and deserved the latter's enthusiastic support.¹⁰⁶⁶ Jacques Piou, president of the Popular Liberal Party, was invited to address the convention of the A. C. J. F. at Chalon-sur-Saône, May 10, 1903; the frantic applause with which the convention approved his stirring appeal for aid in the struggle which his party was waging left room for no doubt that the A. C. J. F. could be counted upon to give the party the most ardent support.¹⁰⁶⁷

CHAPTER XI

DISSIDENT GROUPS

CONSIDERED collectively, the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, the Popular Liberal Party, the *Action Populaire*, the *Semaines sociales*, and the Young Men's Catholic Association might be considered as representing what has been called the "Social Catholic School." Theirs is a fairly clear-cut and distinctly original program of social politics, a program offering three converging methods for the solution of the modern labor problem, namely, first, social legislation to protect the workingman against the abuses of the modern industrial system and to foster industrial organization; second, the unionization of labor and the inter-organization of labor and capital on something resembling the guild plan, to the end that ultimately the organized trades may take over from the state, in large part, the duties of labor legislation and social insurance; third, Christian moral action to strengthen the spirit of charity, justice, fraternity, as opposed to avarice and social indifference on the part of capitalists and materialism and violence on the part of the proletariat.

Now the distinguishing feature of the Social Catholic School is that while asserting most vigorously both the need of social legislation and the need of trade organization, it fits the two into a balanced scheme of society compatible with the maintenance of private property and a considerable measure of individual liberty. But it is very easy by overemphasizing one element of this program to neglect the others and destroy the equilibrium. By stressing the need of social legislation, that is, of state intervention, one arrives at state socialism pure and simple. By exaggerating the case for trade organization, one passes over to revolutionary syndicalism. By exalting pri-

vate property and liberty one may return to economic Liberalism or *laissez-faire* individualism.

The so-called "Social Catholic" organizations which inherit the spirit of Count Albert de Mun, maintain the nice equilibrium between the three ideas, and yet put much stress on all. Of these organizations we have completed our survey. It now remains to glance at some of the groups which have felt the influence of the Social Catholic school, but differ from that school because they do not maintain the balance between its three principles. Such a survey of what might be styled — in no derogatory sense — the "heretical" schools, is an essential part of this study, for otherwise it would be impossible to comprehend either the difficulties with which the Social Catholic movement is confronted or the full measure of the movement's influence.

THE "SOCIAL REFORM" SCHOOL

The "Social Reform" School is one of the conservative Catholic groups which tends to diverge from the Social Catholic doctrine on the issue of social legislation. The group, as a whole, is more timid than are the genuine Social Catholics in asserting the necessity of state intervention in labor questions. Hence, by a logical connection of ideas, the thesis of trade organization is also weakened, because the group is unwilling that the state should make such organization in any sense compulsory. Moral action, therefore, becomes the principal factor in social reform, and the rights of property and liberty are exalted. The divergency, however, is not so wide as to set an impassable gulf between the "Social Reform" School and the Social Catholic School; on the contrary, the two schools are very cordially and intimately associated and the influence of the latter is so strongly felt in the former that a future complete agreement is not at all beyond the range of probability.

Historically, the "Social Reform" and the Social Catholic schools are closely related. The former was founded by Le Play, the eminent Catholic conservative sociologist of the Sec-

ond Empire,¹⁰⁶⁸ and embraces his most faithful disciples. The latter, as the reader will doubtless remember, was at the outset merely an enterprise of popular propaganda, without a distinct doctrine of its own, and much under the influence of Le Play, whom it venerated as the greatest French master of Catholic social economy. The Social Catholic School, in its early years, regarded itself not as a rival or an opponent of the "Social Reform" School, but as a co-worker, primarily concerned with practical action among the masses, while the "Social Reform" School was more concerned with the study of economic phenomena and with a more scholarly kind of propaganda. It was only as the Social Catholics, with the progress of their activity, gradually developed a doctrine of their own, that the two schools began to diverge.¹⁰⁶⁹

At the present time, the "Social Reform" School, as we have designated it, is represented by the Society of Social Economy (*La Société d'Économie Sociale*) and the Unions of Social Peace (*Unions de la Paix Sociale*). The former is a learned society founded by Le Play, in 1856, for the scientific study of social institutions by the method of minute comparative observation, particularly observation of typical families,—a method which he had introduced. The Society holds annual assemblies and conducts deliberative sessions every winter. True to the spirit of its founder, it is interested in encouraging the inductive or empirical method of sociology, and in questions of social reform. It is essentially a learned body, without a definite practical program of social reform; but its studies tend to foster interest in social problems and their proposed solutions. Its president, in 1914, was Paul Nourrisson, a lawyer; its secretary-general, F. Lepelletier, professor of political economy in the *Faculté libre de droit de Paris*. Among its vice-presidents, we find Georges Blondel, professor at the *Ecole des Sciences Politiques*, who is already familiar to us as a lecturer at the *Semaines sociales*. On the council were men like Béchaux, honorary professor of political economy at Lille, Brants, professor of political economy at Louvain, Hubert-Valleroux, a lawyer, Honoré, manager of the big department

store of the Louvre, Paul Bourget, and Martin-Saint-Léon, historian of the guilds and lecturer at the *Semaines sociales*. Glancing through the list of members, one comes, perhaps with some surprise, to the name of Jacques Piou, president of the Popular Liberal Party. That the leader of a party with so radical a program of social legislation should belong to the Society is not, on second thought, astonishing. The Society, it must be remembered, is primarily a learned body rather than a propagandist organization with a definite program.¹⁰⁷⁰

The Unions of Social Peace, on the other hand, were distinctly propagandist. They were founded by Le Play in 1872, in the midst of the reaction against the Commune and against socialism,—a reaction which they endeavored to strengthen. Their purpose to this day remains much the same: to conduct propaganda against revolutionary social doctrines, to preach social conciliation, moral regeneration, and social peace. They strive

to propagate and put into practice the doctrines which the School of Social Peace deduces from the methodical study of facts. Discarding all irritating polemic, they appeal, irrespective of parties, to all men of good faith who desire to assure the respect of the law of God and the reign of social peace. It is by the experience of the past and the study of the present that the Unions strive to illuminate the essential conditions for the maintenance of stability in the family and harmony in the factory. To restore these necessary conditions wherever they have been disturbed is the task which they assume, to the end that by their modest efforts they may contribute to the prosperity of the nation.¹⁰⁷¹

It is the duty of each member of the Unions to gain one new recruit every year, and to distribute Le Play's works as well as the other literature of the school. The propaganda of the Unions is, obviously, somewhat erudite.

The fortnightly review "Social Reform" (*La Réforme sociale*),¹⁰⁷² founded by Le Play in the year 1881, serves as the organ of the Unions of Social Peace as well as of the Society of Social Economy. It is therefore the mouthpiece of the school, and for that reason we have applied its name to the school.

The name, incidentally, is reminiscent of Le Play's famous work, *La Réforme sociale*, published in 1864.

In an article on the social ideas of the Le Play or "Social Reform" School, in 1913, Frédéric Charpin, secretary of the editorial board of *La Réforme sociale*, gives a concise summary of the program. The program is based on the following sequence of fundamental principles: social peace is the criterion of social welfare; social peace may be secured by respect of the moral law, and, notably, of the Decalogue; the practical observance of the moral law necessitates incessant effort; such effort is a matter of free human volition; hence, a large measure of freedom is desirable although absolute individual liberty is to be repudiated. These principles, as well as their practical applications, are put forward as the results of scientific sociological observation and inductive reasoning.

The practical applications may be grouped under four heads. First, the family. The family, in the view of Le Play's disciples, is the most important social unit; to preserve and strengthen it must be the primary aim of all reform. The law and the custom of the equal division of inheritances are regarded as prejudicial to the family, because they bring about the infinite subdivision of family inheritances; when a small property is divided among numerous heirs it is destroyed, because each portion is too small to provide a workable farm. Much to be preferred would be a system in which family properties are maintained intact, passing from generation to generation in lineal descent, and serving as a material basis for family continuity. In the interest of the family, Charpin continues, the principle of private property must be maintained inviolate, for collectivism would imperil the family. Thrift should be encouraged, housing schemes promoted, agriculture fostered, and the employment of women and children in industry restricted;—all of these measures, it is believed, will conduce to the greater stability of family life. Finally, the campaign in favor of the *bien de famille* (that is, the acquisition of a small but virtually inalienable patrimony by every family) is warmly endorsed.

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In the second place, communal and regional autonomy should be developed. This point is perhaps more political than social in character, but it has a bearing on the social question. Decentralization of government is considered to be a safeguard against the socialistic tendencies of the modern national state. In advocating a revival of local self-government and "regionalism" Le Play was a forerunner of the important contemporary "regionalist" movement in France, and his disciples are found in the ranks of that movement.

In the third place, the trade-union movement is to be promoted and diverted from dangerous paths. Le Play, it will be remembered, had been decidedly sceptical of the value of trade-unionism. Charpin believes that had the master lived longer, he would have favored the trade unions. Even Charpin, however, shows some traces of Le Play's distrust of labor unions. The labor unions, he insists, must be free and voluntary. They must have no power or authority over non-members. Perhaps gradually they may develop a sort of customary law, an unwritten law, respecting wages, the limitation of the working day, shop regulations, *etc.*; they may assume charge of employment bureaus, and may develop mutual and co-operative societies. But the trade union must not be given a predominant place in the social structure, nor must it overshadow the family in importance, or tend to promote the replacement of private by collective property. In short, the "Social Reform" School reproduces the Social Catholic doctrine of trade organization, but with many misgivings and reservations.

In the fourth place, as regards social legislation, Charpin's program is more negative than positive. State intervention in labor questions is to be admitted only as a last resort. "We do not deny the necessity," says Charpin, of state intervention "in certain cases — few in number — where, to use Lacordaire's words, 'it is liberty which oppresses and law which emancipates.' But it is a last resort [*un pis-aller*]." ¹⁰⁷³

In its attitude toward Social Catholic organizations such as the *Action Populaire* and the *Semaines sociales*, toward the

Popular Liberal Party, and toward Social Catholic writers, *La Réforme sociale* is extremely friendly, except when its fear of socialistic tendencies is aroused. Thus in 1905, on the eve of a general election, *La Réforme sociale* commented very favorably upon the Popular Liberal Party as an organization claiming the allegiance of "all those who desire honest elections and a fair government"; but it was the religious and political, rather than the social program of the party which earned *La Réforme sociale's* commendation.¹⁰⁷⁴ The *Action Populaire* is also regarded with friendly eye; its publications are favorably reviewed; and prominent members of the "Social Reform" group have contributed pamphlets to the *Action Populaire's* series.¹⁰⁷⁵

As regards the *Semaines sociales*, it has already been observed that members of the "Social Reform" group frequently participate in these conventions. *La Réforme sociale* publishes enthusiastic accounts of the *Semaines sociales*, but it also chides the lecturers who are too radical in their theories.¹⁰⁷⁶

Similarly in reviewing books of Social Catholic tendency *La Réforme sociale* finds it possible to extend cordial personal compliments with one hand while administering doctrinal reproof with the other. Thus Lepelletier, a member of the editorial board, in reviewing a new edition of Professor Paul Pic's *Traité élémentaire de législation industrielle*, praises Professor Pic's scholarship and accuracy in the highest terms, but remarks that he is at times too much inclined toward state intervention.¹⁰⁷⁷

In fact, *La Réforme sociale* again and again voices the chagrin of an obsolescent economic philosophy confronted by a seemingly irresistible modern tendency towards radical social legislation. Hubert-Valleroux, writing on "The New Spirit and Labor Legislation," disconsolately remarks:

Those of my colleagues who are as old as I, may remember the time—long past, to be sure, but not to be thought of without emotion,—when we had the cult of liberty; it was a goddess whom we loved to salute and salute passionately. . . . Today all is changed: that liberty which we had been accustomed to venerate

is treated with the utmost contempt; it is a thing of the past, a superannuated conception, an idea which has had its day.

The popular idea nowadays, he continues, is mass despotism. That is the new spirit.¹⁰⁷⁸

The same hostility toward state intervention determines the attitude of men like Hubert-Valleroux toward trade-union organization. He professes to be a friend of the trade-union movement but he dislikes anything smacking of obligatory membership or the closed shop. The trade unions must be entirely free and voluntary. Moreover, he would make the union liable for damages. Any person, whether a member or not, if injured by the action of a union, and notably any person deprived of employment by the action of the union, should have the right to sue for damages. For such damages the property of the union and the personal property of its officials should be held as security. In case of non-payment, the union might be dissolved by the courts. Such a law would, it is obvious, be a very serious handicap to the trade-union movements. It is inspired by a spirit of distrust.¹⁰⁷⁹

Enough has been said to show that in the "Social Reform" School there is an influential element which still cherishes the ideal of economic liberty and retreats only with the greatest resistance before "the rising tide" of social legislation. As regards social legislation and regarding trade-unionism as well, its spirit is more often critical and negative than positive and constructive. Perhaps the negative tendency has been over-emphasized in the foregoing paragraphs. If so, it is because we desired to bring out more clearly the dissidence between the "Social Reform" School and the Social Catholic School. And perhaps the unfairness of this sketch may be partially corrected by reminding the reader that, after all, many members of the "Social Reform" School are more inclined toward Count de Mun's view of social legislation and labor organization than toward the views of Hubert-Valleroux.

Some accept almost all of the Social Catholic program, others admit only a small part. Thus one might say that the

"Social Reform" school represents Social Catholicism diluted with anti-interventionist Liberalism. The diluting element, being negative, and opposed to the spirit of the age, tends to decrease in potency; the positive element of Social Catholicism tends to become stronger. Without indulging in dangerous prophecy, the opinion may be hazarded that the "Social Reform" School will gradually be more and more permeated by Social Catholicism.

A MONARCHIST GROUP: L'ACTION FRANÇAISE

The *Action Française* is a second group which seems to have been influenced in some measure by Social Catholic ideas, but by overemphasizing some and underemphasizing others diverges far more radically than the "Social Reform" School from the Social Catholic School. Indeed, so far does the divergence go in this case, that the *Action Française* is essentially antagonistic to organizations like the Popular Liberal Party, which accept the Social Catholic program in its entirety. The slight similarity of names, *Action Française* and *Action Libérale Populaire* (Popular Liberal Party), has led some observers of French politics to confuse these two organizations; no error could be more misleading.

The *Action Française* originated in July, 1899, in the midst of the Dreyfus crisis, as a group whose aim was to react against the prevailing tide of liberalism and anti-patriotism. It was reorganized as the *Ligue d'Action Française* in 1905,¹⁰⁸⁰ but never succeeded in becoming much more than a small coterie of reactionary aristocrats and chauvinistic intellectuals. Nevertheless its influence has been relatively large and its official journal, the *Action Française* (edited by Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet) has been sufficiently clever and audacious to wield a real power in politics.

Because the social program of the *Action Française* is incidental to and instrumental to its political program, more attention must be paid to political philosophy than in the case of the "Social Reform" School.

By a brilliant adaptation of modern sociological methods of

reasoning, *L'Action Française* transmutes time-worn concepts such as nationalism and monarchism into scientific verities. Nationalism, with the *Action Française*, is no mere sentiment. It is a fact demonstrated by sociology. Scientific observation shows man to be a social animal. Being social he has need of social groups. The nation is the supreme social group. Nationalism is, therefore, natural and necessary. National patriotism should take precedence over all other political issues.

Applying the same method to the question of the best form of government, one discovers, first of all, that monarchy is the traditional constitution of France. To this fact, the theorists of *L'Action Française* attach great weight, because, in their view, for a nation to attempt to cut itself off from its history, from its past evolution, is as absurd as for a plant to repudiate its roots.

Moreover, assuming national greatness to be a supreme *desideratum*, the monarchical form of government again appears to be vindicated by scientific observation. In the days of the monarchy, France enjoyed glory and prestige, whereas, with a republican form of government, France was compelled to suffer humiliation and to accept a position of inferiority *vis-à-vis* the neighboring monarchy of Germany. The clique of Jews, Protestants, and Free Masons who had obtained control over the republican government were paralyzing France. To restore the national greatness of France, one must overturn that clique and reestablish the historic monarchy.

Moreover, the principle of republicanism is false. Any elective or democratic government is forced, by its very nature, to be concerned, above all, about its own reëlection, whereas an hereditary monarch, free from such concerns, is inclined to devote himself primarily to the public welfare.

On such grounds, the leaders of *L'Action Française* conclude that "the restoration of the national monarchy is for France the certain condition and the only chance of salvation."¹⁰⁸¹

Not for France alone, but for the Catholic Church in France also, monarchy is the only hope. "There is no longer any pos-

sible security for the Catholic Church in France outside the monarchy." ¹⁰⁸² The Republic, the leaders of the *Action Française* point out, has proved itself hostile to the Church. The Monarchy, on the other hand, is traditionally Catholic. With the restoration of the king to his throne, Catholicism should be restored to its place as the historic religion of France and endowed with not mere liberty, but privileges. ¹⁰⁸³

Because it promises privileges to the Church, *L'Action Française* has won the support of many Catholics. But the group is not by origin or composition essentially Catholic. Its leader, Charles Maurras, a former disciple of Anatole France, is certainly not a devout Catholic, and is regarded as an atheist by some French churchmen.

Étienne Lamy, one of the most conspicuous Catholic politicians in France, once attacked the *Action Française* as insincere in its clericalism. For the leaders of *L'Action Française* clericalism was merely a matter of tactics. "For them, the Church is a very useful tool at the service of the monarchy," he said. They were not so much interested in defending the Church as in getting Catholic support.

The *Action Française* strives to make royalty and the Church one and indivisible, so that the Church may see her salvation only in the restoration of the king, and the Catholics and the monarchists form a single army.

Such tactics, Lamy indignantly declared, constituted open disobedience to the counsels of Leo XIII and of Pius X. By representing Catholicism and monarchism as inseparable, the *Action Française* was really injuring the Church; it was keeping alive a harmful cause of dissension among Catholics; it was furnishing the anticlericals with a pretext for attacking the Church as the enemy of the Republic. ¹⁰⁸⁴

The attempt of the *Action Française* to enlist Catholicism in the support of monarchist reaction is one feature, it may be remarked in passing, which marks the antagonism between this party and the *Action Libérale Populaire* or Popular Liberal Party. The latter, as was shown in an earlier chapter, accepts

the Republic, forbids its adherents to conspire against the existing form of government, and desires democratic reform of the republican constitution, with liberty and equality before the law for the Church. The two programs — monarchy with religious privilege, and republic with religious liberty — are diametrically opposed.

Coming at last to the social theories of the *Action Française*, we may observe that they, quite as much as the religious policies of the party, are colored by the political preconception in favor of monarchy. To the workers as to the Catholics, the *Action Française* says, "you have nothing to gain from democracy, but everything to hope for from the monarchy." The working classes, say the party's leaders, are the principal victims of "the democratic mystification." Democratic social legislation is a snare and delusion. To pass laws restricting the number of hours which an adult laborer may work is to "offend his dignity and arrest his activity." The state should intervene as little as possible, and should transfer, so far as possible, all functions of this kind to the trade organizations. Thus, the *Action Française* leans so heavily upon the Social Catholic thesis of industrial organization that it all but discards the Social Catholic thesis of social legislation.

Moreover, the thesis of industrial organization, in the hands of the *Action Française*, assumes a form repugnant to the Social Catholic School. The *Action Française*, like the Social Catholic School, favors the guild organization of industry. But the latter school, abhorring class hatred, aims at the conciliation of labor and capital on a basis of social justice, mutual interest, and Christian concord, while the *Action Française*, fostering class antagonism, aims at an equipoise of opposing forces. The theory of the *Action Française* is that

Today the king appears, above all, as the king of labor, the king of production; his interest is that labor organization should attain its highest development, appealing to that which gives it its rigorously laborite character, the class spirit, in order that the capitalist bourgeoisie may accomplish its historic mission. The king tends to maintain the captains of industry between two walls,—on one

side a central government absolutely independent of the capitalists, on the other side, a working class strongly organized. . . . ¹⁰⁸⁵

To favor the class-conscious labor movement is almost a tactical necessity for the *Action Française*. If the workingmen should become reconciled to the capitalists, or converted to social democracy, one could hardly expect them to aid in the overthrow of the republican government. But revolutionary syndicalism, vowed to "direct action" against the capitalists, and scornful of political democracy, might prove a useful ally; it would at least help to discredit the democratic form of government; and it might conceivably join forces with the monarchists in using violence against the republican bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁸⁶

In a word, the *Action Française* agrees with the Social Catholics in recommending the guild form of industrial organization, but differs from them in regard to the question of social legislation and the question of class antagonism. The difference seems to be traceable to a political preconception in favor of monarchy. Being hostile to the Republic, the *Action Française* naturally has no faith in social legislation by the Republic. Hoping for a monarchical restoration, the *Action Française* is prone to regard revolutionary syndicalism — which is so repugnant to the Social Catholics — as a possible ally against democracy.

THE "CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS"

In precisely the opposite direction, but for precisely the same reason, the "Christian Democrats" diverge from the Social Catholic School. Like the *Action Française*, the Christian Democrats make their social theories dependent upon their preference for a particular form of government. In the case of the Christian Democrats, however, political democracy, not monarchy, is the favored constitution. And whereas the political theories of the *Action Française* lead to the rejection of the Social Catholic theory of democratic social legislation, the political theories of the Christian Democrats lead to the exaltation of such legislation as the great instrument of social reform.

The Christian Democratic movement in France has been so

important that a somewhat more extended consideration must be devoted to its rise and its doctrines. It should be remarked in advance that no hard and fast line may be drawn between this movement and the Social Catholic movement proper. Superficially, their programs are much alike. The difference between the two movements is essentially a difference of emphasis, and such a difference is clearly recognizable only in extremes. Even today the two merge into one another through a continuous zone of intermediate gradation, so that leaders like Max Turmann may be called, sometimes, Christian Democrats, sometimes, Social Catholics.

The French Christian Democratic movement arose about the time of Pope Leo III's famous encyclicals (on the labor question, 1891, and on acceptance of the French Republic, 1892). The leaders, who were, for the most part, brilliant young priests engaged in popular journalism, or in politics, believed that the time had come for the Church to stand forth as the fearless champion of the masses. Militantly democratic was the tone of the numerous journals and reviews, such as Abbé Naudet's *Social Justice*, Abbé Six's *Christian Democracy*, Abbé Dabry's *Catholic Life*, and Abbé Garnier's *The French People*, through which these ardent young journalist-priests poured forth their new gospel of political and social democracy, during the decade of the 'nineties. One of their band, Abbé Garnier, toured France to found a "National Union," a strenuously democratic organization. Two others, namely Abbé Lemire and Abbé Gayraud, were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, the former in 1895, the latter in 1897.¹⁰⁸⁷

The movement was at first spontaneous rather than concerted or organized. But in 1896 and 1897 great conventions were held at Rheims and Lyons, respectively, and out of them grew the "Christian Democratic Party."¹⁰⁸⁸ The party was thoroughly democratic, strongly social in tendency, and passionately anti-Semitic.¹⁰⁸⁹ Edouard Drumont, leader of the anti-Semitic campaign, was recognized as foster-father of the new organization. Léon Harmel, the benevolent Catholic capitalist who twenty-three years previously had come to the

support of Count Albert de Mun's Workingmen's Clubs,¹⁰⁹⁰ now became chairman of the national committee of the Christian Democratic party.¹⁰⁹¹ It was he that led imposing "labor pilgrimages" to the Vatican, and obtained from Leo XIII, in 1897, the encouraging declaration: "if, in a word, Democracy will be Christian, it will give to your country a future of peace, prosperity, and happiness."¹⁰⁹² It was Harmel, also, who at this same period endeavored to steer the French Young Men's Catholic Association in the direction of Christian Democracy.¹⁰⁹³

The Christian Democratic movement seemed first to be simply a new development of the older Social Catholic movement inaugurated by Count Albert de Mun and his disciples in the 'seventies. To advocate social legislation, to repudiate socialism, to champion the principle of labor organization, to emphasize the social mission of Christianity,—all this was merely what the Social Catholics had been doing for years past. In fact, Abbé Gayraud claimed that the Christian Democratic Party was an indirect offshoot of Count Albert de Mun's Workingmen's Clubs.

A difference of spirit, however, gradually became apparent. The older generation of Social Catholics had made a great point of class conciliation and of the devotion of the upper class to the service of the masses; the benevolent rôle of the aristocracy was one of de Mun's most cherished conceptions. But the Christian Democrats believed that men were born with equal rights, and hence that there should be no upper classes. The masses should help themselves. They endeavored to encourage the workingman to defend his own interests, by means of the ballot and of the trade union. For this reason they repudiated the mixed unions of labor and capital, so long vaunted by the Social Catholics. Such unions, they considered, tended to prevent labor from becoming independent. Much to be preferred were parallel but separate employers' unions and labor unions. The same idea of self-help characterized the Christian Democratic program of social politics. Their cry was for more democracy, for direct government; for

proportional representation and for the referendum. This perfected political democracy, they hoped, would be used by the people as an instrument for democratic labor legislation and social insurance.

From the first, the Christian Democrats were radical exponents of social legislation and trade-unionism. In the early 'nineties we find Abbé Naudet, one of the leaders of the movement, advocating trade-unionism as the only means of organizing the power of labor, and demanding state intervention in favor of the unions. "In order," he said, "to assure the workman the protection of which he has need, we must have a guild organization of industry, and, in order that this organization may be effective, we wish it to be obligatory." In another speech Naudet declared, "To crown my social program I boldly and fearlessly demand state intervention to sanction the articles elaborated by the guild." The unions or guilds were to be made compulsory, by law, and their decisions were to be upheld by the authority of the government.¹⁰⁹⁴

In a book published in the year 1900 and entitled *Democracy and the Christian Democrats*, Abbé Naudet outlined a radical program for Christian Democracy. In the first place, the government should be made thoroughly responsive to the will of the people, by means of the popular referendum, representation of minorities, representation of professions or trades, and local self-government. Democracy should then be used as an instrument for the betterment of the conditions of labor. It should pass laws against monopolies, regulate the Stock Exchange, limit the working day, prohibit work at night or on Sunday, establish the minimum wage and obligatory insurance in government contract work, establish accident compensation and old-age pensions for all, promote profit-sharing and co-operative enterprises, and readjust the burden of taxation. The government should also foster the organization of industry, in the form of parallel unions of labor and capital, with mixed boards or joint councils.¹⁰⁹⁵

Another Christian Democrat, Abbé Fesch, in his *Année sociale en France* for 1898, summarized the Christian Democratic

program as follows: (1) Agrarian reforms for the benefit of small holders, (2) progressive taxation of incomes and unproductive capital, (3) trade-union organization, with permanent arbitration committees comprising delegates of employers and of labor, (4) labor legislation, including the minimum wage, Sunday holiday, limitation of hours, suppression of night work except in factories with continuous fire, exclusion of mothers from industrial establishments, restriction of the employment of young girls, obligatory social insurance, international labor legislation, (5) coöperation, (6) regulation of commerce and of the Stock Exchange, (7) proportional representation of professional or trade interests, (8) decentralization, (9) laws against Jews and Free-Masons.¹⁰⁹⁶

While many of the reforms which the Christian Democrats advocated were not essentially different from those which the Social Catholics favored, the latter soon recognized that the Christian Democrats were actuated by a spirit radically different from their own. Christian Democracy was appealing to the class-conscious action of labor; Social Catholicism, to the reconciliation and mutual devotion of the classes.

While criticizing the theories of the Christian Democrats, the Social Catholics made repeated efforts to conciliate them and generously opened the pages of *L'Association catholique* to Christian Democratic writers and to theorists like Goyau and Turmann who held an intermediate position between Christian Democracy and Social Catholicism. The Social Catholic congresses or *Semaines sociales* also showed marked hospitality toward Christian Democrats like Abbé Calippe, Goyau, Turmann. And gradually, one may say, an important group of Christian Democrats became so closely identified with the Social Catholic movement that a real fusion took place. Moreover, experience having shown the Christian Democratic scheme of parallel unions of labor and capital to be more practical than the original Social Catholic scheme of mixed unions, most Social Catholics in course of time were converted to the parallel unions. The result was a conciliation both of persons and of doctrines.

Nevertheless, another group of Christian Democrats, notably those who were most interested in political agitation, drifted away from, instead of towards, the Social Catholic School, because to them the all-important issue was political liberalism. What especially widened the gulf was the establishment of Piou's Liberal Group (1899), which developed into the Popular Liberal Party (1902). This new party, as we have seen, accepted in large part the social program of the Social Catholic School and honored the veteran leader of that school, Count Albert de Mun, with the post of vice-president. Now the Popular Liberal Party, by opening its ranks to former monarchists who consented merely to refrain from agitation against the republic, and by merely accepting the republic as the existing form of government without declaring republican democracy to be the best possible form of government, gave offense to many of the Christian Democrats. For, to them, political democracy was a principle to be enthusiastically embraced and ardently defended, not to be coldly accepted. The Popular Liberal Party, they declared, was simply a manoeuvre of the reactionary monarchists and conservatives, an attempt to create a confessional Catholic party within which the conservatives would have the upper hand.

Consequently, although the program of the Popular Liberal Party, as it gradually developed, was very similar to their own, these Christian Democrats attacked the new party with a violence of indignation which knew no bounds. Abbé Dabry, for example, waged what he called a "terrible campaign" against the Popular Liberal Party. In his book on *The Republican Catholics*, published in 1905, Dabry declared that the organization of the party was the supreme blunder, the great political crime, the cause of the anticlerical legislation which marked the early years of the new century.¹⁰⁹⁷ He himself would have preferred that Catholics should join the existing republican parties, or that a new democratic republican party, not confessional in character, should be organized to coöperate with the Progressists, the Moderate Republicans, the Socialist-Radicals, and even the Socialists, against the reactionaries.¹⁰⁹⁸

Similarly, in his polemic entitled *Why the Catholics Have Lost the Battle*, Abbé Naudet assailed the Popular Liberal Party quite as vehemently.¹⁰⁹⁹ The party, he scornfully declared, was neither popular nor liberal.

Abbé Lemire, a Christian Democratic priest, who had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies, held aloof from the Popular Liberal Party, and gravitated away from the Social Catholics;¹¹⁰⁰ in time he became suspected of modernism and had trouble with the ecclesiastical authorities.

Their breach with the Popular Liberal Party, as has been suggested, made it difficult for the extreme liberal wing of the Christian Democratic group to remain on good terms with the Social Catholic School, many prominent members of which were more or less closely identified with the Popular Liberal Party in politics.

Increasingly, this Christian Democratic faction was drawn toward non-Catholics who held similar political doctrines, and increasingly it fell under the suspicion of wavering in its religious orthodoxy, of attempting to "modernize" the doctrines of the Church to suit its own political philosophy. Conservative clergymen like Abbé Barbier openly accused the Christian Democrats of "modernism," the heresy of making religious truth depend upon changing popular sentiments rather than upon unalterable divine revelation. Abbé Lemire, for example, had attempted to apply his democratic theories to the government of the Church. Various Christian Democrats had shown a disposition to sympathize with the "higher criticism" of the Bible.¹¹⁰¹

With the purely theological aspect of modernism we have no concern in this narrative, but the relation of modernism to the social philosophy of the Christian Democrats is pertinent. This relationship was pointed out by Joseph Zamanski, one of the editors of *Le Mouvement social* and a vigorous exponent of Social Catholic doctrines. The heart of the modernist thesis, he said, was what has been called "religious immanence," the idea that every vital phenomenon has for its primary stimulus a need, for its primary manifestation, a sentiment. The need

of divinity, it would appear, engenders a certain sentiment in which faith reposes.

Now if in some such manner as this "one discovers God within himself" and can even deduce from a "vague aspiration" the most precise dogmas of a given religion, as do the modernists, it is all the easier to follow the same process in regard to sociology, and to "draw sociological conceptions from the mysterious depths of the soul." As a matter of fact, Zamanski continues, "we notice with pain that some of our friends have an unlimited confidence in this method." It is the extreme Christian Democrats to whom Zamanski here refers. To them, he says, the basis of social science appears to consist in discovering what they, like the modernists, call the "aspirations of the modern spirit," in obeying what they consider to be undeniable social necessities.

Under the influence of the generous emotions awakened by knowledge of social needs, these persons think their good intentions an adequate equipment for solving a problem which reveals itself from day to day as they proceed. Invariably they exalt Life, "Life possessing a truth and a logic of its own, different from rational logic and truth, as the immanentists say." Just as the religious modernists construct religion on the human sentiment of aspiration toward the divine, the social modernists believe that social action should be the product of a sentiment of love; just as the Church is regarded as the emanation of the collective conscience of the believers, the new society is expected to be the emanation of "a collective sentimentality."

But the thesis of religious immanence, the writer observes, leads fatally to the acceptance of all religions as true. And similarly, what might be called the thesis of "social immanence" or social modernism, "leads its victims into all sorts of fantastic ideas, into all kinds of action successively undertaken and abandoned, into all the follies of an activity which is not subjected to the guidance of reason." In other words, Zamanski considers that the reliance of the Christian Democrats upon

popular aspirations as the basis of their social doctrines, rather than upon fixed principles, is an exact sociological counterpart of the modernist error in religion, and results in social vagaries rather than in solid contributions to social reform.¹¹⁰²

Modernism and the extreme form of Christian Democracy were not only similar in their method of argument, as Zamanski claimed, but they were actually associated and akin. Christian Democratic reviews were organs for modernist views of religion, as well as for democratic views of politics and society. Consequently, when modernism was condemned by Pope Pius X in 1907, some of the Christian Democrats were involved. Two Christian Democratic organs voluntarily suspended publication, namely, *Tomorrow (Demain)*, a weekly, published at Lyons, by Pierre Jay, and the *Fortnightly (Quinzaine)*, the important Parisian review built up by Georges Fonsegrive during the decade 1897-1907. Two others,—Abbé Dabry's journal, *Catholic Life (La Vie catholique)*, and Abbé Naudet's *Social Justice (La Justice sociale)*—were condemned by decree of the Holy Office, Feb. 13, 1908.¹¹⁰³

The Social Catholics, who had disliked modernist tendencies of the Christian Democrats, applauded the pope's action. The Social Catholic movement had been scrupulously orthodox and made a great point of loyalty to the Holy See.

Commenting on the pope's action, Henri Bazire, a former president of the A. C. J. F., and a prominent member of the Popular Liberal Party, declared that the association of modernism and social reform by the Christian Democrats had done grave injury to the Social Catholic movement. He said,

It was the misfortune of well-intentioned Catholics to permit themselves to be imposed upon by a school of overrated intellectuals, and to associate their own revindications with the most risky affirmations. What was there in common between the thesis on immanence and the reform of the labor contract, between fair wages and the authenticity of such and such a Mosaic book? Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that, in public opinion, a certain confusion arose, due to the fact that too often it was the same men, the same publications, who with the same conviction defended these

causes of unequal value. Who shall say how much injury was done the Social Catholic movement by this confusion? One would have to go back ten years to take account of it.

From Americanism to modernism, not forgetting reform of education for women, everything has been loaded on the poor vessel of Social Catholicism or of Christian Democracy, at the risk of sinking it. Nothing is as heavy as dead weights. . . .

The great words of science, democracy, progress, are used by the confusionist Catholics as an accompaniment to celebrate the reconciliation of the Church and the century; and in this vast perspective Christian social reform no longer appears except as a part of the intellectual movement which has been called Catholic reformism.

No error was more disastrous, and if Social Catholicism has not obtained larger results in France, the fault is not solely with bourgeois egoism, with conservative prejudices, but also with the doctrinal temerities of certain of its partisans who, under its banner, sheltered theses of the purest liberalism in religious matters, of the most inconscient individualism in the social order.

Rome has spoken, and we cannot mark too clearly the abyss which separates the Social Catholic School from modernism. . . . ¹¹⁰⁴

The Christian Democrats — to return to our original thesis,—diverged from the Social Catholic School by reason of their greater faith in political and social democracy, and, hence, of their greater emphasis upon social legislation. One wing of the Christian Democratic movement, as we have seen, carried the belief in democracy to such lengths that it became estranged from the Social Catholic School, associated itself with modernism, and exposed itself to papal condemnation. But the other wing, led by men like Calippe, Goyau, and Turmann, remained orthodox in religious doctrine and participated so actively in the Social Catholic movement that one could hardly regard them as exterior to it. And, thanks to their influence, certain Christian Democratic ideas, such as the parallel unions of capital and labor, were carried over into Social Catholicism, with the result that the Social Catholic movement of today represents no longer the original doctrine of de Mun exclusively, but a synthesis, more democratic than de Mun's earlier conception and more in harmony with the spirit of the age.

THE SILLON AND THE YOUNG REPUBLIC

One very interesting offshoot of the Christian Democratic agitation has been left out of the discussion, up to this point, in order that it might be considered separately. It is the league or association called "The Furrow" (*Le Sillon*), together with its successor, the League of the Young Republic.

The *Sillon* grew out of a group of students who began to hold meetings in the crypt of the Collège Stanislas in 1894 and who continued to meet together in subsequent years at the Ecole Polytechnique. The movement expanded rapidly. In Paris and in the provinces local *Sillons*, study clubs, and "People's Institutes" were founded. A journal, *The Democratic Call* (*L'Eveil démocratique*), and a review, *The Furrow* (*Le Sillon*), popularized the ideas of the association. In 1902 the *Sillon* began to hold national congresses or conventions. The first was attended by a mere handful of delegates; the second, by 300, the third, in 1904, by 800; the fourth, in 1905, by 1500; the fifth, in 1906, by almost 1900. Moreover, instead of limiting its membership to Catholics, as it had done at first, after 1906 it opened its doors to all believers in the religion of democracy, regardless of theological creeds, and styled itself the "Greater Furrow" (*Le Plus Grand Sillon*). So rapid was its growth, and so active were its leaders in popular propaganda and polemic that the *Sillon* soon became a very considerable force in shaping public opinion. Moreover, it really had a direct influence upon a large number of workingmen.¹¹⁰⁵

The *Sillon* was not a political party or a school of political economy; nor was it an ordinary propagandist association. It was something more,— "a movement, a life, a common soul,"— a brotherhood claiming the allegiance of heart as well as of mind. Its aim was to impart, at first to a chosen few or *élite* group, and through them to the masses generally, an ardent spirit of political and social democracy, of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Adepts in the philosophy of the *Sillon* seemed at times to experience super-rational ecstasies of fraternal spirit; they became mystics, devotees of democracy.¹¹⁰⁶

The program of the movement was essentially the Christian Democratic program. Starting from the assumption that Catholicism and republicanism were mutually compatible and, in fact, that republicanism had need of Catholicism, the *Sillon* endeavored, in the words of one of its leaders, "to place at the service of French democracy the social forces which we find in Catholicism." Christianity was necessary to democracy, because a republic was, of all forms of government, the one requiring the greatest virtue, and, therefore, the greatest amount of Christianity.

We have need of moral strength in order to sacrifice our own interests to the common interests. One must therefore respect the sources from which men draw moral strength; and Christianity is an incomparable source of democratic energy since it identifies the individual's interests with the general interests.¹¹⁰⁷

The disciples of the "Furrow" were, above all else, democrats and republicans. They were democrats because they believed democracy to be the most perfect form of government; republicans, because they deemed the republic the most perfect form of democracy.¹¹⁰⁸

The economic program of the "Furrow" was twofold. On one hand, the state was to intervene, by means of social legislation, to repress abuses and to maintain for all citizens a minimum of material welfare sufficient to safeguard the liberty and dignity of each. Thus, the state should establish obligatory social insurance, and should enact factory laws. But on the other hand, the action of the workingmen themselves was necessary. "The proletarians themselves must organize and, in particular, must develop coöperative societies and trade unions." These organizations offered "not merely a remedy for present evils, but an instrument of social transformation." The wage-system was not to be considered as "the final stage of evolution." Just how it would be replaced was not exactly clear, but the system of coöperative production, at any rate, was preferable to it. Moreover, associations of workingmen should be permitted to establish common properties, in addition

to the private properties of the members. Thus there would be three forms of property: private property owned by individuals, common property owned by associations of workingmen, collective property owned by joint stock companies. The co-existence of these three forms of property, it was held, would be "a guarantee of independence, a source of moral energy and moral dignity."¹¹⁰⁹

Opinions of the *Sillon's* program differed. An anticlerical historian, Georges Weill, regarded it as "Catholic liberalism in the broadest, most advanced, least exclusive form."¹¹¹² Abbé Barbier, a conservative, viewed it as a program of class-hatred: the "Furrow," he said, "preaches everywhere the levelling of the classes, uses every occasion for incitement to the class-struggle, promises, every day, the suppression of capitalism, foments contempt and hatred of the employers."¹¹¹³ Another critic, de Marans, discovered that the "Furrow" consisted essentially in a "rejuvenation of the old thesis of the liberal-conservatives, which is presented [by the 'Furrow'] as the most 'advanced' and the most 'opportune' attitude a Catholic can take." The philosophy of the "Furrow," said de Marans, was merely a "travesty" of the old individualism; it was the old individualistic conception of democracy modified by the recognition of the necessity of social legislation. In spirit, it was "retrograde."¹¹¹⁴

"Advanced" or "retrograde"—whichever it might be—the philosophy of the "Furrow" was not acceptable to the Holy See. In a letter to the French archbishops and bishops, August 25, 1910, Pius X formally condemned certain of the "Furrow's" principles and practices. The pontiff's discussion of these points is interesting.

The "Furrow," he said, had been misled by its false conception of the method to be employed in uplifting and regenerating the masses. The "Furrow" stood for popular sovereignty and the levelling of social classes. But on this point it was in direct opposition to Catholic doctrine, for Leo XIII had branded as erroneous the idea of popular sovereignty and of class-levelling.

The "Furrow," Pius pointed out, was very emphatic in upholding the dignity of man, and in claiming liberty as necessary to that dignity. Liberty, as the "Furrow" defined it, meant that except in matters of religion every individual is autonomous. From this principle, the following conclusions were drawn. First, political emancipation: the people are today in subjection to an authority distinct from themselves, and they must be freed. Second, economic emancipation: the people are today dependent upon employers who possess the instruments of their work, and who exploit, oppress and abase them; the yoke must be shaken off. Third, intellectual emancipation: the people are dominated by a caste called the ruling class, whose intellectual development enables it to exercise undue influence; this bond too must be broken. This triple emancipation is also a levelling process, and will establish equality as well as liberty. A political organization founded upon the double basis of liberty and equality is democracy.

Political equality would arise from popular sovereignty, for all men would be equally sovereign, since all sovereignty belonged to the people. All men would be equally kings. This sovereignty, resting with the people, would be expressed by means of election or selection, but would not leave the people or become independent of them.

Similarly, in industry, each man would be a sort of master. Coöperative production would be substituted for the wage system, and coöperative societies would be multiplied to such an extent that they competed among themselves, and the workingmen might be free to choose among them.

With the increase of liberty and equality, and the decrease of authority, a new moral principle was needed as an offset to individual egoism. This new principle was to be zeal for the welfare of the trade and of the public, taking precedence over each individual's instinctive concern for his own and his family's welfare. In a society where this love of public welfare existed, and where each workingman had the soul of a master, each citizen the spirit of a king, human dignity would reach its highest expression. And this spirit of fraternity, or

the love of common interests, might be conceived as expanding in ever wider circles, from the trade to the nation, from the nation to the whole world.

Such was the ideal, the vision, of the "Furrow," as summarized by Pius X. The vision, Pius asserted, rested upon a series of errors.

In the first place, the "Furrow" professed a fallacious doctrine of popular sovereignty. It made the people the source of all governmental authority. Catholic doctrine, on the contrary, regarded God as the source of all power; if, in democratic states, the people elected their rulers, they did not thereby confer authority, but merely designated the person to be invested with authority by God.

If all the people were equally the possessors of sovereignty, there would be no authority. In the future city to which the "Furrow" aspired, there were to be neither masters nor servants, but all were to be free, all comrades, all kings. This, says the pope, is contrary to common sense. There will always be wicked persons who must be curbed by the exercise of authority. There must be an authority to direct collective activity toward the common good.

The "Furrow" was likewise in error with regard to the conception of fraternity, which it based upon the zeal for common interests, or simply upon the notion of humanity, uniting with equal love and tolerance all mankind, regardless of errors and perversities. Catholic doctrine taught that the only genuine source of fraternity was love of God. Experience confirmed this doctrine, by showing in numerous instances how little men cared for the interests of all, when their own evil passions were aroused. Christian charity, not common interests, was the only solid foundation of fraternity. And Christian charity, while applying to all men, did not mean tolerance of wrong convictions, of vice, and of error, but zeal for their betterment.

Finally, Pius attacked what he regarded as the false idea of human dignity underlying all the errors of the "Furrow." The "Furrow," he said

would have us believe that man will not truly be man until the day that he has acquired a conscience, enlightened, strong, independent, autonomous, that can dispense with a master, obedient only to itself. . . .

Such an idea was simply visionary. Even the greatest men had no such infallibility of self-direction and such an extreme of dignity. And should one deny the name of man to humble toilers who performed their duty nobly, in humility, obedience, and patience?

In the second part of his letter, the pope proceeded to discuss "the influence of these errors upon the practical conduct and social action" of the "Furrow." The study groups of the "Furrow" were conducted according to the theory of popular sovereignty; there was no leader, no master; each member was equally master and pupil. Priests who entered such groups forgot the respect and obedience due to authority. Catholics who became filled with the new spirit of the "Furrow" could no longer respect a Church which had existed nineteen centuries without realizing the "Furrow's" ideals.

The "Furrow," Pius went on to remark, enfeoffed religion to a political party; it made Christianity the servant of democracy. Christianity, however, was superior to political parties, and the Church had never attached itself to any one form of government. It had left to each nation the freedom to choose what it considered the form of government best suited to its own interests.

The "Furrow" had at first been thoroughly Catholic. But when it became the "Greater Furrow," and included men of all faiths, it became an interconfessional association, and it was absurd to expect the Catholic nucleus to make the "Greater Furrow" Catholic. No longer Catholic, the "Furrow" had attempted to substitute "a generous idealism" for religion; as a result it had become visionary and utopian. Or, to put it in another way, the "Furrow" had been "captured" by "the great modern movement of apostasy organized in every country for the establishment of a universal Church, which will have neither dogma nor hierarchy, nor rule for the mind, nor

curb for the passion, and which under pretext of liberty and human dignity would bring about in the world, if it could have its way, the legal rule of artifice and force, the oppression of the weak and of all who suffer and work."

In conclusion, the pope urged that the bishops should select well-educated leaders, equipped with a thorough knowledge of practical social science, to take charge of Catholic social work. The Catholic members of the "Furrow," he added, might continue to have their preference for democracy in politics, if they purged their doctrine of the errors which had been pointed out; they might also preserve local organizations of the "Furrow," provided that such organizations were exclusively Catholic and were called Catholic Furrows.¹¹¹⁵

The pope's letter was the death-blow for the "Furrow." Marc Sangnier, leader of the association, declared that he unhesitatingly submitted to the pope's correction. The "Furrow" was abandoned.

But, he maintained, his loyalty to the republic and his ardor for democracy were undiminished. Having renounced the work of educating young Catholics, he and his friends now considered themselves able to enter a field where their action would be freer.

At first he seemed to hope for the evolution of a new political party, uniting Free-thinkers and Catholics on a platform of proportional representation, labor legislation, religious justice, anti-alcoholism, regulation of high finance, democratization of the army, and extension of education. Such a party being impossible to create, at present, he decided to found a league for political and social propaganda.

The new league, the League of the Young Republic, differed from the "Furrow" in being more definitely concerned with politics, and less with religion and morals. Nevertheless, its aims bore a strong resemblance to those of the defunct association. Republican and democratic, it desired "that the Republic may be loved, that the Republic may become the living and organic expression of the soul of France." The Republic had need of moral strength and should therefore respect the

sources — notably, Christianity — whence citizens might draw such moral strength. Catholics should be free to work in the “common house of the Republic” without having to hang their heads or submit to humiliation.

The democratic spirit should be expressed in various political and economic reforms. Proportional representation, representation of trades or professions, the popular referendum, civil service reform, and democratization of the army were proposed as steps toward the political ideal of the Young Republic. In the direction of economic democracy, the burden of reform rested chiefly upon the workingmen themselves, who must use trade-unionism and coöperative production as stepping-stones toward a future economic system more fraternal than the present one. Private property was not to be destroyed, but collective ownership by trade unions or trade associations was to exist side by side with individual ownership. To some extent the state might participate in the work of economic reform, by passing labor legislation; for example, night-work should be interdicted, the sweating system should be repressed, and the law should grant to all workingmen the benefit of old-age pensions, accident compensation, and insurance against industrial diseases.¹¹¹⁶

Such was the program of the League of the Young Republic, much like that of the “Furrow” in its emphasis on democracy and fraternity. Speaking at the first national congress of his new league, in October, 1912, Sangnier, former leader of the “Furrow,” declared that the condemnation of the “Furrow” by the pope had proved to be “the best proof of the political liberty of the Catholics,” because it showed that, after abandoning a confessional organization at the pope’s request, they were now able to work in a larger, freer field:

I say that this a proof that one can be a Catholic, absolutely and filially loyal to the authority of the Church, without losing, for all that, the right to be republican and democratic as much as and more than ever.¹¹¹⁷

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

WE have now completed our general narrative of the Social Catholic movement in France. We have seen how it originated in sporadic protests against industrial anarchy, how it took organized form after 1870, and branched out into a network of interrelated organizations: the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, the Young Men's Catholic Association, the Popular Liberal Party, the *Action Populaire*, the "Social Weeks," the Consumers' League. And we have also traced the influence of its ideas upon associated movements that can hardly be called, in the strict sense of the term, Social Catholic, and yet which owe much to Social Catholicism, namely, the Christian Democratic movement, the "Furrow," the League of the Young Republic, the "Social Reform" School, the *Action Française*, the last-mentioned being an antagonist of as well as a debtor to Social Catholicism. None of these divergent schools of thought are as important, numerically, as the central body of the Social Catholic movement, but each helps to radiate, in some degree, the influence of that movement.

The following tabular statement, showing how the Social Catholic movement stands on the main points of social politics, in comparison with other Catholic schools, and with non-Catholic schools, will perhaps be convenient by way of recapitulation.

A general observation may be hazarded regarding the table. In the Social Catholic program the three elements,—social legislation, labor organization, and conservation of individual rights,—are balanced, or, rather, interwoven. If one of the

COMPARISON OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

	Political action and social legislation	Program of labor organization	Protection of private property and economic liberty
Social Catholics (including Popular Liberal Party)	Comprehensive and radical program including social insurance, restriction of hours, minimum wage, <i>etc.</i> But opposition to government ownership and state socialism.	Guild organization of industry, trade, agriculture, and professions, to be created and promoted by state. Inter-organization and reconciliation of labor and capital. Functional representation. Social legislation and social insurance to be administered in large part by guild organizations.	Maintained, in so far as compatible with moral law and social welfare.
"Liberal" economists, <i>e. g.</i> , A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Yves Guyot, C. Jannet	Less radical. Compromise between "liberal" principle, but more or less grudgingly conceded in case of women and children.	Less radical program. Unions to be free and voluntary, without authority.	More emphasis on economic liberty and property rights
Social Reform School	Less radical. Compromise between "liberal" and Social Catholic programs.	Less radical. Free and voluntary guilds. Benevolent action of employers.	More emphasis
Action Française	Less radical. Democratic social legislation a delusion. Reorganization of trades under influence of monarchy is the only solution.	Guild organization, under patronage of monarchy. Class-conscious opposition of labor to capital.	Liberty to be restricted. Inequality of wealth perpetuated.
Christian Democrats (also Sillon and Young Republic)	More radical. Political democracy the indispensable instrument of social democracy. Strong program of labor legislation. For protection of individual rather than for organic reform.	Less radical. Parallel organization of labor and capital. Less emphasis on organic character of reform.	Limited by social legislation.
Socialists (<i>i. e.</i> , democratic or parliamentary Socialists)	More radical. Political democracy the main instrument of reform. Labor legislation, social insurance by state, government ownership.	More radical but less important. Would expropriate capitalist, but would leave labor organizations with comparatively small functions, overshadowed by authority of socialistic state.	Minimized.
Syndicalists	Repudiated altogether.	More extreme. "Direct action" of organized labor to achieve social revolution, <i>i. e.</i> , destruction of capitalism and of wage-system.	Minimized.
Guild Socialists	Democratic social legislation. National or social ownership. Functional representation.	Control of industry by guilds.	Minimized.

This is essentially a middle term between the Social Catholic and State Socialist programs, combining the latter's thesis of social ownership with the former's principle of guild control.

	Political action and social legislation	Program of labor organization	Protection of private property and economic liberty
Bolsheviks or Communists	More radical. Dictatorship of proletariat as represented by soviet form of government. State ownership of land, industries, banks, <i>etc.</i> State monopoly of grain trade, <i>etc.</i>	Shop committees; industrial and agricultural councils, soviets, <i>etc.</i> Capitalist eliminated. Control by soviet government.	Most property rights destroyed. Liberty subject to dictatorship of proletariat.

three elements is given more emphasis, or a different twist, the whole program takes on a different complexion. For instance, if we lay more emphasis upon economic liberty, we have a conservative program such as that of the "liberal" economists and the Social Reform school. By stressing political action one may arrive at the Christian Democratic, and, ultimately, at the Socialist program. Again, if we decide that the purpose of labor organization is revolution, rather than reform, we shall repudiate social legislation and adopt the Syndicalist program.

It is also worth noting that when one element is stressed, the others suffer. Where economic liberty is prized above all things else, there can be little social legislation and no effective labor organization. Where political action is exalted, as with the Socialists, no very large rôle is left for labor organization and individual rights tend to be minimized. Conversely, the extreme advocates of labor action, namely, the Syndicalists, repudiate social legislation and refuse to recognize either property-rights or economic liberty.

Consequently, each of the other programs is more emphatic on one point, and less so on one or both of the others, than is the Social Catholic program. This fact makes it impossible to assign to the latter its proper place in a graduated scale of radicalism. The most that can be said is that the Social Catholic program aims at profound and far-reaching economic reconstruction without revolution, and that it is, in a sense, a synthesis of the leading ideas that have been put forward by each of the opposing schools of social reform.

OPINIONS OF THE SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT

We must not have any illusions on this score: the only redoubtable adversary,—because it has a social conception and is a party of concessions,—which confronts Revolutionary Socialism is Catholic Reformism [*i. e.*, Social Catholicism].¹¹¹⁸

Such was the estimate which Hubert Lagardelle, one of the most prominent among French Socialist-Syndicalist writers, placed upon the importance of the Social Catholic movement in 1898. Fourteen years later, Lagardelle found his judgment of the vigor of the movement confirmed by events. Writing in *Le Mouvement socialiste* for September-October, 1912, Lagardelle says of the "Social Catholics":

The *Semaine sociale*¹¹¹⁹ of Limoges has affirmed the vitality of Social Catholicism. There is in this movement an intellectual fermentation which Socialism no longer possesses. It is its strength. Let us recognize it, because it is our adversary.¹¹²⁰

French Radicals likewise recognize that the Social Catholic movement is attaining such formidable proportions that its opponents have reason for alarm. The Radical or Radical-Socialist journal, *Le Rappel*, points out the danger. The clerical victory in the Belgian elections of 1912, says *Le Rappel*, may well serve as a warning to France:

Despite the plural vote, despite the gerrymandering of electoral districts, the Belgian clericals would not have carried off the victory if the Church had not toiled throughout past years, with as much perseverance as sagacity, to conquer democracy by its benefits. But by the boldness, and, in a sense, the generosity of its social policy, it has extended its action among the popular classes to the point of disquieting socialism itself.

That is what we should meditate upon at the present hour, when, by its *patronages* [workingmen's friendly societies], by its vacation-colonies, by its people's kitchens and its workingmen's gardens, by its trade associations and its trade unions, by the admirable work of its "*Semaines sociales*" [social-study congresses], the Church is striving in France as elsewhere to effect the conquest of the proletariat. . . . The day when, even in parliament, the Radical

party will find itself in conflict with two "social" parties, one Catholic and the other Socialist, what will it do? And how will it become again the party of the people, as it was formerly, if the masses are divided between the Church and the Revolution?

It will still have, of course, the resource of political oratory, but it seems truly that the time for that is past, in France as in Belgium.¹¹²¹

From an opposite quarter, namely, from the camp of the clerical antagonists of Social Catholicism, are heard similar expressions of alarm at the progress and direction of the movement. Gaston Defoyère, in a polemic entitled "The Syndicalist Revolution Promoted by the 'Social Catholics,'" ¹¹²² sets forth the thesis that the Social Catholic movement has become an exceedingly dangerous ally of Revolutionary Syndicalism. His argument is after this manner. "The Republic had been founded and maintained contrary to and against the will of the nation." The Republicans, determined to eradicate the old traditions in society as well as in government, and resolved to advance ever further in their innovations, soon arrived at the idea of state socialism. Catholics protested, especially against the application of the state-socialist idea to education, but were not sufficiently on their guard against economic state socialism. Count Albert de Mun, notably, in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, made "imprudent" speeches accentuating the state-socialist idea of "labor as a social function." "An entire Catholic social school then followed the penchant toward state socialism; today that school is *integrally Syndicalist*." ¹¹²³ The action of these "Social Catholics" is "demoralizing," not merely from the point of view of "sound doctrine"; their action "has been *in fact* noxious and revolutionary for the past twelve years." In short, "they have become the effective, blind accomplices of the subverters of traditional values." The latest and "most dangerous" form of Revolution, Defoyère adds, is that of "*integral Syndicalism* promoted by the Social Catholics." ¹¹²⁴

Having quoted first the opinions of adversaries, perhaps it

is only fair to give the supporters of the movement a hearing. Fidao-Justiniani, in *Le Mouvement social* (the chief Social Catholic review), asserts :

With a movement that is very slow, perhaps, but also very sure, "Social Catholicism"—doctrine and action—gains ground, imposes itself upon the attention of our contemporaries, wins their suffrages.

This is his preface to a general review of books published during the year 1911. Even Socialist and Syndicalist writers, Fidao-Justiniani observes, are devoting attention to the movement. The Syndicalist theorist, Lagardelle, in a book on *Le Socialisme ouvrier*, seems "dazzled" by the brilliance of the latest Social Catholic convention. Georges Guy-Grand, in his *Le Procès de la Démocratie*, discusses the "generous and vague Christianity" of the so-called Social Catholics; if Guy-Grand had familiarized himself with the Social Catholic review—*Le Mouvement social*—or with the recent publications of Social Catholic writers on the most detailed problems of industry and social legislation, says the reviewer, he would not have used the adjective "vague," at any rate. Fidao-Justiniani concludes his article with a confident declaration that, while Socialism and Syndicalism are breaking up into cross-currents and losing headway, Catholic Reformism or Social Catholicism is ever advancing, united, strong in its logic and its principles.¹¹²⁵

Professor Max Turmann, another Social Catholic writer, and member of the Academy, agrees with the Syndicalist Lagardelle that the Social Catholic movement is the only formidable rival of revolutionary collectivism:

Social Catholicism constitutes, in the modern world, a powerful force, which, by reason of its intensity and its diversity, may be compared, and almost everywhere is opposed, to revolutionary collectivism.¹¹²⁶

Finally, Joseph Zamanski, one of the leading figures in French Social Catholicism, discusses the contribution of the movement to the progress of French social legislation. The

following long extract from one of his articles, is interesting enough to be worth quoting:

... The resistance which every social law encounters in the country and in parliament comes from minds in which the principles of 1791 have left their stubborn imprint, and the best of these laws we have to wrest by sheer strength from the tenacious thought of a régime of bourgeois ensconced in power.

I do not say that some Catholics, in industry or in Parliament, do not sometimes lend them [the opponents of social legislation] assistance; we have had to signalize, in these pages, inconceivable opposition, also the survival of the old orthodox Liberalism, the power of prejudice and of blind interest. All the same, the initiators are in our ranks, when they are not among the Socialists. The first idea, the first bill, the first text, the first legislative effort comes from the Right [clericals] or from the Left [Socialists]. And when the reform has won the support of public opinion, when various studies have perfected it, a Government Bill appears which hardly conceals the original label, obtains the vote, and reaps the honor. How many of them during the past thirty years have had for their first and true signature the name of M. de Mun or of one of his friends!

It was M. de Mun who, in 1885, with Mgr. Freppel, presented a bill on workingmen's pensions. The first text on the regulation of wages in sweated industries was also his work, and public opinion had been apprised of the wretchedness which this form of industry engenders, by the books of Abbé Mény, quite a long time before the official investigation was instituted to reveal certain details and elaborations of the facts. The workingmen's gardens, with which the Government announces its intention to concern itself, have existed for twenty years and their initiator, Abbé Lemire, is also the father of the family patrimony [*bien de famille*].

The Government Bills themselves are elaborated, discussed, reviewed, and perfected in private associations like the Society for Legislative Research or the Association for the Legal Protection of the Workingmen, in which Catholics like M. Lorin play an important part; and it is the Superior Council of Labor, where so many times the weight has been felt of M. Jay's competent and generous words, which furnishes the texts later stamped with approval by the Office of Labor.

Then, when the Bill has become law, it finds in our social school its most sincere defenders, champions who regard the Bill's defects with clear vision and without complacency. Is it not right that,

some day, we should receive credit for our efforts to acclimatize pension legislation while improving it?

But with that as with other matters, gratitude is ephemeral, when it is given at all. The part which M. de Mun has so proudly claimed in the patriotic work which France has begun to inaugurate, we can claim also in the social work of the "republican reign." For that as for the other we are rewarded by persecution; it is a coinage familiar to us; for us, it has been current coinage throughout history, but history is in itself our magnificent recompense.

Today, in the endeavors and struggles for the amelioration of the general conditions of labor, we are forming the true policy for tomorrow. This social policy will in the end vanquish the last traces of resistance on the part of the old Revolution. But, in all probability, it will set two doctrines in opposition, one which will draw from the ever vernal sap of Catholicism its principles and its strength, the other which will attempt to rear on the ruins of the "Republican Party," the new Revolution.¹¹²⁷

The gist of all these commentaries on the significance of the Social Catholic Movement in France,—commentaries inspired by such diverse preconceptions and prejudices,—is that the movement is the one great potential and actual rival of revolutionary Socialism; according to the Social Catholics, the movement is, by reason of its soundness of doctrine and vigor of growth, the unique bulwark against the erroneous and destructive propaganda of the revolutionary parties, while according to the revolutionaries themselves and in the view of the clerical reactionaries, the movement is misguided, an unwitting accomplice of Socialism or of Syndicalism. Between these two views, the reader is left to judge for himself. But on one point there seems to be virtual agreement, namely, that the Social Catholic movement is vigorous, that it is a force of such magnitude that it is either a great peril or a great hope.

GUILDISM, GUILD SOCIALISM, AND THE SOCIAL CATHOLIC PROGRAM

One feature of the Social Catholic program has been rendered particularly significant by the trend of events during and since the war. A generation ago, the Social Catholics were almost if not absolutely alone in advocating the reconstruction of in-

dustrial society on the basis of the guild. When Count Albert de Mun, in the 'eighties, defended the principle of guildism, he found few sympathetic auditors in the French Chamber of Deputies. The very word, "guild," was abhorrent to Liberals and Socialists alike. Since 1914, however, there has been a veritable revolution in public sentiment. Ideas which were formerly almost the exclusive property of the Social Catholic movement have become popular over night.

The full import of this change of sentiment can hardly be grasped unless one views it in historical perspective. To measure the magnitude of the contemporary swing of the pendulum towards guildism and similar forms of democratic industrial organization, one must trace the course of the pendulum back to the opposite extreme. What more striking contrast could be conceived than that between present-day ideas concerning industrial organization and the ideas bequeathed to the nineteenth century by the French Revolution? Historians have not sufficiently emphasized the fact that the French Revolution was directed against guildism, against any form of trade-unionism, as well as against feudalism. During the Revolution, the Constituent Assembly did not merely sweep away the old guild system (by the law of March 2-17, 1791); it formally sanctioned the doctrine that "the annihilation of all kinds of guilds of citizens belonging to the same social class and trade is one of the fundamental bases of the French Constitution" (the Le Chapelier Law of June 14-17, 1791). There should be no trade unions, no special group interests, but only individual interests and "the general interest," said the author of the latter law. Workingmen of the same class or trade were forbidden, under severe penalties, to assemble together, organize, elect officers, or adopt resolutions regarding "their pretended common interests." Confirmed in a slightly modified form by the Napoleonic Penal Code of 1810, this principle was handed down to the nineteenth century as one of the legacies of the French Revolution. Liberty, as interpreted by the heirs of the Revolution, was irreconcilable with guildism or any other form of trade organization.¹¹²⁸

Thus compulsory industrial individualism,— compulsory industrial anarchy one might say,— was the position from which the pendulum had to swing. And it has swung far.

Though they could hardly have foreseen clearly the turn events would take, the Catholics who advocated a return to guildism, in the heyday of economic individualism, were anticipating and in a measure promoting one of the most profound social metamorphoses of modern times, namely, the replacement of anarchic individualism by unionism or organization in industry. As early as 1834, Villeneuve-Bargemont, one of the precursors of the Social Catholic movement, outlined a plan for the formation of workingmen's unions in each trade, as a substitute for the guilds which the Revolution had destroyed.¹¹²⁹ Guildism is one of the oldest and most characteristic elements in the Social Catholic program.

The specific reforms which have been advocated by the Social Catholic leaders as steps toward a new guild régime may be recapitulated under four heads. (1) *Trade-unionism*. In the early years of the Third Republic, before trade-unionism had been legalized, the Social Catholics were among the most outspoken champions of the right of organization. After helping to secure the enactment of the historic law of 1884, by which incomplete legal sanction was given to trade unions, they demanded still further legal rights for the unions.¹¹³⁰

(2) *Mixed Unions and Joint Councils*. The trade union, in the Social Catholic scheme of things, was to become not an instrument of class-warfare, but an agent of class-reconciliation. During the 'eighties, many Social Catholics favored mixed unions, *i. e.*, trade unions including employers and salaried employees as well as workingmen. As it became manifest that such unions were impracticable, the Social Catholics advocated the establishment of joint councils or boards to serve as bridges between the trade union and the employer or the employers' union.¹¹³¹

(3) *Guilds*. In a Bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies in 1906 by Count Albert de Mun, M. Jacques Piou, and other prominent Social Catholic members of the Popular Lib-

eral Party, a plan was offered for the creation of trade organizations on a more elaborate scale.¹¹³² In each commune, the mayor and two municipal councillors were to draw up a list of trades, a sort of economic census. Every resident over eighteen years of age and engaged in agriculture, industry, commerce, or the liberal professions, was to have his name inscribed in the appropriate list according to his occupation. All the inscribed members of each trade or occupational group would then be considered members of an occupational corps (*corps professionnel*) or, as we may style it, a guild. The guild would be made co-extensive with a smaller or a larger administrative unit, from the *canton* to the *département*, according to the number of its members. Inside the guild, voluntary trade unions of employers or of workingmen were to be freely permitted, even encouraged.

It should be observed that the guild was to include not the wage-earners alone, as does the ordinary trade union, but all the classes engaged in the occupation. Independent farmers, tenant-farmers, and farm laborers, for example, would belong to the same agricultural guild, or, rather, to separate sections of the same guild. An industrial guild would include, ordinarily, three sections: (a) employers or capitalists, (b) salaried officials, technicians, managers, and clerks, (c) wage-earners or proletarians. Each of these three sections would elect separately an equal number of representatives who would constitute a *conseil professionnel* or guild council. Where trade unions existed within the guild, they were to have the right of electing a share of the representation of their section; in fact, they were to be given more representatives than strict arithmetical proportion would justify, because belonging to a union was considered a meritorious manifestation of social-mindedness.

The functions assigned to the guild councils by the Bill of 1906, are suggestive. Subject to the general prescriptions of national legislation, each guild council was to have charge of vocational training, shop regulations, the conditions and terms of labor, and welfare institutions. The various forms of

social insurance,—against sickness, accident, unemployment, and old age,—were to be taken over ultimately by the guilds or by insurance societies supported by the guilds. By such decentralization, it was hoped, social insurance would be rendered cheaper and more efficacious, while the danger of bureaucracy would be avoided. Arbitration of collective disputes would likewise devolve upon the guild councils. Finally, the councils were to be given a voice in labor legislation. Labor laws enacted by the national government should be drafted in general terms and referred to the interested guild councils for criticism before being promulgated. The general provisions of national laws should be executed by means of specific regulations devised by each guild council to suit the peculiar conditions of its locality and its trade. Such regulations must be approved by a referendum vote of the guild members.

The essential ideas back of these provisions are three: that the workingmen are entitled to a voice in the regulation of their trade interests; that by bringing together workingmen, employers, clerks, technicians, and managers engaged in the same industry or occupation, misunderstandings might be minimized while a sense of solidarity and pride of profession might be revived; and that the national government is too clumsy and bureaucratic an authority to assume with safety the complete control of social insurance, labor legislation, and industrial regulation.

(4) *Functional Representation.* The guild organization just described would provide a basis for what is now called functional representation, that is, the representation of the interests which people have by reason of the function or economic occupation in which they are engaged. According to this theory, the farmer should be represented as a farmer, not merely as a Republican living in a certain geographical district; the merchant should be able to elect a merchant to represent his interests; and the miner should have the opportunity of voting for a miner. This has been a favorite idea with French Social Catholics. The existing politico-geographical system of representation would not be destroyed; it was to

be coördinated with the new system of functional representation. Thus, alongside of the existing Senate and Chamber of Deputies a new body might be created, a Guild Congress, elected by the guilds. Or possibly, it was suggested, the Senate might be transformed into a Guild Congress or Professional Senate. Such a Guild Congress might at first be given merely advisory powers; in course of time, it might share legislative authority with the Chamber of Deputies as the Senate does today. This innovation, it was believed, would bring politics into a closer and more vital relation with the nation's economic life, and would provide the mechanism for really expert criticism of economic legislation.¹¹³³

Not many years back, such proposals might have seemed visionary in the extreme. Today, they are in accord with powerful tendencies which manifest themselves spontaneously in all highly industrialized countries, under the pressure of post-war conditions. The industrial conferences held in Great Britain and the United States under governmental auspices, for the discussion of labor problems, exhibit the strength of the desire for the kind of expert opinion which the proposed Guild Congress or Guild Senate would provide. When, in response to an imperative popular demand, the French Government decided to establish the eight-hour day, the minister of labor invited and obtained the assistance of representatives of capital and labor (the French delegates to the International Labor Legislation Committee of the Peace Conference) in drafting an eight-hour-day Bill. The Bill, moreover, was framed in such a manner that it could be adapted to local and special conditions after consultation with the interested organizations of capitalists and workingmen. M. Jean Lerolle, a Social Catholic deputy, observed that the innovation of delegating a certain amount of quasi-legislative power to the trade organizations, as was done by the Bill, "might seem rash to certain minds accustomed to the old administrative formulæ, but none will applaud it more than we. It is simply the application of a principle which has long been supported by our friends: the principle of labor legislation by representatives of

occupational groups (*législation professionnelle du travail*).”¹¹³⁴

Similarly, the Social Catholic idea of bringing workingmen and capitalists together by means of joint trade boards or by means of guilds has been realized, to a greater or less degree, by numerous recent experiments. Of their own initiative, a number of employers in Great Britain and the United States have instituted joint boards, on which workingmen and employers are both represented. The “Plumb Plan” for the American railroads embodied the same fundamental principle in more radical form. In England, the Whitley Councils provide another indication of the same tendency. The events of September and October, 1920, in Italy afford an even more interesting parallel. After the metal-workers had seized five hundred or more factories, an agreement was reached, at the instance of the Government, for the establishment of joint councils to supervise the books of the metallurgical firms. Whether this agreement will lead to a thoroughgoing system of democratic control, or will be rendered abortive by the extremists on either side, cannot well be predicted, but the proposition itself is significant.

In Germany, the idea has been carried further since the democratic revolution of 1918. In the new German Republic, the Catholic party joined with the Majority Socialists and Democrats to form a moderate coalition government, which opposed both extreme Socialists on one hand and reactionaries on the other hand. As a result, the party had a voice in determining the constitution and policies of the new German Republic. The constitution adopted on July 31, 1919, represents a compromise between Socialist and Social Catholic ideas regarding economic organization. By article 156, the Commonwealth is empowered to transfer private business enterprises to public ownership. This is essentially a Socialist clause. The same article, however, authorizes the Commonwealth to combine business enterprises and “give to employers and employees a share in the management.” Moreover, Article 165 is astonishingly similar to the French Social Catholic Bill of

1906, and to the ideas which have been put forward for many years past by Social Catholics in other countries. By Article 165, "wage-earners and salaried employees are qualified to coöperate on equal terms with the employers in the regulation of wages and working conditions, as well as in the entire economic development of the productive forces." The wage-earners, the article continues, and the salaried employees "are entitled" to form local workers' councils for each establishment, the local councils being federated under a district workers' council for each "economic area" and a "National Workers' Council" for the commonwealth as a whole. The district workers' councils meet with representatives of the employers and of other interested classes in "district economic councils." In the same way, the National Economic Council is formed by the addition of employers to the National Workers' Council. All "substantial vocational groups" are to be represented in the district and national economic councils "according to their economic and social importance." In this fashion, the familiar Social Catholic idea of bringing the various industrial classes — employers, middle-class employees, and workingmen — together in joint councils is realized. The functions of the councils likewise are in accordance with Social Catholic principles. To the local and district councils "supervisory and administrative functions may be delegated." The National Economic Council is a sort of Guild Congress, possessing the right to propose Bills and to consider, before they are introduced into the National Assembly, all important drafts of laws relating to social and economic policy. Reading such provisions, one is strongly reminded of the Bill presented in 1906 by de Mun and his friends.¹¹³⁵

The young English Guild Socialist movement is a particularly interesting manifestation of the drift of opinion towards guildism. The principles of Guild Socialism had been expounded, in the period immediately preceding the Great War, by S. G. Hobson, A. J. Penty, A. R. Orage, and a few others. The *New Age*, although not an official organ, served as a vehicle for Guild Socialist ideas. Enthusiastic and able young

recruits, notably G. D. H. Cole, gave intensity and vigor to the new movement, if, indeed, it could be called a movement. During the war a National Guilds League was organized and the "guild idea" was spread with phenomenal rapidity, for the most part among the younger generation of intellectuals interested in the labor movement. To an extraordinary extent, considering its novelty, Guild Socialism attracted and influenced trade-union leaders. Without attempting seriously to build up a separate and distinct party, the Guild Socialists succeeded in giving new form to the ideas of the leaders of labor. The Annual Report of the National Guilds League for 1919-1920 claims that, "so far as the Trade Union movement is concerned . . . the guild is everywhere coming to be more and more consciously accepted as the goal of the workers' efforts and the governing conception of their policy." This seemed to be particularly true of the miners and of the building trades.

There are many striking similarities between the English Guild Socialist program and the program which the French Social Catholics have long advocated. Both are based upon the guild. Both propose to create a guild congress which will share authority with the democratic "political" parliament. Both repudiate economic individualism. Both oppose State Socialism. There is, however, one essential difference. The Guild Socialist proposes to eliminate the capitalist altogether by establishing national ownership of productive capital and abolishing the wage system, whereas the French Social Catholic would make a place for the capitalist within the guild system, at least for the present. The Guild Socialist, therefore, is more of a revolutionist; he is a Socialist as well as a Guildsman. He has less faith, if any, in the possibility or desirability of reconciling capitalist and proletarian.¹¹³⁶

The Guild Socialist movement is mentioned as an additional indication of the strong current of opinion towards principles akin to the principles of the Social Catholic movement. The point which it has been the aim of this section to emphasize is not that the Social Catholic program has been proved right or wrong by recent events, but that it has been demonstrated to

be more vital and more significant than one might have predicted a generation ago.

Whether its program is right or wrong, menacing or reassuring, the Social Catholic movement undoubtedly constitutes an important factor in the post-war situation. Because of its numerical strength, its political influence, and its intellectual vigor, the movement may be regarded as one of the most formidable elements in the coalition recently formed against Bolshevism in France. Conservative in this respect, it is radical in its demands for a thoroughgoing reconstruction of society and of government on the basis of industrial democracy, as embodied in the guild. Likewise in Italy, in Austria, in Germany, and in other countries where large Catholic populations exist, the Social Catholic movement in general is to be found opposing Bolshevism and promoting social reform. Originating as a reaction against the economic individualism so generally associated, in the nineteenth century, with political liberalism, the Social Catholic movement has become, in the twentieth century, one of the strong forces making for democratic social progress. As opposed to destructive revolution, it strives for constructive reforms. It is a practical effort to realize in both economic and political life the Christian ideals of justice and liberty and the dignity of man.

APPENDIX

¹ Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils, submitted by the sub-committee (on Relations between Employers and Employed) of the Reconstruction Committee, March 8, 1917, Parliamentary Papers, 1917-1918, Cd. 8606. Cf. Kellogg and Gleason, *British Labor and the War* (N. Y., 1919), pp. 185-194, 418-448.

² M. Jouhaix, secretary of the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, claimed that there were 400,000 dues-paying members and, in reality, 600,000 adherents, in 1912. Opponents of the C. G. T. regard these figures as exaggerated; cf. *Année sociale internationale* 1913-1914 (Rheims, 1914), pp. 530-31. In his book on *The Labor Movement in France* (N. Y., 1912), pp. 181, 191-192, Dr. Louis Levine gives the total membership of the C. G. T. as 357,814 in 1910, and leaves the reader to judge the accuracy of M. Pawlowski's claim that approximately five-eighths of these members repudiate revolutionary Syndicalism, as contrasted with the opposing claim that the Syndicalists have a two-thirds majority in the C. G. T. Admitting the latter claim, we would arrive at something like 266,000 as the maximum estimate of the number of revolutionary Syndicalists.

³ Jacques, *Les Partis politiques sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1913), pp. 309, 336, supplemented by information obtained at party headquarters in Paris.

⁴ It is impossible to calculate the voting strength of the Popular Liberal Party in the elections of 1919, because, under the new system of proportional representation, the Liberals frequently supported fusion tickets. The Socialist vote, according to official returns, was approximately 1,615,000. For the figures cited, the author is indebted to Georges Lachapelle's book, *Les Élections législatives du 6 Novembre 1919* (Paris, 1920), and to personal correspondence.

⁵ The British Trade Boards Act, 1909, concerning certain "sweated" trades, is a case in point.

⁶ "'Social politics' thus becomes a convenient phrase to indicate, loosely perhaps, the present-day development of political democracy and its utilization for social purposes."—C. Hayes, *British Social Politics* (Boston, 1913), p. 3.

⁷ A good mental picture of the Industrial Revolution in France may be obtained by comparing J. A. C. de Chantal, *De l'industrie française* (Paris, 1819); Villermé, *Tableau de l'état physique et moral des ouvriers . . .* (Paris, 1840); and E. Levasseur, *Comparaison du travail à la main et le travail à la machine* (Paris, 1900). For a narrative and discussion, see Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789 à 1870* (Paris, 1904).

⁸ According to Weill, *La France sous la monarchie constitutionnelle* (1815-1848) (Paris, new ed., 1912), p. 222, there were 200 steam-en-

gines in 1820; 572 in 1830; 3,053 in 1843. According to M. Block, *Statistique de la France* (Paris, 1875), vol. ii, p. 140, there were 2,873 in 1840; 4,019 in 1843; 6,832 in 1850; 18,726 in 1860. According to E. Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières . . . de 1789 à 1870*, vol. ii, p. 171, there were 2,591 in 1840; 3,360 in 1843. I have given approximate round figures in the text, since the exact figures are of no great interest in this connection, and in the presence of conflicting statements, any new figures claiming precision would require an extensive exposition by way of support.

⁹ Levasseur, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ Levasseur, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 628; Block, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 322-323.

¹¹ Block, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 143, 149.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

¹⁴ Deposition of MM. Witz Sons and Co., in *Enquête sur l'industrie du coton*, cited by Ch. Rist, "Durée du travail dans l'industrie française de 1820 à 1870," *Revue d'économie politique*, 1897, vol. xi, p. 373.

¹⁵ *Bulletin de la société industrielle de Mulhouse*, 1828, pp. 326-329, cited by Ch. Rist, *op. cit.* p. 373.

¹⁶ G. Weill, *La France sous la monarchie constitutionnelle*, pp. 233-234.

¹⁷ Villermé, *Tableau de l'état physique et morale des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine et de soie* (2 vols., Paris, 1840), vol. ii, p. 85, *et seq.*

¹⁸ *Bulletin de la Société industrielle de Mulhouse*, vol. XX, p. 222, Report by M. Achille Penot on the modification of the law of March 22, 1841. Cited in Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

¹⁹ Villermé, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 28-32.

²⁰ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *L'Economie politique chrétienne* (Paris, 1834), cited by Villermé, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

²¹ At Rouen, for example, men were earning from 1 fr. 25c. to 2 fr. a day. See the comparative table of expenses and wages, Villermé, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 150-151.

²² Villermé, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 408. The quotation is from M. Barbet's remarks in the Chamber of Deputies, June 15, 1839. It is only fair to state that some of the larger manufacturers, notably the Industrial Association of Mulhouse, expressed the desire for legislative regulation of child-labor, and the General Council of Commerce, composed of the chief industrial magnates of France, wished the employment of children under eight years of age to be prohibited, and the working day to be limited to twelve hours for children under fifteen years of age. Cf. Villermé, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-100.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116, note 2. Villermé regards this as "a rare exception."

Mouvement physiocratique en France de 1756 à 1770 (2 vols., Paris, 1910); also H. Higgs, *The Physiocrats* (London, 1897); G. Schelle, *Du Pont de Nemours et l'école physiocratique* (Paris, 1888); Eugène Daire, *Physiocrates* (Paris, 1846), selected works and biographical notes; Paul Permez, *Les Idées des physiocrates en matière de commerce internationale* (Lyons, 1907); August Oncken, *Die Maxime Laissez faire et laissez passer, ihr Ursprung, ihr Werden* (Bern, 1886); Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, pp. 1-59; L. de Lavergne, *Les Économistes français du dix-huitième siècle* (Paris, 1870); G. Schelle, "Physiocrates," in Léon Say and J. Chailley, *Nouveau Dictionnaire d'économie politique* (Paris, 1892), vol. ii, pp. 473-486.

²⁸ François Quesnay (1694-1774). His first writing on economic questions was in the form of articles (on "Fermiers" and "Grains") for the *Encyclopédie* (vol. vi, 1756, vol. vii, 1757). His famous *Tableau économique* appeared in 1758. Cf. Aug. Oncken (ed.), *Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay* (Frankfort and Paris, 1888); and G. Schelle, *Le docteur Quesnay* (Paris, 1907); in addition to general works already cited on the Physiocrats.

²⁹ Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours (1739-1817). A full list of his voluminous writings is given by G. Schelle, *Du Pont de Nemours et l'école physiocratique* (Paris, 1888), p. 399, *et seq.*; Schelle's biography of the economist, it may be remarked, is exceptionally informing. Probably the most interesting of Du Pont's treatises, from the point of view of social politics, is that entitled *De l'Origine et des progrès d'une science nouvelle* (London and Paris, 1767). His collection of Quesnay's works, published under the title *Physiocratie, ou constitution naturelle du gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain* (Leyde, Paris, 1767-1768), gave the Physiocratic school its familiar name, and contained an introduction by Du Pont recapitulating the philosophy of the new school.

³⁰ Victor Riquetti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789). He wrote *L'Ami des hommes ou traité de la population* (Avignon, 1756), *Théorie de l'impôt* (1760), *Philosophie rurale* (Amsterdam, 1763). Cf. Louis de Loménie, *Les Mirabeau* (Paris, 1889-91); L. Brocard, *Les Doctrines économiques et sociales du marquis de Mirabeau dans "L'Ami des hommes"* (Paris, 1902).

³¹ Mercier de la Rivière, *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* (Paris, 1767), is perhaps the best exposition of the Physiocratic doctrine.

³² G. F. Le Trosne (1728-1780). His views are best stated in *De l'Ordre social* (2 vols., Paris, 1777).

³³ Nicholas Baudeau (1730-1792?). See especially his *Première introduction à la philosophie économique* (Paris, 1771).

³⁴ Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, baron de l'Aulne, (1727-1781), expounded his economic theories in the *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses* (written in 1766, published in Dupont's *Ephémérides du citoyen*, 1769-1770). While minister under Louis XVI, he endeavored to realize his theories by suppressing restrictions on internal free trade and by abolishing the craft guilds. Cf. G.

Schelle, *Œuvres de Turgot et documents le concernant avec biographie et notes*, (Paris, 1913-1914); Léon Say, *Turgot* (second ed., Paris, 1891); Du Pont de Nemours, *Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. Turgot* (2 vols., Phila., 1782); R. P. Shepherd, *Turgot and the Six Edicts* (Columbia Univ. Studies, 1903, vol. xviii, No. 2). While there is good reason to include Turgot among Quesnay's followers, Turgot in developing his ideas manifested great independence of mind and differed from the orthodox Physiocrats on several important points.

³⁵ Cited by Ch. Gide and Ch. Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 6.

³⁶ Mercier de la Rivière, *Ordre naturel* (new edition, Paris, 1910), p. 338.

³⁷ Du Pont, in his preface to *Physiocratie*, p. lxxxii.

³⁸ This famous phrase is usually attributed to Gournay, a contemporary of Quesnay; it was repeated by some of Quesnay's followers, though not by the master himself, and came to be regarded as the central maxim of physiocratic doctrine. Cf. Oncken, *Die Maxime Laissez faire et laissez passer, ihr Ursprung, ihr Werden* (Bern, 1886).

³⁹ Du Pont de Nemours, *De l'origine et des progrès d'une science nouvelle*, reprinted in Daire's edition of the *Physiocrates* (Paris, 1846), vol. ii, p. 347.

⁴⁰ Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832). His *Traité d'économie politique ou simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses*, appeared in 1803 and was very widely read, going through many subsequent editions. After the publication of this treatise, Say established a large textile factory, and divided his time between the practise and the theory of economic science. Among his other works, special interest attaches to the *Cours complet d'économie politique pratique* (six vols., Paris, 1828-1829), a work "destined to place before the eyes of statesmen, landed proprietors and capitalists, scientists, agriculturalists, manufacturers, merchants, and in general all citizens, the economy of societies"; *Catéchisme d'économie politique* (first ed., 1817, 7th ed., Malines, 1836); *Lettres à M. Malthus* (Paris, 1820); *Mélanges et correspondance d'économie politique* (Paris, 1833), a posthumous collection edited by Charles Comte. See also A. Liesse, "Un professeur d'économie politique sous la restauration" (in *Journal des économistes*, series V. vol. 46, pp. 3-22, 161-174).

⁴¹ E. Dubois de l'Estaing, "J. B. Say," in *Nouveau Dictionnaire d'économie politique* (Paris, 1892), vol. ii, pp. 783-790.

⁴² Cf. Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, pp. 120-138.

⁴³ J. B. Say, *Traité d'économie politique* (seventh edition), p. 13.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 355, et seq.

⁴⁵ J. B. Say, *Cours complet d'économie politique pratique*, vol. iii, pp. 243-244. Liberty, to J. B. Say, implied prohibition of associations of workmen and of employers,—cf. *ibid.*, p. 269.

⁴⁶ Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) was a bourgeois by birth as well as by economic viewpoint. His father was a prosperous merchant at

Bayonne; Frédéric himself was at first employed in business, but later became a gentleman farmer, then a politician and publicist. Cobden's Anti-Corn-Law campaign in England inspired Bastiat with the aspiration of becoming a French Cobden. He organized a Free-Trade Association in France and issued a series of pamphlets against protectionism and socialism, the two greatest menaces to economic liberty. His most ambitious economic treatise, *Les Harmonies économiques*, was begun in 1849, and published in 1850. See G. de Molinari's biographical note on Bastiat in *Journal des économistes*, Feb. 1851, p. 180, *et seq.*, and A. Courtois, "Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Frédéric Bastiat," *Journal des économistes*, Feb., 1888, p. 272, *et seq.*

⁴⁷ Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 384.

⁴⁸ Speech on labor coalitions, in the National Assembly, Nov. 17, 1849, printed with *Incompatibilités parlementaires* (Paris, 1851), p. 85, *et seq.* The speech is extremely interesting as an evidence of his attitude toward labor.

⁴⁹ Bastiat, *Les Harmonies économiques* (Brussels, 1850), ch. iv, p. 127.

⁵⁰ Bastiat, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵³ Gide et Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

⁵⁴ Bastiat, it may be remarked, received Christian sacraments at his death, but was far from a devout Catholic in life, *Journal des économistes*, Feb., 1851, p. 195; Feb., 1888, p. 293.

⁵⁵ Charles Dunoyer, (1786-1862), *De la liberté du travail, ou simple exposé des conditions dans lesquelles les forces humaines s'exercent avec le plus de puissance* (Paris, 1845). This was the enlarged and final form of a work which had already appeared in 1825 and 1830.

⁵⁶ Charles Dunoyer, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 448, *et seq.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 435, *et seq.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 457.

⁵⁹ Louis Gabriel Ambroise, vicomte de Bonald (1754-1840). Consult Mauduit, *Les Conceptions politiques et sociales de Bonald* (thesis, Paris, 1913); Beaumont, *Esprit de M. de Bonald, ou Recueil méthodique de ses principales pensées* (third ed., Paris, 1870). Of Bonald's works (*Œuvres complètes*, edited by Abbé Migne, Paris, 1859, 1864), the following are of chief interest: *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile démontrée par le raisonnement et par l'histoire* (1796); *Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social, ou du Pouvoir, du ministre et du sujet dans la société* (1800); *Législation primitive considérée dans les derniers temps par les seules lumières de la raison. . . .* (1802); *Observations sur l'ouvrage de Mme. la baronne de Staël, ayant pour titre, "Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française"* (1818); *Démonstration philosophique du principe constitutif de la société* (1830).

⁶⁰ Bonald, *Observations sur l'ouvrage de Mme. la baronne de Staël ayant pour titre "Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française,"* (1818), section vi. (*Œuvres*, vol. ii, p. 634).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, sections ix-x, on Bonald's attitude toward political liberalism.

⁶² François René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), the famous apologist for Christianity and author of *Le Génie du christianisme* (1802). He was the recipient of distinguished political honors under the Restoration government, but went over to the Opposition during the reign of Charles X. On his life and writings, consult Jules Lemaitre, *Chateaubriand* (Paris, 1912),—a primarily personal and literary biography.

⁶³ These tendencies of his thought are perhaps best expressed in the "Conclusions" which Chateaubriand appended to his *Mémoires d'outre tombe* (Paris, 1860), vol. vi, p. 352, *et seq.* Cf. also Chateaubriand, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1859), vol. viii, p. 18, *et seq.* Chateaubriand valued liberty, as he defined it, but detested Liberalism as it was then understood.

⁶⁴ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, vol. ii, p. 271.

⁶⁵ *Revue européenne*, 1831, no. 4, p. 7. Quoted by Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. i, p. 95.

⁶⁶ Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, vol. vi, p. 359.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 367, *et seq.*

⁶⁸ Philippe Joseph Benjamin Buchez (1796-1865). Cf. *Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Buchez*, by A. Ott, which serves as a biographical preface to the posthumous *Traité de politique et de science sociale*, (Paris, 1866) by Buchez, pp. xi-cxliii. For criticism, see Calippe, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-176; Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie*, pp. 23-27; Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, pp. 301, 357, 582. Also, Debidour, *Rapports de l'église et de l'état en France* (Paris, 1898), p. 484. Éblé asserts that Buchez was not a Catholic but "gravitated in the sphere of influence of the Church." It is true that in his earlier life Buchez was not a Catholic, but he is usually regarded as having returned to the Catholic faith. Cf. Buchez, *Essai d'un traité complet de philosophie, du point de vue du catholicisme et du progrès* (Paris, 1838-1840).

⁶⁹ See his scathing denunciation of existing conditions and of the attitude of the economists, in *Introduction à la science de l'histoire, ou science du développement de l'humanité* (Paris, 1833), pp. 5-42, especially p. 21.

⁷⁰ Buchez, *Introduction à la science de l'histoire*, p. 347, *et seq.*

⁷¹ A coöperative association of gilt-workers was founded in 1834 under his inspiration. Cf. the article by Buchez in the *Journal des Sciences morales et politiques*, Dec. 17, 1831, and comment by Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

⁷² Dr. Ott's *Traité d'économie social* (Paris, 1851) gives an interesting development of Buchez's ideas. Chevê's *Catholicisme et démocratie* (Paris, 1842), and *Le dernier mot du socialisme* (Paris, 1848) present a somewhat similar doctrine. Cf. Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 28, *et seq.*, and Calippe, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

⁷³ Calippe, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁷⁵ Buchez, *Traité de la politique et de science sociale* (Paris, 1866), vol. ii, p. 504.

⁷⁶ Mgr. Olympe Philippe Gerbet (1798-1864), bishop of Perpignan.

⁷⁷ Gerbet, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1832) pp. 221-223.

⁷⁸ Gerbet, *Mandements et instructions pastorales* (Paris, 1876), vol. i, p. 323.

⁷⁹ Louis Veuillot (1813-1883), consult Eugène Veuillot, *Louis Veuillot* (Paris, 4 vols., 1899), or the more recent study by Eugène Tavernier, *Louis Veuillot* (Paris, 1913) and the article in the Social Catholic organ, *Association catholique*, vol. xv, p. 545, *et seq.*

⁸⁰ Louis Veuillot, *Cours d'économie politique à l'usage d'un journal conservateur*, published in *L'Univers*, Jan. 16, 1842. Reprinted in Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 301-304.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Jean Baptiste Henri Dominique Lacordaire (1802-1861), *Cf. Œuvres du R. P. H. D. Lacordaire* (Paris, 1873); R. P. Chocarne, *The Inner Life of the Very Rev. Père Lacordaire*, tr. from French (Dublin, 1867?); MacNabb, *Lacordaire* (London, 1890); Foisset, *Vie du R. P. Lacordaire* (Paris, 1870); Montalembert, *Le Père Lacordaire* (Paris, 1862); Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste 1830-1848* (Paris, 1897); comte d'Haussonville, *Lacordaire* (4th ed., Paris, 1911); H. Villard, *Correspondance inédite du P. Lacordaire*, preceded by a biographical study (Paris, 1870); Ségur, "Le Père Lacordaire, le libéralisme et l'infaillibilité," in *L'Association catholique*, vol. i, p. 289.

⁸³ In his own words, "I reached Catholic belief through social belief," Chocarne, *The Inner Life of the Very Reverend Père Lacordaire*, p. 46.

⁸⁴ Lacordaire, *Conférences de Notre-Dame de Paris* (Paris, 1844-51), 52e Conf.

⁸⁵ H. Villard, *Correspondance inédite du P. Lacordaire* (Paris, 1870), appendix xvi, pp. 498-500.

⁸⁶ Armand de Melun, (1807-1877). The biographical details are drawn from Baunard, *Le vicomte Armand de Melun* (Paris, 1880); Baguenault de Puchesse, "Le vicomte de Melun" (a series of articles in *Le Correspondant*, Feb. 10, 1882, p. 43, *et seq.*; Feb. 25, p. 655, *et seq.*; March 25, p. 953, *et seq.*); F. Dreyfus, *L'Assistance sous la seconde République* (Paris, 1907); Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. ii, pp. 129-152.

⁸⁷ Which became the *Revue d'économie chrétienne* in 1860, and subsequently, *Le Contemporain*.

⁸⁸ In 1847. The association included 150 delegates, representing fourteen nations. *Cf.* Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁸⁹ *Cf.* biographical sketch in Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 23-24.

⁹⁰ Goyau, *Autour du catholicisme social*, 3e série, pp. 130-131.

⁹¹ *Cf. infra.* His speech in the Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 22, 1840, *Moniteur universel*, 1840, p. 2493, *et seq.*, is well worth reading in contrast with the liberal, anti-interventionist doctrines voiced by some of the speakers in the same debate. Théry, in *L'Œuvre économique de Villeneuve-Bargemont* (Paris, 1911), p. 68, ascribes great importance to Villeneuve-Bargemont's defense of the Bill.

⁹² *Moniteur universel*, 1841, p. 721.

⁹³ Charles Forbes René de Montalembert (1810-1870). Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 17-32, and biography in *Catholic Encyclopedia*. See Montalembert's speech on the child-labor bill in the Chamber of Peers, March 4, 1840, *Moniteur universel*, 1840, p. 418 *et seq.*, and 444.

⁹⁴ Jean Paul Alban vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784-1850). Cf. Théry, *Un précurseur du catholicisme social, le vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont* (Lille, 1911); Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 73-82; Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 9, *et seq.*; Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 233; Jannet, "De l'État actuel de la science sociale," in *Correspondant*, Sept. 25, 1878, p. 1072. There is a short biography by an authoritative Social Catholic scholar, Georges Goyau, in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, under the entry, "Villeneuve-Barcement" [*Sic*].

⁹⁵ Théry, *L'Œuvre économique de Villeneuve-Bargemont*, pp. 50-51.

⁹⁶ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Économie politique chrétienne, ou Recherches sur la nature et les causes du paupérisme en France et en Europe, et sur les moyens de le soulager et de le prévenir*. (Paris, 1834).

⁹⁷ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Histoire de l'économie politique, ou Études historiques, philosophiques et religieuses sur l'économie politique des peuples anciens et modernes* (Paris, 1841).

⁹⁸ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Le Livre des affligés* (Paris, 2 vols., 1841).

⁹⁹ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Histoire de l'économie politique, etc.*, ii, p. 423.

¹⁰⁰ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Économie politique chrétienne*, p. 151; *Histoire de l'économie politique*, vol. i, ch. ix and *passim*.

¹⁰¹ Speech in Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 22, 1840, *Moniteur universel*, 1840, p. 2492, *et seq.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Villeneuve-Bargemont, *Économie politique chrétienne*, p. 468.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-117.

¹⁰⁷ Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 167, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁸ Speech in Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 22, 1840, *Moniteur universel*, 1840, pp. 2493-2494.

¹⁰⁹ Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

¹¹⁰ Henry Michel, *L'Idée de l'état* (Paris, 1895), p. 263.

¹¹¹ A Swiss Protestant historian and economist, whose *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique* (Paris, 1819), and *Études sur l'économie politique* (Paris, 1837-38) expounded a new system of economy, opposed to the methods, objects, and practical conclusions of what he called economic "orthodoxy," *i. e.*, the classical school of economists. In method, economy should be less abstract, more historical. Its object should not be mere production of wealth, but men's welfare by the general distribution of wealth. Unrestrained production, competition, and individualism, he endeavored to prove, were not conducive to the welfare of society. Hence, he concluded, the government should regulate and restrain production, favor small holdings and small *entrepreneurs*, grant to labor the right of coalition, forbid child-labor

and limit adult labor, force employers to support their employees in sickness, unemployment and old age, and place obstacles in the way of the marriage of paupers. Sismondi is one of the first modern economists to admit extensive intervention in behalf of the workers; he is also regarded as the precursor of the historical school of political economy. In many respects his doctrine was close to that of Villeneuve-Bargemont, by whom he was frequently cited. In fact, Sismondi was one of the writers whom Villeneuve-Bargemont wished to include in a new group or school of "Christian political economy" as opposed to the orthodox or liberal school. Sismondi, says Théry, was not much read in the middle of the nineteenth century, whereas Villeneuve-Bargemont enjoyed greater prestige. In more recent times, however, Villeneuve-Bargemont has fallen into obscurity, while Sismondi's reputation has enormously increased. Cf. Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, pp. 201-233; Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-228; Aftalion, *L'Œuvre économique de Simonde de Sismondi* (Paris, 1899); G. Isambert, *Les Idées socialistes en France de 1815 à 1848* (Paris, 1905), ch. v.

¹¹² Gaston Isambert, *Les Idées socialistes en France de 1815 à 1848* (Paris, 1905), p. 254.

¹¹³ For a discussion of other friends or disciples of Villeneuve-Bargemont, notably Droz, Ganilh, Saint-Chamans, and Morogues, the reader is referred to Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-213.

¹¹⁴ Count Charles de Caux (1787-1865). Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 59-72; Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie*, p. 9, et seq.; Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-209.

¹¹⁵ Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 556.

¹¹⁶ Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

¹¹⁷ *Revue européenne*, vol. i, no. 9, pp. 380-382 (1832).

¹¹⁸ Charles de Caux, "De l'état moral de l'Europe," in *L'Avenir*, April 21, 1831; cf. his *Essais d'économie politique* (Paris, 1832), p. 4.

¹¹⁹ Charles de Caux, "Des Associations patriotiques," in *L'Avenir*, March 21, 1831.

¹²⁰ Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

¹²¹ Charles de Caux, *Essais d'économie politique*, p. 44.

¹²² *Ibid.*, passim.

¹²³ Antoine Frédéric Ozanam (1813-1853). On his biography, consult C. A. Ozanam, *Vie de Frédéric Ozanam* (Paris, 1879); O'Meara, *Frédéric Ozanam, his life and works* (2nd ed., London, 1878); Huit, *La Vie et les œuvres de F. Ozanam* (Lyons, 1888); H. Joly, *Ozanam et ses continuateurs* (Paris, 1913); Baudrillart, *Frédéric Ozanam* (Paris, 1912); and an article by V. de Clercq in *L'Association catholique*, Feb., March, June, 1902. Ozanam's complete works were published in 11 volumes, at Paris, 1855-65.

¹²⁴ Frédéric Ozanam, *Réflexions sur la doctrine de Saint-Simon* (1831). The *Réflexions* were little more than a pamphlet against Saint-Simon's attempt to substitute a new religion, the "New Christianity," for the historic Church. In another work, *Les Origines du socialisme* (*Œuvres complètes de A. F. Ozanam*, Paris, 1862-1873, vol. vii, pp.

196-245), Ozanam recognizes the "generosity" of socialist "illusions," and asserts that, "like all the doctrines which have troubled the peace of the world, socialism is a power only because it contains many truths, mixed with many errors." All that which is true in socialism, Ozanam continued, was contained in Christianity, but without the admixture of errors and illusions.

¹²⁵ Saint-Simon, *Le nouveau christianisme* (pub. 1825), in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon* (Paris, 1841), p. 138, *et seq.* Saint-Simon put these words in the mouth of Luther, as what Luther should have said.

¹²⁶ He says this very clearly in his speech before the Conference of Saint-Vincent-de-Paul at Florence, Jan. 30, 1853, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. viii, p. 38, *et seq.*

¹²⁷ These principles were stated in Ozanam's notes for a course of lectures delivered in 1840. The notes are published under the caption of "*Notes d'un cours de droit commercial*" in Ozanam's *Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1862-1873), vol. viii, especially pp. 537-545. Ozanam, it should be explained, studied and, for a time, taught law, before he devoted himself to literary history and philosophy.

¹²⁸ Ozanam, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. vii, pp. 263-265,—an extract from the *Ère nouvelle*, of Oct. 1848.

¹²⁹ *Notes d'un cours de droit commercial, op. cit.*, p. 544.

¹³⁰ Cf. Vansteenberghe's assertion (*Revue de Lille*, 1901, n. s. vol. 5, p. 603) that the new school of Christian sociology "finds its basis in the ancient doctrine of Saint Thomas, of the Fathers of the fourth century, of the Franciscans of the thirteenth, the doctrine which does not grow old, because it is the truth; and Leo XIII, who is its chief, in teaching it has done no more than rehabilitate the august and ancient Christian sociology." Leo XIII's historic encyclical "On the Condition of the Working Classes," which may be regarded as the charter of the Social Catholic movement, laid great emphasis on the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

¹³¹ The Society of Saint Vincent de Paul, founded by Ozanam at Paris, 1833, now has branches in almost every Catholic parish, the world over. It took the name from Saint Vincent de Paul (1580-1660), a French priest distinguished by his work for the poorer classes. Consult *Catholic Encyclopedia* under entry, "Saint Vincent de Paul, Society of."

¹³² The Franciscan order (Order of Friars Minor) was founded by Saint Francis of Assisi in the thirteenth century. It is at present one of the largest orders, and together with its auxiliary "third order" of lay brothers, exercises a very powerful influence in the direction of social action. Cf. Georges Fonsegrive's interesting article in the *Quinzaine*, 1900, vol. xxxiv, pp. 523-542, on "Le Tiers-Ordre franciscain: son influence religieuse et sociale." The Franciscans were the most interesting, from this point of view, but several other orders of mendicant friars, notably the Dominicans, the Augustinians, and the Carmellites, arose in the Middle Ages.

¹³³ Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821) was a Savoyard, of French ancestry (on his father's side). His most famous apologetic work, *Du Pape*

(Lyons, 1819), was devoted to the defense of the doctrine of papal infallibility and proof of the necessity of papal sovereignty. In *L'Église gallicane dans ses rapports avec les souverains pontifes* (Paris, 1821), he energetically combated "Gallicanism," i. e., the attempt in France to diminish papal control and to increase the national autonomy of the French Church. His writings exerted a very powerful influence upon French Catholic thought, especially upon the ideas of the ultramontane group. Consult F. Paulhan, *Joseph de Maistre et sa philosophie*, (Paris, 1893); E. Grasset, *Joseph de Maistre* (1901); G. Cogordan, *Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1894); de Margerie, *Le Comte Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1882); John Morley, *Critical Miscellanies* (London, 1892), vol. ii, pp. 255-338; L. Moreau, *Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1879).

¹³⁴ Cf. *Œuvres complètes de Joseph de Maistre* (Lyons, 1891), vol. i, pp. 197-202, 8, et seq.

¹³⁵ Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France*, in his *Œuvres complètes*, vol. i, p. 55.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 123, et seq.

¹³⁷ Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 60.

¹³⁸ Cf. Lamartine, *Histoire de la restauration* (8 vols., Paris, 1851-1852); Bourgain, *L'Église de France et l'état au 19^e siècle, 1802-1900* (2 vols., Paris, 1901); Lavissee, *Histoire générale*, vol. x, ch. iii.

¹³⁹ Art. 6 of the Charter of June 8, 1814. Cf. L. Duguit and H. Monnier, *Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (third ed., Paris, 1915), p. 185.

¹⁴⁰ Debidour, *Rapports de l'église et de l'état en France de 1789 à 1870* (Paris, 1898), p. 340. Law of May 8, 1816.

¹⁴¹ Laws of March 17 and 25, 1822. Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 369, et seq.

¹⁴² Law of April 20, 1825. Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 379, et seq.

¹⁴³ Debidour, *op. cit.*, 2nd part, ch. i and ii, *passim*.

¹⁴⁴ Mgr. Frayssinous is perhaps best known as an exponent, in *Les Vrais Principes de l'église gallicane* (1818, third ed., 1826, Paris), of the theory of the liberties of the Gallican Church. He was made grand master of education by Louis XVIII, and insisted upon the teaching of "religious and monarchical sentiments" in the schools. The combination of Gallicanism and ultramonarchism, as shown in Frayssinous, is typical. Cf. Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 371, et seq.

¹⁴⁵ De Bonald, mentioned in the preceding section as an opponent of economic liberalism, was one of the foremost advocates of political absolutism and of religious intolerance. Cf. his *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile, démontrée par le raisonnement et par l'histoire* (1796); *Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social, ou du Pouvoir, du ministre et du sujet dans la société* (Paris, 1800); *Observations sur l'ouvrage de Mme. la baronne de Staël ayant pour titre "Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution française"* (Paris, 1818); *Démonstration philosophique du principe constitutif de la société, suivie de Méditations politiques tirées de l'évangile* (Paris, 1830); and Mauduit, *Les Conceptions politiques et sociales de Bonald* (thesis, Paris, 1913).

¹⁴⁶ Cited by Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale*, vol. i, p. 92. For the sake of

bringing out more clearly the drift away from old-fashioned monarchism, I have given a too simple sketch of Chateaubriand's political philosophy. In the face of discouragements, Chateaubriand remained a monarchist,—with misgivings. Thus, in 1830, he said, "perhaps the representative republic is the future state of the world, but its time has not come." (*Œuvres de Chateaubriand*, vol. viii, p. 475.) In 1836 he promised that the remainder of his life would belong to his young king. (*Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, vol. vi, p. 345). But, with all his loyalty, he could not refrain from writing, in 1841, that "The old European order expires" . . . "the kings still hold the cards, but they hold them for the nations." . . . "Since the banner of the French kings exists no more, all modern society is deserting monarchy. To hasten the degradation of royal power, God has delivered the sceptres in various countries into the hands of sickly kings and little girls. . . ." (*Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, vol. vi, p. 356, *et seq.*)

¹⁴⁷ Eugène Veuillot, *Louis Veuillot* (Paris, 1899); Tavernier, *Louis Veuillot* (Paris, 1913). The quotation is from Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. iii, pp. 38-43.

¹⁴⁸ This quotation is from the *Univers*, Veuillot's organ, Dec. 26, 1852, and is cited by A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux* (Paris, 1885), p. 163.

¹⁴⁹ Pierre Marcel, *Essai politique sur de Tocqueville* (Paris, 1910), ch. ii-iii, especially p. 64.

¹⁵⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (tr. by Henry Reeve, N. Y., 1898), vol. i, pp. 384, 393.

¹⁵¹ Letter of Jan. 30, 1829, cited in Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux*, p. 82.

¹⁵² Lacordaire, however, seems to have maintained certain mental reservations regarding Lamennais' philosophy. Cf. Chocarne, *Inner Life of the Very Rev. Père Lacordaire* (tr. from the French, Dublin, 1867), p. 93, *et seq.*

¹⁵³ Cf. Blaize, *Essai biographique sur M. F. de Lamennais* (Paris, 1858); E. Spuller, *Lamennais* (Paris, 1892); Boutard, *Lamennais, sa vie et ses doctrines* (Paris, 1905-8); Maréchal, *Lamennais et Lamartine* (Paris, 1907); Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux*, p. 81, *et seq.*; Gibson, *Abbé de Lamennais and the Liberal Catholic Movement in France* (London, 1896); A. Roussel, *Lamennais d'après des documents inédits* (3d. ed., Rennes, 1893); A. Feugère, *Lamennais avant l'essai sur l'indifférence* (Paris, 1906).

¹⁵⁴ As minister of the interior, Aug. 11, 1830; as minister of public instruction, Oct. 11, 1832.

¹⁵⁵ Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état en France de 1789 à 1870* (Paris, 1898), part ii, ch. iii; Bourgain, *L'Eglise de France et l'état au XIX^e siècle*; G. Weill, *La France sous la monarchie constitutionnelle* (Paris, 1912); J. MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century* (St. Louis, 1910), vol. i, p. 59, *et seq.*; consult especially the memorandum presented to the pope by the editors of *L'Avenir*, reprinted in Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, p. 308, *et seq.*, for a contemporary description of the government's policy.

¹⁵⁶ The editors were Lamennais, Gerbet, Rohrbacher, Lacordaire, de Coux, Bartels, Montalembert, Daguerre, Ault-Duménil. Cf. Fesch, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

¹⁵⁷ G. Weill, *La France sous la monarchie constitutionnelle*, p. 147.

¹⁵⁸ Leroy-Beaulieu: *Les Catholiques libéraux*, p. 96. It should not be implied, however, that the editors were unanimously convinced that a democratic republic was the best possible form of government. Lamennais, for one, would have preferred a republic to the July Monarchy. At the time of the July Revolution he wrote to a friend,—“They are going to place the crown on the head of the duke of Orleans. The majority would prefer a republic, a republic frankly declared, and I am among that number.” The Orleanist monarchy, he believed, was only a compromise, the republican idea was bound to triumph and non-republican institutions would inevitably be overturned, perhaps by dangerous violence. Cf. Spuller, *Lamennais*, p. 172. Lacordaire, on the other hand, was a constitutional monarchist by predilection, and became a hesitant republican by necessity. In a letter to Montalembert, Oct. 9, 1839, he said, “We will not put our hope in the reëstablishment of the ancient monarchy; no more must we put hope in the reëstablishment of the old aristocracy. We can expect nothing except from new elements hidden in the palpitating bosom of modern peoples. . . . Democracy, born of the old society and thereby corrupted in its cradle, has already committed great faults and great crimes, but this new French people has been a product, not a cause; it has not yet possessed power long enough to be condemned forever. Moreover, it is the only strong element today. It is a vigorous child of an aged race; instead of wishing to curb it under the corrupted ferule of its fathers, Religion must elevate and enlighten it.” Cf. Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, pp. 60–61. *L’Avenir* did not openly condemn monarchy in principle, cf. Spuller, *Lamennais*, p. 178.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Articles de l’Avenir* (7 vols., Louvain, 1830–1832).

¹⁶⁰ Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 422; Spuller, *Lamennais*, pp. 180–181.

¹⁶¹ Spuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–4.

¹⁶² Cf. Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome* (Paris, 1836) for Lamennais’ own story of the episode; cf. also Leroy-Beaulieu, *Catholiques libéraux*, p. 101, *et seq.*; Spuller, *op. cit.*, ch. vi. The memorandum presented to the pope by the editors of *L’Avenir* is reprinted in Lamennais, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–89.

¹⁶³ *Bullarium Romanum* xix, pp. 126–132. Cf. F. Neilsen, *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century* (translation, London, 1906), vol. ii, pp. 67 *et seq.*; the text of the encyclical is given in French and in Latin in Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome*, p. 318, *et seq.*

¹⁶⁴ Cardinal Pacca wrote Lamennais a personal letter informing him that the pope had been pained to see him discuss questions with which only the highest ecclesiastical authorities were capable of dealing, and that *L’Avenir’s* advocacy of liberty of the press as positively desirable had astonished the Holy See. Cf. Spuller, *op. cit.*, 209; Neilsen, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 70; Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome*, pp. 32, 131, *et seq.*

¹⁶⁵ Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome*, p. 137.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Lamennais, *Paroles d'un croyant* (Paris, 1834), *passim*; *idem*, *Affaires de Rome*, p. 270, *et seq.*; Spuller, *Lamennais*, *passim*.

¹⁶⁷ Montalembert, whose mother was Irish, knew and admired O'Connell, the famous Irish leader, and possibly had O'Connell's example in mind. Cf. Weill, *La France sous la monarchie constitutionnelle*, p. 155; and, by the same author, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France* (Paris, 1909), p. 69, *et seq.*; J. T. Foisset, *Le Comte de Montalembert* (Paris, 1877).

¹⁶⁸ Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux*, pp. 111, 118, 121-124.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142, *et seq.*

¹⁷⁰ Weill, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96. For further details regarding Maret, see G. Bazin, *Vie de Mgr. Maret* (2 vols., Paris, 1891).

¹⁷² Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, p. 62, *et seq.*

¹⁷³ Charles de Caux, although barely mentioned in this sketch, was an extremely interesting figure. He had been the acknowledged economist of *L'Avenir*. His theory that universal suffrage would help to ameliorate the condition of the workingman is an indication of his attitude toward democracy. Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 59-72, and also *supra*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64, *et seq.*, 87. Other signatories of the prospectus were Charles Sainte-Foy, Lorain, de Labaume, J. P. Tessier, and Gouraud.

¹⁷⁵ The success of the journal was immediate and its influence considerable. The circulation reached 20,000 in June, 1848. After the June Days, Lacordaire's lack of faith in the republic became so discordant with the democratic convictions of the other editors, of Maret particularly, that he resigned the office of editor-in-chief in Maret's favor, September 2, 1848. Lacordaire's own explanation of his retirement, as given in Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, p. 91, *et seq.*, shows clearly that while he accepted the republic he was not a convinced republican. As he himself said, he was not a republican of yesterday, but a republican of tomorrow; hope rather than principle was the basis of his republicanism, and hope was destroyed by the tragic events of June. Cf. Chocarne, *Inner Life of . . . Lacordaire*, ch. xvii; Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, p. 59, *et seq.*

¹⁷⁶ *Le Correspondant*, vol. xxi, p. 412. In a letter to M. Foisset, Feb. 22, 1848, Ozanam explained the phrase. "When I say 'let us go over to the side of the barbarians,' I do not mean go over to the side of the radicals. . . ." What he did mean, was to go over, "from the camp of the kings, of the statesmen of 1815, to the people." "And in saying 'let us go over to the barbarians,'" he continued, "I demand . . . that we concern ourselves with the people, who have too many needs and not enough rights, who rightly demand a more complete participation in public affairs as well as guarantees of work and against poverty,—the people, who have false leaders, but only because they cannot find good leaders. . . ." *Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam* (Paris, 1873), vol. ii, p. 217, *et seq.*

¹⁷⁷ Letter to M. Prosper Dugas, March 11, 1849, in *Lettres de Frédéric Ozanam*, vol. ii, 251.

¹⁷⁸ MacCaffrey, *op. cit.*, p. 235; Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-487. In strict accuracy, it should be said that Lacordaire was acclaimed by the crowds outside, rather than by the Assembly itself. Cf. Fesch, *Lacordaire journaliste*, p. 76 note, and Chocarne, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

¹⁷⁹ Lamartine's part in the great events of 1848 is described in much detail in his own *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848* (Leipsig, 1849). Cf. also, P. Quentin-Bauchart, *Lamartine, homme politique* (thesis, Paris, 1903); H. Remsen Whitehouse, *The Life of Lamartine* (2 vols., Boston, and New York, 1918); Émile Ollivier, *Lamartine* (Paris, 1874); L. de Ronchaud, *La Politique de Lamartine* (2 vols., 1878); L. Barthou, *Lamartine, orateur* (Paris, 1916); there are numerous other biographies. As regards social questions, Lamartine was opposed to *laissez-faire*, on one hand, and to socialism, on the other. He stood for the workingman's "right to work, or to state assistance in case of demonstrated necessity." Cf. his *Discours sur le droit au travail* (Paris, 1848); H. Michel, *L'Idée de l'état* (Paris, 1895), p. 330, *et seq.*; and Eva Sachs, *Les Idées sociales de Lamartine* (thesis, Paris, 1915).

¹⁸⁰ Dreyfus, *L'Assistance sous la seconde république* (Paris, 1907), pp. 211-212.

¹⁸¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 483-4, gives this and additional evidence of the generality of Catholic approval. Cf. Henri Cabane, *Histoire du clergé de France pendant la Révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1908).

¹⁸² Cf. Chocarne, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-437. The pope himself wrote to Montalembert, expressing deep gratification that during the Revolution no injury had been offered to the Church.

¹⁸³ Fesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-67.

¹⁸⁴ Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848* (2 vols., Paris, 1870), ch. xi, xix-xxii; J. A. R. Marriott, *The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspect* (Oxford, 1913), vol. i, p. lxix, *et seq.*; Émile Thomas, *Histoire des ateliers nationaux* (Paris, 1848,—republished as vol. ii of Marriott, *op. cit.*); Pierre de La Gorce, *Histoire de la seconde république française* (7th ed., Paris, 1914), vol. i, pp. 277-328.

¹⁸⁵ La Gorce, *Histoire de la seconde république*, vol. i, pp. 377-381, 389; and *Moniteur universel*, 1848, p. 1503. This event occurred on June 25, after the fighting had begun. Ozanam, one of the precursors of Social Catholicism mentioned in ch. i, wished to accompany the archbishop, but the latter refused to grant the request. Mgr. Affre induced the workingmen to discuss a truce, and the drums were beat to command silence, but the drum-call was misinterpreted and fighting was resumed. The unsuccessful mediator, mortally wounded, fell into the arms of a workingman and was taken to a nearby rectory. Louis Blanc (*Histoire de la révolution de 1848* vol. ii, p. 179) cites an affidavit by one of Mgr. Affre's companions stating that, so far as could be judged in the confusion, the archbishop was not shot by the defenders of the barricades.

¹⁸⁶ The losses on both sides were estimated at 16,000 by Lord Normanby, then British ambassador to France (Marriott, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. xcii). The prefect of police, however, placed the figure much lower,

probably too low; there had been 1,035 killed and 2,000 wounded, he said. La Gorce, a conservative historian, arrives at 3,000 as the approximate figure. (La Gorce, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 393). Gustave Geofroy, writing in *La Révolution de 1848*, *Bulletin de la société d'histoire de la révolution de 1848* (1904-1905, pp. 22-29), gives a "moderate" estimate of 12,000 dead and 25,000 arrests.

¹⁸⁷ A "state of siege" was maintained until the end of October, and Gen. Cavaignac was virtually dictator. Cf. Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, vol. xi, p. 20, *et seq.*; La Gorce, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 405, *et seq.*; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*, vol. i, p. 184, *et seq.*; Marriott, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. xcii, *et seq.* Louis Blanc, who is, of course, a prejudiced witness, tells us that after the June Days, "the counter-revolution audaciously unfurled its flag"; Cavaignac's power, he says, was merely nominal, for "the true masters of the situation were MM. Thiers, de Falloux, de Montalembert, Odilon Barrot, Berryer: royalists." Of the Republic, "only the word remained." Though this may be exaggeration, it gives some idea of the bitter passions excited by the June Days,—passions fatal to democratic concord. Cf. also E. Dagnan, "La Réaction conservatrice" in *La Révolution de 1848*, *Bulletin de la société d'histoire de la révolution de 1848*, 1909-10, pp. 213-223, 290-313.

¹⁸⁸ Lavissee et Rambaud, *Histoire générale*, vol. xi, pp. 22-23; La Gorce, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 458, *et seq.*; MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i, p. 237; Debidour, *Rapports de l'église et de l'état en France*, p. 494; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les catholiques libéraux* (Paris, 1885), p. 165; Georges Renard, *La République de 1848* (*Hist. socialiste*, vol. ix, Paris, 1907), p. 124, *et seq.* Montalembert supported Louis Napoleon, and gave evidence of abandoning his earlier liberal views. In October, 1849, he wrote, "the kings have mounted their thrones again; liberty has not regained hers, she has not even regained the throne which she had in our hearts."

¹⁸⁹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, part ii, ch. v.; G. Weill, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France, 1828-1908*, p. 109, *et seq.*

¹⁹⁰ Cf. two articles by Am. Matagrín, entitled "Le Comité des cultes en 1848," in *La Révolution de 1848*, *Bulletin de la société d'histoire de la révolution de 1848*, 1905-1906, pp. 180-196, 245-256; the author holds that the development of anticlericalism among the French republicans was in large measure due to clerical aggression.

¹⁹¹ W. R. Thayer, *Dawn of Italian Independence* (Boston and New York, 1893), vol. ii, pp. 263, 288-293; L. C. Farini, *Lo Stato Romano dall'anno 1815 al 1850* (Florence, 1853), vol. iii, pp. 1-208; H. Reuchlin, *Geschichte Italiens* (Leipzig, 1859-1873), vol. iii, pp. 18-52.

¹⁹² La Gorce, *Histoire de la seconde république*, vol. ii, pp. 151-248; T. Delord, *Histoire du second empire* (5th ed., Paris, 1869), vol. i, pp. 141-150; Olliver, *L'Empire libéral* (Paris, 1895-1912), vol. ii, p. 220; Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 496, *et seq.*; E. Bourgeois and E. Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III* (Paris, 1907); Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 360, *et seq.*, vol. iv, *libro sesto*.

¹⁹³ Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 504-512, 701-718 (text of law). Cf. Leroy-

Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux*, ch. ix, and G. Weill, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France*, p. 102, *et seq.*, regarding the effect of this law in disrupting the Catholic party.

¹⁹⁴ Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 519. Veuillot gave chief credit for the Rome expedition to Louis Napoleon himself,—*cf.* Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.* p. 155 note.

¹⁹⁶ Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, ch. ix; Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 524, *et seq.*; La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire* (Paris, 1899-1905), vol. i, livre ii; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 111, *et seq.*; Delord, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. ii, ch. v-vi.

¹⁹⁷ Foisset, *Vie du R. P. Lacordaire*.

¹⁹⁸ *Cf.* Montalembert, *Des Intérêts catholiques au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1852); Lacanuet, *Montalembert, passim*; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 161, *et seq.*; Debidour *op. cit.*, pp. 522, 532, 580, 582, *et seq.*; and an article by J. F. Jeanjean on "Montalembert, les catholiques et l'Empire en 1859," in *La Révolution de 1848, Bulletin de la société histoire de la révolution de 1848*, 1913-1914, p. 23, *et seq.*

¹⁹⁹ *Cf.* Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, pp. 168, 196, *et seq.*

²⁰⁰ Original text in Latin in *Acta et decreta concilii Vaticani* (Freiburg, 1871); in French translation, Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 719, *et seq.*; in English and Latin, Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* (N. Y., 1878), vol. ii, pp. 213-233. On the effect of the Syllabus, consult Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, ch. xi; Debidour, *op. cit.*, part ii, ch. viii; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 169, *et seq.*; Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. vii, p. 201, *et seq.*

²⁰¹ La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. ii, p. 97, *et seq.*, vol. iv, p. 190; T. Delord, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iii, p. 398.

²⁰² On his earlier career, *cf. supra*, ch. i, pp. 18-19.

²⁰³ Dreyfus, *L'Assistance sous la seconde République*, pp. 96-97.

²⁰⁴ From a speech before the Society of Charitable Economy, March 6, 1848,—*cf. Annales de la charité, quatrième année*, p. 65. It is interesting to compare this with a letter of June, 1850, in which Melun explained that what he hoped for in the republic was an opportunity to establish social legislation inspired by Christian charity, so that by merely opening the code of laws "one could recognize that Christianity was at the basis of our social legislation, and that the Gospel was our legislative alphabet. That was what attracted me, I admit, in the Republic, which seemed to discard all established principles, all official maxims, and promised to realize in this world, so far as possible, the divine commands. The monarchy, as it was formerly understood, had the advantages and the disadvantages of the theory upon which it rested: it placed itself between God and us, posing as intermediary between heaven and earth." This doctrine had the advantage of strengthening obedience to authority, but too often it forced the acceptance of evil. But the fiction of divine right monarchy had crumbled, and the people had assumed the right to choose the form of government considered most serviceable to their own interests. They had established a republic, but were already growing weary of it, and there were signs of reversion to monarchy, not monarchy by divine

right, Melun sarcastically observed, but monarchy for the protection of property.

²⁰⁵ *Correspondant*, Feb. 10, 1882, p. 446.

²⁰⁶ Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 98, *et seq.*

²⁰⁷ *Correspondant*, Feb. 10, 1882, p. 449.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1882, p. 656.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 668.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 657; Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²¹² Article XIII of the constitution of 1848 is as follows: "The constitution guarantees to the citizens liberty of work and of industry. Society favors and encourages the development of labor by free primary instruction, vocational training, equality in the relationship between employer and workingman, institutions for providence and credit, agricultural institutions, voluntary association, and the establishment by the state, by the departments and by the communes, of public works designed to employ idle arms; it furnishes aid to abandoned infants, to the infirm and aged who are destitute of resources, and whose families cannot succor them."—Duguit and Monnier (ed.), *Les constitutions de la France*, p. 235.

²¹³ Melun's report, in *Moniteur universel*, 1840, p. 2197. Cf. also p. 2140.

²¹⁴ *Moniteur universel*, 1849, pp. 2304-2308.

²¹⁵ Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-127.

²¹⁷ *Correspondant*, Feb. 25, 1882, pp. 661-662.

²¹⁸ *De l'Intervention de la Société pour prévenir et soulager la misère* (pamphlet, Paris, 1849). This pamphlet is a reprint of two articles which appeared in the *Annales de la charité* for 1849, pp. 337, *et seq.*, 401, *et seq.*

²¹⁹ In 1851 he reported a bill for such organization. The bill provided for the creation of a special council or board under the chairmanship of the minister of the interior to supervise the execution of the laws on public assistance of the poor. This council was to be composed of twenty members, including four delegates of the National Assembly, two of the Council of State, two of the court of appeal, one of the audit department, one of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, and ten members appointed by the president of the Republic. In addition, each *département* was to have a committee on assistance of the poor; the departmental committee in each case would comprise the prefect, the bishop, a Protestant minister in *départements* where a Protestant church was recognized, a delegate of the court of appeals or of the court of first instance, and from four to six members chosen by the *conseil général* of the *département*. To these committees would be intrusted the task of supervising the various public institutions for poor relief, and the authority to grant recognition [implying the right to own property and receive bequests] to deserving institutions of private charity. The bill was never adopted. Cf. *Moniteur universel*, 1851, pp. 965-967.

²²⁰ Melun, *De l'Intervention de la Société pour prévenir et soulager la misère*. In summarizing Melun's ideas I have availed myself freely of the excellent exposition and discussion to be found in Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. iii, *et seq.*

²²¹ *Loi relative à l'assainissement des logements insalubres*, passed by the National Assembly on April 13, 1850, and duly promulgated, *cf. Moniteur universel*, April 23, 1850, p. 1317. The law gave the municipal council in each commune authority to appoint a committee for the inspection of housing conditions, and to require improvements where necessary. Buildings which could not be rendered healthful, might be condemned by the prefectural council. This bill had been presented by Melun.

²²² *Loi qui crée, sous la garantie de l'Etat, une caisse de retraites ou rentes viagères pour la vieillesse*, passed by the National Assembly on June 12, 1850, and duly promulgated,—*cf. Moniteur universel*, June 25, 1850, p. 2163. This was a scheme for voluntary insurance against old age; neither the state nor the employer was obliged to contribute. The amount of the annuity or pension was based on the amount of the premiums paid by the workingman, plus five per cent interest, taking into account his probability of life according to actuarial tables; in any case, the annuity could not exceed 600 francs.

²²³ *Loi sur les sociétés de secours mutuels*, passed by the National Assembly on July 15, 1850, and duly promulgated,—*cf. Moniteur universel*, July 20, 1850, p. 2479. Mutual aid societies having not fewer than 100 and not more than 2,000 members might under certain conditions be recognized as of public utility and be authorized to receive gifts and legacies not exceeding 1000 francs. Such societies were forbidden to promise old age pensions to their members, but they were allowed to grant temporary aid in case of sickness, accident, or infirmity, and to defray funeral expenses. Dues were to be fixed in accordance with actuarial tables prepared or approved by the government. The societies were to be subject to municipal surveillance.

²²⁴ *Loi sur l'éducation et le patronage des jeunes détenus*, passed by the National Assembly on Aug. 5, 1850 and duly promulgated,—*cf. Moniteur universel*, Aug. 13, 1850, p. 2813. Juvenile offenders were to receive moral, religious, and vocational training, and were to be kept apart from adult criminals. Under certain conditions they might be employed in penitentiaries.

²²⁵ *I. e.*, the revolving closets (*tours*), which were placed at the entrance to hospices, and in which foundlings might be deposited without observation. The foundlings left there were then cared for by charitable institutions. *Cf. Melun's report, Moniteur universel*, pp. 974, 1080.

²²⁶ *Loi sur les hospices et hôpitaux*, passed by the National Assembly on Aug. 7, 1851,—*cf. Moniteur universel*, Aug. 13, 1851, p. 2363.

²²⁷ *Loi relative aux contrats d'apprentissage*, passed by the National Assembly on Feb. 22, 1851, and duly promulgated,—*cf. Moniteur*

universel, March 4, 1851, p. 641. This was an important measure. By article 8, "the master must conduct himself towards the apprentice as a good father." He must not employ the apprentice on work unrelated to the trade, or work injurious to health, or work in excess of the boy's strength (art. 8). Apprentices less than fourteen years old might not work over ten hours a day; apprentices under sixteen might not work at night; no work was to be done on Sundays and legal holidays (art. 9). If the apprentice had not yet mastered the "three R's" he must be allowed two hours a day for instruction (art. 10). The master was legally obliged to give his apprentices full training in the trade (art. 12).

²²⁸ The reference is probably to a bill prepared by the Conseil général de l'agriculture, des manufactures et du commerce, *cf. Moniteur universel* 1850, pp. 1393, *et seq.*, 1439, *et seq.*, 1454 *et seq.*

²²⁹ From one of the series of biographical articles by G. Baguenault de Puchesse in the *Correspondant*, Feb. 25, 1882, p. 664. The list is not complete. Among other laws passed by the National Assembly,—and in some of these laws Melun took a very active interest,—might be mentioned the law of Feb. 3, 1851, on the provision of cheap or free public baths (*Moniteur universel*, Feb. 10, 1851, p. 429); the law of March 27, 1851, on repression of frauds in the sale of merchandise (*Moniteur universel*, April 2, 1851, p. 955); the law of May 21, 1851, emancipating the workingman from the veritable peonage which indebtedness to his employer sometimes brought about (*ibid.*, May 21, 1851, p. 1427); the law of Dec. 10, 1850, facilitating the marriage of paupers by reducing official fees (*ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1850, p. 3609); the law of Dec. 19, 1850, on usury (*ibid.*, Dec. 26–27, 1850, p. 3707); the law of Jan. 22, 1851, on free legal service (*ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1851, p. 303).

²³⁰ *Correspondant*, Feb. 25, 1882, p. 670.

²³¹ Report by M. Thiers, in the name of the commission on public assistance and provident institutions, Jan. 26, 1850, in *Moniteur universel*, 1850, p. 304, *et seq.* Thiers recommended the encouragement of miscellaneous charitable institutions and of mutual aid societies, the improvement of dwellings, *etc.*

²³² Quoted by Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 141, from Melun's *Memoires*, vol. ii, p. 57, *et seq.*

²³³ *Correspondant*, Feb. 1882, p. 661.

²³⁴ Written in October, 1852, when Louis Napoleon was acclaimed with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur.*" Quoted in *Correspondant*, Feb. 25, 1882, pp. 671–672.

²³⁵ Written in 1855. *Ibid.*, March 25, 1882, pp. 1099–1100.

²³⁶ *Correspondant*, March 25, 1882, p. 1091.

²³⁷ E. Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789 à 1870* (2nd ed. Paris 1903–1904), vol. ii, p. 343; Émile Thomas, *Histoire des ateliers nationaux* (Paris, 1848), pp. 19–21; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1870), vol. i, ch. vii.

²³⁸ Émile Thomas, *Histoire des ateliers nationaux*, p. 27; Levasseur, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 382.

²³⁹ Levasseur, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, ch. ii; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*, vol. i, pp. 136 *et seq.*; Figliera, *La Protection légale des travailleurs en France* (Paris, 1913), vol. i, p. 64, *et seq.*

²⁴⁰ Louis Blanc, *L'Organisation du travail* (Paris, 1839).

²⁴¹ Louis Blanc, in his *Appel aux honnêtes gens* (Paris, 1849), definitely repudiates the "national workshops," and alleges that Émile Thomas, who was selected as director, was not only a stranger to him, but an indefatigable antagonist of his doctrines; see especially pp. 20-31. Émile Thomas, in his own account of the affair,—*Histoire des ateliers nationaux*,—shows clearly enough that he was no disciple of Louis Blanc (p. 323); his aim was not to apply Louis Blanc's theories, but to realize "the Saint-Simonian idea of semi-military organization of the workers" (p. 35). Cf. Levasseur, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, ch. iii; J. A. R. Marriott, *The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspect* vol. i, p. lxix, *et seq.*; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*, vol. i, ch. xi, *passim*.

²⁴² Levasseur, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 370, 372; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*, vol. ii, ch. xix, p. 222.

²⁴³ Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 351.

²⁴⁴ Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-308.

²⁴⁵ Cf. *supra*, ch. i, p. 26.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. i, pp. 8-9, and Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 84.

²⁴⁷ Pierre Leroux, *De l'Humanité* (Paris, 1840), and *De l'Égalité* (Paris, 1838), *passim*.

²⁴⁸ For example, see his *Organisation du travail* (5th ed., Paris, 1848), pp. 6-7.

²⁴⁹ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 52, *et seq.*

²⁵⁰ *Correspondance de P. J. Proudhon* (Paris, 1875), vol. vi, pp. 110-11. Cf. Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 53; Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 339, *et seq.* Proudhon in his *Confessions d'un révolutionnaire* (new ed., Paris, 1876), says that there is an "eternal dilemma,"—"either no papacy, or no liberty" (p. 261). On the other hand, "Christianity is the best expression of religion, up to the present" (*ibid.*, p. 267).

²⁵¹ That the modern socialist movement in France is pronouncedly anticlerical, even anti-Christian, is a thesis hardly requiring documentation; but the reader who desires an explanation of this antagonism should consult the opinions expressed by leading socialists, in reply to a questionnaire or "Enquête sur l'anticléricalisme et le socialisme" in *Le Mouvement socialiste* of 1902; also, the article on "*Socialisme et l'Église*" in *La Revue socialiste*, 1903, vol. xxxviii, p. 35, *et seq.* On the other side of the controversy, *vide* Victor Cathrein, S. J., *Socialism* (translated from the German, New York, 1904), p. 204, *et seq.*

²⁵² Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état en France de 1789 à 1870*, p. 518. Compare Montalembert's declaration with the view of the *Ere nouvelle*, that "there is an honest Christian socialism, and the Revolution in proclaiming itself social has yielded to a movement which is the very impulse of the evangelic spirit,"—Joly, *Le Socialisme chrétien* (Paris, 1892), ch. iv.

²⁵³ Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. iii, pp. 51-69.

²⁵⁴ Augustin Cochin, *De la Condition des ouvriers français* (Paris, 1862), p. 29. Cf. also Cochin's pamphlets entitled *Lettre sur l'état du paupérisme en Angleterre* (Paris, 1854), and *Progrès des sciences et de l'industrie au point de vue chrétien* (Paris, 1863), as well as his *La Réforme sociale* (Paris, 1865), and *Études sociales et économiques* (Paris, 1880).

²⁵⁵ *I*vide J. Bourgeois, *Le Catholicisme et les questions sociales* (Paris, 1867), *passim*.

²⁵⁶ Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 191, *et seq.*

²⁵⁷ Huet, *Le Règne social du christianisme* (Paris, 1853).

²⁵⁸ *I*vide Huet, *Le Règne social du christianisme*, and Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 31, *et seq.*

²⁵⁹ Frederic Le Play (1806-1882) began his career as a mining engineer. Between 1829 and 1853 he travelled extensively, making careful observations of social conditions. These observations he published in the form of thirty-six monographs on working-class families, under the title *Les Ouvriers européens* (1855). In 1864 appeared his second important work, *La Réforme sociale en France*,—an exposition of his theories,—and in 1877 an enlarged edition of his *Ouvriers européens*.

He enjoyed great prestige and exercised a certain influence upon the emperor. The Society for Social Economy was founded by him in 1856. After Le Play's death, divergent tendencies, leading to a definite schism, appeared among his followers. One school, organized in the Unions of Social Peace, and publishing the review *La Réforme sociale*, held firmly to Le Play's system. The other school, which publishes the review *La Science sociale*, follows Le Play's scientific method of careful observation, on a somewhat different basis, to be sure, but lays greater stress on the influence of geographic environment and regards the family of the American type, rather than of the English or Chinese type, as the desirable unit of social organization. Both schools are conservative and anti-socialist in their tendency. On Le Play see P. Ribot, *Exposé critique des doctrines sociales de M. Le Play* (Paris, 1882); Ch. de Ribbe, *Le Play d'après sa correspondance* (2nd ed., Paris, 1906); Auburtin, *Frédéric Le Play d'après lui-même* (Paris, 1906); H. Higgs, article on Le Play in *Harvard Quarterly Journal of Economics*, June, 1890; Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 71-92, 305-307; Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 572, *et seq.*; Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, pp. 23-25, 387-389; Éblé, *Les Ecoles catholiques etc.*, ch. ii; *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiii, pp. 559-579; obituary in *La Réforme sociale*, vol. iii, pp. 345-360, 410-412, 430-438, 474-482.

²⁶⁰ Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France* (6th ed.), vol. ii, pp. 302-305, vol. iii, p. 190, *et seq.*

²⁶¹ *Idem*, Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90; Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 112, *et seq.*; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

²⁶² Cf. Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 88-89; Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 109, *et seq.*; Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 577

²⁶³ Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, vol. iii, pp. 22-23.

²⁶⁴ E. Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers*, (Paris, 1897), p. 619.

²⁶⁵ Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, vol. iii, p. 21.

²⁶⁶ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁶⁷ Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, vol. iii, ch. 50, is especially interesting as embodying his doctrine on "patronage."

²⁶⁸ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁶⁹ Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, vol. iv, p. 339. There should be democracy in the communes, aristocracy in the provinces, and monarchy in the national government.

²⁷⁰ V. Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, introduction; *Les Ouvriers européens* (2nd ed., Tours, 1878), vol. v, p. 528.

²⁷¹ Le Play, *L'Organisation du travail* (first ed., Tours, 1870), fourth ed., Tours, 1877, p. 201.

²⁷² Le Play, *La Réforme sociale en France*, book i; *L'Organisation du travail*, ch. v.

²⁷³ Henri Charles Xavier Périn (1815-1905), a Belgian economist. He began his career as a lawyer at Brussels, but was called to fill the chair of public law in the Catholic University of Louvain, 1844. In 1845 he began to teach political economy, at the same institution. During the Second Empire period he exercised a steadily increasing influence over French Catholic thought, through his University lectures, his articles in French periodicals, and his books. Among his writings, the following works may be mentioned: *Les Économistes, les socialistes et le christianisme* (Paris, 1849); *Du Progrès matériel et du renoncement chrétien* (1850, a collection of articles first published in *Le Correspondant*, a French review); *De la Richesse dans les sociétés chrétiennes* (2 vols., Paris, 1861, second edition 1868); *Les Libertés populaires* (Paris, 1871); *Les Lois de la société chrétienne* (2 vols., Paris, 1875); *Le Socialisme chrétien* (Paris, 1879); *Les Doctrines économiques depuis un siècle* (Paris, 1880); *L'Association ouvrière* (pamphlet, Lille, 1881); *Mélanges de politique et d'économie* (Paris, 1883); *Le Patron, sa fonction, ses devoirs, ses responsabilités* (Paris, 1886); *Premiers principes d'économie politique* (Paris, 1895); *Premiers principes d'économie politique. Seconde édition, revue et complétée, suivie d'une étude sur le juste salaire d'après l'encyclique Rerum Novarum* (Paris, 1896).

²⁷⁴ Mgr. Fèvre, Charles Périn, créateur de l'économie politique chrétienne (Paris, 1903).

²⁷⁵ De Clercq, *Les Doctrines sociales en France*, vol. ii, p. 7.

²⁷⁶ Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 263.

²⁷⁷ Fèvre, Charles Périn créateur de l'économie politique chrétienne, p. 121.

²⁷⁸ Périn, *Les Lois de la société chrétienne*, especially livre iv.

²⁷⁹ Périn was not a partisan of absolute liberty, in the sense of individualism; what he advocated was liberty tempered by voluntary association and properly used in accordance with moral laws. Cf. *Le Socialisme chrétien*, p. 10.

²⁸⁰ Périn, *Le Socialisme chrétien*, (Paris, 1879), p. 32; *De la Richesse* (second ed.) vol. i, p. 141, vol. ii, p. 477, *et seq.*

²⁸¹ Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 264.

²⁸² Périn, *Le Socialisme chrétien*, p. 16.

²⁸³ Périn, *Premiers principes* (1st ed.) pp. 39-40.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ Périn, *Les Économistes etc.*, ch. v; *De la Richesse*, vol. ii, p. 259, *et seq.*; *Premiers principes*, *passim*.

²⁸⁶ Cf. *Premiers principes*, p. 144, *et seq.*; *De la Richesse*, vol. ii, pp. 259-352; *Les Doctrines économiques*, p. 233; *Le Patron*, ch. iii, xi.

²⁸⁷ Metz-Noblat, *Les Lois économiques, résumé du cours d'économie politique fait à la faculté de droit de Nancy en 1865 et 1866* (Paris, 1867), p. xxii, *et passim*. These laws, he admits, are not absolutely inflexible.

²⁸⁸ Metz-Noblat, *op. cit.*, *passim*, especially ch. xv and xxv; see also his *Analyse des phénomènes économiques* (Nancy, 1853), vol. i, ch. x.

²⁸⁹ Metz-Noblat, *Les Lois économiques*, p. xvii.

²⁹⁰ J. Rambaud, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, (Paris and Lyons, 1902), second edition, p. 295.

²⁹¹ Metz-Noblat, *Analyse des phénomènes économiques*, vol. i, ch. xxv, *Les Lois économiques*, ch. vii, xlii. After discussing the relative merits of state action and private charity for the relief of poverty, he concludes in favor of the latter.

²⁹² Metz-Noblat, *Les Lois économiques*, p. 726, *et seq.*

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, ch. xxxiv.

²⁹⁴ Corbière, *L'Économie sociale au point de vue chrétien* (Paris, 1863), *passim*.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 225-230.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 273-291, 372-384.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 380, *et seq.*

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 278, *et seq.*

²⁹⁹ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social*, ch. i-ii.

³⁰⁰ Auguste Comte, the great positivist philosopher and sociologist, played an important rôle in denouncing revolution, in preaching social peace, in emphasizing the moral aspect of the social problem.

³⁰¹ *Journal des Économistes*, second series, vol. xv, p. 275.

³⁰² Quoted in Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 4. It must be remembered, however, that in practice Louis Napoleon promoted a number of legislative measures in the interest of the working-classes. Cf. Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789 à 1870*, vol. ii, livre vi, *passim*, especially pp. 828-836; P. L. Fournier, *Le second empire et la législation ouvrière* (Paris, 1911).

³⁰³ Jules Simon, *La Liberté* (Paris, 1857), second edition, vol. i, p. 204.

³⁰⁴ Jules Simon, *L'Ouvrière* (Paris, 1861), especially part iv, ch. i. See also his later books, *Le Travail* (Paris, 1866), and *L'Ouvrier de huit ans* (Paris, 1867).

³⁰⁵ Jules Simon, *La Liberté*, vol. ii, p. 126.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125

³⁰⁸ *Vide* Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, *Des Idées Napoléoniennes* (London, 1839); *Extinction du paupérisme* (Paris, 1844). On the social policy of the Second Empire, cf. Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, ch. i-vi; P. L. Fournier, *Le second empire et la législation ouvrière* (Paris, 1911); Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789 à 1870*, vol. ii, livre vi; A. Thomas, *Le Second Empire* (in the *Histoire Socialiste*). For suggestions regarding the political philosophy of the Second Empire, see H. A. L. Fisher's lectures on *Bonapartism* (Oxford, 1908), or the more substantial works of Pierre de La Gorce, Taxtile Delord, Émile Ollivier, and Jerrold.

³⁰⁹ Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral* (Paris, 1895-1912), vol. v, p. 8, *et seq.*; vol. vi, p. 154, *et seq.*, and p. 248, *et seq.*; La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire* (Paris, 1899-1905), vol. iii, p. 457, *et seq.*; Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état*, part ii, ch. vi-viii.

³¹⁰ Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. vi, p. 98, *et seq.*, 157, *et seq.*, 328, *et seq.*; La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iv, p. 414, *et seq.*

³¹¹ Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. vi, p. 436, *et seq.*, 574, *et seq.*, vol. vii, p. 514, *et seq.*, vol. ix, p. 58, *et seq.*, 523, *et seq.*; La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iv, p. 6, *et seq.*, 308, *et seq.*; T. Delord, *Histoire du second empire* (Paris, 1869-1874), vol. iii, ch. ix-x; vol. iv, ch. iv; vol. v, ch. iv.

³¹² Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état*, p. 582.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 573. La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iv, p. 134, *et seq.*; T. Delord, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iii, p. 216, *et seq.*

³¹⁴ La Gorce, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. ii, p. 97, *et seq.*, vol. iv, p. 190; T. Delord, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. iii, p. 398; cf. Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. xi, p. 557, *et seq.*, vol. xii, p. 341, *et seq.* The Legitimist pretender consistently represented the traditional monarchy as the true protector of religion, as will be seen by consulting his letters, conveniently published in *Étude politique: M. le comte de Chambord, correspondance de 1841 à 1871* (Geneva, 1871).

³¹⁵ Summary of excerpts reprinted in *La Monarchie française: Lettres et documents politiques (1844-1907)* (Paris, 1907), pp. 202-207.

³¹⁶ *Lettre sur les ouvriers*, April 20, 1865, reprinted in full in *La Monarchie française*, pp. 84-91. As early as Jan. 12, 1855, the Count of Chambord had written:

"As regards labor associations, during recent years they have undergone a development which has by no means escaped my attention. By conforming to ideas of order, of morality, of mutual aid, by regularizing their existence under the tutelary authority of the laws and by avoiding, along with the abuses of monopoly which in another epoch led to the suppression of the old trades organizations, all that which might make them instruments of disorders and of revolutions, these associations will more and more constitute serious collective interests,

which will naturally have the right to be represented and heard in order that they may be sufficiently protected."

V. *L'Association catholique*, 1882, vol. xiv, p. 147. Cf. E. Demolins, "Les Doctrines sociales de M. le comte de Chambord," in *La Réforme sociale*, 1883, vol. vi, pp. 289-292.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-91.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³²² Étienne Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers*, (Paris, 1897), p. 538, *et seq.*

³²³ *La Monarchie française*, p. 91.

³²⁴ *Supra*, pp. 27-28.

³²⁵ This fact is recognized by writers of the most divergent social views. Cf. Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 141, *et seq.*; G. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France* (tr. from the French by J. C. Tarver, N. Y., 1912), vol. i, pp. 163-169; E. Zévort, *Histoire de la Troisième République* (Paris, 1899), vol. i, p. 208; Dubreuilh, *La Commune, 1871* (vol. xi of the *Histoire socialiste* edited by Jaurès), *passim*.

³²⁶ The events of the Commune are among the most controversial in French history, and consequently historians of the Commune differ radically not only in their general interpretation of the revolution but even in their statement of the facts. Cf. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, vol. i, ch. iii; Lissagaray, *Histoire de la Commune* (the second edition was not permitted to be published in French but was translated by E. M. Aveling as, *History of the Commune of 1871* (London, 1886); L. Fiaux, *Histoire de la guerre civile de 1871* (Paris, 1879); Maxime du Camp, *Les Convulsions de Paris* (4 vols., Paris, 1881); A. Bertrand, *Les Origines de la Troisième République* (Paris, 1911), pp. 50-130; B. Becker, *Geschichte und Theorie der Pariser revolutionären Kommune des Jahres 1871* (Leipzig, 1879); E. Lepelletier, *Histoire de la Commune de 1871* (2 vols., Paris, 1911-1912); Jules Claretie's quaintly illustrated *Histoire de la Révolution de 1870-1871* (Paris, 1872); Dubreuilh, *La Commune, 1871* (in the Jaurès series, Paris, 1908). Perhaps the most interesting source-material is found in the *Enquête parlementaire sur l'insurrection du 18 mars* (Versailles, 1872); Count Albert de Mun's testimony appears on pp. 275-277.

In particular, opinions differ as to the number of persons killed and executed. Hanotaux asserts that "Paris lost 80,000 citizens" (*op. cit.*, p. 228); Seignobos, in Lavis et Rambaud, *Histoire Générale* (Paris, 1901), vol. xiii, p. 7, mentions 17,000 killed; Lissagaray, p. 393, declares that 20,000 is no exaggeration; Lt. Col. Rousset, in 1871, *La Commune à Paris et en province* (Paris, 1912), p. 249, gives the losses of the Versailles army as 7,514 and, as regards the losses of the insurgents, mentions estimates running as high as 30,000 or 40,000 but considers these exaggerated. The conflict of opinions on this one point shows

how much uncertainty obscures the true history of the insurrection.

³²⁷ Bertrand, *Origines de la Troisième République*, pp. 118-127.

³²⁸ Jules Favre, *Discours parlementaires* (Paris, 1881), vol. iv, p. 85, *et seq.*

³²⁹ E. Levasseur, *Questions ouvrières et industrielles en France sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1907), p. 472.

³³⁰ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 172; E. Martin-Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers*, p. 538, *et seq.* By article 414 of the penal code, as it existed before 1864, any coalition, whether on the part of employers for the purpose of lowering wages, or on the part of the laborers with a view of stopping work in a factory, was *ipso facto* a misdemeanor; the leaders were subject to a penalty of from two to five years' imprisonment, and their accomplices to imprisonment from six days to three months and a fine of from sixteen to 3,000 francs. In 1864 the article was amended, so that mere membership in such coalitions was not penalized, except in case of violence, assault, menaces, or fraudulent manoeuvres.

³³¹ These words are taken from the speech of M. Aclocque, in the National Assembly, meeting of May 15, 1872. *Journal officiel*, May 16, 1872, p. 3277.

³³² *Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête sur les conditions du travail en France*, par M. Ducarre, Aug. 2, 1875, in *Journal officiel*, November 15-22, 1875, pp. 9339, 9369, 9396, 9425, 9465, 9483, 9519, 9561. The quotation is from p. 9483. Another report on the conditions of the laboring classes was made at about the same time by Count de Melun, a brother of the philanthropist of the same name mentioned on an earlier page; this report is found in the *Journal officiel*, August 14, 1875, pp. 6788-6792. Neither report was discussed by the National Assembly; both concluded that little or nothing should be done to remedy the existing evils. There is an interesting analysis of the two reports, and a protest against their spirit, in the Social Catholic organ, *L'Association catholique*, 1876, vol. i, pp. 57-78.

³³³ *Vide*, Le Play's review, *La Réforme sociale* (from 1881) during this period, or the *Association catholique* (from 1876), or the *Revue Catholique des institutions et du droit* (from 1873), or Charles Périn *Le Socialisme chrétien* (Paris, 1879).

³³⁴ Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 198-9, 218, 219, 222; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

³³⁵ Charles Périn, *Le Socialisme chrétien*, p. 8, *et seq.*

³³⁶ *Association catholique*, vol. i, p. 13, *et seq.*; Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

³³⁷ A. Delaire, "Le Programme d'Action des Unions de la Paix sociale," in *La Réforme sociale*, vol. i, pp. 393-402.

³³⁸ Albert de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale* (Paris, 1908).

³³⁹ Grandmaison, "Le Comte Albert de Mun," in *Études publiées par des pères de la compagnie de Jésus*, October, 1914, vol. 141, p. 26. It is a curious circumstance that de Mun's grandfather was Helvetius, the famous materialist *philosophe*. For biographical material on de Mun, in addition to the autobiographical work, *Ma Vocation sociale*, already

cited, consult: A. de Mun, "Quatre années d'action sociale (1871-1875)," in *Le Correspondant*, Paris, 1908, vol. 233, new series vol. 197, pp. 449-474, 625-649; *idem*, *Discours* (7 vols., Paris, 1888-1904); *idem*, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1908); A. Saint-Pierre, *Le Comte Albert de Mun* (Montreal, 1915); Eugène Tavernier, "Le Comte de Mun," in *Nineteenth Century and After*, London, 1915, vol. 77, pp. 409-420; G. de Grandmaison, "La dernière œuvre du comte Albert de Mun," in *Le Correspondant*, 1914, vol. 257, pp. 657-680; Lucien Degron, "M. le comte Albert de Mun et son œuvre," in *Revue de Lille*, 1910, année xxi, pp. 286-302; L. de Grandmaison, "Le Comte Albert de Mun," in *Études publiées par des pères de la compagnie de Jésus*, Paris, 1914, vol. 141, pp. 25-52; *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, vol. iv, pp. 456-457.

³⁴⁰ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 2, et seq.

³⁴¹ Émile Keller, *L'Encyclique du 8 décembre 1864 et les principes de 1789, ou l'église l'état et la liberté* (1865); a revised edition was published in 1909 under the title, *Les Syllabus de Pie IX et Pie X*, etc. Keller represented the department of Haut-Rhin in the *Corps législatif* of the Second Empire.

³⁴² A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 13-14. On the German movement, Cf. *infra*, pp. 121-129.

³⁴³ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 17-36. The horror which he felt at the sight of the corpse-strewn working-quarters in the Belleville ward is expressed in *L'Association catholique*, vol. i, p. 91.

³⁴⁴ I have spelled his name as de Mun spells it in *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 60-62; Léonce de Grandmaison, in *Études*, vol. 141, p. 30, uses the spelling "Meignen." Cf. biographical article by Marolles in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xxxi, pp. 273-284, 414-424.

³⁴⁵ Otherwise and more properly styled the Congregation of Priests of the Mission; sometimes called also the Vincentians and the Lazarists. The order was founded by Saint Vincent de Paul in 1625 for work among the poorer classes in rural districts. This religious order is not to be confused with the lay Society of Saint Vincent-de-Paul, founded by Ozanam in 1833. Cf. "Mission, Congregation of Priests of the," in *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

³⁴⁶ The *Cercle des jeunes ouvriers* (founded in 1865) was an offshoot of a *patronage d'apprentis* or apprentices' welfare society, founded by the Brothers of Saint Vincent-de-Paul.—Cf. A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 57; Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale*, vol. iii, p. 108, et seq. René de La Tour du Pin, de Mun's close friend, had previously been induced to speak before the club.

³⁴⁷ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 62.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-66; *Discours* (fourth ed.), vol. 1, p. 13.

³⁴⁹ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 67-75. The first session of the committee was held in Vrignault's "humble chamber," Dec. 23, 1871. Vrignault was elected president, but de Mun seems to have been the active spirit. Cf. Lecanuet, *L'Église de France sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1907-10), vol. i, p. 394.

³⁵⁰ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 107.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-112; *Discours*, vol. i, pp. 21-32.

³⁵² Cf. A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 111, 295.

³⁵³ Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 218.

³⁵⁴ "Nous descendîmes la colline dans une ivresse de victoire."—

A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 113.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-134.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³⁵⁷ "Vivre en travaillant, ou mourir en combattant." *Ibid.*, p. 140; cf. also Louis Blanc, *Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840* (2 vols. in one, Brussels, 1847), vol. i, pp. 372-386, especially p. 385.

³⁵⁸ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 225-230.

³⁵⁹ Some 3,000 of the 18,000 members were recruited from the upper and middle classes. A. de Mun, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

³⁶⁰ Cf. Lecanuet, *L'Église de France*, vol. i, pp. 409-419; A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 278; Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 405; *L'Année sociale internationale, 1913-1914*, p. 42; *Revue sociale catholique*, vol. xvi, p. 184.

³⁶¹ "Regardez-le, il vous parle encore." A. de Mun, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 280.

³⁶³ *L'Année politique*, 1875, p. 292.

³⁶⁴ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 282, 283.

³⁶⁵ By the law of March 14, 1872. Cf. *supra*, p. 78.

³⁶⁶ MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i, pp. 255-256.

³⁶⁷ At a banquet in May, 1873, Vrignault proclaimed the Counter-Revolution, and the leading members of the Association, uplifting their hands, swore to accomplish the regeneration of France (A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 193). Many times de Mun repeated this declaration of war against the Revolution, most notably perhaps at Chartres, September 8, 1878; "we are the implacable Counter-Revolution" (*ibid.*, p. 199).

³⁶⁸ Cf. the "Bases et plan général de l'Œuvre" (A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 291-294), and also de Mun's deliberate declaration of the principles of the Association: "To set over against the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which served as the basis of the Revolution, the proclamation of the Rights of God, which must be the foundation of the Counter-Revolution, and the ignorance or forgetfulness of which is the true cause of the evil which is bringing modern society to ruin; to investigate, in absolute obedience to the principles of the Catholic Church and to the infallible teaching of the Sovereign Pontiff, all the consequences which naturally result, in the social order, from the full exercise of this right of God over societies; to propagate—by means of an indefatigable public apostolate—the doctrine thus established; to form men determined to adopt it as the rule of their public as well as of their private life; and to demonstrate its application in the Association by the devotion of the directing class to the popular class; to toil without respite for the purpose of infusing these principles and doctrines into custom, and of creating an organized force capable of making them triumph, to the end that they may find

their expression in the laws and in the institutions of the nation; such should be the spirit and aim of our Association. . . ." (*Ibid.*, p. 285).

³⁶⁹ The translation does not exactly express the sense of the original phrase, "*le dévouement de la classe dirigeante à la classe populaire*," — A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 285, 83–84. In later years the ideal became more democratic, and a readjustment was necessary. In January, 1912, for example, we find de Mun declaring before the General Assembly of the Association, — "The Club should not be a prolonged *patronage*, where the authority of the director suffices for all things, regulates all things, decides all things, but a veritable labor association, governed, administered, by its members themselves. This was indeed in our minds at the origin, and the regulations of the Clubs bore the trace of this very sincere thought. But, forty years ago, no one would have dared, no one would have thought it possible, without danger, to follow out the idea completely." Hence, the Association had tended too strongly to aristocracy rather than democracy. "The workingmen's initiative, the sense of responsibility which results from self-government, have been almost inevitably stifled by customs, by prejudices, by the rules imposed." In 1912, therefore, de Mun was proposing more democracy for the Clubs. "That is the great reform which I should demand. . . . We love the workingmen with a loyal and disinterested heart. I demand that we should love them more fraternally than paternally," — *Le Gaulois*, Jan. 29–31, 1912. The aristocratic conception of the Association, at the outset, is simply another illustration of the general fact that, in the nineteenth century, bourgeois liberalism was attacked both by reactionary feudal nobles and by revolutionary workingmen, and that the nobles in many cases assumed the rôle of championing the working-classes against bourgeois exploitation. Members of the feudal aristocracy played a very important and a very laudable part in promoting early factory legislation; merely to mention Lord Ashley's name is proof enough.

³⁷⁰ Many other officers were interested in the Association, among them: General Borson, Colonel Léon, Captain de Parseval, Captain de Langalerie, Captain de Roquefeuil, Captain Récamier, Captain de Hennezel. Cf. Lecanuet, *L'Église de France*, vol. i, p. 398. The *Plan général de l'Œuvre* aims to protect the patriotism as well as the faith of the workingmen.—Cf. A. de Mun, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–294, and compare with the "Appeal to Men of Good Will," *supra*, p. 83.

³⁷¹ A. de Mun, *op. cit.*, p. 210. In another place, he admits, "Although strangers to politics, we were for the most part supporters of the Extreme Right,"—*ibid.*, p. 272.

³⁷² Léon Grégoire (Georges Goyau) *Le pape, les catholiques et la question sociale* (Paris, 1893), edition of 1895, p. 14. M. Goyau was and is a prominent figure in the more democratic wing of the French Social Catholic movement. Cf. obituary of Chambord in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xvi, pp. 351–353.

³⁷³ Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, vol. ii, pp. 48–49, 266–275, 475–483, vol. iii, pp. 124–194, 283–362, 446–471.

³⁷⁴ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 274.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

³⁷⁶ At that moment Gambetta was proclaiming his campaign to free "the country of Voltaire" from the "retrograde and theocratic spirit,"—Lecanuet, *L'Église de France*, vol. i, p. 491.

³⁷⁷ A. de Mun, *Discours*, vol. ii. p. 2; *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 312. This electoral address should be compared with Marshal MacMahon's presidential proclamation to the electorate: "I appeal to the united action of those who place defense of the social order, respect of the laws, devotion to the nation, above the memories, the aspirations, and the engagements of parties." The president urged the nation to defeat those who menaced its internal security "by the propagation of anti-social doctrines and revolutionary programs,"—*cf. Année politique*, 1876, pp. 4-5.

³⁷⁸ *Annual Register*, 1876, p. 141; *Journal officiel*, March 24, 1876, p. 2053, *et seq.* Free-Masonry had been assailed by de Mun at Havre, Jan. 15, 1876, as "a supreme effort of Satan against Jesus Christ,"—*Discours*, vol. i, p. 168.

³⁷⁹ *Journal officiel*, March 25, 1876, p. 2087, *et seq.*

³⁸⁰ *Journal officiel*, March 24, 1876, p. 2056.

³⁸¹ *Journal officiel*, March 24, 1876, p. 2055, and June 21, 1876, p. 4351.

³⁸² *Journal officiel*, March 25, 1876, p. 2089.

³⁸³ *Journal officiel*, March 25, 1876, p. 2089; *Année politique*, 1876, p. 96.

³⁸⁴ *Journal officiel*, June 21, 1876, pp. 4348-4360.

³⁸⁵ *Journal officiel*, July 14, 1876, pp. 5130-5145.

³⁸⁶ De Mun's speech in the Chamber, June 3,—*Journal officiel*, June 4, 1876, p. 3840, *et seq.* The Guichard report,—*Journal officiel*, June 21, 1876, pp. 4353-4360,—on clerical influence in the elections of 1876, shows the spirit of the men who pronounced de Mun's election invalid.

³⁸⁷ *Dictionnaire des parlementaires*, vol. iv, p. 457.

³⁸⁸ *Journal officiel*, March 28, 1878, pp. 3564-3570.

³⁸⁹ *Journal officiel*, Feb. 22, 1878, p. 1856, *et seq.* This speech was delivered in the course of a debate on the suppression of the *bourses des séminaires*.

³⁹⁰ *Journal officiel*, Feb. 22, 1878, p. 1859.

³⁹¹ *Journal officiel*, May 5, 1877, p. 3284.

³⁹² *Journal officiel*, Feb. 19, 1878, p. 1728.

³⁹³ *Journal officiel*, Feb. 22, 1878, p. 4862.

³⁹⁴ *Journal officiel*, Nov. 16, 1878, pp. 10661, 10664.

³⁹⁵ *Journal officiel*, March 25, 1878, pp. 3447, 3564-3570; Nov. 7, 1878, pp. 10261, 10386-10408; Nov. 16, 1878, p. 10661, *et seq.* After the decision of the Chamber, Nov. 16, 1878, that his election had been invalid, de Mun once more contested the Pontivy seat, Feb. 2, 1879, this time unsuccessfully, being narrowly defeated by the Republican Le Maguet. He then threw himself enthusiastically into extra-parliamentary campaigns against anticlericalism. *Cf. Dictionnaire des parlementaires*, vol. iv, p. 457; Saint-Pierre, *Le comte Albert de Mun*, pp. 43-44. He was elected to the Chamber in August, 1881, as representative of a

new electoral district carved from the former district of Pontivy, and was reelected in 1885 and 1889. In 1893 he suffered defeat, but the following January found him again in parliament as deputy from the second district of Morlaix, and from 1894 to the time of his death, in 1914, he was continuously reelected. Cf. *Dictionnaire des parlementaires*, loc. cit.

³⁹⁶ After the death of the Count of Chambord, the Legitimist pretender, in 1883, de Mun became one of the leading supporters of the Orleanist candidate for the throne, the Count of Paris; but he seems to have been somewhat out of place in the Orleanist party. In 1885 he attempted to found a Catholic party, but was discouraged by the papal nuncio. Later, in 1888, he gave his support to Boulanger. After the Boulanger episode, he was suspected of abandoning monarchism. In 1892 he became a leader in the movement for acceptance of the republic. Cf. A. de Mun, *Les derniers jours du drapeau blanc* (Paris, 1910); L. de Grandmaison, "Le comte Albert de Mun," in *Études*, Oct., 1914, vol. 141, pp. 25-52.

³⁹⁷ *Discours*, vol. ii, p. 387, et seq.; *Le Temps*, March 9, 1881.

³⁹⁸ "Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête parlementaire sur les conditions du travail en France" in the *Journal officiel*, Nov. 5-22, 1875, pp. 9339, 9369, 9396, 9425, 9465, 9483, 9519, 9561.

³⁹⁹ "Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'étudier la situation des classes ouvrières en France, par M. le comte de Melun," *Journal officiel*, July 27, 1875, pp. 6788-6792.

⁴⁰⁰ *Journal officiel*, 1874, p. 3697, et seq. For the debate, see *Journal officiel*, 1874, p. 3381, et seq. The bill was pushed through by Ambroise Joubert, a monarchist and capitalist, and is usually known as the Joubert Bill.

⁴⁰¹ *Journal officiel*, Jan. 24, 1873, p. 511.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 1873, pp. 911, 1008.

⁴⁰³ Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, vol. iii, pp. 463, 471.

⁴⁰⁴ Jean E. Laroche-Joubert (1820-1884) inherited part ownership in a paper manufactory, which he directed, and in which he instituted a system of profit-sharing. After the fall of the Empire, his political sympathies were with the Bonapartists. He held a seat in the Chamber of Deputies from 1876 to 1884. Cf. *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, vol. iii, p. 598.

⁴⁰⁵ *Journal officiel*, June 24, 1876, p. 4476, et seq. The debate was opened on June 23.

⁴⁰⁶ *Journal officiel*, June 24, 1876, p. 4476.

⁴⁰⁷ *Journal officiel*, June 24, 1876, p. 4477. These words closed the debate.

⁴⁰⁸ Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, vol. iv, pp. 516-529, 540.

⁴⁰⁹ *L'Association catholique*, vol. ix, p. 975.

⁴¹⁰ For the text and history of the Bill see *Sénat*, 1881, *Documents*, p. 733, et seq.; cf. *Association catholique*, 1881, vol. xi, p. 543, et seq.

⁴¹¹ *Chambre des députés*, 1881, *Débats*, pp. 667-668.

⁴¹² It is not to be inferred that all Republicans opposed the Bill. The Bill had been presented by Republicans of socialist tendency and

was ardently defended by them. *Vide*, the speech by Martin Nadaud, *ibid.*, p. 599, *et seq.* But Nadaud represented a minority opinion.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 595-599.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

⁴¹⁵ *Chambre des députés*, 1881, *Débats*, p. 677, *et seq.*

⁴¹⁶ *Cf. infra*, p. 110. The texts will be found in *Sénat*, 1881, *Documents*, p. 733, *et seq.*, and *Chambre des députés*, 1881, *Débats*, p. 676.

⁴¹⁷ *Vide*, *Sénat*, 1881, *Documents*, p. 733, *et seq.* The Bill was not passed by the Senate.

⁴¹⁸ *Chambre des députés*, 1881, *Débats*, p. 677, *et seq.*

⁴¹⁹ *Cf. supra*, pp. 70-74.

⁴²⁰ Bréda, "La Question ouvrière et le gouvernement chrétien," in *L'Association catholique*, 1882, vol. xiv, p. 133, *et seq.*

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

⁴²² The passage is quoted from a letter written by Chambord in 1847. *Ibid.*

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ *Appel aux hommes de bonne volonté*, issued by the committee for the creation of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, in December, 1871, and reproduced in A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 72-75.

⁴²⁵ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 110; *Discours*, vol. i, pp. 21-32.

⁴²⁶ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 194.

⁴²⁷ A. de Mun, *Discours*, vol. i, p. 181.

⁴²⁸ Count de Mun's speech at the General Assembly of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs, 1878, published in *L'Association catholique*, vol. v, pp. 925-939; see especially p. 930.

⁴²⁹ A. de Mun, speech at Chartres, Sept. 8, 1878; *cf. L'Association catholique*, vol. vi, pp. 624-633.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, *Cf. L'Association catholique*, vol. vi, pp. 587-593.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ Speech at the General Assembly of the Association of C. W. C., May 4, 1879, published in *L'Association catholique*, vol. vii, pp. 904-1009.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁶ De Mun conceived that the aristocracy, as a disinterested third party, should be the "negotiators of peace" between capitalists and workingmen, "the artisans of social reconciliation." *Cf.* A. de Mun, *Discours*, vol. i, p. 378.

⁴³⁷ A. de Mun, *Discours*, vol. i, p. 378.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ A. de Mun, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 403.

⁴⁴⁰ A bill to legalize *syndicats* (unions of workingmen or employers in the same branch of industry) had been adopted by the Chamber of Deputies in June, 1881, amended by the Senate, and returned to the Chamber. The second debate in the Chamber, beginning June 12, 1883, is the one referred to. *Cf. Journal officiel*, 1880, p. 11677; *Chambre*

des députés, 1881, Documents, p. 361; Chambre des députés, 1881, Débats, pp. 516, 910, 917, 956, 972, 996, 1160, 1170; Sénat, 1882, Débats, pp. 688, 706, 748, et seq., 775 et seq., 790 et seq., 801 et seq., 847, 980, et seq.; Chambre des députés, 1882, Documents, p. 2626; Chambre des députés, 1883, Débats, pp. 513, 1276, et seq., 1312, et seq., 1330, et seq., 1346, et seq.

⁴⁴¹ June 12, *Chambre des députés, 1883, Débats, p. 1277, et seq.* See also his second speech, June 19, *idem, p. 1356, et seq.*

⁴⁴² *Chambre des députés, 1883, Débats, p. 1283, et seq.*

⁴⁴³ *Chambre des députés, 1884, Débats, p. 33.*

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid., p. 190, et seq.*

⁴⁴⁵ *Chambre des députés, 1884, Débats, p. 2076.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid., p. 1388, et seq.*

⁴⁴⁷ Article by Grandmaison in *Études*, vol. 141, p. 42; Saint-Pierre, *Le Comte Albert de Mun*, pp. 47-50. The death of the Legitimist pretender in 1883 had left de Mun politically stranded, so to speak; moreover, the Catholic successes in the election of 1885 had encouraged him to hope that by emulating the Belgian Catholic party and the German Center party, the French clericals might stem the tide of republican anticlericalism.

⁴⁴⁸ By repealing the divorce law.

⁴⁴⁹ By revision of the articles in the Civil Code which tended to the division and, consequently, the destruction of family properties.

⁴⁵⁰ Saint-Pierre, *loc. cit.* This program represents de Mun's idea of the social legislation which Catholics could be induced to advocate, at that time. It does not represent the maximum development of his own proposals. In fact, the Bills presented by him in 1886-1889 contain definitive proposals of a much more radical nature. Cf. *infra*, p. 111.

⁴⁵¹ Grandmaison, *loc. cit.*, Saint-Pierre, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵² Law of Sept. 9, 1848, Cf. R. Fighiéra, *La Protection légale des travailleurs en France*, pp. 73-87; P. Pic, *La Protection légale des travailleurs* (Paris, 1909), pp. 77-79.

⁴⁵³ *Chambre des députés, 1886, Documents, p. 1073, et seq.*

⁴⁵⁴ *Chambre des députés, 1886, Documents, p. 1738.*

⁴⁵⁵ *Chambre des députés, 1886, Documents, p. 891, et seq.*

⁴⁵⁶ Bills presented June 16, 1887, and Dec. 7, 1889. *Chambre des députés, 1887, Documents, p. 903, et seq., and 1889, Documents, p. 273, et seq.*

⁴⁵⁷ Bill presented on Dec. 7, 1889. *Chambre des députés, 1889, Session extraordinaire, Documents, p. 270, et seq.*

⁴⁵⁸ *Chambre des députés, 1889, Documents, p. 268, et seq.*

⁴⁵⁹ *Chambre des députés, 1889, Session extraordinaire, Documents, p. 272.*

⁴⁶⁰ *Chambre des députés, 1889, Débats, p. 241, et seq.*

⁴⁶¹ *Chambre des députés, 1891, Débats, pp. 129, 185, 208, 214, 215, 235.*

⁴⁶² Reply to an official questionnaire regarding the Val-des-Bois works, *vide L'Association catholique*, vol. v, p. 682, *et seq.*

⁴⁶³ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xvii, p. 536, *et seq.*

⁴⁶⁴ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 245.

⁴⁶⁵ *Manuel d'une corporation chrétienne* (Tours, 1876).

⁴⁶⁶ *Catéchisme du patron: élaboré avec le concours d'un grand nombre de théologiens; édité par L. Harmel* (Paris, 1889).

⁴⁶⁷ The following description of the Val-des-Bois Guild and discussion of its principles is based on the works of Harmel already cited, and also "La Démocratie dans l'usine," in *La Démocratie chrétienne*, 1903; *Le Val-des-bois: situation actuelle, juin, 1895*, (Rheims, 1895); *Fortnightly Review*, Jan. 1896; Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale*, vol. iii, pp. 133-143; Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, pp. 291-299; "L'usine du Val-des-Bois; Enquête . . . exposition du ministère de l'Intérieure," a reply to a questionnaire, in *L'Association catholique*, vol. v, p. 682, *et seq.*; *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, Jan. 10, 1914, pp. 14-22, Feb. 10, pp. 121-130, March 20, pp. 210-217, April 10, pp. 263-270, a series of articles entitled "La Famille ouvrière du Val-des-Bois," by J. Dassonville.

⁴⁶⁸ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 245.

⁴⁶⁹ *Manuel d'une corporation chrétienne* (Tours, 1876). Cf. *L'Association catholique*, vol. iv, p. 455.

⁴⁷⁰ From Harmel's report at the Bordeaux congress,—*Association catholique*, vol. ii, p. 456. In the Manual, he gave a shorter definition of the guild as "a religious and economic society formed freely by the heads of industrial families (employers and workingmen of the same industrial group or of analogous professions) all the members of which are grouped in various pious associations." *Manuel d'une corporation chrétienne*, p. 193.

⁴⁷¹ *L'Association catholique*, vol. iv, p. 372, *et seq.*

⁴⁷² A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 246.

⁴⁷³ Reproduced as "Annexe XIII," pp. 308-309, in de Mun, *op. cit.* For evidence that this was not a purely platonic resolution, *vide Année sociale internationale*, 1913-1914, p. 39, *et seq.*

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 104.

⁴⁷⁵ The monthly review, *L'Association catholique*, which served as an organ for the group of Social Catholic leaders interested in the Association, teemed with such articles.

⁴⁷⁶ This is not to say that von Ketteler was the first, but, rather, that he was the first *great* figure in the German Social Catholic movement. Before him, Adolph Kolping (1813-1865), a priest of working-class origin, had been very active in founding Journeymen's Unions (*Gesellenvereine*), somewhat similar to de Mun's Workingmen's Clubs. At the time of Kolping's death, in 1865, there were about 400 of these unions. Cf. *L'Association catholique*, vol. i, pp. 402-406.

⁴⁷⁷ On von Ketteler's life and social ideas, consult Pfülf, *Bischof von Ketteler* (3 vols., Mainz, 1899); E. de Girard, *Ketteler et la question ouvrière* (Berne, 1896); Goyau, *Ketteler* (Paris, 1907); J. Lionnet, *Un Evêque social, Ketteler* (Paris, 1903); A. Kannengieser, *Ketteler et l'organisation sociale en Allemagne* (Paris, 1894); John J. Laux (Geo. Metlake, pseud.), *Christian Social Reform: program outlined by its pioneer, William Emmanuel, baron von Ketteler, bishop of Mainz* (Philadelphia, 1912); Rev. C. D. Plater, *Catholic Social Work in Germany* (Herder, 1909).

⁴⁷⁸ Max Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, p. 4.

⁴⁷⁹ This is von Ketteler's interpretation of the Thomist doctrine. The sermons were published under the title, *Die grossen sozialen Fragen der Gegenwart* (Mainz, 1849); the remarks here quoted are found on pp. 12, 17, 25-26, of the pamphlet.

⁴⁸⁰ Despite the burden of his duties as bishop of Mainz (1850).

⁴⁸¹ *Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christenthum*.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, (third ed., Mainz, 1864), pp. 28-29.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23, and appendix ii, p. 171, *et seq.*

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

⁴⁸⁵ Cf. W. H. Dawson, *German Socialism and Ferdinand Lassalle* (London, 1899), p. 136, *et seq.* Four lectures by Schulze-Delitzsch, bound together under the title *Die Arbeit* (Leipzig, 1863), afford an interesting expression of the spirit in which his plan was conceived.

⁴⁸⁶ W. E. von Ketteler, *Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christenthum*, p. 32, *et seq.*

⁴⁸⁷ W. H. Dawson, *German Socialism and Ferdinand Lassalle* (London, 1899), p. 205; Ed. Bernstein (ed.), *Ferdinand Lassalles Reden und Schriften* (Berlin, 1892), vol. i, p. 131, *et seq.*, and vol. iii, pp. 1-261, especially pp. 221-238, in which Lassalle attacks Schulze-Delitzsch.

⁴⁸⁸ W. E. von Ketteler, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-87.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 138, *et seq.*

⁴⁹⁰ G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse: le catholicisme* (Paris, 1909), vol. iii, p. 135, *et seq.*

⁴⁹¹ W. E. von Ketteler, *Die Arbeiterbewegung und ihr Streben im Verhältniss zu Religion und Sittlichkeit*, a speech delivered on July 25, 1869, (second ed., Mainz, 1869).

⁴⁹² G. Goyau, *Ketteler*, pp. 226-237; Kannengieser, *Ketteler*, pp. 66-67.

⁴⁹³ W. E. von Ketteler, *Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche; Entwurf zu einem politischen Programm* (Mainz, 1873).

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80, *et seq.*

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 86, *et seq.*

⁴⁹⁷ Franz Christoph Ignaz Moufang (1817-1890). See his biography in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, liii, 486-8.

⁴⁹⁸ Moufang proposed that the state should institute a commission of magistrates and workingmen to fix a just wage for each category of labor, and to enforce its decisions. Cf. Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 142.

⁴⁹⁹ *Christlich-Soziale Blätter*, March, 1871.

⁵⁰⁰ Franz Hitze (1851-). *Vide Deutsches Zeitgenossexikon* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 615.

⁵⁰¹ *Die Sociale Frage und die Bestrebungen zu ihrer Lösung* (Paderborn, 1877); *Kapital und Arbeit und die Reorganisation der Gesellschaft* (Paderborn, 1880); *Die Quintessenz der Socialen Frage* (pamphlet, Paderborn, written in 1880); *Schutz dem Handwerke* (Paderborn, 1883); *Pflichten und Aufgaben der Arbeitgeber in der Arbeiterfrage* (Cologne, 1888); *Schutz dem Arbeiter* (Cologne, 1890); *Die Arbeiterfrage und die Bestrebungen zu ihrer Lösung* (Berlin, 1899); *Zur Würdigung der deutschen Arbeiter-Sozialpolitik* (München-Gladbach,

1913); besides many articles in *Arbeiterwohl*, *L'Association catholique*, *Christlich-Soziale Blätter*, and other Social Catholic periodical publications, and "Die Arbeiter-Sozialpolitik," in *Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II* (Berlin, 1914).

⁵⁰² Franz Hitze, *Capital et travail et la réorganisation de la société* (an enlarged edition of *Die Soziale Frage*, in French, Louvain, 1898), ch. ii, and p. 37.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. i, v, vi, vii.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. x-xv.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. Hitze's three bills of March 5, 1887, to amend the *Gewerbeordnung* or factory code, in *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages, VII Legislaturperiode, I Session 1887, Dritter Band, Erster Anlageband, Nr. 21*, pp. 281-282, *Nr. 22*, pp. 282-284, *Nr. 23*, pp. 284-285, and his speeches on these bills, March 16, June 8, June 14, 1887, in *Stenographische Berichte, VII Legislaturperiode, I Session 1887, Erster Band*, pp. 127-130, 780-783, 964, 966. Also, a bill presented on Nov. 25, 1887, by Hitze and other deputies, in *Stenographische Berichte, VII Legislaturperiode, II Session 1887-1888, Dritter Band, Erster Anlageband, Aktenstück Nr. 21*, pp. 148-150, and discussion, in *Erster Band*, pp. 477, 1182, 1184, 1192, 1193. Also, a bill by Lieber and Hitze, in *op. cit.*, *Dritter Band, Erster Anlageband, Nr. 54*, pp. 295-296, with discussion, *Erster Band*, pp. 905, 1245, 1253, 1356. Also, Hitze's emphatic speech of May 20, 1890, favoring the legal enforcement of Sunday, the progressive diminution of the working-day, restriction of woman-labor, and the legal organization of labor, *Stenographische Berichte, VIII Legislaturperiode, I Session 1890-1891, Erster Band*, pp. 179-185. In the last-mentioned speech he proposed the legal institution of a form of labor organization resembling the "shop committee" so much discussed at present.

⁵¹⁰ On Nov. 20, 1884, to cite one instance, Freiherr von Hertling with several of his colleagues and a large number of supporters or seconders, introduced a resolution to the following effect:—"Be it resolved by the Reichstag: that the federated governments be requested to lay before the Reichstag, if possible in this session, a bill relative to the further development of the legislation for the protection of the laborer, in which (1) work on Sundays and holidays shall be forbidden, subject to special exceptions to be precisely defined, (2) child-labor and woman-labor in factories shall be restricted, (3) the maximum working-day for adult male workers shall be regulated." *Stenographische Berichte, VI Legislaturperiode, I Session 1884-1885, Fünfter Band*, p. 80.

⁵¹¹ F. Salomon, *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme* (Leipzig, 1912, second ed.), vol. ii, pp. 23, 38-45. Cf. also Wenzel, *Arbeiterschutz und Centrum*.

⁵¹² Alphonse Thun, in *Die Industrie am Niederrhein und ihre Ar-*

beiter, *Erster Theil: die linksrheinische Textilindustrie* (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 197-198, gives interesting testimony to this effect: "with the Kulturkampf, a new principle appeared in the formation of parties: the weavers of Rhenish Prussia had to take a position on a question toward which they had hitherto been neutral. The social conflict between manufacturers and laborers subsisted; to it was joined a new conflict, between clericals and liberals. The liberal party appeared as the organization of manufacturers and anticlericals, the Center party as the organization of workingmen and clergy. More than ever the clergy, hostile to the liberal manufacturers, were thrown back upon the people. The weavers are the adepts of ultramontaniam less because it is a religious party than because it has become a social party."

For this illuminating quotation I am indebted to the excellent chapter on the social movement among German Catholics, in G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse: le catholicisme*, vol. iii (Paris, 1909), chapter ii, pp. 85-169.

⁵¹³ V. Brants, "La Réglementation du travail industriel en Autriche," in *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. vii, 1889, pp. 165-175; cf. *L'Association catholique*, vol. xv, p. 468, vol. xvi, pp. 233-234, vol. xviii, pp. 662-669.

⁵¹⁴ His program is set forth in an article entitled, "La Réforme sociale et le programme antisémitique," in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xxxii, pp. 164-173, 199-207; cf. de Bréda, "Le Prince de Lichtenstein et la question sociale," in *L'Association catholique*, vol. vi, pp. 238-250, 402-416, and *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. vii, p. 226.

⁵¹⁵ See Vogelsang's articles in *Monatsschrift für christliche Social-Reform*: on interest and usury, May, 1884, pp. 233-258; June, pp. 321-342; July, pp. 345-350; Aug., pp. 419-432; Sept., pp. 457-480; on sickness-insurance for workingmen, Nov., 1884, pp. 602-612, Dec., 656-661; on the organization of industry, April-May, 1886, pp. 188-196; on state-action, in reply to Michael Flürscheim, Aug., 1887, pp. 405-411; on the basis of social reform, vol. xi, pp. 617-623; etc. He contributed to the French Social Catholic review, *L'Association catholique* (q. v. for May, 1888).

⁵¹⁶ Dr. Rudolph Meyer, *Politische Gründe und die Corruption in Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1877).

⁵¹⁷ He was subsequently compelled to make a second migration, this time because of an attack on the Austrian premier. Leaving Vienna, he went to Paris, where he made the acquaintance of the French Social Catholic leaders and became a contributor to their review, *L'Association catholique*.

⁵¹⁸ Dr. Rudolph Meyer. *Der Emancipationskampf des vierten Standes* (second ed., Berlin, 1882); *Ursachen der Amerikanischen Concurrenz* (Berlin, 1883); *Heimstätten und andere Wirthschaftsgesetze der Vereinigten Stäten von Amerika, von Canada, Russland, China, Indien, Rumänien, Serbien, und England* (Berlin, 1883). Cf. "Le Socialisme d'état en Autriche," in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xvi, pp. 209-222; La Tour du Pin, "Étude de législation sociale," in same review, vol. xvi, pp. 464-485.

⁵¹⁹ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiii, pp. 383-386, 783-786, vol. xv, pp. 419-436, 461-467; Prince A. von Lichtenstein, "La Réforme sociale et le programme antisémitique," in same review, vol. xxxii, pp. 164-173, 199-207; V. Brants, "La Réglementation du travail industriel en Autriche," in *La Réforme sociale*, 1889, 2nd series, vol. vii, pp. 165-175; Dr. Kaempfe, "Le Mouvement antisémitique en Autriche," in *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. vi, pp. 567-577.

⁵²⁰ The clergy also bore an important part in the movement; witness the work of Father Weiss, Father Kolb, Mgr. Schleicher, Father Eichorn, and others.

⁵²¹ Stauracz, *Dr. Lueger's Leben und Wirken* (Klagenfurt); *idem.*, *Dr. Karl Lueger, Zehn Jahre Bürgermeister* (Vienna, 1907); *cf.* *Le Mouvement social*, April, 1910, p. 339, *et seq.*; Dr. Kaempfe, "Les Résultats du socialisme chrétien en Autriche," *La Réforme sociale*, 1891, 3d. series, vol. i, p. 471.

⁵²² Gaspard Mermillod (1824-1892), ordained bishop, in 1864, and appointed cardinal in 1890. *Cf.* Jeantet, *Le Cardinal Mermillod*.

⁵²³ Quoted by Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, pp. 237-238.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 241, *et seq.*

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁶ For this initiative he was praised by Leo XIII,—*cf.* *Civiltà Cattolica*, March 1, 1890, and *T'Serclaès, Le Pape Léon XIII* (2 vols., Paris and Lille, 1894), ii, pp. 56-58. The proposition was taken up by the Swiss Government, but Wilhelm II intervened and brought the conference to Berlin,—*cf.* *La Réforme sociale*, 1890, 2nd series, vol. ix, pp. 89-98, 145-154.

⁵²⁷ Gaspard Decurtins, *Les Catholiques et la question sociale* (Fribourg, 1890).

⁵²⁸ *Cf.* *L'Association catholique*, May, 1890, pp. 615, 617; *Revue d'économie politique*, May-June, 1890, pp. 315, 316; *La Réforme sociale*, 1890, 2nd series, vol. ix, pp. 572-579; *Le Temps*, April 11, 1890; *L'Economiste français*, April 26, 1890.

⁵²⁹ Huet was French by nationality, but is usually classed as a Belgian because he was a professor in the Belgian university of Ghent. Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 581. *Cf.* Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 301, *et seq.*; Éblé, *Les Ecoles catholiques d'économie*, p. 31, *et seq.*; Laveleye, *Le Socialisme contemporain*, pp. 236-239.

⁵³⁰ M. Gide, in Gide and Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, p. 582.

⁵³¹ François Huet, *Le Règne social du christianisme* (Paris, 1853). Huet, says M. Gide, was the first to use the term *socialisme chrétien*.

⁵³² "The Gospel does not recognize its social expression in the middle ages, that terrible dictatorship corresponding to the barbarity of the period, the iron age of the church, the long '93 of religion. Born in pains, in the midst of a régime of blood, the true Christian society of which the communes were the cradle did not take possession of the stage of the world until 1789."—François Huet, *Le Règne social du christianisme*, p. 4.

⁵³³ Huet, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁵³⁴ Charles Périn, *Le Socialisme chrétien*, p. 48.

⁵³⁵ Périn's theories have been discussed more fully on another page, *cf. supra*, pp. 62-65.

⁵³⁶ Béchaux, *La Politique sociale en Belgique* (Paris, 1887); Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 304; V. Brants, "Les nouvelles lois sociales en Belgique," in *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. v, pp. 198-203; *cf.* also the excellent summary of Belgian social legislation to 1890 in the same review, 1890, 2nd series, vol. x, pp. 385-403, 439-452.

⁵³⁷ Henry Edward Manning (1808-1892). Among many biographical studies, the following throw most light on his social work: J. Lemire, *Le Cardinal Manning et son action sociale* (Paris, 1893), a very interesting study by a French Christian Democrat; F. de Pressensé, *Le Cardinal Manning* (Paris, 1896); I. A. Taylor, *The Cardinal Democrat*, *Henry Edward Manning* (London, 1908). W. H. Kent, author of the article on "Manning, Henry Edward" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, has under preparation a definitive biography.

⁵³⁸ The lecture was published in pamphlet form, as *The Rights and Dignity of Labor* (London, 1887).

⁵³⁹ See especially his article in the *Dublin Review*, 1891, vol. 109, pp. 153-167.

⁵⁴⁰ Sidney Buxton, "Cardinal Manning, a Reminiscence," *Fortnightly*, 1896, vol. 65, pp. 576-594; *La Réforme sociale*, 1889, vol. viii, pp. 603-609.

⁵⁴¹ *Dublin Review*, 1891, vol. 109, pp. 153-167; *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. x, p. 536; Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 319; Spuller, *L'Evolution politique et social de l'église*, p. 97.

⁵⁴² Spuller, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵⁴³ Mgr. E. G. Bagshawe, *Mercy and Justice to the Poor, the True Political Economy* (London, 1885); Père de Pascal, "Monseigneur Bagshawe, évêque de Nottingham," in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xxv, p. 109, *et seq.*; also, *L'Association catholique*, vol. xviii, pp. 61-71, and vol. xvii, p. 442.

⁵⁴⁴ *Cf.* Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, pp. 348-357; J. Cazajoux, "La Question sociale en Espagne," *La Réforme sociale*, 1891, 3d series, vol. i, pp. 85-90; Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, *passim*.

⁵⁴⁵ The French Social Catholic review, *L'Association catholique*, had an article on "Les Chevaliers du travail" before the decision, in vol. xxii, p. 703, *et seq.*; it printed Cardinal Gibbons' memorandum, in vol. xxiii, p. 488, *et seq.*, and Cardinal Manning's letter, vol. xxiii, p. 505, *et seq.*, and published another article on "Les Chevaliers du travail et le Saint-Siège," in vol. xxvi, p. 729, *et seq.* *Cf.* also an anticlerical's comment in Spuller, *L'Evolution politique et sociale de l'église*, p. 97.

⁵⁴⁶ *Cf. supra*, p. 81.

⁵⁴⁷ For example, in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiv, pp. 253-273.

⁵⁴⁸ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiii, p. 301, *et seq.*

⁵⁴⁹ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xii, pp. 621-646, 744-766; vol. xiii, pp. 52-68; vol. xvi, pp. 209-222, 322-338, 565-585; vol. xvii, pp. 334-348, 467-481.

⁵⁵⁰ Cf. *infra*, pp. 153-154.

⁵⁵¹ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 118.

⁵⁵² Cf. *L'Association catholique*, vol. xi, pp. 247, 266-270.

⁵⁵³ Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. iii, pp. 251-252, 312-316; *Semaine sociale de Rouen*, 1910, p. 69, *et seq.*

⁵⁵⁴ Cf. *infra*, pp. 157-165.

⁵⁵⁶ Cf. *supra*, pp. 58-65.

⁵⁵⁷ Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie*, ch. iii; F. Le Play, "L'École de la paix sociale, son développement et son avenir," in *La Réforme sociale*, 1882, vol. iii, pp. 145-150; Delaire, "Les Doctrines sociales de Le Play et de son école," in same review, vol. viii, pp. 496-501.

⁵⁵⁸ Claudio Jannet, "L'Intervention de l'état dans le régime du travail," in *Revue cath. des inst.*, Jan., 1885; H. Dubreuil, "La Liberté du travail au congrès des jurisconsultes," *La Réforme sociale*, 1885, vol. ix, pp. 181-183; Jannet, "Les Syndicats professionnels et la loi du 21 mars 1884," in same review, vol. x, pp. 289-319.

⁵⁵⁹ *L'Association catholique*, vol. i, pp. 9-41.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, p. 257.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiii, p. 559, *et seq.*

⁵⁶² Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 184.

⁵⁶³ A. de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 123; Grandmaison, "Le Comte Albert de Mun," in *Études*, vol. 141, p. 32.

⁵⁶⁴ Vol. xi, p. 247, *et seq.*, vol. xv, p. 294, *et seq.*, cf. vol. vii, appendix, pp. 1-52.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁶ Cf. "Rapport et avis No. VII" and "Rapport et avis No. VIII" printed *in extenso* in *L'Association catholique*, vol. xi, pp. 387-412, 548-574, and vol. xiii, pp. 511-555. "Avis No. VII" was adopted by the general committee of the Association of Catholic Workingmen's Clubs on Feb. 23, 1881; "Avis No. VIII" on March 1, 1882.

⁵⁶⁷ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiii, "D'où nous venons," p. 122, *et seq.*, "Où nous en sommes," p. 244, *et seq.*, "Où nous allons," p. 347, *et seq.*

⁵⁶⁸ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xiv, pp. 253-273, Sept., 1882.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁰ *L'Association catholique*, vol. xvii, p. 1, *et seq.*, Jan., 1884.

⁵⁷¹ *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. ix, p. 592; *L'Association catholique*, Nov. 15, 1889, p. 591.

⁵⁷² De Ségur-Lamoignon in *L'Association catholique*, Nov., 1889, p. 591.

⁵⁷³ Cf. *La Science sociale* (1886—); *La Réforme sociale*, vol. xi (1886), pp. 1-2; vol. x, p. 418; *Journal des économistes*, 1886, 4th series, vol. xxxiii, pp. 236-237; Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie*, pp. 181, 234.

⁵⁷⁴ Alfred Renouard, in *La Réforme sociale*, vol. xii, pp. 236-239.

⁵⁷⁵ H. de Moly, "La Réglementation du travail en France et les catholiques," in *La Réforme sociale*, May 16, 1890, 2nd series, vol. ix, pp. 585-606.

⁵⁷⁶ *Supra*, p. 110.

⁵⁷⁷ Charles Périn, "Ni libéraux, ni socialistes," in *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, 2nd series, vol. v, pp. 463-470; cf. *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. x, p. 675.

⁵⁷⁸ Raoul du Sart in *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. iv, p. 507.

⁵⁷⁹ *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. ii, pp. 326-327, 584-592.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 2nd series, vol. iv, pp. 507-513.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸² J. Cazajoux, "Le Socialisme chrétien aux congrès de Liège et d'Angers," in *La Réforme sociale*, Nov. 1, 1890, 2nd series, vol. x, pp. 533-547.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, and *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, 2nd series, vol. v, pp. 530-543.

⁵⁸⁴ *La Réforme sociale*, 2nd series, vol. ix, pp. 585-606, vol. x, p. 545, and *Revue cath. des inst.*, 2nd series, vol. v, pp. 415-427.

⁵⁸⁵ *Revue cath. des inst. et du droit*, 2nd ser., vol. v, pp. 385-414; cf. Spuller, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 149-150; *Revue d'économie politique*, 1891, vol. v, p. 87.

⁵⁸⁶ Éblé, *Les Écoles cath. d'économie*, p. 190.

⁵⁸⁷ H. de Lestelly, "Procès-verbal général du congrès tenu à Angers par les jurisconsultes catholiques," *Revue cath. des inst.*, 2nd series, vol. v, pp. 385-414; Mgr. Freppel, "La Question ouvrière et le socialisme chrétien," *ibid.*, pp. 415-427; G. Théry, "Rapport sur le socialisme d'état," *ibid.*, pp. 428-463; A. Onclair, "Rapport sur le socialisme contemporain," *ibid.*, pp. 481-510; A. Gibon, "Les Accidents du travail," *ibid.*, 2nd series, vol. vi, pp. 126-153.

⁵⁸⁸ Spuller, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 153-158.

⁵⁸⁹ Count Albert de Mun, in *L'Association catholique*, Jan. 15, 1891, vol. xxi, pp. 3-33.

⁵⁹⁰ Éblé, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

⁵⁹¹ Gioacchino Pecci (1810-1903), son of Count Lodovico Pecci. On his character and life, consult Mgr. Charles de T'Serclaès, *Le Pape Léon XIII* (Paris, 1892); Justin McCarthy, *Pope Leo XIII* (London, 1896); R. H. Clarke, *The Life of His Holiness Pope Leo XIII* (Phila., 1903); Martin Spahn, *Leo XIII* (Munich, 1905); Boyer d'Agen, *La Prélature de Léon XIII* (Paris, 1900); Lecanuet, *L'Eglise de France*, vol. ii, *Pontificat de Léon XIII* (Paris, 1910); F. Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, ch. xii; Rev. J. J. Wynne (ed.), *The Great Encyclicals of Leo XIII* (N. Y., 1902).

⁵⁹² Cf. *supra*, pp. 121-125.

⁵⁹³ *L'Eglise et la Civilisation*, par S. Em. le cardinal Pecci, archevêque de Pérouse . . . traduit de l'italien par Paul Lapeyre (Paris, 1878); quoted by Max Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social depuis l'encyclique "Rerum Novarum"* (2nd ed., Paris, 1909), p. 23.

⁵⁹⁴ *Acta sanctae sedis*, (Rome), vol xi, p. 369, et seq.

⁵⁹⁵ *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xii, p. 97, et seq.

⁵⁹⁶ *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xi, pp. 369 et seq. English translation, in

The Pope and the People (London, 1912) pp. 28-40; Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, pp. 365-370.

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. *supra*, p. 122.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. *supra*, pp. 141-145.

⁵⁹⁹ On the general development of Social Catholicism prior to 1891, see Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*.

⁶⁰⁰ Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, p. 10; Léon Grégoire, *Le Pape, les Catholiques et la Question sociale* (Paris, 1899, 3rd ed.), p. 26, *et seq.* There is also a pamphlet entitled *Union de Fribourg* (Paris, 1893), setting forth the work of the Union.

⁶⁰¹ *Association catholique*, May 15, June 15, 1887; Léon Grégoire, *op. cit.*, p. 48, *et seq.*; Justin McCarthy, *Pope Leo XIII* (2nd ed., N. Y., 1899), pp. 152-156.

⁶⁰² Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, p. 184; E. Spuller, *L'Evolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 163-184.

⁶⁰³ Turmann, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Spuller, *loc. cit.* In *Catholic Social Guild Pamphlets*, No. 3, Mgr. Parkinson asserts that 100 employers, 1,400 workmen, and 300 priests participated in the pilgrimage. Spuller states that there were 1,200 workingmen.

⁶⁰⁴ Turmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-188; Spuller, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁰⁵ Francesco S. Nitti, *Studi sul socialismo contemporaneo: Il socialismo cattolico* (Turin, 1890).

⁶⁰⁶ *Acta sanctæ sedis*, vol. xxiii, p. 641, *et seq.* Citations are from the Official English Translation, "*The Condition of Labor*," published in pamphlet form by the International Catholic Truth Society. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, G. Goyau, G. de Pascal, and Max Turmann will be found among the most interesting of the Encyclical's numerous commentators. Justin McCarthy, *Pope Leo XIII*, pp. 169-181, gives a summary of contemporary comments. An English translation may be found in Rev. J. J. Wynne (ed.), *The Great Encyclicals of Leo XIII* (N. Y., 1902).

⁶⁰⁷ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 165, writes "*Le 15 mai 1891 éclata comme un coup de tonnerre l'Encyclique Rerum novarum*"; the statement is somewhat surprising in the light of the facts mentioned by the same author, pp. 158-164. Among the utterances foreshadowing *Rerum Novarum* may be mentioned, besides the documents adverted to in the text, the address "*C'est avec une particulière satisfaction*" with which Leo XIII encouraged the Catholic Workingmen's Clubs of France (February 24, 1885, *The Pope and the People*, pp. 67-70); the reply to Cardinal Langénieux's address, October 20, 1889 (see Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, pp. 401-403); and the letter written in 1890 to William II, on the occasion of the International Congress for Social Legislation (*cf.* McCarthy, *Pope Leo XIII*, pp. 157-160).

⁶⁰⁸ Despite the length of *Rerum Novarum*, certain of the declarations, and still more the omissions, of the Encyclical gave rise to controversy. Leo XIII, therefore, and his successors Pius X and Benedict XV, found it necessary at frequent intervals to write more precise explanations, new exhortations, and more than one rebuke. Their

utterances, compiled from encyclical letters, instructions and allocutions, would constitute a lengthy treatise on the social question.

⁶⁰⁹ *The Condition of Labour*, p. 12.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 3-9, II.

⁶¹³ The first nine pages are directed against Socialism; the remaining thirty-two are devoted to what the pope considered to be the true solutions.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 22-23, 25, 39-40, 15, 9.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 23, 24, 25.

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-37.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-37.

⁶¹⁹ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 50-51: *supra*, p. 107.

⁶²⁰ Tournier, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie* (Paris, 1913), pp. 277, 338.

⁶²¹ Dabry, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-59.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁶²³ Spuller, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'église* (Paris, 1893), pp. 67-73.

⁶²⁴ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 72, 91-92.

⁶²⁵ *Année politique*, 1890, p. 15, *et seq.*

⁶²⁶ *Journal officiel*, July 17, 1889, p. 3437, *et seq.*

⁶²⁷ *Année politique*, 1889, pp. 197-198.

⁶²⁸ J. Tournier, *Le cardinal Lavigerie et son action politique d'après les documents nouveaux et inédits* (Thesis, Paris, 1913); Mgr. Baudard, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie* (Paris, 1896); Vicomte de Colleville, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie* (4th ed., Paris, 1912); Jules Delacroix, *La Déclaration du cardinal Lavigerie, le clergé français et les partis politiques* (Saint-Amand, 1891); *Du Toast à l'encyclique* (Paris, 1892), published anonymously but written by Goyau and Brunhes.

⁶²⁹ In his Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885, Leo XIII had written, "no one of the several forms of government is in itself condemned, inasmuch as none of them contains anything contrary to Catholic doctrine and all of them are capable, if wisely and justly managed, to insure the welfare of the state." The pope explicitly stated that political democracy was not only permissible but might be of benefit and of obligation in some cases.—*The Pope and the People*, p. 92; *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xviii, p. 161, *et seq.* Again, in *Sapientiae Christianae*, January 10, 1890, Leo XIII declared that "the Church . . . holds that it is not her province to decide which is the best amongst many diverse forms of government and the civil institutions of Christian States, and among the different systems of government she disapproves none, provided that religion and the Christian discipline of morals be respected."—*The Pope and the People*, p. 165; *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xxii, p. 385, *et seq.*

⁶³⁰ Text in Debidour, *L'Eglise catholique et l'état sous la Troisième République*, vol. ii, pp. 499-500; comment on its influence, from an

anticlerical viewpoint, *ibid.*, p. 39, *et seq.*; cf. Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 72-75; and Tournier, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie*, p. 287, *et seq.* The latter is the best and most recent account of Cardinal Lavigerie's action.

⁶³¹ See the comments of a shrewd non-Catholic political observer, Eugène Spuller, in the article reprinted in his *L'Evolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 1-19.

⁶³² Tournier, *Le Cardinal Lavigerie*, p. 308.

⁶³³ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 77.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-79.

⁶³⁵ Weill, *Mouvement social en France*, pp. 395-398; Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18; *et infra*, pp. 365-374.

⁶³⁶ Tournier, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-344.

⁶³⁷ Tournier, *op. cit.*, pp. 374-375; Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 57; Spuller, *L'Evolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 100-102.

⁶³⁸ Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 104; Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁶³⁹ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 104-109.

⁶⁴⁰ De Mun himself was active in forming a *Ligue de propagande catholique et sociale* in 1892. Cf. Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 91, and Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶⁴¹ Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

⁶⁴⁴ The letter of February 16, 1892, was antedated by a letter to Cardinal Lavigerie, approving the policy enunciated in the Toast of Algiers. MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. I, p. 265.

⁶⁴⁵ The encyclical *Inter Gravissimas*. The text is found in *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xxiv, p. 529, *et seq.* Cf. MacCaffrey, *op. cit.*, p. 266; Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 174, *et seq.*; Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale*, vol. i, pp. 252, *et seq.*; Spuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-276.

⁶⁴⁶ Spuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-300.

⁶⁴⁷ Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

⁶⁴⁹ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 177-178.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁶⁵¹ *Année politique*, 1892, pp. 158-159; Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91; Tournier, p. 400; Dabry, pp. 109, 177-179; Spuller, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁶⁵² *Vide supra*, p. 83.

⁶⁵³ Albert de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, pp. 71, 289-290, gives the text of the address, together with a facsimile reproduction of the papal benediction which was received in return.

⁶⁵⁴ In particular see the commendatory briefs written by Pius IX in 1871, 1874, and 1877, reproduced in de Mun's *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 316, *et seq.*

⁶⁵⁵ Count Albert de Mun, *Ma Vocation sociale*, p. 275, note 2.

⁶⁵⁶ Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, p. 242, *et seq.* Compare de Mun's Bordeaux speech of January 16, 1892, urging Catholics to take a more earnest interest in social reform, and agreeing

with socialistic criticisms of existing economic evils, but defending the principles of private property and religion,—in *Année politique*, 1892, pp. 28–29.

⁶⁵⁷ Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des catholiques*, vol. ii, p. 127, note; Turmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–245.

⁶⁵⁸ An interesting and frankly partisan account of the early development of Christian Democracy will be found in Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, especially chapters vi, vii, viii; a shorter and more scholarly treatment is that by Professor Weill, in his *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, pp. 395–403; cf. the same author's *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France*, pp. 215, 229, et seq.

⁶⁵⁹ The declaration of Gallican liberties in 1682 was an illustration of the Gallican spirit. On the nature and influence of Gallicanism in the nineteenth century consult MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i, chapters i and viii; and also Georges Weill, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral en France*, pp. 3–6, 8, 212, et seq.

⁶⁶⁰ See the comments of the monarchist leader d'Haussonville and of the reactionary journals *Autorité* and *Soleil* on the *ralliement*, particularly their contention that the pope had no infallible authority in political questions,—in *Année politique*, 1892, *passim*; cf. also Debidoir, *op. cit.*, p. 93; Spuller, *L'Evolution politique et sociale de l'église*, pp. 123–126, 277–296.

⁶⁶¹ Léon Jacques, *Les Partis politiques*, pp. 484–485, 184–185.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 182–185, 485. Note especially that the *Action française* rejects the idea of legislative limitation of the working-day and at the same time appeals to feelings not much different from those evoked by the socialist conception of the “class-struggle.”

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁶⁶⁴ Debidoir, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 308. The latter gives the date as 1903,—an obvious misprint.

⁶⁶⁵ Article in *La Vérité française*, July 23, 1894, cited by Barbier, *Rome et l'Action Libérale Populaire*, pp. 35–39.

⁶⁶⁶ Cited by Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 311–313.

⁶⁶⁷ *My Italics*.

⁶⁶⁸ Cited by Barbier, *Rome et l'Action Libérale Populaire*, pp. 220–223.

⁶⁶⁹ By way of exception it should be noted that a few monarchists continued to support the Social Catholic movement. Most notable of all the monarchist Social Catholics was La Tour-du-Pin. But the main body of the Social Catholic movement was cut off from monarchism.

⁶⁷⁰ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 260.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

⁶⁷² *Chambre des députés, 1885, Débats*, p. 382.

⁶⁷³ *Année politique*, 1886, pp. 2–3.

⁶⁷⁴ Lockroy had brought in a bill as early as 1876 for the legalization of trade-unions. *Journal officiel*, 1876, pp. 5600–5601.

⁶⁷⁵ *Chambre des députés, 1885, sess. extr., Débats*, p. 19.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ch. des dép. 1886, Documents*, pp. 1787, 972, and *session extraordinaire*, p. 1057.

⁶⁷⁷ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 267; cf. *Année politique*, 1887, p. 103.

⁶⁷⁸ *Année politique*, 1888, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁷⁹ *Chambre des députés, 1888, Débats*, p. 1489.

⁶⁸⁰ Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-270. The Blanquist faction was inclined to support Boulanger; the Guesdists held to class-conscious neutrality.

⁶⁸¹ Vizetelly, *Republican France*, pp. 293-342; *Année politique*, 1888, *passim*, 1889, pp. 173-199.

⁶⁸² *Chambre des députés, session extraordinaire, 1891, Débats*, pp. 2487-2490.

⁶⁸³ Throughout his speech, Lafargue was much annoyed by interruptions. He could not understand, he said, why there was so much noise and tumult in the Chamber of Deputies. With a fine touch of irony, he asked the Chamber's indulgence, on the ground that he had hitherto been accustomed only to public mass-meetings, "where business proceeds in a calmer manner."

⁶⁸⁴ *Débats, loc. cit.*

⁶⁸⁵ *Loc. cit.*, speech of Henry Fouquier.

⁶⁸⁶ *Loc. cit.*, speech of M. Dumay.

⁶⁸⁷ *Loc. cit.*, speech of Henri Brisson.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2491-2492.

⁶⁸⁹ Eugène Spuller, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'église*, p. xii.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. xii, xxxv, 162.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁶⁹² Cf. *Dictionnaire des parlementaires*, vol. iv, p. 374; G. Vapereau, *Dictionnaire universel des contemporains* (Paris, 1893), p. 1110; Weill, *op. cit.*, *passim*; S. P. Orth, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe* (N. Y., 1913), p. 80, *et seq.*

⁶⁹³ *Chambre des députés, session extraordinaire, 1891, Débats*, p. 2492. It is an interesting fact that on several occasions, earlier in the year, in debates on labor questions, de Mun had rushed to Millerand's support, earning the applause of the Left. Cf. *Chambre des députés, 1891, Débats*, pp. 775, 778, 1081 and *Chambre d. d., sess. extr. 1891, Débats*, pp. 2231-2232.

⁶⁹⁴ *Chambre d. d., sess. extr., 1891, Débats*, p. 2492.

⁶⁹⁵ In the foregoing sketch of the early career of Jaurès I have used biographical data from Charles Rappoport's *Jean Jaurès* (Paris, 1915), Margaret Pease, *Jean Jaurès* (N. Y., 1917), and Weill, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Cf. also, S. P. Orth, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe*, pp. 80-117. None of these authorities, however, is responsible for my interpretation of Jaurès' political attitude; my own reading in the *Débats* and in the above-mentioned biographies inclines me to regard Jaurès in action as more of the bourgeois Radical and less of the Socialist economic reformer than he is usually considered.

⁶⁹⁶ With some Catholic orators it was at this period a favorite theme to denounce the Jewish capitalists who dominated high finance.

⁶⁹⁷ Count Albert de Mun's speech at Toulouse, in 1893, *Vide Année politique*, 1893, p. 155 and Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 275.

⁶⁹⁸ From the *Soleil*; *vide Année politique*, 1893, p. 155.

⁶⁹⁹ *Année politique*, 1893, p. 137. The names of the members of the Delegation were as follows: M. Piou, Gen. de Frescheville, Prince d'Arenberg, Baron Hély d'Oissel, M. Sabatier, Count de Caraman, M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, M. Caplain, M. Delville, M. François Maynard, (editor of the *Figaro*), Ernest Daudet, D. Guibert, A. Viellard, Viscount Pierre de Pelleport-Burète, M. Henri Darcy, M. Savoye, and M. Achille Delorme. This group was to all intents and purposes the campaign committee of the Republican Right.

⁷⁰⁰ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 273, *et seq.*; *Année politique*, 1893, p. 266.

⁷⁰¹ *Année politique*, 1893, p. 265.

⁷⁰² A passage from d'Haussonville's book, *Misère et remèdes*, quoted by M. Paul Deschanel in the Chamber of Deputies, 1896, *Débats*, p. 1048.

⁷⁰³ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 268, *et seq.*

⁷⁰⁴ From a letter defining the policy of the *ralliés*, published in the *Figaro*, in January, 1893. I quote it from the *Année politique*, 1893, pp. 3-8.

⁷⁰⁵ *Année politique*, 1893, pp. 184-187; *cf.* E. Spuller, *L'Evolution pol. et soc. de l'église*, pp. 74-77; Vapereau, *Dictionnaire universel des contemporains* (Paris, 1893), pp. 1406-1408; Georges Picot, *Notices historiques* (Paris, 1907), vol. ii, pp. 1-53; Georges Michel, "Une Dynastie d'économistes," in *Journal des économistes*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 170-191.

⁷⁰⁶ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 563.

⁷⁰⁷ *Annuaire du parlement* for 1898 and following years.

⁷⁰⁸ *Chambre des députés*, 1891, session extr., *Débats*, p. 2487, *et seq.*

⁷⁰⁹ For instance, see *Ch. d. d.*, 1891, *Débats*, p. 2487, *et seq.*

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2492.

⁷¹¹ Weill, *Hist. du mouvement social*, p. 291.

⁷¹² *Année politique*, 1893, p. 156.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-178.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁵ Labusquière, *La Troisième République*, p. 264; Levine, *Labor Movement in France*, *passim*.

⁷¹⁶ The electoral programs and declarations of the various successful candidates for election to the Chamber contained a surprisingly large number of references to the *ralliés*; one must read them to get any adequate conception of their hostility to the new group. They are printed in *Chambre des députés*, 1894, *Documents*, p. 1253, *et seq.*

⁷¹⁷ In the preceding election, when he ran as a monarchist, de Mun had received 5,572 votes and had not been opposed. In 1893 he received only 4,158 votes as against 4,427 given to his moderate Republican opponent, Le Cléc'h. In other words, because de Mun abandoned monarchism, a thousand voters abandoned him and permitted an anticlerical Republican to win the seat. See Samuel and Bonét-

Maury, *Les Parlementaires français*, p. 303. Dabry, in *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 280, affirms that "there is no doubt that at least the defeat of M. Mun (*sic*) was the result of a manoeuvre of the royalists." Debidour, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 108, makes a similar statement.

⁷¹⁸ In 1889 Piou had obtained, on the second ballot, 7,228 votes against 6,229; but in 1893, when he stood for election as a *rallié*, he obtained only 6,168 votes, as compared with 6,959 for his Republican opponent. It is significant that whereas Piou lost 1,060 votes, his opponent gained only 730; hence it seems probable that several hundred monarchists who had voted for Piou in 1889 simply abstained from voting in 1893. Cf. *Les Parlementaires français*, p. 330, and Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁷¹⁹ Cf. Hosotte, *Troisième République*, Part II, p. 66.

⁷²⁰ These and the foregoing figures can only approximate the truth, since the groups of the Chamber were in such a state of flux that it is impossible to draw hard and fast lines between them. Compare Hosotte, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 66 and Part I, p. 534, *et seq.*; *Année Politique*, 1893, p. 281; Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 293; Levine, *Labor Movement*, p. 111; Orth, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe*, p. 81, gives the number of socialists as 40. Jacques, *Les Partis politiques*, p. 270, mentions 55 "*radicaux socialistes*."

⁷²¹ Levine, *op. cit.*, p. 111; but the *Journal des Débats*, May 20, 1902, quotes a Socialist calculation that the number of Socialist votes in 1893 was 440,000. Obviously the discrepancy arises from the difficulty of distinguishing between Socialists and Socialist-Radicals.

⁷²² Jaurès, speech in the Chamber of Deputies, Nov. 21, 1893, *Chambre des députés, sess. extr. 1893, Débats*, p. 79, *et seq.*

⁷²³ *Chambre des députés, 1893, sess. extr., Débats*, p. 79, *et seq.*

⁷²⁴ Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 537, *et seq.*; E. Zévort, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, vol. iv., pp. 252-254.

⁷²⁵ *Dictionnaire des parlementaires*, vol. i, p. 600; E. A. Vizetelly, *Republican France, 1870-1912* (London, 1912), pp. 404-411; *Année politique*, 1893, pp. 316-324.

⁷²⁶ *Année politique*, 1893, p. 319, *et seq.*

⁷²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 326, *et seq.*

⁷²⁸ These bills modified (1) the press law, (2) the provision of the penal code regarding associations and malefactors, (3) the law on explosives; the fourth bill appropriated 800,000 fr. for an increase of the police force. *Année politique*, 1893, p. 329, *et seq.*

⁷²⁹ *Chambre des députés, 1894, Débats*, p. 388.

⁷³⁰ Spuller, *L'Évolution politique et sociale de l'église* (Paris, 1893), especially pp. v, 325-331.

⁷³¹ Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 543.

⁷³² *Ibid.*, p. 541.

⁷³³ *Chambre des députés, 1894, Débats*, p. 659, *et seq.*

⁷³⁴ *Année politique*, 1893, p. 262.

⁷³⁵ *Ch. des dép. 1894, Débats*, p. 856.

⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 865.

⁷³⁷ Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 544; Zévort, *Hist. de la Troisième République*, vol. iv, pp. 286-289.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁹ *Chambre des députés*, 1895, sess. extr. *Débats*, p. 2267, Nov. 4, 1895.

⁷⁴⁰ *Année politique*, 1895, pp. 177-178, 185-186; *idem.*, 1896, pp. 25-36, 103-112, 139-141, 380; *Annual Register*, 1895, p. 242, and 1896, pp. 228-229; Hosotte, *op. cit.*, pp. 559-565.

⁷⁴¹ *Questions actuelles*, vol. xl, p. 341.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 342.

⁷⁴³ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 563.

⁷⁴⁴ *Annual Register*, 1896, p. 237.

⁷⁴⁵ *Chambre des députés*, 1896, *Débats*, pp. 925, 933, 948, 1020, 1038, 1052, 1076.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 944.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 965, *et seq.*

⁷⁴⁸ Cf., R. C. K. Ensor, *Modern Socialism*, p. 48, *et seq.*; *Questions actuelles*, vol. xxxiv, pp. 98-108; *Année politique*, 1896, pp. 208-211; Jean Jaurès (ed.), *Histoire socialiste*, vol. xii, p. 284.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁰ Weill, *Hist. du mouv. soc.*, p. 311, quoting Bracke, *Leur congrès à la salle Wagram* (1901).

⁷⁵¹ *Le Catholicisme social* (3 vols., Paris, 1892-1899), especially vol. iii, ch. v. Citations are from vol. iii, p. 179, and vol. ii, p. 271.

⁷⁵² *Vers un ordre social chrétien* (2nd ed.), p. 347.

⁷⁵³ *Chambre des députés*, 1894, *Débats*, pp. 669-670.

⁷⁵⁴ Vizetelly, *Republican France*, pp. 348-371; Hosotte, *Troisième République*, pp. 523-532.

⁷⁵⁵ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

⁷⁵⁶ Joseph Reinach, *Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus* (7 vols., Paris, 1901-1911); Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 582, *et seq.*

⁷⁵⁷ On the attitude of the Socialists, read Labusquière, *Troisième République*, p. 266, *et seq.*, a Socialist's view, and compare Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-315. The foregoing account of the Dreyfus affair is based on J. Reinach, *op. cit.*, and Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 582, *et seq.*

⁷⁵⁸ Dec. 4, 1897. *Ch. des députés*, 1897, *Débats*, p. 2734.

⁷⁵⁹ *Ch. d. d.*, 1898, *Débats*, p. 1225.

⁷⁶⁰ *Questions actuelles*, vol. 40, pp. 340-341, quoting Méline's speech at Remiremont, Oct. 10, 1897.

⁷⁶¹ Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, pp. 84-88, 566, *et seq.*; compare with the statements of M. Dron in the *Chambre des députés*, 1898, *Débats*, p. 1207.

⁷⁶² *Infra*, pp. 347-352.

⁷⁶³ *Supra*, p. 169.

⁷⁶⁴ *Supra*, p. 188.

⁷⁶⁵ *Infra*, pp. 365-374.

⁷⁶⁶ Dabry, *op. cit.*, pp. 568-574.

⁷⁶⁷ Those *ralliés* who had been thoroughly absorbed into the Republican Progressist group are not counted. The 31 are those who still hesitated, unwilling wholly to identify themselves with either the Conservative Right or the Progressists.

⁷⁶⁸ The *Association catholique*, the Social Catholic organ, remarked, "The scheme of calling itself Progressist has served as a substitute, with the Moderate Party, for a program of social reforms," first volume for 1898, p. 553, *et seq.*

⁷⁶⁹ *Année politique*, 1898, p. 213, *et seq.*

⁷⁷⁰ Official figures given by *Année politique*, 1898, p. 217. Needless to say, different authorities give different figures. Hosotte, *op. cit.*, p. 586, gives 55. *Journal des Débats*, May 20, 1902, gives 43, and estimates the number of Socialist votes at 751,554.

⁷⁷¹ *Annuaire du parlement*, 1898, and Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains*, p. 576.

⁷⁷² *Annuaire du parlement*, 1898.

⁷⁷³ For example at Gourdon, in the department of Lot, the *rallié* Abbé Magne on the first ballot received 5700 votes while the Progressist Lachière received 5600 and the Radical Cocula 8000. Had the *rallié* insisted upon his right to fight out the second ballot against the Radical, enough of the Progressists would probably have voted for the Radical to give the latter the victory. Shrewdly, therefore, the *rallié* withdrew in favor of the Progressist and the Progressist was elected by clerical votes.

⁷⁷⁴ Dabry, *op. cit.*, p. 578, *et seq.*

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 579. Zévaès it was who in 1901 proposed to suppress the religious congregations (monastic orders) altogether,—Hosotte, *op. cit.*, p. 635.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 579.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 580.

⁷⁷⁸ *Année politique*, 1898, pp. 231-245.

⁷⁷⁹ *Année politique*, 1898, pp. 335-343.

⁷⁸⁰ *Idem.*, 1899, pp. 203-218.

⁷⁸¹ *Journal officiel*, June 23, 1899, pp. 4189-4190.

⁷⁸² The author has purposely avoided encumbering his narrative with a discussion of the interesting debates at the French Socialist congress of December, 1899, at the international Socialist congress of September, 1900, at the French Socialist congress of the same month, at the Wagram Hall Congress of May, 1901, and elsewhere, on the question whether an orthodox Socialist might be permitted to enter a bourgeois cabinet. Interesting brief accounts of the controversy will be found in Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-343; Orth, *Socialism and Democracy in Europe*, pp. 84-93. For full details, of course, the "Proceedings" of the congresses should be consulted.

⁷⁸³ Labusquière, *Troisième République* (vol. xii of the *Histoire socialiste*), p. 296.

⁷⁸⁴ An interesting discussion of Millerand's work as minister is found in A. Lavy, *L'Œuvre de Millerand* (Paris, 1902).

⁷⁸⁵ Lavy, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16. Decrees of Aug. 10, 1899.

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-77. Decree of Sept. 1, 1899.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-90. Decrees of Sept. 17, 1900, and Jan. 2, 1901.

⁷⁸⁸ *Journal officiel*, 1900, p. 2025; Fighiéra, *La Protection légale des travailleurs*, p. 335, *et seq.*; Lavy, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-57.

⁷⁸⁹ *Chambre des députés*, 1900, *Documents*, pp. 721-740; *idem*, 1901, *Débats*, pp. 1242-1754; *Année politique*, 1901, pp. 215-223, 232-233.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ch. d. députés*, 1901, *Débats*, pp. 1760-1762, 2165-2179; *Sénat*, 1902, *Doc.*, pp. 187-189; *Annuaire du parlement*, 1903-1904, p. 88; *Année pol.*, 1901, pp. 211-213, 306-309.

⁷⁹¹ *Ch. d. députés*, 1901, *Débats*, p. 2652; *Sénat*, 1902, *Débats*, pp. 658-664; *Journal officiel*, March 30, 1902, p. 2274; *Année pol.*, 1901, pp. 91-94, 325; *idem.*, 1902, pp. 79-80.

⁷⁹² Reinach, *Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus*, vol. iii, p. 587, vol. iv, pp. 296-310, 330-332, 416, 425-428, 571-580.

⁷⁹³ See his book, *Vers un ordre social chrétien*, *passim*.

⁷⁹⁴ Reinach, *op. cit.*, vol. v, ch. iv, v.

⁷⁹⁵ Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 616; Wright, *Third French Republic*, p. 140, *et seq.*; Reinach, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 615, vol. v, pp. 74, 113, 183-184, 257, 261, 311, 422-426, vol. vi, pp. 30, 32, 59, 61, 64-65.

⁷⁹⁶ Reinach, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 182-184, 251-263, 308, 311, vol. vi, pp. 63-65; Hosotte, *op. cit.*, p. 616. Hosotte asserts that Déroulède was absolutely innocent of monarchical conspiracy, whereas Reinach holds the contrary view.

⁷⁹⁷ Hosotte, *op. cit.*, pp. 616-617.

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁹ Text of bill as presented, *Ch. d. députés*, 1899, *sess. extr.*, *Documents*, pp. 123-125; text of law, *Journal officiel*, July 2, 1901, pp. 4025-4027; cf. Waldeck-Rousseau, *Associations et congrégations* (Paris, 1902).

⁸⁰⁰ Text of bill, *Chambre des députés*, 1899, *sess. extr.*, *Doc.*, p. 132; report of committee, *idem*, 1900, *Doc.*, p. 626.

⁸⁰¹ Count Albert de Mun, preface to Jacques Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales* (Paris, 1910), p. ix.

⁸⁰² Let it be remarked once and for all that the author has deemed it wiser to give an intelligent equivalent rather than a meaningless literal translation of the names of the group and the party.

⁸⁰³ Léon Jacques, *Les Partis politiques sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1913), p. 320.

⁸⁰⁴ *Année politique*, 1899, *passim*; Waldeck-Rousseau, *Pour la République* (Paris, 1904), pp. 391-404, 418-426.

⁸⁰⁵ Piou, Amédée Reille, and de Mun. See *Association catholique*, 1905, first part, p. 122, *et seq.*, article by de Montenon.

⁸⁰⁶ Eugène Flornoy, *La Lutte par l'association: L'Action libérale populaire* (Paris, 1907), p. 40, *et seq.*

⁸⁰⁷ Joseph Zamanski, "La politique sociale," in *Association catholique*, May, 1910, p. 485, *et seq.*

⁸⁰⁸ *Annuaire du parlement*, 1898, 1899, 1900, 1901.

⁸⁰⁹ *Annuaire du parlement*, 1901. They were: Alicot, Aymé, Blanc, Chambrun, Colle, Dansette, Fould, Galot, Gay, Gourd, Guibert, Loyer,

Motte, Pascal, Rogez, Saint-Quentin, Salignac-Fénelon, and Viellard.
⁸¹⁰ *Annuaire du parlement*, 1901. They were: F. Bougère, L. Bougère, B. de Castellane, Dansette, Daudé, Delpech-Cantaloup, Desjardins, Dupuytrem, Elva, L'Estourbeillon, Galot, Gay, Gayraud, Jacquy, Jaluzot, La Ferronnays, Laroche-Joubert, Lerolle, Pascal, Paulmier, Roy de Loulay, Savary de Beauregard.

⁸¹¹ Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 37, et seq. Piou's speech is given in extenso in *Questions actuelles*, vol. 59, p. 323, et seq.

⁸¹² Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, pp. 38-39.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁸¹⁴ The membership certificates explained the other parts of the name as follows: "Elle [the party, *l'Action Libérale Populaire*] s'appelle *Action* parce qu'elle doit être un centre de vie et d'activité. Elle s'appelle *Libérale* parce qu'elle veut maintenir ou restaurer dans leur intégrité toutes les libertés publiques, sans en refuser le bénéfice à personne."

⁸¹⁵ A reprint of the constitution (*Statuts*) may be found in Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 168, et seq., or in Jacques, *Partis politiques*, p. 501, et seq.

⁸¹⁶ Art. 6, *Statuts* of the *Action Libérale Populaire*.

⁸¹⁷ The Central Committee was invested with power to pronounce—by a two-thirds vote—the exclusion of one of its own members or—by a simple majority—of any member of the Association, for an infraction of honor or a contravention of the constitution, "or for an act contrary to the aim and the spirit of the Association," — *Statuts*, Art. 6.

⁸¹⁸ *Statuts*, Art. 4.

⁸¹⁹ *Association catholique*, 1905, first part, p. 122, et seq.

⁸²⁰ *Congrès de 1911. Compte rendu*, p. 57.

⁸²¹ Jacques, *Partis politiques*, pp. 306, 309.

⁸²² *Statuts*, Art. 5.

⁸²³ Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 53, et seq.

⁸²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57, et seq.

⁸²⁵ See de Mun's definition of the bond between the *Jeunesse Catholique* and the party, in Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 148.

⁸²⁶ Flornoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 150.

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 152.

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁸²⁹ For full accounts of the proceedings, see the *Compte-rendus* published by the A. L. P., 7, rue Las-Cases, Paris.

⁸³⁰ *Compte-rendu du congrès général tenu à Paris . . . 1904*, pp. 4, 105, et seq., 127, et seq.

⁸³¹ See comment in Flornoy, *op. cit.*, p. 76, et seq. Since Flornoy's book was written, the party bulletin has been made a fortnightly.

⁸³² At present (1920), MM. Jean Lerolle, Henri Bazire, and Joseph Denais, all members of the Popular Liberal Party, are among the principal members of the editorial staff of *La Libre Parole*, an important Parisian daily.

⁸³³ Levine, *Labor Movement in France*, *passim*.

⁸³⁴ *Supra*.

⁸³⁵ *i. e.*, legally recognized unions.

⁸³⁶ Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 99, *et seq.*

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100, *et seq.*, 107, *et seq.*

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105, *et seq.* An interesting list of the social-economic institutions maintained by the party is given by the same author, p. 201, *et seq.*

⁸³⁹ Léon Jacques, *Partis politiques*, pp. 343-344. Compare the more sympathetic account of the party's employment bureaus in Flornoy, *op. cit.*, p. 96, *et seq.*

⁸⁴⁰ *Brochure No. 110* of the Action Populaire; *Guide social* of the Action Populaire, 1905 and 1906; Flornoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-53, 170-177; *Répertoire des archives législatives parlementaires et sociales* (published by the P. L. Party, Paris, 1904, 372 pages).

⁸⁴¹ The speech may be conveniently consulted in *Questions actuelles*, vol. lix, p. 323, *et seq.*

⁸⁴² A literal translation of Piou's phrase, "*sur le terrain constitutionnel*" might be misleading. He meant to express not a desire to preserve the constitution against change in the manner of certain American constitutionalists, constitutionally opposed to innovation, but, rather, a determination to refrain from any attempt to overthrow the Republic. "On a basis of acquiescence in the Republic" would perhaps be the best translation.

⁸⁴³ An obvious reference to the *Volksverein*, that great league of German Catholics, for the purposes of benevolent, social, and religious action, primarily, rather than for political aims. The *Volksverein* in 1913 had 776,090 members, including 26,786 women. See *Année sociale internationale*, 4me année, p. 51.

⁸⁴⁴ Speech delivered by Jacques Piou at Lille, November 17, 1901, on the occasion of the annual congress of the Catholics of the departments of the North and Pas-de-Calais,—Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, p. 94, *et seq.*

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁶ *Questions actuelles*, vol. lxii, p. 169, *et seq.*

⁸⁴⁷ The foregoing is a fragmentary résumé of de Mun's speech in the *Salle des agriculteurs de France*, March 15, 1902, printed in *Questions actuelles*, vol. lxiii, p. 2, *et seq.*

⁸⁴⁸ Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 640.

⁸⁴⁹ *Correspondant*, vol. 207, p. 600.

⁸⁵⁰ The most interesting of these Liberal defeats was that which occurred in the second district of Albi (department of Tarn), where the Socialist, Jaurès, defeated the Liberal, Marquis de Solages, by 6494 votes to 6154. Since the latter had received 6,702 votes in 1898, more than two hundred of his former followers must have deserted him. Were these two hundred deserters intransigent Monarchists, or were they bourgeois Republicans who from observation of the Socialists' attitude toward the Waldeck-Rousseau Government had concluded, with the premier, that the "Socialist menace" was, after all, not very menacing, so long as the Socialists could be induced to spend most

of their energy passing laws against the Catholic Church? Or were they workmen who had been converted to Socialism?

⁸⁵¹ I have obtained this figure by count of the names; a slightly smaller figure is sometimes given, as in Jacques, *Partis politiques*, p. 437. The discrepancy is explained by the fact that a few members, affiliated with the Liberal Group in 1902, drifted away a year or two later. Compare *Annuaire du parlement*, 1901, 1902, 1903-4, 1905.

⁸⁵² Figures from Hosotte, *Troisième République*, p. 640; compare the same work, *Deuxième Partie*, p. 66 and Jacques *Partis politiques*, pp. 336, 437, 438. Needless to remark, the figures are so uncertain that even Jacques cannot remain self-consistent; for example, he gives the number of members of the *Action Libérale* as 75 on p. 437 and as 79 on p. 336.

⁸⁵³ *Correspondant*, vol. 207, p. 601, issue of May 10, 1902.

⁸⁵⁴ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du congrès général tenu à Paris, les 15, 16, 17 et 18 décembre 1904* (Paris, 1905).

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-151.

⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 126.

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 217, 225.

⁸⁵⁸ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 2^e congrès général, tenu à Paris, les 14, 15, 16 et 17 décembre, 1905* (Paris, 1906), pp. 129-130.

⁸⁵⁹ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, tenu à Lyon, les 22, 23, 24, 25 novembre 1906* (Paris, 1907), pp. 37-38, 55-56, 68-69, 80. The question of decentralization was further studied at the convention of 1907, cf. *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 4^e congrès général tenu à Bordeaux, les 7, 8, 9 et 10 novembre 1907* (Paris, 1908), p. 79.

⁸⁶⁰ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 5^e congrès général, tenu à Paris, les 3, 4, 5, et 6 décembre, 1908* (Paris, 1909), p. 20.

⁸⁶¹ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 6^e congrès général, tenu à Paris, les 2, 3, 4 et 5 décembre 1909* (Paris, 1910), pp. 33-35, 43, 51.

⁸⁶² *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 7^e congrès général, tenu à Paris, les 8, 9, 10 et 11 juin 1911* (Paris, 1911), pp. 39, 43-44, 45, 56.

⁸⁶³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 72, 101.

⁸⁶⁴ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, pp. 63-64, 70.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-80.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-172. The following quotations are from this same speech, which was delivered at the convention of Social Workers at Pau, October 13, 1903.

⁸⁶⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 218.

⁸⁶⁹ Piou, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁷⁰ Flornoy, *L'Action libérale populaire*, p. 65.

⁸⁷¹ From a letter written by Jacques Piou to the editor of the *Croix*, describing the character of the Popular Liberal Party, published in the

Croix of October 18, 1906, and reproduced in Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, p. 16, *et seq.*

⁸⁷² Since 1891 the magazine no longer served as the organ of the Clubs, but de Mun continued to write articles for it, and its editors were in close sympathy with the leading spirits in the Clubs.

⁸⁷³ *Association catholique*, 1898, first part, p. 553, *et seq.*

⁸⁷⁴ *Association catholique*, 1899, first part, pp. 51-53.

⁸⁷⁵ *Association catholique*, 1899, first part, p. 1.

⁸⁷⁶ *Association catholique*, 1899, first part, p. 1, *et seq.*

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁸ *Association catholique*, 1905, first part, p. 131, *et seq.*

⁸⁷⁹ *Association catholique*, 1910, first part, p. 485, *et seq.*

⁸⁸⁰ For a good expression of this view, see article on "*Le Rôle social de l'église*," by Count Albert de Mun, in *Association catholique*, 1909, December, p. 1319, *et seq.* He asserts that the Church never accepted the rôle of a "sort of religious gendarmerie but rather was from the beginning the champion of the downtrodden, coming forth from the catacombs, defending the enchained slaves against pitiless masters, the oppressed against the oppressors"; in the Middle Ages it had enforced Sunday rest, curbed usury and profiteering, safeguarded the dignity of labor, protected women and children from industrial exploitation, limited hours of labor, dispensed charity, and through quasi-religious fraternities cared for the aged and the infirm. The Reformation, the Renaissance, and the resultant Caesaristic state had withered the beneficent influence of Christianity, but even so, de Mun believed that still "the Church alone is independent enough, disinterested enough, to love the people sincerely and without ulterior motive."

⁸⁸¹ Proposition de loi sur l'organisation professionnelle, presented by MM. Léonce de Castelnau, Piou, Ollivier, de Mun, and Lerolle. *Chambre des députés*, 1906, *Documents*, p. 768.

⁸⁸² *Comptes-rendus* of the A. L. P. conventions, *passim*.

⁸⁸³ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, p. 245, *et seq.*

⁸⁸⁴ *Revue des deux mondes*, June 15, 1897, pp. 801-806.

⁸⁸⁵ Resolution of the Party Convention of 1904, *Action libérale populaire*, *Compte-rendu du congrès général tenu à Paris, les 15, 16, 17 et 18 décembre, 1904*, p. 225; *cf.* also pp. 217-225.

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-193. Numerous examples are cited.

⁸⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁸⁸⁸ *Action libérale populaire*, *Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, tenu à Lyon, les 22, 23, 24, et 25 novembre, 1906*, pp. 37-38, 56.

⁸⁸⁹ A resolution favoring proportional representation with the *scrutin de liste* was passed by the party convention in 1904, see the *Compte-rendu*, p. 217. The system of voting by list, with whole departments as constituencies, had been employed in the election of the National Assembly of 1871, it will be remembered, but a system of uninominal voting, with single-member constituencies, *i. e.*, the *scrutin d'arrondissement*,—had been introduced in 1876; after a reversion to the *scrutin de liste* in 1885, the *scrutin d'arrondissement* was reintroduced in 1889.

⁸⁹⁰ *Chambre des députés, 1900, Session extraordinaire, Documents*, p. 304.

⁸⁹¹ See Dansette's Bill, *Chambre des députés, 1903, Documents*, p. 837; Massabuau's Bill, *Chambre des députés, 1906, Documents*, p. 587; Massabuau's Bill, *Chambre des députés, 1910, x^e législature, Documents*, p. 494.

⁸⁹² *Chambre des députés, 1909, Débats*, p. 2330.

⁸⁹³ *Chambre des députés, 1912, Débats*, p. 2192, et seq.

⁸⁹⁴ *Annuaire du parlement, 1909*, p. 230.

⁸⁹⁵ *Chambre des députés, 1911, Débats*, p. 2198.

⁸⁹⁶ *Chambre des députés, 1912, Débats*, p. 2221.

⁸⁹⁷ *Chambre des députés, 1914, Débats*, pp. 377-387.

⁸⁹⁸ Electoral Reform Act of July 12, 1919. Text in *Revue politique et parlementaire*, August, 1919, p. 205. Cf. Georges Lachapelle, *Les Elections législatives du 16 novembre 1919* (Paris, 1920).

⁸⁹⁹ A. L. P., *Compte-rendu du 6^e congrès général*, p. 44; *Association catholique, 1910*, part i, pp. 88-89.

⁹⁰⁰ *Chambre des députés, 1906, Documents*, p. 768, et seq.

⁹⁰² A. Esmein, *Eléments de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 6th ed., 1914), pp. 252-260; L. Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 1911), *passim*; A. L. Lowell, *The Governments of France, Italy, and Germany* (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 2-118; E. M. Sait, *Government and Politics of France* (Yonkers, 1920).

⁹⁰³ Léon Duguit and Henry Monnier, *Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (Paris, 1898), pp. 1-4, 36-38, 66-69, 78-80, 127-129, 183-185, 196-197, 213-214, 233-236, 274. Cf. L. Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 1911), vol. ii, pp. 5-16.

⁹⁰⁴ Quoted from a report by M. Souriac, at the convention of 1906. *Vide, Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, tenu à Lyon, les 22, 23, 24, et 25 novembre, 1906*, p. 42.

⁹⁰⁵ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, . . . 1906*, p. 55. Resolution adopted by unanimous vote of the party convention.

⁹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁹⁰⁷ These details are contained in M. Souriac's report at the convention of 1906, cf. *Compte-rendu*, pp. 52, 54-55. The resolution voted by the convention was couched in more general terms as follows: "3. That the institution of a court or supreme tribunal, composed of irremovable magistrates absolutely independent in their selection and in the exercise of their functions, should be established as the guardian of the constitution, as protector of the public liberties inscribed therein, and with the right to annul or to declare void any act, whether of the executive or of the legislative power, which infringes upon these liberties."

⁹⁰⁸ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, . . . 1906*, p. 56. Resolution adopted by the convention.

⁹⁰⁹ *Journal officiel*, 1875, pp. 1521, 1545; 5489.

⁹¹⁰ Cf. Esmein, *op. cit.*, pp. 636-854; Duguit, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 416-

514; Lowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-65; F. A. Ogg, *Governments of Europe* (N. Y., 1916), pp. 308-311; Sait, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-67.

⁹¹¹ Esmein, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-259; Sait, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Lowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.

⁹¹² *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général*, . . . 1906, pp. 44-46, 50-52, 56.

⁹¹³ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 6^e congrès général*, . . . 1906, pp. 29-30.

⁹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

⁹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-36.

⁹¹⁶ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 6^e congrès général*, . . . 1909, p. 11.

⁹¹⁷ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 4^e congrès général*, . . . 1907, p. 6.

⁹¹⁸ M. Charles Brun, quoted at the 1907 convention, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁹¹⁹ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général*, 1906, p. 56.

⁹²⁰ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 4^e congrès général*, . . . 1907, p. 64, *et seq.*

⁹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 67-69, 72-73.

⁹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

⁹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁹²⁶ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social* (ed. by Geo. Beau-lavon, Paris, 1914), p. 271.

⁹²⁷ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général*, . . . 1906, p. 56.

⁹²⁸ *L'Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 7^e congrès général*, . . . 1911, pp. 35-39. The same convention also resolved, "That, for the municipal elections of 1912, all the committees (of the party) be invited to include the question of the municipal referendum among those which figure in their programs; that, furthermore, the executive committee send to all the local groups instructions regarding the application of the municipal referendum."

⁹²⁹ *Le Programme social et politique de l'Action libérale populaire* (published by the secretariat of the party, Paris, 1913), p. 4.

⁹³⁰ Speech of Oct. 15, 1905, in Jacques Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, p. 228.

⁹³¹ Eugène Flornoy, *La Lutte par l'association: l'Action libérale populaire* (Paris, 1907), pp. 1-3.

⁹³² *Le Programme social et politique de l'Action libérale populaire*, p. 3, and *Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général* . . . 1906, p. 55.

⁹³³ *Journal officiel*, 1905, p. 7205.

⁹³⁴ Article 4 provided that the associations for public worship should conform "to the general rules of organization of the religion of which they proposed to assure the exercise." In deciding disputes, therefore, under article 8, the council of state would have to decide which association really conformed to "the general rules of organization" of the

religion in question. Owing to the opposition of the Catholics, the government refrained from enforcing the provision regarding associations, and, by a law of Jan. 2, 1907, the clergy was permitted to use the church buildings, without being given legal title. *Journal officiel*, 1907, pp. 34, 997.

⁹³⁵ *Compte-rendu du 6^e congrès général*, p. 55.

⁹³⁶ *Chambre des députés*, 1901, *Débats*, pp. 64-65.

⁹³⁷ *Journal officiel*, 1901, pp. 4025, 4087, 5240.

⁹³⁸ *Chambre des députés*, 1903, *Débats*, pp. 1117, 1137, 1179, 1199, 1219, 1245, 1306, 1359, 2163.

⁹³⁹ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, pp. 39-40.

⁹⁴⁰ Speeches by Piou and Grousseau, Jan. 17 and 21, 1910, in *Chambre des députés*, 1910, *Débats*, pp. 112-122, 248-254.

⁹⁴¹ *Journal officiel*, 1882, p. 1697. One day a week, besides Sunday, was allowed, in which religious instruction might be given, outside the school. Priests were not allowed to give religious instruction in the school building even outside of class hours.

⁹⁴² *Journal officiel*, 1886, p. 4997.

⁹⁴³ Law of July 1, 1901, cf. *Journal officiel*, 1901, p. 4025.

⁹⁴⁴ Law of July 7, 1904, cf. *Journal officiel*, 1904, p. 4129. The schools maintained by religious orders were to be suppressed within a maximum of ten years.

⁹⁴⁵ *Le Programme social et politique de l'Action libérale populaire*, p. 7.

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 32-33; and *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 7^e congrès général . . . 1911*, pp. 17, 24, et seq., 47, et seq., 56.

⁹⁴⁷ Léon Jacques, *Les Partis politiques sous la III^e République* (Paris, 1913), pp. 341-342.

⁹⁴⁸ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général . . . 1906*, p. 118.

⁹⁴⁹ *Idem, Compte-rendu du 4^e congrès général . . . 1907*, p. 114.

⁹⁵⁰ Speech at Pau, Oct. 13, 1903, in Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, p. 171.

⁹⁵¹ Speech at Besançon, Nov. 29, 1903, in A. de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, vol. i, p. 467, et seq.

⁹⁵² *Chambre des députés*, 1905, *Débats*, p. 268.

⁹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-280.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-283.

⁹⁵⁷ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, pp. 48-49.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁹⁶⁰ A. de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, vol. i, pp. 434-435.

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

⁹⁶² The Law of March 30, 1900, limiting the working day to eleven hours for women and children and for men working in the same shops with women or children. The limit of eleven hours was to be reduced

to ten and one-half after two years, and to ten after another two year delay.

⁹⁶³ *Chambre des députés, 1904, Débats, p. 785, et seq., 789, et seq.*

⁹⁶⁴ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général, . . . 1906, pp. 6-7.*

⁹⁶⁵ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales, p. 170.*

⁹⁶⁶ A. de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, vol. ii, pp. 273-274.*

⁹⁶⁷ *Ibid., vol. i, p. 469.*

⁹⁶⁸ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales, pp. 264-265.*

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁰ This decision was taken at the eighth party convention, January, 1914, *Cf. Le Temps, Jan. 31, Feb. 1-3, 1914.*

⁹⁷¹ In a debate on Tunisian affairs, Nov. 9, 1881, de Mun threw the Chamber into an uproar by using the expression, "the difficulty which the republican régime has in sustaining worthily our national honor," — *Cf. Chambre des députés, 1881, Débats, p. 1993, et seq.* In the debate on Franco-German negotiations respecting Morocco, de Mun delivered a patriotic oration which won unusual applause,—*Ch. des d., 1911, Débats, sess. extr., pp. 3970-3973.*

⁹⁷² *Chambre des députés, 1900, Débats, p. 1870.*

⁹⁷³ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du congrès général . . . 1904, p. 15.*

⁹⁷⁴ The author was informed at the Office of the party that among the deputies who served in the army were Lt. Col. Plichon, M. Engerand, Lt. Col. Driant, M. Dutreil, Col. Cochin, M. René Reille, M. de Constans, M. Ybarnegarey, M. Blaisot, M. Tailliandier. Col. Cochin, M. Reille, Lt. Col. Driant, and M. Tailliandier lost their lives.

⁹⁷⁵ The last sentence is from an obituary article by François Veuillot, quoted by A. Saint-Pierre, in his *Le Comte Albert de Mun, p. 53, et seq.* *Cf. L. de Grandmaison, "Le Comte Albert de Mun," in Études, vol. 141, pp. 25-52.*

⁹⁷⁶ *La Presse de Paris, Nov. 17, 1919; Le Temps, Dec. 17, 1919, and Jan. 2, 1920.*

⁹⁷⁷ *Chambre des députés, 1891, Débats, p. 2492.*

⁹⁷⁸ Paris, 1909, vol. ii, pp. 331-332.

⁹⁷⁹ Paris, 1909, pp. 224-225.

⁹⁸⁰ Paris, 1913, p. 339, *et seq.*

⁹⁸¹ *Cf. Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 7^e congrès général . . . 1911, p. 112.*

⁹⁸² *Cf. Ibid., p. 110.*

⁹⁸³ *Ibid., p. 15.*

⁹⁸⁴ Abbé Naudet, *Pourquoi les catholiques ont perdu la bataille* (2nd. ed.), p. 217, *et seq.*

⁹⁸⁵ Pierre Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains, Histoire et souvenirs 1890-1903* (Paris, 1905), p. 696.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid., p. 700.*

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid., p. 699.*

⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid., p. 728.*

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 694.

⁹⁹⁰ Abbé Emmanuel Barbier, *Rome et l'Action libérale populaire, Histoire et documents* (2nd ed., Paris and Poitiers), pp. 246-247.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 238-239.

⁹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219. Inasmuch as one of Abbé Barbier's books, *Le Progrès du libéralisme catholique en France sous le Pape Léon XIII* was placed on the Index by a decree of May 28, 1908, it may be doubted whether he is an authoritative interpreter of the papal policy as regards liberalism. A decree of Jan. 4, 1909, announced that he had praiseworthy submitted to the correction of his views.

⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38. He quotes a letter written by M. Arthur Loth in 1894, claiming that the Republican factions had never obtained even a majority of the electoral body.

⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269. He quotes these figures from a computation made by *L'Action catholique française*.

⁹⁹⁶ L. Hosotte, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, Part II (Paris and Besançon, 1912), pp. 66-67.

⁹⁹⁷ According to a calculation based on official returns of the first ballot.

⁹⁹⁸ *Le Programme social et politique de l'Action libérale populaire* (Paris, 1913), p. 2.

⁹⁹⁹ *Action libérale populaire, Compte-rendu du 5^e congrès général* . . . 1908, p. 20.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *L'Action Libérale Populaire, Bulletin bi-mensuel de l'Association*, July 15, 1919, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰¹ Jacques, *Les Partis politiques*, p. 343.

¹⁰⁰² *Le Temps*, April 9, 1919.

¹⁰⁰³ *L'Action Libérale Populaire, Bulletin bi-mensuel de l'Association*, July 15, 1919, pp. 9-10.

¹⁰⁰⁴ A complete bibliography of these would be almost a volume in itself. Many are cited in the footnotes of this and preceding chapters. For others, consult the bibliographies in the successive issues of *L'Association catholique*, *Le Mouvement social*, and *L'Année sociale*. The Catholic universities are producing in increasing number dissertations on philosophical, legal, and economic aspects of the social problem, and on the lives and works of precursors of the Social Catholic movement.

¹⁰⁰⁵ The most convenient source of information concerning these various institutions is the *Année sociale internationale*. The same work provides useful bibliographies for further research.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Professor Max Turmann, in his *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, makes his whole program rest, logically, upon the Christian view of the dignity of the laborer; in the first place, dignity as an individual, which involves a minimum wage, Sunday holiday, a maximum working day, shop committees or joint boards, and profit-sharing; in the second place, as the head of a family, which function requires a wage sufficient for the family, interdiction of night work, restriction of the employment of women, and protection of small

holdings; in the third place, as member of a profession, which involves proper organization of the trades.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie politique et sociale en France*, p. 248.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Année sociale internationale*, 1913-1914, p. 51.

¹⁰¹⁰ In 1904, for example, the chairman of the central committee of the A. C. J. F. was Jean Lerolle, who is a conspicuous member of the Popular Liberal Party, while the first vice-chairman was Joseph Zamanski, who is one of the most important figures in the *Action populaire*, and joint editor of *Le Mouvement social*.

¹⁰¹¹ The following account of the *Action Populaire* is based upon personal observations and inquiries, upon consultation of the various publications of the organization, and upon the following descriptions of its work: Georges Goyau, "L'Action Populaire de Reims, son histoire, son rôle," in *Le Correspondant*, June 25, 1912, pp. 1058-1077; G. Desbuquois, *L'Action Populaire, son esprit, son travail*, No. 1 of the yellow brochures published by the *Action Populaire*; the *Catalogue général des publications de l'Action Populaire de Reims*, 1916; *Année sociale internationale*, 1913-1914, p. 48, *et seq.*; and Irene Hernaman, *Catholic Social Action in France*, a brochure published by the Catholic Truth Society of London, being an account of a visit to the office at Rheims.

¹⁰¹² *Année sociale internationale*, 1913-1914, p. 51.

¹⁰¹³ Georges Goyau, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰¹⁴ *Guide social 1913-1914*, tenth year, published by the *Action Populaire* at Rheims, 1914, and its Paris agent, Lecoffre.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Guide social*, 1911, preface, p. 3.

¹⁰¹⁶ *Année sociale internationale 1913-14: Bilan des Idées et des Institutions: 4me Année* (Rheims and Paris, 1914), preface, p. vi.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. v.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Manuel social pratique*, published by *Action Populaire* (Rheims, 1910, sixth thousand) part two, ch. ii, section A.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Manuel de droit pratique usuel et rural*, by Jean Hachin (*Action Populaire*, Rheims).

¹⁰²⁰ *The Guide pratique de lois d'assistance* (*Action Populaire*, Rheims) gives an exposition of and commentary on the laws on public assistance of maternity cases, of children, of large families, on accident compensation, old-age pensions and old-age assistance, *etc.*

¹⁰²¹ *Vocabulaire économique et social* (*Action Populaire*, Rheims).

¹⁰²² *L'Almanach illustré de l'Action Populaire*, a 130-page almanac, with a circulation of over 120,000.

¹⁰²³ *Manuel pratique d'action religieuse*.

¹⁰²⁴ *Guide d'Action religieuse* for 1908 and for 1909.

¹⁰²⁵ *Guide de l'école libre*.

¹⁰²⁶ *Le Mouvement social*, Jan., 1909, p. 7.

¹⁰²⁷ Léon de Seilhac, *Les Congrès ouvriers en France*.

¹⁰²⁸ Eugène Duthoit, *Vers l'organisation professionnelle*.

¹⁰²⁹ O. Jean, *Le Syndicalisme: son origine, son organisation, son rôle social*.

¹⁰³⁰ J. Hachin and A. Agasse, *Retraites ouvrières et paysannes: Commentaire pratique de la loi.*

¹⁰³¹ *La Question de l'apprentissage: Études et enquêtes présentées à l'Assemblée générale de l'Œuvre des Cercles catholiques, 1913*, and *L'Élite ouvrière catholique*, a publication of the reports and deliberations of the General Assembly of the Association of Catholic Workmen's Clubs.

¹⁰³² Maurice Rigaux, *Vers les humbles: Drame social des premiers siècles du christianisme.*

¹⁰³³ *Idem, Quand l'âme est droit.*

¹⁰³⁴ Ch. Calippe, *Balzac: ses idées sociales.*

¹⁰³⁵ René Johannet, *L'Évolution du roman social au xix^e siècle.*

¹⁰³⁶ G. Goyau, "L'Action Populaire de Reims: son histoire — son rôle" (in *Le Correspondent*, June 25, 1912, pp. 1058-1077).

¹⁰³⁷ Irene Hernaman, *Catholic Social Action in France* (brochure published by the Catholic Truth Society of London); G. Goyau, "L'Action Populaire de Reims: son histoire — son rôle" (in *Le Correspondant*, June 25, 1912, pp. 1058-1077); *Année sociale internationale 1913-1914*, p. 50.

¹⁰³⁸ Goyau, *loc. cit.*; *Année sociale internationale, 1913-1914*, p. 49.

¹⁰³⁹ The following paragraphs are all based upon the series of articles — of which they are a summary — published by Abbé Desbuquois in *Le Mouvement social*, Aug., 1912, p. 672, *et seq.*; Sept., p. 779, *et seq.*; Oct., p. 865, *et seq.*, under the title "L'Action sociale catholique."

¹⁰⁴⁰ The word syndicalism comes from the French word for a union, and specifically for a trade union, — *syndicat*. But revolutionary propaganda aiming to overthrow political democracy and to make the *syndicats* of the workingmen all-powerful gave revolutionary implications to the word *syndicalisme*. Still, the word is sometimes used to designate labor-unionism, the revolutionary movement being described as *syndicalisme révolutionnaire*.

¹⁰⁴¹ These prophetic words, it should be recalled, were written not in 1919, when the Great War and the Bolshevik uprisings in Russia, Hungary and Germany had made such events all too actual, but in 1912, when the Great Powers were at peace and the social order seemingly secure.

¹⁰⁴² In the *Catalogue général des publications de l'Action Populaire de Reims, 1916*, pp. 4-6, are cited a number of endorsements of the *Action Populaire*. The Pope, the papal secretary of state, six cardinals, and 76 French bishops and archbishops have commended the institution. In 1912, Pius X said to a French bishop, referring to the *Action Populaire*, "*non solum laudo sed approbo.*" Cardinal Merry del Val, papal secretary of state, wrote on July 8, 1909, "Among the social works so useful and so highly recommended for the present age, the Holy Father is not ignorant of the zeal with which the *Action Populaire* . . . pursues its noble aim. But what especially pleases the Sovereign Pontiff is to observe by what principles the *Action Populaire* is inspired. Its frankly Catholic spirit, superior to all party struggles,

its entire fidelity to the teachings of the Church, from which it professes to receive all its strength and its direction, finally, its generous aim of working for the true welfare of the working class, which is so worthy of interest, are pledges that it will produce precious and enduring fruits. . . ." In 1911, also, Cardinal Merry del Val sent a telegram to the congress of the *Action Populaire* at Paris, expressing the pope's "paternal encouragements." Cardinal Luçon, archbishop of Rheims, wrote in 1911, "For five years as I have watched you at work in my episcopal city and in my diocese, I have admired your intelligence in social work and Catholic work, your fruitful activity, the zeal with which you apply yourselves to promoting devotion among the popular classes, and with which you strive toward the aims defined by the Church and toward the solution of the Social Question. All the world feels the necessity of social action, but many do not know how to undertake it: they have not been trained for it, they have not had experience in it. The orthodoxy of your principles, your Catholic spirit, your scrupulous attention to conformity with the directions of the Holy See, as well as the talent and science of your collaborators, make the *Action Populaire*, in my opinion, a trustworthy school of social studies, and make its publications, the classics, so to speak, of Catholic work. . . ."

¹⁰⁴³ This section is based upon the *Comptes rendus* of the *Semaines sociales* of Orléans (1905), Dijon (1906), Amiens (1907), Marseilles (1908), Bordeaux (1909), Rouen (1910), Saint-Etienne (1911), Limoges (1912), and Versailles (1913), and the following articles: M. Rigaux, *La Semaine sociale de Rouen* (No. 134 of the *Action Populaire's* yellow brochure series); H. J. Leroy, "La Semaine sociale de Limoges" (in *Le Mouvement social*, vol. 74, pp. 821-824); Albert Chapon, "La Semaine Sociale" (in *Le Monde économique*, Aug. 9, 1913); Hubert Lagardelle, "Les Catholiques sociaux" (in *Le Mouvement socialiste*, vol. 32, pp. 199-201); Georges Blondel, "Les Semaines sociales" (in *Le Monde économique*, June 7, 1913); A. Boissard, "La Semaine sociale de Versailles" (in *Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug. 1913, pp. 522-521); Robert Ulens, "La Semaine sociale de Versailles" (in *Revue social catholique*, vol. 17, pp. 376-377); Étienne Lamy, "À propos des semaines sociales; Socialistes et Catholiques" (in *Le Correspondant*, Aug. 25, 1909, vol. 236, pp. 625-653); Louis Rivière, "La Semaine sociale de Versailles" (in *La Réforme sociale*, vol. 66, pp. 467-476); A. Danset, "De Versailles à Besançon" (in *Le Mouvement social*, July 15, 1914, pp. 34-55); Abbé Ch. Calippe, "La 'Semaine sociale' d'Amiens" (in *Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1907, pp. 632-644); A. Albaret, "La Semaine sociale de Saint-Etienne" (in *Revue sociale catholique*, vol. 16, pp. 1-20); Max Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social* (Paris, 1909), pp. 328-329; and Count Albert de Mun's letters to the *Semaines sociales* (*Le Mouvement social*, vol. 74, pp. 859-860, vol. 76, p. 90).

¹⁰⁴⁴ See, for example, Hubert Lagardelle's significant comment in *Le Mouvement socialiste*, vol. 32, pp. 199-201.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Le Correspondant*, Aug. 25, 1909, vol. 236, pp. 625-653.

¹⁰⁴⁶ A. Boissard, "La Semaine sociale de Versailles" (*Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1913, pp. 522-531).

¹⁰⁴⁷ Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, pp. 328-341; *Année sociale internationale 1913-1914*, pp. 55-56; Blondel, in *Le Monde économique*, June 7, 1913; Boissard, in *La Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1913, pp. 522-531; Ulens, in *La Revue sociale catholique*, vol. 17, pp. 376-377.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 394; Blondel, in *Le Monde économique*, June 7, 1913; Turmann, *op. cit.*, p. 329; Calippe, in *La Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1907, pp. 632-644; Albaret, in *La Revue sociale catholique*, vol. 16, pp. 1-20.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Quoted by Lamy, in *Le Correspondant*, vol. 236, p. 631.

¹⁰⁵⁰ The *Comptes-rendus* of the *Semaines sociales* give the number of registered attendants, in addition to whom there are always a large number who attend the lectures without formally registering. Cf. Boissard in *La Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1913; Danset, in *Le Mouvement social*, July 15, 1914; Rivière, in *La Réforme sociale*, vol. 66, pp. 467-476.

¹⁰⁵¹ Calippe, in *La Revue hebdomadaire*, Aug., 1907, pp. 632-644.

¹⁰⁵² Étienne Lamy, "À propos des Semaines sociales; Socialistes et Catholiques" (*Correspondant*, Aug. 25, 1909, vol. 236, pp. 625-653).

¹⁰⁵³ Article by Eugène Rostand on "The Young Social Catholics and the 'Semaine sociale' of Bordeaux," originally published in the *Journal des Débats*, reprinted in *La Réforme sociale*, 1909, vol. 58, pp. 606-612. It should be noted that *La Réforme sociale* is hostile only to the extremist tendencies exhibited in the *Semaine sociale*, not to the *Semaines* themselves. In fact, the school of which this review serves as organ is obviously friendly to the *Semaines*. Cf. André Roche on "Semaine sociale d'Orléans," in *Réforme sociale*, 1905, vol. 50, pp. 585-588, and Louis Rivière on "La Semaine sociale de Versailles," in *Réforme sociale*, 1913, vol. 66, p. 467, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁵⁴ Fr. Veuillot, *Action social des jeunes: Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* (Yellow Brochure No. 29 of the *Action populaire* series), pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, 10, 31; *Annuaire de l'Action Libérale Populaire 1904-1905*, p. 324.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Idem*, pp. 9-12, 17-21, 31-32; *Annuaire de l'A. L. P.*, p. 323.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Article by Alexandre Souriac on the social ideas of the A. C. J. F., in a symposium on "The Social Ideas of the Contemporary Youth," in *La Réforme sociale*, 1913, vol. 65, pp. 513-541.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Count Albert de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, vol. i, p. 408.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Cf. for example his letter to the convention of 1903, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-438, and his speech on "The Social Duty of the Catholic Young Men's Association" at a convention at Besançon, *ibid.*, 439-475.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Cf. Souriac's article on "Les Idées sociales de la Jeunesse contemporaine" (*La Réforme sociale*, 1913, pp. 513-541); G. Piot, *op. cit.*; *L'Action sociale dans l'A. C. J. F.*; Zamanski's report to the Bordeaux

convention of 1907 (*Association catholique*, vol. 63, p. 189, et seq.).

¹⁰⁶¹ Fr. Veuillot, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶² *Semaine sociale* of Saint-Etienne, *Compte-rendu*, p. 267, et seq., 222, et seq.; of Limoges, *Compte-rendu*, p. 137, et seq.; of Versailles, *Compte-rendu*, p. 291, et seq.

¹⁰⁶³ *Semaine sociale* of Rouen, *Compte-rendu*, p. 245, et seq.; of Saint-Etienne, *Compte-rendu*, p. 515, et seq.; of Limoges, *Compte-rendu*, p. 129, et seq.; of Versailles, *Compte-rendu*, p. 423, et seq.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Cf. *Action libérale populaire*, *Compte-rendu du congrès général* . . . 1904, p. 148; *Compte-rendu du 2^e congrès général* . . . 1905, p. 126; *Compte-rendu du 5^e congrès général* . . . 1908, p. 49.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Cf. *Action libérale populaire*, *Compte-rendu du 3^e congrès général* . . . 1906, pp. 40, 54; *Compte-rendu du 4^e congrès général* . . . 1907, p. 64.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Count Albert de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, vol. i, p. 438 (letter to the convention of the A. C. J. F. at Chalon-sur-Saône, May 9, 1903).

¹⁰⁶⁷ Piou, *Questions religieuses et sociales*, pp. 135-145; cf. *Annuaire de l'Action libérale populaire* . . . 1904-1905, pp. 54-62, and Fr. Veuillot, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Cf. *supra*, pp. 58-62.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 140-156.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *La Réforme sociale*, 1914, vol. 67, p. 1, et seq.

¹⁰⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷² *La Réforme Sociale: Bulletin de la Société d'Économie Sociale et des Unions de la Paix Sociale fondées par P.—F. Le Play*, published twice monthly, at Paris. The editorial committee, in 1914, comprised Paul Nourrisson, F. Lepelletier, Louis Rivière, Herbert-Valle-roux, Maurice Defourmantelle, F. Charpin (secretary).

¹⁰⁷³ The article here summarized is part of a symposium on "The Social Ideas of the Contemporary Youth," in *La Réforme sociale*, 1913, vol. 65, pp. 513-541.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *La Réforme Sociale*, 1905, vol. 49, pp. 326-327, article by A. D. (presumably Alexis Delaire, secretary-general of the Society of Social Economy) on "Le Programme de la Paix Sociale et les élections prochaines."

¹⁰⁷⁵ Cf. for example, *La Réforme sociale*, 1909, vol. 57, p. 676, reviewing the *Manuel social pratique* published by the A. P. Among the pamphlets published by the A. P. and written by conspicuous members of the "Social Reform" group, may be mentioned: No. 13 (Etienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *La Mutualité*), No. 257 (*idem*, *Une crise économique: La Vie chère*), No. 51 (A. Delaire, *Le Play et son École*), No. 101 (G. Blondel, *La Situation économique et sociale des États-Unis*), No. 164 (*idem*, *Les Transformations de l'Allemagne contemporaine*), No. 28 (Pierre du Maroussem, *Qu'est-ce que la Question ouvrière*), No. 49 (*idem*, *Qu'est-ce que la Question sociale*), No. 152 (M. Dufourmantelle, *Le crédit populaire*).

¹⁰⁷⁶ Cf. *supra*, pp. 345-346.

¹⁰⁷⁷ *La Réforme sociale*, 1910, vol. 59, p. 598.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Idem*, 1909, vol. 57, pp. 296-308.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *La Réforme sociale*, 1900, vol. 40, pp. 641-659.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Charles Maurras and Lucien Moreau, on "L'Action Française," an article in *Le Correspondant*, June 10, 1908, pp. 959-981; Léon Jacques, *Les Partis politiques sous la III^e République*, p. 176; R. L. Buell, *Contemporary French Politics* (N. Y., 1920), pp. 8-18.

¹⁰⁸¹ Maurras and Moreau, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸³ Jacques, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Étienne Lamy, "L'Action Française et le Correspondant," in *Le Correspondant*, Dec. 10, 1907, pp. 984-1005.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Quoted by Jacques, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Cf. Guy-Grand's interesting discussion of the possibility of alliance between the *Action Française* and the C. G. T., in his book, *Le Procès de la Démocratie* (Paris, 1911), pp. 10-11, *et passim*.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Weill, *Histoire du mouvement social en France*, p. 395, *et seq.*; Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie*, p. 222, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁸⁸ Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-399; Éblé, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-225; Barbier, *Progrès du libéralisme*, p. 88, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁸⁹ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Cf. *supra*, p. 208.

¹⁰⁹¹ Barbier, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Abbé Lemire was secretary-general.

¹⁰⁹² Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social*, p. 193.

¹⁰⁹³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 347-348.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Extracts from Abbé Naudet's speeches, quoted by Barbier, *op. cit.*, p. 46, from *Le Bien du Peuple*, 1892-1894.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Abbé Naudet, *La Démocratie et les Démocrates chrétiens* (Paris, 1900), *passim*, especially p. 76, *et seq.*

¹⁰⁹⁶ Fesch, *Année sociale en France et à l'étranger*, 1898 (Paris, 1899), pp. 75-80.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Abbé Pierre Dabry, *Les Catholiques républicains, Histoire et souvenirs, 1890-1903* (Paris, 1905), especially pp. 694-695.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, and *La Vie catholique*, Nov. 2, 1907.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Naudet, *Pourquoi les catholiques ont perdu la bataille*.

¹¹⁰⁰ Another Christian Democratic priest in the Chamber of Deputies, Abbé Gayraud, joined the Popular Liberal Party. Abbés Gayraud and Lemire may exemplify the two tendencies of the Christian Democrats, the first towards reconciliation with the Social Catholics, the second towards a form of radicalism incompatible with Social Catholicism.

¹¹⁰¹ Abbé Emmanuel Barbier, *Les Démocrates chrétiens et le modernisme: histoire documentaire* (Paris and Nancy, 1908), *passim*.

¹¹⁰² Article reproduced in Barbier, *Les Démocrates chrétiens et le modernisme*, p. 367, *et seq.*

¹¹⁰³ *Acta sanctae sedis*, vol. xli, p. 141.

¹¹⁰⁴ Article by Bazire, in *L'Univers*, Aug. 29, 1907.

¹¹⁰⁵ Marc Sangnier, *L'Histoire et les idées du Sillon*; *idem*, *Le plus grand Sillon*; "Cinq années d'action," in *Le Sillon* for March 10, 1907; Jacques, *Les Partis politiques*, p. 347; Weill, *Histoire du catholicisme libéral*, p. 241; Fesch, *Année sociale*, 1907, pp. 183-196.

¹¹⁰⁶ In addition to the works already cited, see Marc Sangnier, *Le Sillon, esprit et méthodes*; Louis Cousin, *Vie et doctrine du Sillon*; Barbier, *Les Idées du Sillon*; *idem*, *Les Erreurs du Sillon*; *idem*, *La Décadence du Sillon*; Ch. Maurras, *Le Dilemme de Marc Sangnier*.

¹¹⁰⁷ Quoted by Weill, *loc cit.*

¹¹⁰⁸ Works cited above.

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹² Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

¹¹¹³ Barbier, *Progrès du libéralisme catholique*, p. 45.

¹¹¹⁴ R. de Marans, "Un nouvel état d'esprit rétrograde," in *L'Ame latine*, July, 1904, quoted by Éblé, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

¹¹¹⁵ Pius X, letter to the French Archbishops and Bishops, August 25, 1910, in *Rome*, Sept. 3, 1910, pp. 116-120, Sept. 10, pp. 129-132.

¹¹¹⁶ Marc Sangnier, *Discours 1910-1913* (Paris, 1913), *passim*.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 403, *et seq.*, 451, *et seq.*

¹¹¹⁸ Hubert Lagardelle in *Le Devenir social*, 1898, p. 81.

¹¹¹⁹ A convention or congress for the study of social questions. Cf. *supra*, pp. 339-346.

¹¹²⁰ *Le Mouvement socialiste*, Sept.-Oct., 1912, p. 199, *et seq.* Lagardelle in concluding his article finds comfort in the reflection that "Socialism, and I speak of syndicalist Socialism, not of democratic Socialism, has nothing to fear from the Social Catholics. It can only profit by their critique of capitalism and by their exaltation of trade-union organization. Social Catholicism is working for syndicalism."

¹¹²¹ *Le Rappel*, June 5, 1912.

¹¹²² *La Révolution Syndicaliste convoyée par les "Catholiques Socialistes"* (Paris, 1913).

¹¹²³ Defoyère, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93. Italics are as in original.

¹¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100, 107.

¹¹²⁵ Fidaio-Justiniani, "Les Courants d'idées," *Le Mouvement social*, Feb., 1912, pp. 113-126; April, 1912, pp. 317-333.

¹¹²⁶ Max Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social depuis l'encyclique "Rerum Novarum"* (15 mai 1891); *idées directrices et caractères généraux: deuxième édition revue et augmentée d'une étude sur le mouvement social catholique depuis 1900* (Paris, 1909), p. iii of Preface to First Edition.

¹¹²⁷ Joseph Zamanski (joint editor of *Le Mouvement social*), article on "La Politique sociale," in *Le Mouvement social*, 1913, vol. 76, p. 336, *et seq.*

¹¹²⁸ *Moniteur universel*, Feb. 17, 1791, pp. 194-196, and June 15, 1791, p. 688; Office du travail, *Les Associations professionnelles ouvrières* (Paris, 1899), vol. i, pp. 6-19.

¹¹²⁹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 19-24.

¹¹³⁰ Cf. *supra*, pp. 101-105.

¹¹³¹ M. Éblé, *Les Écoles catholiques d'économie politique et sociale en France* (Paris, 1905), ch. v; *Manuel social pratique* (Rheims, 1910), pp. 150-171; *Le Mouvement social*, vol. 77, pp. 372-377.

¹¹³² Proposition de loi sur l'organisation professionnelle, présentée par MM. Léonce de Castelneau, Piou, Ollivier, le comte Albert de Mun,

Lerolle, Chambre des députés, 1906, *Documents*, pp. 768-771. Cf. Éblé, *loc. cit.*; Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers* (Paris, 1897), pp. 620-659.

¹¹³³ The idea of professional or functional representation is suggested but not formally included in the Bill of 1906. Cf. Max Turmann, *Le Développement du catholicisme social* (Paris, 1909), pp. 93, 290-292; La Tour du Pin, *Vers un ordre social chrétien* (2nd ed., Paris), *passim*; articles by Urbain Guérin and Eugène Duthoit in *L'Association catholique*, January, 1891, p. 34, *et seq.*, and July, 1900, pp. 4-21. The article by Duthoit is particularly interesting.

¹¹³⁴ Max Turmann, article in *Le Correspondant*, July 10, 1919, pp. 1-31.

¹¹³⁵ *The Constitution of the German Republic*, translated by W. B. Munro and A. N. Holcombe, published by World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1919.

¹¹³⁶ The literature of Guild Socialism is rapidly becoming voluminous. I have based my brief discussion of the subject upon *The Guildsman* (monthly, edited by G. D. H. and Margaret Cole, London); articles in *The New Age*; G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour* (London, 1920, first published, 1913); *Self-Government in Industry* (London, 1920, first published, 1917); *Labour in the Commonwealth* (London, 1920); *Chaos and Order in Industry* (London, 1920); *Social Theory* (London, 1920); S. G. Hobson, *National Guilds* (London, 1919); *Guild Principles in War and Peace* (second edition, London, 1919); *National Guilds and the State* (London, 1920); A. J. Penty, *Restoration of the Guild System* (London, 1906); *Old Worlds for New* (London, 1917); M. B. Rickett and C. E. Bechhofer, *The Meaning of National Guilds* (London, 1918).

INDEX

- Accidents, workingmen's compensation for, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 163-164, 204, 240.
- Action Française, 175, 361-365, 384.
- Action Libérale Populaire, (Popular Liberal Party), preface, ch. ix, 221, 351-352, 393.
- Action Populaire, 320-339.
- Année Sociale Internationale*, 324-326.
- Antisemitism, 206-211.
- Antoine, Abbé, 343, 344.
- Aquinas, 122, 157, 158, 161.
- Arbitration and conciliation, 109, 163, 164, 240, 243, 245, 253.
- Association Catholique*, 155, 251, 253, 256, 319-321, 328.
- Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française, 347-352.
- Associations Law, 220, 281-282, 283.
- Austria, Social Catholic Movement in, 129-132.
- Avenir*, 17, 25, 32.
- Bagshawe, Mgr. E. G., 136.
- Barbier, Abbé Emmanuel, 303-305.
- Bastiat, 12.
- Baudeau, 10.
- Bazire, 351, 373-374.
- Béchaux, 355.
- Belgium, Social Catholic Movement in, 134-135.
- Bishops' Program, preface.
- Blanc, Louis, 53-54, 55, 96.
- Blanc Saint-Bonnet, 56.
- Bloc, ch. viii, 242, 291.
- Blondel, 343, 355.
- Boissard, 344.
- Bolshevism, 384.
- Bonald, 14, 29.
- Bordas-Demoulin, 57, 58.
- Boulangier affair, 167, 178.
- Bourgeois, J., 57, 58.
- Bourgeois, Léon, 202, 205.
- Brisson, 214.
- Brunetière, 348.
- Brunhes, Jean, 344.
- Buchez, 16.
- Cabet, 55.
- Caillaux, 217.
- Calippe, 343, 344, 369, 374.
- Casimir-Périer, 194-195, 197, 199, 200.
- Chambord, Henri, count of, 70-74, 97-98.
- Charles X, 29.
- Chateaubriand, 14-15, 30.
- Chesnelong, 169, 171, 211.
- Child-labor, 8-9, 19-20, 22, 91-92, 94, 107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 125, 126, 259.
- Christian Democrats, 168, 174-175, 208, 210, 211, 301-302, 365-374, 384.
- Civil service, 273-274.
- Clemenceau, 178, 267.
- Clercq, V. de, 256. ..
- Clericalism, 209, 289, 291.
- Cochin, Augustin, 56-57.
- Cochin, Henry, 229.
- Collective bargaining, 243, 259.
- Combes, 267.
- Commune, 77-79, 81.
- Confédération générale du travail, preface, see also Syndicalism.
- Constitution, amendment of, 270.
- Consumers League, 316.
- Coopération, 253, 378.
- Corbière, 66-67.
- Counter-Revolution, 86-87.

- Coux, Charles de, 24-25, 31, 35, 52.
 Croi, 19.
Croix, 209, 220.
- Dabry, 168, 174, 302-303, 366, 370, 373.
 Dansette, 265.
 Daudet, Léon, 361.
 Decentralization, 244, 274-278, 358.
 Decurtins, 132, 133-134, 136.
 Denis, Theodore, 287-288.
 Déroulède, 219.
 Desbuquois, 328, 330-339, 343.
 Deslandres, 344.
 Dreyfus affair, 208-211, 214-215, 219.
 Driant, 297, 300.
 Drumont, 206-207, 208, 366.
 Dufaure, 92-93.
 Dunoyer, 12-13.
 Dupanloup, 40-41.
 Du Pont de Nemours, 9, 10.
 Dupuy, 191, 194, 201, 215.
 Duthoit, 329, 344.
- Eight-hour day, 164.
 Elections, of 1893, 191-192; of 1898, 211-214; of 1902, 240-242; of 1906, 305; of 1910, 306; of 1914, 306, 307; of 1919, preface, 263-264, 298, 306, appendix (note 4).
 Electoral practices, 263-264.
 Employers, federations of, 234.
 England, Social Catholic Movement in, 135-136.
Ère Nouvelle, 17, 34-35, 37, 39, 41.
- Falloux law, 39-40.
 Fava, 169, 171.
 Fesch, 168, 174, 368-369.
 Fidao-Justiniani, 388.
 Fonsegrive, 348, 373.
 Fourier, 55.
 Freyssinous, 29.
 Freppel, 154-156, 168, 347.
 Fribourg, Union of, 139, 158.
- Gailhard-Bancel, 246, 250, 256, 310.
 Gaillard, 229.
 Gallicanism, 175, appendix (notes 144 and 659).
 Gambetta, 88, 89.
 Garnier, 168, 174, 366.
 Gayraud, 168, 174, 208, 229, 366, 367.
 Gerbet, 16-17, 52.
 Germany, Social Catholic Movement in, 121-129.
 Gibbons, 137.
 Goyau, 348, 369, 374.
 Grandmaison, 246.
 Guérin, Urbain, 343.
 Guesde, 204.
 Guide social, 323-324.
 Guild Socialism, 384, 390-399.
 Guilds, 19, 22, 28, 59-60, 64-65, 70-73, 75, 96-107, 110-111, 113-117, 118-120, 127, 144-145, 148, 162, 173, 252, 254, 257-259, 317, 319, 334-335, 339, 368, 384, 390-399.
 Guyot, 189, 335.
- Harmel, J. J., 113.
 Harmel, Léon, 117-120, 159, 174-175, 319, 175, 319, 347-348, 366.
 Haussenville, 188.
 Health insurance, 109, 116; see also Insurance, social.
 Hertling, 128-129.
 Hitze, 126-128, 129, 340.
 Hubert-Valleroux, 355, 359-360.
 Huet, 57-58, 134.
 Hugo, 45.
- Industrial Revolution, 1; in France, 6-9.
 Inheritance and inheritance taxes, 134, 218, 240, 357.
 Insurance, social, 112, 163, 253, 259, 394; see also Health Insurance, Accidents, Pensions.
 International labor legislation, 23, 106, 112, 204, 253, 311.
 Italy, 136.
- Jacques, 235-236.

- Jaluzot, 229.
 Jaurès, 183, 184-185, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 197-198, 213, 291.
 Jay, Raoul, 344, 389.
 Justice-Equality Office, 209, 211.
- Keller, 81, 82, 91-92, 94-97, 169.
 Ketteler, 121-125, 138, 146, 147, 148.
 Knights of Labor, 137.
- Labor exchange of Paris, 191, 202.
 Labor legislation, international, 23, 106, 112, 204, 253, 311.
 Lacordaire, 17-18, 33, 34-36, 41, 52, 318.
 Lafargue, 179-180, 183, 190.
 Lagardelle, 386, 388.
 Laissez-faire, 10, 18, 224; see also Liberalism, economic.
 Lamartine, 36, 39, 43.
 Lamennais, 31-33.
 Lamy, 344, 345, 363.
 Land, small holdings of, 165.
 Langénieux, 159.
 Lapeyre, 207.
 Laroche-Joubert, 92-93.
 La Tour du Pin, 80, 81, 82, 141, 147-149, 207, 219, 225, 319, 341, and Appendix (note 669).
 Lavigerie, 167-168.
 Lemire, 168, 343, 348, 366, 371, 389.
 Leo XIII, 139, 156, 157-166, 170-172, 174, 317, 367.
 Le Play, 58-62, 80, 309, 318, 319, 354; followers of, 150, 354-361.
 Lerolle, Jean, 256, 351, 395.
 Leroux, 55.
 Leroy, Abbé, 321-322.
 L'Estourbeillon, 288.
 Le Trosne, 10.
 Liberal Catholics, 31-33, 52, 225, 227.
 Liberalism, economic, 11, 13, 18, 56, 57, 64, 74, 102, 142, 159, 224-225, 316, 318, 332-333, 335, 384.
 Liberty, religious, 279-285.
 Lichtenstein, 129, 136.
- Liège, social work congresses at, 153.
 Lorin, 320, 341, 389.
 Louis XVIII, 29.
 Louis Napoleon, see Napoleon III.
 Louis Philippe, 32.
 Lueger, 131-132.
- Maignen, 82.
 Maistre, Joseph de, 29.
 Manning, cardinal, 135-136, 137.
 Maret, 34-35.
 Martin Saint-Léon, 60, 344.
 Marx, 55.
 Maurras, 361, 363.
 Maze-Sencier, 236, 256.
 Méline, 203-204, 209, 214.
 Melun, Armand de, 18-19, 40, 42-51, 52.
 Mercier de la Rivière, 10.
 Merrimod, 132-133, 138, 139, 158.
 Metz-Noblat, 65-66.
 Meyer, Rudolph, 130, 138.
 Millerand, 183-184, 190, 192, 198, 199, 205, 216, 217-218, 240, 291, 298, 311.
 Millevoye, 300.
 Mirabeau, 9.
 Modernism, 371-374.
 Monastic orders, 220, 281-282, 283.
 Montalembert, Charles de, 20, 33-34, 39, 40, 41, 45, 52, 56.
 Moufang, 125-126, 129.
 Mouvement Social, 327-329.
 Mun, Albert de, 80-91, 97-113, 117-118, 120, 136, 146, 149, 150, 155, 163-166, 169, 170, 172-174, 179, 180-181, 184-186, 190, 192, 198-200, 204, 208, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, 240, 256, 279, 281, 286, 289-290, 293, 295, 297, 319, 341, 347, 348, 349, 351, 389-390, 392.
 Mutual aid, 204.
- Nationalists, 219, 229, 241.
 Napoleon III, 39-42, 50-51, 67-69.
 Naudet, 168, 302, 366, 368, 371, 373.
 Nitti, 159, preface.

- Ozanam, 25-27, 34, 35, 41, 52, 318-319.
- Paix Sociale, Unions de, 355-356.
- Paris, count of, 70.
- Passy, Frédéric, 189.
- Passy, Hippolyte, 67.
- Passy, Louis, 229.
- Patriotic League, 233.
- Patriotism, 295-298.
- Patronage, 61.
- Pensions, Workingmen's, 107, 108, 109, 163-164, 204, 218, 243, 245, 248, 287; see also Insurance, social.
- Périn, 58, 62, 134, 141, 147, 153.
- Physiocrats, 9-11.
- Piou, Jacques, 166, 169, 186, 187, 188, 192, 220, 226-227, 237-240, 242, 246-251, 260-262, 266, 273, 274, 279-282, 285-286, 289, 292-296, 301-303, 352, 356, 392.
- Pius X, 373, 377-381.
- Popular Liberal Party, preface, ch. ix, 221, 351-352, 393.
- President, election and powers of, 272-273.
- Progressists, 210, 212, 216, 220, 225, 228-229, 241.
- Proudhon, 55.
- Quesnay, 9.
- Ralliement, 166-193.
- Ralliés, 187, 188, 189, 190-192, 195, 197-198, 199-200, 201, 202, 203, 209-214, 220-221, 225, 228.
- Referendum, 244, 278-279.
- Réforme Sociale*, 150, 152, 356.
- Reille, Amédée, 228.
- Representation, functional, 72, 101, 128, 173, 245, 268-269, 394-395.
- Representation, proportional, 243, 264-267.
- Republican Right, 187, 189, 191, 200, 229.
- Rerum Novarum, 159-165, 178-180.
- Réunions françaises des revues catholiques sociales, 320.
- Revolution of 1830, 31-32.
- Revolution of 1848, 34-39, 53-55.
- Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, 155.
- Richard, cardinal, 169, 347.
- Roquefeuil, 347.
- Rutten, 343, 344.
- Saint-Mandé Program, 205.
- Saint-Simon, 26, 54-55.
- Sangnier, 381-382.
- Sanitation, 164.
- Savatier, Henri, 251, 348.
- Say, J. B., 11-12.
- Say, Léon, 189, 200.
- Schneider, Eugène, 229.
- Seilhac, 329.
- Semaines Sociales, 320, 339-346.
- Separation of Church and State, 280-281, 287-288.
- Sertillanges, 343, 344.
- Sillon, 375-381, 384.
- Simon, Jules, 67-68, 92.
- Sismondi, 24.
- Six, Abbé, 366.
- Social Catholic Study Union, 320.
- Socialism and Socialists, 4, 54-56, 64, 77-79, 127, 157-158, 160, 177-186, 190, 192-193, 194, 198-200, 205-206, 217, 232, 247-248, 289-294, 298, 332-333, 335-356, 384.
- Social Politics, 5.
- Social Reform School, 354-361, 384.
- Société d'Économie Sociale, 355-356.
- Souriac, 271, 349, 351.
- Spain, Social Catholic Movement in, 136.
- Speculation, laws against, 253, 255, 259.
- Spuller, 182, 195-197.
- Sunday holiday, 107, 108, 110, 125, 126, 165, 243, 253, 259.
- Supreme Court, 244, 245, 264, 271-272.

- Switzerland, Social Catholic Movement in, 132-134.
 Syllabus of Errors, 42.
 Syndicalism, preface, 4, 334, 365, 384, 387, 388, Appendix (note 2).
 Thiers, 45, 46, 49-50, 81.
 Tocqueville, 31.
 Trade boards, 218, 240.
 Trade-unionism, 3, 59, 73, 78, 99-105, 162-163, 200, 243, 244, 249, 250, 252, 254, 257-258, 309, 334-335, 360, 367, 368, 369, 374, 391-392.
 Turgot, 10, 79, 105.
 Turmann, 343, 366, 369, 374, 388.
 Unemployment, 164.
 Union de la France Chrétienne, 169, 170, 171.
 Unions de Paix Sociale, 355-356.
 Union of Reviews, 253, 255.
 Union des Travailleurs Libres, 234.
 Veuillot, Louis, 17, 30, 34, 36, 40.
 Villeneuve-Bargemont, 8, 19-24, 52, 318, 392.
 Villermé, 7.
 Vogelsang, 130.
 Volksverein, 321.
 Voting, compulsory, 263.
 Wages, 7, 8, 11, 12, 22-23, 26, 28, 75, 110, 126, 135, 163, 245, 253, 259, 369.
 Waldeck-Rousseau, 216-220, 227.
 Welfare Societies, Union of, 80.
 Whitley Plan, preface.
 Women, employment of, 7, 8, 59, 92, 94, 107, 108, 110, 125, 126, 165, 253, 259.
 Working day, length of, 8, 19-20, 23, 91-92, 94, 96, 108, 110, 111, 112, 125, 135, 151, 164, 218, 244, 253, 259, 395.
 Workingmen's Clubs, 82-87, 118, 141, 155, 172, 319, 329, 347, 349.
 Young Men's Catholic Association, 211, 347-352.
 Young Republic, League of the, 381-382.
 Zamanski, 256, 328, 343, 350-351, 371, 388-389.

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The labor problem

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